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Introduction
Gunther Martin, Federica Iurescia, Severin Hof, and Giada Sorrentino
1 Preliminaries
This book assembles selected papers from a conference entitled Doing things
with words on stage. Pragmatics and its use in ancient drama, which was held
at the University of Zurich from 4th to 7th July 2018.* The conference brought
together scholars who, in their work, use the heuristic potential of interper-
sonal pragmatics, i.e. the systematic and theoretically informed study of com-
municative interaction.1 Rather than following a single approach or creating a
uniform picture of the objects and objectives of pragmatic analysis, however,
their contributions illustrate the breadth of the discipline and show the many
different forms that engagementwith the pragmatic dimension of literary texts
can take: from the force that a single word can have in referring to its intra- and
extratextual context to the back and forth in conversations; from the purely lin-
guistic resources of communication to the interplay of verbal and non-verbal
forms of interaction and to the grounding of communicative acts in social
structures and norms of conduct. In other words, this volume offers a panor-
amic view that illustrates the continuum of pragmatic phenomena by which
meaning is constructed: from lingual to non-lingual forms of interaction, or as
it were, from ‘doing things with words’ to ‘making statements without words’.
As each author contributes their uniqueperspective, this volumedemonstrates
the different opportunities that pragmatic work on interaction in literature
affords, and it aims to stimulate the exchange between the different branches
of pragmatics to create synergies and thereby further advance the study of the
field.
While the pragmatic approaches that the authors take may be diverse, they
all tackle the same literary medium: drama. In that way the papers deal with a
* The Swiss National Science Foundation provided generous funding for the conference and
the research projects in the course of which this volume was prepared (PP00P1_157444 and
PP00P1_183707). For help with the preparation of the manuscript the editors are indebted to
Alexander Herren.
1 Since its inception in the first half of the 20th century, the exact nature and definition of
pragmatics has been much discussed. The two branches this volume is mainly concerned
with are pragmalinguistics, which received its first major impulse by Austin (21975), and the
pragmatics of communication, as founded by Watzlawick et al. (1967). The lack of mutual
recognisance between these two approaches has oftenbeen lamented, e.g. byMey (22001: 69).
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comparable set of parameters and similar characteristics of the representation
of communication. The choice of ancient comedies and tragedies as the corpus
of pragmatic studies is a natural one. For drama is a mimetic and performative
art form, and as such it endows interaction with a privileged position. At least
among thepoetic genres, there is noother inwhich it is represented in the same
concentrated und unfiltered way: not only do dramatic texts consist to a large
extent of interaction, both verbal and physical; they are, moreover, character-
ised by the absence of an intermediary voice. For example, narrators in epic can
explain situations and actions of their characters. They can even report and
assess the characters’ thoughts and motives from a privileged vantage point.
In so doing they guide the readers’ perception and interpretation. In drama,
these options do not exist: the information that the spectators or readers need
in order to make sense of the plot is conveyed almost exclusively on the intra-
dramatic level or ‘internal system of communication’.2 The burden of giving
a sufficient amount of clues about the characters’ dispositions, thoughts, and
manner of execution of (speech-)acts rests entirely on their shoulders. What
the characters say, and in equal measure how they say it and how they interact
with each other, becomes the source of all our knowledge about the dramatic
world. What is more, since we do not have stage directions or other external
information about the performative side of the plays, the characters’ speech
is all we can rely on: even their own gestures and movements as well as their
meaning can only be gauged from the indications the characters give verbally
about what they do and what it signifies.
What the characters convey about the world of each drama and the people
that populate it is still plenty. Far from letting us knowonly about their identity,
they also provide rich insight into who they are, i.e. which character type they
belong to and also what makes them unique as individuals.3 On the one hand,
they act as representatives of groups: old vs young, male vs female, dominant
vs powerless, hero vs villain, etc., and both their behaviour as such and their
conduct towards others helps, in its pragmatic aspects, to reaffirm their belong-
ing to these types. We see, moreover, how interaction enacts typical patterns
of communication. These can be types of ‘scripts’, i.e. standard situations that
2 For the concept see Pfister (1988: 3, 40–41). The exception are someprologue speakers in com-
edy, who asπρόσωπα προτατικά or ‘real-life’ characters breach the fourthwall.Messengers can
also engage in some limitedmind-reading, but they do so strictly as intra-dramatic characters
(see de Jong 1991).
3 The degree to which individualisation is achieved or even attempted has of course been the
matter of an old debate: on the Greek side cf. e.g. Gould (1978); Easterling (1990); Gill (1990);
Budelmann and Easterling (2010); see the substantial volume by De Temmerman and van
Emde Boas (2018a) and the recent dissertation by Rodríguez-Piedrabuena (2019). For Roman
drama cf. Dupont (1998) and Faure-Ribreau (2012).
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recur in very similar fashion and follow an identifiable (though often informal)
protocol, such as introductions and recognitions; they can also concern the typ-
ical conduct in certain kinds of rapport, e.g. subordination or confrontation.
The dialogue thus contributes to the establishing, shaping, and changing of the
relationships between the speakers, wherein each interaction has the potential
to foster, destroy, or alter the nature of such relationships.
On the other hand, the text of the plays also gives the dramatic situation and
the interaction of the various personae an individual touch. The way in which
the latter act with words, gestures, movements, and so forth distinguishes the
individual instance from a ritualised staple scene: it can, for example, illustrate
the specific frictions and struggles of the characters in an agon scene—beyond
the issues of the disputed matter; in a scene of counsel, it can cast light on the
relationship of the characters and their attitudes to the advice and each other:
whether, for instance, the advisor/advisee relationship resembles that between
father and son, teacher and disciple, or warner and recalcitrant tyrant.
On account of the specific way in which information is distributed in drama,
pragmatic approaches have proven immensely fertile for the study of tragedy
and comedy. Elements of pragmatic analysis avant (or sans) la lettre have long
been floating around.4 Early ventures into pragmatic theory were first com-
binedwith rhetorical elements (see Battezzato 2000). In a volumeon Sophocles
and the Greek Language (de Jong and Rijksbaron 2006) pragmatics features as
part of a triad of linguistic aspects, together with diction and syntax. The last
few years have seen a flourish of studies on drama that were firmly rooted in
pragmatic theory.5 The innovative approaches that pragmatics has brought to
the field have thus led to considerable progress in our understanding of drama
as such and of individual plays. The system by which they explain behaviour
in communication has laid the foundations for a more pervasive and strongly
conceptualised description of what ‘happens’ or ‘is done’ in and through a text.
The result—from a literary point of view—is a more solid footing of inter-
pretation and an approach to a methodology to test earlier descriptions of
interaction. Moreover, new criteria emerge by which we can describe and
measure interactional behaviour and compare particular characters within a
play or even the same or similar characters across plays. Pragmatic approaches
4 E.g. Schwinge (1968); Ireland (1974); Mastronarde (1979); Turner (1980); Pfeiffer-Petersen
(1996); Rutherford (2012) essentially still does not use the pragmatic framework. For a syn-
opsis of works on Latin literature, see Ricottilli (2009).
5 Sorrentino (2013); Schuren (2015); Barrios-Lech (2016); Unceta Gómez (2016); van Emde Boas
(2017); Ricottilli (2018); Iurescia (2019).
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demonstratebymeansof clear criteria andon thebasis of a consistentmodel—
rather than by nit-picking scattered details—how speakers exhibit unco-
operative or impolite behaviour and how they search to find common ground
with their addressee or employ techniques of dominating the discussion with
their partner. In essence, pragmatics permits us todetect anddescribedramatic
techniques and how they are employed—and thereby to extend the concept
that Fraenkel has called the ‘grammar of dramatic technique’ (1950: II 305).
The interpretations that pragmatic studies have produced do, however, come
with two important caveats:
Firstly, they treat dramatic characters as agents that are not just black boxes
but endowed with a character and mental abilities that manifest themselves
in the characters’ (inter-)actions. The characters react—or are interpreted as
reacting—to each other and adapt to what they assume to be the other’s
thoughts and intentions. Thus, there is a layered process of ‘theory of mind’
going on: on the onehand,we as recipients try to explorewhat is going on in the
characters’ minds and ascribe feelings and other cognitive processes to them
that we extrapolate from words (both content and pragmatics) and gestures
(see in particular Easterling 1990); we construct ‘realistic’, i.e. understandable
and believable, personalities out of what we hear and see from the personae.
On the other hand,we ascribe to the characters the samemental processeswith
regard to their interactants—we read their minds reading each other’s minds.
This is not a case of the number of Lady Macbeth’s children; instead, it has a
fundamental impact on the ‘sense’ we make of a piece of literature: whether
we construct such a sense by forming a coherent picture from all the actions
and utterances of a character or whether we take every play scene by scene or
even sentence by sentence, without looking behind the actor’smask and trying
to draw conclusions for the character (see most recently De Temmerman and
van Emde Boas 2018b: 11–19).
Perhaps even more pressing is another caveat concerning pragmatic ana-
lysis of literature: that it presupposes—with varying degrees of strictness and
awareness—that principles of the ‘real life’ can be transferred to the study
of literary texts. In order to address this problem, pragmatics-based work on
drama has fostered theoretical andmethodological reflection. One of themain
branches of the ‘pragmatics of fiction’ (see Locher and Jucker 2017) deals very
generally with the applicability of pragmatics to fictional and scripted rep-
resentation of speech. There is a general willingness to accept the validity of
pragmatic phenomena in literary texts (e.g. Pilkington 1991, 2000; Sperber and
Wilson 1995: 231–237;Wilson 2011), including dramatic texts (Hess-Lüttich 1981;
Petrey 1990; Herman 1995; Leech and Short 22007). For ancient drama specific-
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ally, this question has not been discussed extensively. However, Ricottilli (2010)
emphasises that drama goes far into imitating the practices of real-life interac-
tion, and Schuren (2015: 11–49) offers a differentiated view of the naturalism of
one of themost formalised elements of tragedy: stichomythia. She argues that,
while that formatmaybe reductionist in someaspects, in others it concurswith
real dialogues. We may add that, as a consequence, the latter can still be ana-
lysed bymeans of pragmatic parameters: we can look for turn-allocatingmech-
anisms and interpret the degree of co-operation, orwe can rearrange lines from
the order in which they have been transmitted on the basis that this leads to
greater coherence. Ultimately, this proceduremeans littlemore than taking the
mimetic character of ancient drama seriously. In that sense, the instruments of
pragmatics can be legitimately and profitably applied to dramatic dialogue. At
the same time, it has never been contentious that dramatic language has an
artificial, literary character, be it the penchant for the grotesque and coarse in
Aristophanes and Plautus, be it the ‘high style’ in tragedy, which is distinctive
enough for comedy to parody. This artificiality of literary language, specific-
ally tragic language, and its distance from the registers of ‘regular’ language
pose specific difficulties for the analysis of pragmatic phenomena. Literature
in general, and individual genres in particular, carry their own frame of refer-
ence, their specific audience expectations, something that may be explained,
for example, as shifting the scale of relevance (Uchida 1998; Giltrow 2017; for
Greek tragedy now Willi 2019). Hence, it is crucial to identify the degree to
which ‘principles, norms and conventions of use which underlie spontaneous
communication in everyday life are precisely those which are exploited and
manipulated by dramatists in their constructions of speech types and forms in
plays’ (Herman 1995: 6). In otherwords, wemust try to find outwhere literature
starts developing its own conventions that are recognised and understood by
the audience and that can be exploited. This is especially the case in genres
such as tragedy and comedy, which show a high degree of formalisation of
both language and gestures, such as the already mentioned stichomythia or
the rather strict rules that apply to characters’ weeping (see e.g. Telò 2002).
Once we undertake to reflect on the particular frame in which dramatic
interaction articulates itself, we can start to reassess the potential scope of use
of pragmatics.Wemay then hope to distinguish between, on the one hand, uni-
versals (be it the theoretical background of philosophical linguistics à la Grice
or the ethnomethodological approach of conversational analysis) that can be
applied to a set of literary texts and, on the other hand, factors that manifest
themselves in a deviant way in literature. For example, while the mechanisms
of im/politeness (Brown and Levinson 21987 aswell asmore recent approaches:
Watts 2003; Terkourafi 2005; Culpeper 2011) are still in place (see Lloyd 2006;
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van Emde Boas 2017: 31–39; Berger 2017), what counts as im/politeness or over-
politenessmust be inferred or evennegotiated anewwhenweapproachdrama.
For, the cosmos of tragedy and that of comedy demonstrate very different
standards in the formality or coarseness of their language. The problemmay be
evenmore acute when generic conventions clash with pragmatic indicators: is
an interruption of the interlocutor’s turn in stichomythia to be read pragmat-
ically or is it merely a consequence (void of meaning) of the dramatic form,
which constrains a speaker’s turn to one line—or can it be both at the same
time?What distinguishes an interruption from an aposiopesis, and what does
that distinction mean for the understanding of the ongoing interaction?With
answers to questions like these, we may ultimately not only define the applic-
ability of pragmatic principles but simultaneously make a judgement about
the interpretability of a feature of the text. The judgements on pragmatic prin-
ciples and those on the defining elements of genre condition each other and
demarcate each other’s realms. In order to use the full potential of a pragmatic
approach to ancient drama, we need to remind ourselves constantly about
these two realms and the fact that the line between them is often arguable and
potentially subjective.
2 Outline of the Volume
The papers in this volume address the issues raised above, each in its own way
and with its own focus. However, focal points of interest do emerge, which are
mirrored in the structure of this book: the force of language in communica-
tion; more specifically, questions of politeness; and the fringes of language and
its interplay with non-verbal means of communication. Several contributions
also address thepoints of contact of pragmaticswithother fields and thepoten-
tial of synergies, and they form the core of the last paper, on the old question
of the relationship between pragmatics and rhetoric.
2.1 Part 1: Verbal Communication I—DoingThings withWords
The first part illustrates different levels on which and different ways in which
the pragmatic potential of language transcends its semantic or syntactic value.
The first contributions deal with themicro-level of language, namely structural
words and addresses. In themselves, these elements of language do not seem
to carry much weight; in specific contexts, however, they assume qualities or
connotations that create an added layer of meaning or position themessage in
the wider communicative situation, making a point about the utterance itself,
the wider conversation, or the relationship between the speakers.
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Regarding the contemplationof themacro-level, ConversationAnalysis (CA)
takes a prominent role borne out in several contributions: the organisation of
dialogue is viewed as a sequence of turns forming larger units. Through the
construction of adjacency pairs of related utterances (e.g. question-answer),
interlocutors become partners whose co-operation, or lack thereof, is analys-
able und helps grasp conversational behaviour.
The tools of pragmatic analysis that are introduced in this part all bear
an obvious relationship to aspects such as characterisation and motivation of
action. As such, they have a direct impact on our understanding of the liter-
ary meaning of the texts. This potential of pragmatics is explored with greater
focus on literary interpretation in the second half of this part.
Anna Bonifazi demonstrates by the example of αὐτός and (ἐ)κεῖνος how even
inconspicuous deictics can be connected with cognitive operations and then
charged with implied meaning that makes them more than just anaphoric
markers. The aspects thus signposted include the connection to the visual or
corporeal, distance, or identity; when clustered, deictics may even create a res-
onance effect. The conclusion she offers is that structural words are not chosen
out of metrical convenience but must be considered with their full range of
context-specific connotations.
The interaction between characters comes more into view in Rutger Allan’s
study of the particles δή and τοι in tragedy. By drawing on the concept of com-
mon ground, he accomplishes a more comprehensive account of their func-
tion and effect, which reconciles earlier competing explanations of their use:
both particles serve as grounding devices, i.e. they put the information in rela-
tion with knowledge, notions, or attitudes that are shared, or presumed to
be shared, between the interlocutors. They differ in the degree to which the
speaker assumes the hearer is aware of this information being inside the com-
mon ground.
While forms of address have long been established as a fruitful area of
research, the position of addresses within a sentence is shown by Sandra
Rodríguez-Piedrabuena to be an underestimated carrier of pragmatic signific-
ance in Greek drama. She focuses on the right periphery, i.e. addresses at the
end of sentences, and carves out the specific patterns and effects this place-
ment of the address has by correlating their frequency with parameters such
as speech acts, type of term of address, and social status. As a result of the
analysis, the position of a term of address emerges as an important pragmatic
factor along with the lexis and the frequency or omission of addresses.
The particular contribution of pragmatics to the analysis of dramatic char-
acters and their minds is discussed by Evert van Emde Boas. He argues that
through the study of ‘mind style’, the distinctive linguistic representation of a
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mental self, it becomes possible to extrapolate that self and thereby to assess
its individuality as projected by the author. Van Emde Boas exemplifies the
methods and the potential of this approach by reference to the protagonist of
Sophocles’OedipusTyrannus. From the analysis of pragmatic aspects of his lin-
guistic behaviour Oedipus emerges as a character distinguished by a particular
style that highlights his inquisitiveness, which in turn mirrors his mental qual-
ities of intelligence and distrust.
Severin Hof draws on resonance theory in order to explore what the dialogic
character of the prologue of Sophocles’ Ajax contributes to the play. He stud-
ies how each utterance is interwoven into the tissue of dialogue and how it
has itsmeaning enriched by the echoes and resumptions of the other speaker’s
turns. By readingAthena’s andOdysseus’ parts against each other,we can gauge
the differences in their predispositions andmindsets, which create a friction of
different perspectives that will continue in different constellations throughout
the play.
The development of the confrontation between Pentheus and Dionysus
in Euripides’ Bacchae is traced by Camille Semenzato. With reference to CA
concepts, she diagnoses the different misunderstandings that occur (or are
deliberately produced) between the two characters. Patterns of coherence
manifest, on a linguistic level, the shifting relationship and the distribution
of control. Differences of knowledge thus turn into differences of linguistic
competence, and Pentheus’ limitations in this regard contribute to his down-
fall.
Finally, Giada Sorrentino draws a contrastive characterisation of Iphigenia
and Clytaemestra in Euripides’ Iphigenia in Aulis, using speech acts, im/polite-
ness theory, floor management, and other CA tools. She shows how the two
dramatic figures are consistently opposed in their conversational behaviour,
even transcending the change in their personal characters as a result of the
major plot turn. In this way, not only does that opposition define them against
each other, but it also makes tangible the antithetical shift in control over the
course of events that the revelation of Iphigenia’s fate brings. The characters’
linguistic conduct in dialogue and the emphasis on the difference between
them becomes both a window into the inner self of the two women and a
means to elaborate Iphigenia’s self-empowerment.
2.2 Part 2: Verbal Communication II—BeingMore or Less Kind with
Words
Part 2 deals specifically with im/politeness, an aspect of pragmalinguistics
that has received a great amount of attention in Classical Studies over the
last decade. The phenomenon had originally been couched in terms of Face
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Threatening Acts (FTAs) that could either infringe on someone’s self-image
(positive face) or their freedom of action (negative face). Politeness then con-
sists, according to this approach, in the avoidance of face-threats through,
for example, expressions of respect or mitigating devices. The papers in this
volume partly expand on this theoretical framework and partly look at more
recent developments. Extensive use is made of the seminal work by Watts
(2003) that moves away (in the so-called discursive approach) from the ana-
lyst’s perspective, which considers abstract mechanisms and assigns to them
the character of im/politeness. Watts proposes to complement this approach
(which he terms second-order politeness) with the consideration of how the
interactants qualify utterances as im/polite (first-order politeness). The focus
shifts to the relativity of what is perceived as polite and to the importance of
contextual factors. This combination of two dimensions of politeness opens
new alleys of investigation: it brings to the fore both the specificities of the cul-
ture and the language as well as the principles of operation that are shared
across language communities. One aim of recent studies in im/politeness has
accordingly been to give historical depth to the study of politeness phenomena,
and to highlight the difficulties of polite behaviour in different cultures and in
cross-cultural communication (cf. Watts 2010; Maha 2014). The contributions
in this part that deal with Greek and Roman comedy similarly expand the ana-
lysis of their corpus by exploring the advances that can be made by the recent
developments in politeness studies.
First, however, Luigi Battezzato explores the compatibility of politeness in
the sense of Brown and Levinson with cognitive approaches (theory of mind
and theory of possible worlds). He uses as a test case a paradoxical comment
Tiresiasmakes in Sophocles’OedipusTyrannus: by stating that he had saidwhat
he had come to say, the seer seems to contradict the content of the preceding
conversation. As Battezzato argues, the three approaches unite to open up new
readings and create a sense in Tiresias’ quizzical remark: politeness is a mech-
anism active on the local level of the text, while the cognitive approaches help
to understand the general mindset with which the seer approaches the scene.
If read in this sense, the dialogue between Oedipus and Tiresias as well as the
latter’s behaviour in it offer an important contribution toTiresias’ characterisa-
tion.
Positive face-threats and their avoidance are discussed by Michael Lloyd,
who demonstrates the limits of the traditional model: a model that ascribes
an absolute effect to certain types of expressions, such as Brown and Levin-
son’s, strongly correlates semantic value and impact on politeness. Lloyd ques-
tions this connection by reference to terms of endearment in Aristophanes. He
shows how these terms, which would traditionally be considered positive face-
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work, canbebereft of any such effect and, in fact, even turn into over-politeness
and thus FTAs. By demonstrating how the two conceptions and levels of polite-
ness jar he makes the advantages of adopting Watts’ approach in the inter-
pretation of the text clear. He brings into play the parameters of distance and
power, which influence the perception of terms of endearment—and he raises
‘the question whether there is more to politeness than hypocrisy’ (this volume,
p. 231).
Relativity of politeness, this time from a diachronic perspective, is also the
subject of Peter Barrios-Lech’s contribution, which investigates aspects of the
politeness system between the fifth and the third centuries BCE. In so doing
he advances work on Greek politeness by adopting a diachronic approach,
as is frequently practised with modern languages (for English cf. e.g. Jucker
and Taavitsainen 2008). He traces the use of directives and softening devices
in dialogue-centred genres and highlights the continuities and differences
that exist in comedy, prose dialogue, and mime: both the ratio of softened
to unsoftened directives and the relative frequency of individual softeners are
largely stable across the texts of the corpus, independent of the social andpolit-
ical environment. Onlymime exhibits deviant patterns. The result is evenmore
significantwhen compared toRomancomedy,where the figures differ and thus
indicate the cultural specificity of the Greek politeness system.
Łukasz Berger looks at the pragmatics of offering advice in Roman com-
edy and proposes a new framework of analysis. Going beyond the analysis of
single speech acts and turns, he treats advice as a multi-act move in which dif-
ferent factors have to be equilibrated to ensure the acceptability of the move
and avoid intrusiveness: the choice of the sub-type of directive speech-act and
politeness devices must be dovetailed with contextual (social) factors to form
a complex but effective operation. In addition, Berger demonstrates that the
sequence in which the elements are arranged also has an impact on whether
advice is welcome, and how redressive action can be taken into the middle of
the exchange to accommodate the advisees’ face wants.
Over-politeness employed by characters of low social rank in Roman com-
edy is the subject of Luis Unceta-Gómez’ paper. As he demonstrates, the com-
municative strategies of parasites and meretrices entail heavy use of devices
to enhance the positive face of the people they depend on. Their use is inter-
preted as both conscious and insincere: they are means employed to gain a
certain personal advantage, but at the same time they appear to be accep-
ted norm for the respective classes. These observations make a strong case for
the social determination of felicitousness in Roman comedy of forms of face-
work.
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2.3 Part 3: Verbal and Non-verbal Communication—DoingThings Not
Just withWords
While our knowledge of individual plays does not go far beyond their text,
the communicative interaction between the characters does not stop at their
use of language. On the contrary, even the decision not to speak can convey
information and createmeaning in a pragmaticway.Moreover, the deployment
of gestures adds a vital layer to our understanding of relationships and social
operations, especially in the performative genres of drama. However, much of
the characters’ non-verbal behaviour—certainly the part authors wanted to
have preserved for future performances—is captured and can be inferred from
the text, as gestures and other physical actions are regularly verbalised, i.e. re-
deployed in themediumof language. The gestures are not simply the extension
of language but equivalent as a means of expression and communication; or
rather, they can be read in analogy to speech acts, serving the same function,
albeit in a different medium. As such, they follow their own pragmatic play-
book and can interplay with the verbal forms of communication.
Silence is a special case of linguistic action and takes us to the borderline
between verbal and non-verbal behaviour. Vanessa Zetzmann deals with cases
in which a character in Greek tragedy stays silent. She distinguishes between
different types of infelicity in conversation that such a silence can signal. Some
cases can be read as speech acts through denial to speak and hence as a dis-
preferred response. The subsequent prompts to answer (i.e. questions of the
type τί σιγᾶις;) are interpreted as relational markers: they are pragmaticalised
signs that indicate a mental operation—the formation of a theory of mind—
initiating a new attempt at persuasion. These attempts, however, regularly fail.
The interplay of language and gesture and their respective function in com-
munication is conceptualised by Matteo Capponi. He emphasises the paral-
lelism and the equivalence of words and gestures and the need for a ‘unitary’
analysis: gestures and verbal dialogue unite to spell out the meaning of the
action. The expressive force and the pragmatic importance of this combination
is then exemplified with reference to the recognition scenes of Sophocles’ and
Euripides’ Electrae: these plays show very different patterns of gesticulation,
which results in a shift of the expressive dynamics in the symbolic ‘language’ of
the physical performance.
The boundaries between words and gestures are the subject also of the con-
tribution by Licinia Ricottilli, who deals with the question how gestures may
be interpreted in terms of Pragmatics of Communication. Drawing on her pre-
vious work on gestures in the Aeneid, she provides a definition of gesture as
bodily or facial behaviour that takes on communicative, informative, or inter-
active value. In her paper, she applies this definition in order to study gestures,
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especially movements of the head, in Terence’s comedies. Her analysis under-
scores the importance of gestures in the communication between Terence and
his audience and retrieves the emic specificities of certain gestures in Roman
culture. Ultimately, we see how this shared knowledge is harnessed to create
comic effects and adds further details to the relationships between charac-
ters.
Ricottilli’s definition of gestures also provides the methodological frame-
work of Renata Raccanelli’s and Evita Calabrese’s papers, who each focus on
a specific kind of gesture: kisses and tears respectively. More specifically, Rac-
canelli offers a reading of Plautus’ Stichus as a case-study to demonstrate the
culture-specific significance of the kiss. She argues that the kiss between father
and daughter can only be thoroughly understood when placed in its proper
Roman context: not only does a kiss between relatives serve as a ritual of greet-
ing, but it is embedded in the practice of male social control over the pudicitia
of female relatives.
Calabrese’s contribution discusses gestures that have an impact on human
interactions, focussing on Seneca’s tragedies. Gestures related to countenance
enable interactants to manage their personal relations on a one-to-one level.
More specifically, Calabrese shows how one type of gesture, namely female
tears, is used to negotiate and calibrate the relationship between an individual
and the community or to deceive.
Strategies of deception in tragic dialogues are also explored by Lavinia Sco-
lari, who is interested in how gestures andwords concur in attempts to deceive
an interlocutor. In a bottom-up approach, she provides a definition of fraus,
tracking the vocabulary and the emic representation of deception in Seneca’s
tragic dialogues. Through a combination of pragmatic, dramaturgical, and
anthropological approaches, she identifies the main features of successful
deception in Seneca’s Troades and Thyestes.
2.4 Epilogue
The last contribution looks at the notoriously difficult relationship between
pragmatics and rhetoric. Almost from its inception on, pragmatics as a discip-
line has had to defend its position against the claim that it was as a mere sub-
set of the ancient art of speaking. Looking back at the long discussion about
the distinction between the two fields, Carlo Scardino instead makes the case
that these two approaches are in fact complementary. The mutual fostering of
the disciplines is exemplified by the Fourth Epeisodion of Euripides’ Orestes.
United, they allow amore thorough exploration of the ideas and emotions that
are conveyed, Scardino argues, especially under the performative conditions
of the stage: for tragedymoves between the poles of conformance with natural
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language and the demands of a Kunstsprache, both of which are harnessed by
the poets to shape our understanding of the fictional world.
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HowTo Do Things with (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός in
Tragedy: Initial Suggestions
Anna Bonifazi
1 Aim and Origin of the Present Contribution
This chapter offers an input on the pragmatics of (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός, mainly
when they are used as anaphoric markers and, in a few cases, as deictic mark-
ers.1 The target corpus is formed by Classical tragedies, where anaphoric ref-
erences are third-person references, that is to say, other characters than the
‘I’-‘you’ present on stage, i.e. people who are absent at a given moment staged
in the performance: people who have disappeared, who are going to appear
later, or even dead people.
This paper selects investigation materials and pursues selected results: on
the one hand, (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός are selected out of other third-person pro-
nouns used in Classical Greek (e.g. οὗτος, σφ- forms) because their grammar (in
terms of language use) still needs additional considerations; on the other hand,
the readings that I am about to offer cannot claim any general conclusions
as they apply to very few passages. In other words, this contribution presents
preliminary analyses, and the thoughts being put forward invite expansion
through future research and more systematic investigations.
However limited the evidencemay be, the theoretical back-up relies on con-
siderable work in linguistics from the second half of the 1970s.Moreover, paral-
lels in modern literary texts as well as in other Ancient Greek genres do not fail
to provide significant cases. The present argument does not start from classical
Greek drama language or from ancient Greek grammars but aims at importing
concepts and ideas from outside ancient Greek, in line with other chapters in
this volume. The overarching goal is to view the skilful usages of these words
by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides as part of a bigger set of usages, that
is, what literary genres offer also in modern times; most of all, they will be
observed in the light of general linguistic studies on howwe process anaphoric
markers in order to understand each other.
1 In view of upcoming analyses and for the sake of coherence, I shall focus on αὐτός accom-
panying third-person references (i.e. I do not consider αὐτός accompanying ‘I’ or ‘you’ refer-
ences).
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Section 2 singles out central concepts in relevant pragmatic and cognitive
accounts of anaphora, including studies onpronouns innarrative texts. Section
3 proposes instances from modern literary texts confirming but also expand-
ing on general contemporary assumptions, and it draws conclusions about the
methodology of textual analyses. Section 4 recaps points from my previous
work on (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός. Section 5 offers a pragmatic and cognitive reading
of (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός in several tragic passages. Section 6 closes the investiga-
tion with a summary and future research directions.
2 Anaphora Processing: Current Understanding
Since the end of the 1970s, researchers from Linguistics, Psychology, and Artifi-
cial Intelligence have questioned the idea that the interpretation of a pronoun
involves the search for earlier words (see e.g. Grosz 1977, Clancy 1980, Brown
and Yule 1983). Nowadays, most theories of anaphora processing highlight the
cognitive operations and the psychological factors influencing our comprehen-
sion of anaphoricmarkers. Concepts that are crucial in this respect regard how
accessible a referent is (e.g. Ariel 1990, Fretheim and Gundel 1996), or how
active an entity is in one’s consciousness (Chafe 1996). For example, we may
prefer to use ‘light’ recalls for entities that are already active or ‘in focus’ in
the recipient’s mind, e.g. ‘she’, and heavy recalls for entities that are inactive
and are about to be activated again, e.g. ‘this girl’ (cf. Cornish 1999). A fur-
ther relevant term is anadeixis (see e.g. Fossard et al. 2012): instead of a clear-
cut distinction between anaphora and deixis, we may think of a continuum
from retrieving referents in ourmind out of the extralinguistic context (deictic
pole) to retrieving referents in our mind out of previous discourse (anaphoric
pole).
Equally profitable are studies on the interface between reference manage-
ment and people’s perspective, starting from investigations on logophoricity
(i.e. dealing with reflected or reported points of view) and free reflexive/indir-
ect markers (reflexives whose verbal antecedent resides outside of the host
clause), e.g. Hagège (1974), König and Siemund (2000). A seminal work on pos-
itive and negative attitudes of speakers towards referents recalled by means
of demonstratives is Lakoff (1974), although the author calls the phenomenon
‘emotional deixis’. More recently, Hinterwimmer and Bosch (2016) discusses
German demonstratives and perspective taking, and Dancygier (2008) reads
pronouns as part of viewpoint configurations: a phenomenon thatmay encom-
pass the personal viewpoint of characters as well as authorial design about
large portions of texts.
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Finally, relevant researchhas been focusing on the role of anaphoricmarkers
in elaborated texts or narratives: Fox (1987) discusses anaphora in popular Eng-
lish narratives, Daneš (1990) the stylistic relevance of anaphoric choices, Baker
(1995) locally free reflexives in Jane Austen, Conte (1996) anaphoric ‘encapsula-
tion’ (recapping ‘this’ and the like), andEmmott (1997) participant tracking and
contextual frames. Clancy (1980) andHofmann (1989), among others, stress the
relationship between discourse structure and anaphoric choices. Illuminating
contributions on anaphora processing and participant tracking in Latin literat-
ure encompass Bolkestein and van de Grift (1994) and Kroon (2007).
All these works address the pragmatic and cognitive relevance of anaphoric
markers, which I summarise in terms of their illocutionary force, their ‘doing
things’, in Austin’s terms: what speakers convey by uttering them, and how they
signalwhat is going on in the discourse. Instances of illocutionary force include
what characters or authors may imply, such as ‘by uttering this marker I sig-
nal that this person is already active in my mind’, ‘as I utter this marker let me
express what I think of/how I see that person’, or what the position in the ongo-
ing discourse may imply, such as ‘a new episode is starting’ or ‘a turning point
in the story is about to involve the referent’.
3 Hints fromModern Literary Texts
Actual instances of anaphoricmarkers representing choices rather thanmech-
anical coherence tools can be found everywhere; for the present purposes, I
shall draw the reader’s attention towards a sample of passages from German
andEnglish literary texts.2 The first passage is relevant to ancientGreek tragedy
because it is from a play written in meter.
[1] G.E. Lessing NathanderWeise (1779), Act 1, Scene 1 (ed. Bark [1954: 12]3)
Daja … Ihre ganze Seele war / Die Zeit her nur bei Euch—und ihm.
Nathan Bei ihm? / Bei welchem Ihm?
2 The following analysis is part of my research that I have presented in recent papers (Uni-
versity of Stuttgart, Linguistics department, December 2017; University of Padua, Conference
on qualitative and quantitative methods for the study of modern literatures, June 2018; Uni-
versity of Birmingham, Poetics and Linguistics Association Conference, July 2018; University
of Poznań, Cognitive Linguistics Conference, October 2018). I am grateful to the respective
(and very diverse) audiences for their fruitful feedback.
3 Tr. Taylor (http://www.fullbooks.com/Nathan‑the‑Wise1.html.).
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Daja … Her thoughts [Reha’s] have only been with you—and him.
Nathan And HIM?What him?
The referent of German ‘ihm’ is the young Templar who rescued Recha
(Nathan’s daughter and a close friend of Daja) from a terrible fire. In Daja’s
mind, he is a fully active entity, whereas Nathan does not know him yet, which
is why he raises an anaphora-resolution question: ‘Bei welchem Ihm?’/ ‘With
which “he”?’ This discrepancy of knowledge at the onset of the play triggers
curiosity about the person that looks so dear to the protagonist’s daughter and
enhances everyone’s attention to a character that is still absent from the scene.
The second passage features a supposedly ungrammatical use of an ana-
phoric reflexive marker:
[2] J. Austen Sense and Sensibility (ed. Copeland [2006: 160])
Could he [E.F.] ever be tolerably happy with Lucy Steele; could he, were
his affection for herself [Elinor] out of the question, with his integrity,
his delicacy, and well-informed mind, be satisfied with a wife like her—
illiterate, artful, and selfish?
Austen’s use of indirect reflexive markers (see ‘herself ’ in this passage with
reference to Elinor) can be fully understood only in the light of large dis-
course domains, such as the chapters of Sense and Sensibilityhosting [2], where
Elinor’s perspective is predominant.
The final passage shows a case of blurred distinction between anaphora and
what Bühler calls ‘Deixis am Phantasma’ (1934: 121–140).
[3] Agatha Christie, The Bloodstained Pavement (2008: 340)
‘If anyone sees those bloodstains—’
I submit that, in this short crime story, Christie’s use of the adjective ‘those’ to
recall some stains of blood that have been mentioned earlier in the discourse,
may suggest amomentary visualisationof the stains (almost deictically) invited
by the speaker—an old fisherman—to keep everyone’s attention on them. Not
by chance do they represent a decisive detail in the development of the story.
From the analysis of anaphoricmarkers encompassing not just third-person
pronouns but all types of nouns phrases used to recall somebody/something in
large discourse domains such as a crime story or an entire novel a fewmethod-
ological points emerge:
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a) The individual form may have a local function—justified by the host
clause or small discourse unit—and a global function—inviting the pro-
cessing of referents as they evolve throughout complex narrations, or as
they are mentioned at different points of the articulation of discourse.
b) Local functions never rely exclusively on the anaphoric form; they emerge
from the understanding of the co-text as well, along with its syntactic,
semantic, and pragmatic features; by the latter, I mean the illocutionary
force of a whole clause together with the illocutionary force of the single
anaphoric marker.
c) Like particles and tenses, anaphoric markers are particularly discourse
sensitive and multifunctional.
4 Input from Pragmatic and Cognitive Readings of (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός
in Pindar and in Homer
In previous work of mine,4 I challenge a few canonical assumptions about
(ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός. For example, I attempt to demonstrate that, in Pindar and
inHomer, not only the nominative cases but also non-nominative cases of both
markers may convey emphasis. This emphasis comes from a range of implied
meanings inferable from local and global context. I also offer counterexamples
to the following two rules: ‘far antecedent’ for (ἐ)κεῖνος and ‘immediately pre-
ceding’ referent for αὐτός (esp. Bonifazi 2009, 2010, 2012). I also explore the
strongly visual potential of (ἐ)κεῖνος (Bonifazi 2004, 2012: 40–68) and the image
schema—acognitive notion referring to skeletal structure—that possibly over-
arches all the meanings and syntactic functions of αὐτός (Bonifazi 2019). The
first three chapters of Bonifazi (2012: 13–183) combine the analysis of local as
well as global contexts by themeansof the analysis of thedistribution, position,
and multi-functions of Odysseus-as-κεῖνος and Odysseus-as-αὐτός throughout
the Odyssey.5
As a way of recapping my readings, I shall list the range of implications that
I see up to now behind the use of the two markers in lyric as well as in epic.
Along with the surrounding co-text, (ἐ)κεῖνος pronoun and (ἐ)κεῖνος adjective
4 Bonifazi (2004, 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2019).
5 On pages 19–40 of the samemonograph, I preface the analysis with a section inspired by cur-
rent linguistic accounts of third-person pronouns, titled ‘Alternative readings of third-person
pronouns: accessibility of the referent, narrative functions, and pragmatic impact’. Then, I
test the main ideas on the proem of the Odyssey, and I make a case for an anaphoric reading
of ἄνδρα (Odyssey 1.1).
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in noun phrases can suggest physical distance, intersubjective distance, emo-
tional distance (to the degree of stigmatisation in the negative sense and of
veneration in the positive sense); it can invite visualisation (possibly in relation
to PIE *ke) and/or a connection between the mind’s eye and the sight (appear-
ance) of someone.
Along with the surrounding co-text, αὐτός adjective (in attributive or pre-
dicative position), pronoun, and indirect reflexive suggests a centre evoking
(implicitly or explicitly) periphery: one vs. many; chiefs vs. subordinates (see
Latin ipse); gods vs. humans; persons vs. animals; body vs. body adornments/
weapons;6 aloneness; one’s inner part; one’s true self; one’s identity (deictic-
ally); discourse prominence; cognitive sameness (‘still in focus’).
Do (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός passages in tragedy let us infer anything similar, or do
they mean something different?
5 Things Done by Uttering (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός on Stage
5.1 (ἐ)κεῖνος for the Dead: Intersubjective (Physical) Distance and
Reverence
The following passage from Alcestis features a double anaphoric choice (ἐ)κεῖ-
νος with reference to the dead (in 866 as a pronoun, in 867 as an adjective
connoting the dwelling of the dead).
[4] Euripides Alcestis 861–8677
ἰώ, στυγναὶ πρόσοδοι, στυγναὶ δ’ ὄψεις χήρων
μελάθρων. ἰώ μοί μοι. αἶ αἶ.
ποῖ βῶ; ποῖ στῶ; τί λέγω; τί δὲ μή;
πῶς ἂν ὀλοίμαν;
ἦ βαρυδαίμονα μήτηρ μ’ ἔτεκεν.
ζηλῶ φθιμένους, κείνων ἔραμαι,
κεῖν’ ἐπιθυμῶ δώματα ναίειν.
Oh, how gloomy
are the entrances, how gloomy the sight
of this bereaved dwelling. Oh! Alas, alas!
6 These contrasts already appear inWagnon 1880 (with no reference to cognitive linguistics).
7 The Greek texts of Euripides follow Diggle (1981–1994); those of Sophocles Lloyd-Jones and
Wilson (1990); those of Aeschylus Page (1972).
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Where should I go?Where should I stay?What should I say?What
should I not say?
How I wish I would perish!
Really, my mother bore me luckless.
I admire the dead, I long for those ones,
those dwellings are the ones I love to stay in.8
As his beloved wife dies in his place, Admetus falls into a state of desperation
and laments his own misery at the funeral procession. By stating that he longs
for ‘those ones’ and ‘those dwellings’, he not only expresses physical and inter-
subjective distance towards entities that are no longer part of ‘this’ world, but
also reverence, just as in Odyssey 1–4, where the most frequent pronoun used
for Odysseus (uttered exclusively by characters) is (ἐ)κεῖνος, which recalls the
absent and perhaps already dead hero.9 In this passage certain general gram-
matical characteristics of (ἐ)κεῖνος turn out to be disregardedor even irrelevant:
the emphasis provided by the repetition of the form does not relate just to
the nominative but also to the genitive and the accusative case (κείνων, 866,
and κεῖνα, 867). Moreover, in line 866, the verbal antecedent immediately pre-
cedes the anaphoric marker, which, conventionally, is not supposed to be the
case.
5.2 Cumulative (ἐ)κεῖνος for Ajax: Blaming, Reverence, and Projected
Lament
Within the range of impliedmeanings of (ἐ)κεῖνος in tragedy, blaming (derived
from a negative sense of distance) is well represented in Ajax, although com-
mentaries hardly pay attention to this lexical choice and its recurrence. Ajax
has to be reproached for what he has done, and yet his heroic figure is pre-
dominant in his life and afterlife. I suggest that the twelve occurrences of
(ἐ)κεῖνος for Ajax in the homonymous play reflect a mix of implied meanings
that match his controversial figure and the mixed feelings of people towards
him. These meanings include blame, the reconnection of the characters’ and
the audience’s mind’s eyes with his presence, and reverence. Moreover, in the
frame of hero-cult but also independently, (ἐ)κεῖνος may be seen as a way to
avoid pronouncing someone’s name, while the referent is clear in everybody’s
mind.10
8 The translations of [4] and [9] are mine.
9 As for (ἐ)κεῖνος uttered in contexts of laments, see Bonifazi (2012: 41–57).
10 For an overview of scholarship pro and contra hero-cult reflected in Ajax, see Finglass
(2011: 47–51).
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The play includes 25 occurrences of (ἐ)κεῖνος (16 times without the epsilon)
in masculine singular forms.11 Ajax takes the lion’s share with twelve of them
(see the following table). The other referents are his father Telamon (437, 472,
1303), Teucer (567, 798), Odysseus (113), Hector (1032), Eurysaces (513), someone
who thinks differently from Teucer (1039), χρόνος (933), and three times in
almost contiguous lines ‘the inventor of war and weaponry’ (1195, 1198, 1199).
Here is a synopsis of the instances with Ajax as the referent throughout the
play:
Line Form Speaker Local co-text
6 κείνου Athena scanning his fresh tracks
20 κεῖνον Odysseus tracking that one
28 ἐκείνῳ Odysseus all lay responsibility to that one
220 κείνου… τἀνδρός Tecmessa victims as sacrifices made by that man
271 ἁνὴρ ἐκεῖνος Tecmessa that man, frenzied, …
275 κεῖνος Tecmessa that one is subjected to anguish
285 κεῖνος Tecmessa that one, in the dead of night …
755 ἐκεῖνον Messenger to see that one alive
762 κεῖνος Messenger that one was foolish also earlier
783 ἁνὴρ κεῖνος Messenger that man does not exist any longer
795 ἐκεῖνον Messenger to keep that one in his tent
991 ἁνὴρ κεῖνος Chorus that man had asked for the care of his
child
I shall solely comment on these occurrences that illustrate, alongwith their co-
text, the inferable speakers’ attitudes or show how different anaphoricmarkers
in the same passage are meaningful choices rather than metrical alternatives.
11 An additional occurrence, κἀκεῖνον in 1035, refers to the girdle that Ajax had once given
to Hector; Achilles later used it to drag Hector’s corpse around Troy. Finglass (2011: 430),
in line with other scholars, considers lines 1028–1039 spurious; interestingly, one reason
is the apparently awkward anaphora resolution of the pronoun: ‘κἀκεῖνον looks back five
lines for its referent, a fault not eased by the syntactic compression and interposed nouns’.
Independently of whether those lines are spurious or not, I submit that the relatively
remote verbal antecedent of κἀκεῖνον is not necessarily a problem: anyone would easily
retrieve ‘that girdle’ in connection to Hector’s story rather than in connection to previous
textual referents; in other words, the referent may be activated through the memory of
another known discourse separate from the present one.
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[5] Sophocles Ajax 25–31 (Odysseus speaking)
ἐφθαρμένας γὰρ ἀρτίως εὑρίσκομεν
λείας ἁπάσας καὶ κατηναρισμένας
ἐκ χειρὸς αὐτοῖς ποιμνίων ἐπιστάταις.
τήνδ’ οὖν ἐκείνωι πᾶς τις αἰτίαν νέμει.
καί μοί τις ὀπτὴρ αὐτὸν εἰσιδὼν μόνον
πηδῶντα πεδία σὺν νεορράντωι ξίφει
φράζει τε κἀδήλωσεν·…
For we recently found all the cattle, our plunder, dead—yes, slaughtered
byhumanhand—andwith them the guardians of the flocks. Now, allmen
lay responsibility for this crime to him. And further, a scout who had seen
him bounding alone over the plain with a newly-wet sword reported to
me and declared what he saw.12
In line 28, Odysseus stresses the guilt of Ajax as collectively attributed to him
(‘that one’). Odysseus is also a good candidate for indirectly conveying his
own personal hatred, or at least emotional distance towards Ajax. A further
element of this passage that lends support to the non-neutral choice of the
anaphoric marker is the occurrence of αὐτόν in the following line (29). A ‘plain
third-person pronoun’ reading thereof would miss the pragmatic implication
of aloneness conveyed by αὐτόν, which is further reinforced by μόνον.13
The next passage confirms that the discourse strategies behind using both
(ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός for a referent that is fully in focus must go beyond the
‘simple’ necessity of recalling Ajax.
[6] Sophocles Ajax 271–276 (Tecmessa speaking)
ἁνὴρ ἐκεῖνος, ἡνίκ’ ἦν ἐν τῆι νόσωι,
αὐτὸς μὲν ἥδεθ’ οἷσιν εἴχετ’ ἐν κακοῖς,
ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς φρονοῦντας ἠνία ξυνών·
νῦν δ’ ὡς ἔληξε κἀνέπνευσε τῆς νόσου,
κεῖνός τε λύπηι πᾶς ἐλήλαται κακῆι
ἡμεῖς θ’ ὁμοίως οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἢ πάρος.
12 Translations of the Ajax are from Jebb (31907).
13 See section 4 andTaillardat (1987) about isolation and unity as components of the seman-
tic nucleus of αὐτός.
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That man, while afflicted, found joy for himself in the dire fantasies that
heldhim, thoughhis presencedistresseduswhowere sane. Butnow, since
he has had pause and rest from the plague, he has been utterly subjected
to lowly anguish, and we similarly grieve no less than before.
Behind the unquestionable emphasis of ἁνὴρ ἐκεῖνος (i.e. ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος) in 271
(see also 783 and 991, where the same anaphoric expression is uttered by the
messenger and the chorus respectively), I see Tecmessa’s tragic despair and
torment adding to the negative evaluation of Ajax’ sickness. The additional
description applying to ‘that man’, αὐτὸς μέν and ἡμᾶς δέ (272–273), reflects the
cognitive image schema centre-periphery: the basic relation is between Ajax-
the-centre and ‘us’-the-periphery.14 κεῖνός τε […] ἡμεῖς θ’ in 275–276 retrieves
the juxtaposition of ‘he’ and ‘us’, this time, however, to lament what is common
to both, namely sorrow and grief (see the τε… τε construction).
Example [7] shows that the implications of uttering κεῖνοςmay additionally
concern the discourse function of the hosting unit.
[7] Sophocles Ajax 282–287 (Chorus and Tecmessa)
Χο. τίς γάρ ποτ’ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κακοῦ προσέπτατο;
δήλωσον ἡμῖν τοῖς ξυναλγοῦσιν τύχας.
Τεκ. ἅπαν μαθήσηι τοὔργον, ὡς κοινωνὸς ὤν.
κεῖνος γὰρ ἄκρας νυκτός, ἡνίχ’ ἕσπεροι
λαμπτῆρες οὐκέτ’ ἦιθον, ἄμφηκες λαβὼν
ἐμαίετ’ ἔγχος ἐξόδους ἕρπειν κενάς.
Ch. In what way did the plague first swoop down on him? Tell us who
share your pain how it happened.
Tek. You will hear all that took place, since you are involved. In the dead
of night when the evening lamps were no longer aflame, he seized a
two-edged sword and wanted to leave on an aimless foray.
By means of γάρ, Tecmessa starts the narrative of Ajax’ mad actions.15 The use
of κεῖνος cannot be explained due to the far antecedent, be it in the text or in
the mind: the hero is in fact the focus of the chorus’ and Tecmessa’s attention
14 See section 4 and Bonifazi (2019).
15 In its discourse function, this γάρ resembles γάρ that starts embeddednarratives inHomer
(on which see de Jong 1997 and recently Bonifazi et al. 2016: II.3 §§20–32) and in Hero-
dotus and Thucydides (see Bonifazi et al. 2016: IV.3 §§109–110).
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and discourse at least since the entrance of Tecmessa at line 201. Rather, I see
two co-existing functions of κεῖνος: one is themental visualisationof Ajax in the
setting of the report (Deixis am Phantasma), the other is a strong recall of the
referent at the onset of a new discourse units (wewould call this the beginning
of a new paragraph).16
The last passage features Αἴανθ’, ἐκεῖνον and αὐτόν: all referring to Ajax in
three contiguous lines.
[8] Sophocles Ajax 752–762 (the messenger speaking)
θεὶς εἶπε κἀπέσκηψε παντοίαι τέχνηι
εἶρξαι κατ’ ἦμαρ τοὐμφανὲς τὸ νῦν τόδε
Αἴανθ’ ὑπὸ σκηναῖσι μηδ’ ἀφέντ’ ἐᾶν,
εἰ ζῶντ’ ἐκεῖνον εἰσιδεῖν θέλοι ποτέ·
ἐλᾶι γὰρ αὐτὸν τήνδ’ ἔθ’ ἡμέραν μόνην
δίας Ἀθάνας μῆνις, ὡς ἔφη λέγων.
The prophet [= Calchas] then addressed him [= Teucer] and strictly com-
manded him to use every possible resource to keepAjax inside his tent for
the duration of this day that now shines on us, and to prevent him from
moving about if he wished ever to look on him alive. For this day alone
will the anger of divine Athena lash at him.
Teucer is the implied grammatical subject of the εἰ clause in 755; nevertheless,
the participle ζῶντα suffices to recall Ajax in the object position (see Αἴανθ’ at
754 in the same grammatical function). Then, ἐκεῖνον looks like an unneces-
sarily heavy pronoun.17 However, if we consider the entire host clause, ἐκεῖνον
seems to be linked to the semantic sphere of seeing (‘to look on him’, εἰσιδεῖν).
I advocate the reading of the following αὐτόν as keeping Ajax as the centre of
everyone’s attention and possibly hinting at the corporeal side of his persona
as Athena lashes at him (more below on αὐτός and one’s body). ‘Lashing’ is to
be understood metaphorically, but it is as if αὐτόν keeps the physicality of the
action; in other words, it matches the frame of the source.18
16 See section 2 and Hofmann (1989).
17 Jebb (31907: ad 755) comments: ‘ἐκεῖνον, wherewemight have looked for the less emphatic
αὐτόν, since Αἴαντα has so lately preceded’; by quoting a passage from Andocides where
ἐκεῖνον occurs shortly after the proper name of the referent, Jebb concludes that it is an
Attic idiom.
18 I am grateful to Douglas Cairns (personal communication) for drawing my attention to
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It is difficult to judge whether these twelve instances of (ἐ)κεῖνος represent-
ing Ajax are enough to produce a resonance effect for the actors on stage and
the audience.19 My point is that at least they share two pragmatic, cognitive,
and poetic aspects: a. all of them mentally (if not visually) reconnect every-
one to Ajax’ presence when he is not on stage, with the exception of 991, as
the chorus utters ἁνὴρ κεῖνος right before Teucer addresses Ajax’ dead body;
b. on the whole, they compress a network of references to what he has done:
they recall his isolation/distance and his death; furthermore, they project, from
the very beginning (in a proper tragic style), the dimension of lament that will
accompany the performance until his burial. Perhaps there is a link between
this anaphoric strategy and the thematic (and visual?) centrality of a dead
Ajax.20
5.3 Epiphanic (ἐ)κεῖνος
As the chorus of elderly citizens of Colonus enters the stage and sings (Soph.OC
118–137), Antigone and a blind Oedipus hide in the sacred grove of the Eumen-
ides, but afterwards they come forward, and at that point Oedipus talks:
[9] Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 137–140
Oι. ὅδ’ ἐκεῖνος ἐγώ· φωνῆι γὰρ ὁρῶ,
τὸ φατιζόμενον.
Xo. ἰὼ ἰώ,
δεινὸς μὲν ὁρᾶν, δεινὸς δὲ κλύειν.
Oe. Here I am; I can see with the sound,
as they say.
Ch. Oh! Oh!
Fearful to see, fearful to hear!21
the general possibility that metaphorical expressions ‘attract’ to the source frame other
linguistic features than themselves.
19 The name ‘Ajax’ appears 39 times in the play; however, it is a vocative case twelve times,
which reduces the references to him in third person to 27 occurrences. On a side note,
nothing prevents us from hypothesising that uttering the proper name of a hero may in
turn hint at a series of implied meanings, not so different from what happens with ana-
phoric markers.
20 On the interpretive problems about the visibility of Ajax on the ekkyklēma, see in partic-
ular Meineck (2006); on ambiguities regarding the scene settings of the play, see Finglass
(2011: 11–20).
21 The translation is from Jebb (31900).
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ἐκεῖνος in 138 ismore than just a deicticmarker (ὅδε already fulfils the deictic
role of pointing to the referent). Ruijgh (2006: 160) sees in this combination of
ὅδε + ἐκεῖνος a “type of ‘present revelation’ ”. ἐκεῖνος has an epiphanic quality in
itself, which results from the combination of co-occurring cognitive operations
dealing with vision and memory: someone/something appears to the speaker,
and the speaker, visually (re-)connects this someone/something to a referent
that is in her mind. The visual component is essential.22
5.4 αὐτός for Corpses
It is well known that on the onset of the Iliad, αὐτούς refers to the corpses of
heroes that are fed to the dogs (Il. 1.4). Homeric poetry features other instances
where αὐτός implies ‘body’ (i.e. someone’s body without weapons or anything
else) and ‘alone’ (i.e. without anything else around), which makes Taillardat
(1987: 77–79) argue for separation and distinction as its basic semantic com-
ponents. The following utterance by Orestes in Libation Bearers seems to keep
the epic implication of ‘dead body’:
[10] Aeschylus Libation Bearers 903–904
Ορ. κρίνω σε νικᾶν, καὶ παραινεῖς μοι καλῶς.
ἕπου, πρὸς αὐτὸν τόνδε σὲ σφάξαι θέλω.
Or. (to Pylades) I judge you the winner; you have advised me well.
(to Clytaemestra) Follow me. I want to slay you right next to that
man.23
I let the reader notice that Sommerstein’s translation ‘right next to that man’
fails to translate both the allusion to Aegisthus’ corpse and the deixis. I inter-
pret this phrase to mean ‘next to this corpse’.
22 See e.g. Eur. El. 581 ἐκεῖνος εἶ σύ; 1222 ἦ γὰρ σὺ κεῖνος; 1178 τόδ’ ἔστ’ ἐκεῖνο, καὶ μάλ’ ἀθλίως
ἔχον with reference to Electra’s visual perception of Orestes (in line 1178, the object is
the urn containing Orestes’ ashes). See also Homer Odyssey 24.321 κεῖνος μὲν δὴ ὅδ’ αὐτὸς
ἐγώ, πάτερ, ὃν σὺ μεταλλᾶις (the ultimate revelation of Odysseus in front of his father)
and Sappho fr. 31.1 Voigt φαίνεταί μοι κῆνος ἴσος θέοισιν (on which see Nagy 1990: 201
n. 110).
23 The translation is from Sommerstein (2008).
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5.5 αὐτός Implying ‘Someone’s Body’ as well as Discourse Prominence
Let us go back for amoment to Ajax. Ajaxwants to take his leave of his son after
giving him his shield (529–577). Example [11] shows different ways in which
Eurysaces is referred to over the stichomythia in lines 529–545 when the child
is unquestionably the topic of the conversation (presumably a fully active ref-
erent in Tecmessa’s and Ajax’ mind). In order to refer to Eurysaces, Sophocles
could have used other phrases, other pronouns (such as τοῦτον), or nothing
(null anaphora, given that direct objects are part of the pro-drop characterist-
ics of ancient Greek). Instead, after the ‘priming’ mention παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν (530),
he hasTecmessa andAjax use δύστηνος (533) and four times αὐτόν (531, 538, 542,
545).24
[11] Sophocles Ajax 530–545
Aι. κόμιζέ νύν μοι παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν, ὡς ἴδω.
Tε. καὶ μὴν φόβοισί γ’ αὐτὸν ἐξελυσάμην.
Aι. ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς κακοῖσιν; ἢ τί μοι λέγεις;
Tε. μὴ σοί γέ που δύστηνος ἀντήσας θάνοι.
Aι. πρέπον γέ τἂν ἦν δαίμονος τοὐμοῦ τόδε.
Tε. ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐγὼ ’φύλαξα τοῦτό γ’ ἀρκέσαι.
Aι. ἐπήινεσ’ ἔργον καὶ πρόνοιαν ἣν ἔθου.
Tε. τί δῆτ’ ἂν ὡς ἐκ τῶνδ’ ἂν ὠφελοῖμί σε;
Aι. δός μοι προσειπεῖν αὐτὸν ἐμφανῆ τ’ ἰδεῖν.
Tε. καὶ μὴν πέλας γε προσπόλοις φυλάσσεται.
Aι. τί δῆτα μέλλει μὴ οὐ παρουσίαν ἔχειν;
Tε. ὦ παῖ, πατὴρ καλεῖ σε. δεῦρο προσπόλων
ἄγ’ αὐτὸν ὅσπερ χερσὶν εὐθύνων κυρεῖς.
Aι. ἕρποντι φωνεῖς, ἢ λελειμμένωι λόγων;
Tε. καὶ δὴ κομίζει προσπόλων ὅδ’ ἐγγύθεν.
Aι. αἶρ’ αὐτόν, αἶρε δεῦρο·…
Aj. Then bring me my son, so that I may see him.
Tek. But in my fear I released him frommy keeping.
Aj. Because of these troubles of mine? Or what do you mean?
Tek. Yes, for fear that somehow the poor child would get in your way, and
die.
24 I shall not discuss the vocativeὦπαῖ and the second-person pronoun σε (541), even though
they refer to the child as well; as deictic markers they interrupt the focus on him in third
person.
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Aj. Yes, that would have been truly worthy of my destiny.
Tek. Well, at least I took care to avert that disaster.
Aj. I approve of your action and of your foresight.
Tek. How, then, can I serve you, as things stand now?
Aj. Let me speak to him and see him face to face.
Tek. Oh, yes—he is close by, watched by our servants.
Aj. Then why is his presence delayed?
Tek. My child, your father calls you. Bring him here, servant, whichever
of you is guiding his steps.
Aj. Is the man coming? Or has he missed your call?
Tek. Here now one of the servants approaches with him.
Aj. Lift him; lift him up here.
I interpret this exceptional concentration of αὐτός for the same referent as a
pragmatic signpost for two implications: a. the discourse prominence of the
child (centre opposed to the periphery made of other people); b. the focus on
Eurysaces’ body, as the respective co-texts indicate: ‘releasing him from keep-
ing’ (531), ‘speaking and seeing him’ (538), ‘bringing him’ (542), and ‘lifting him’
(545).
5.6 Cumulative αὐτός for Hippolytus: Centrality and Relevance of the
Body
The combination of discourse prominence, centre-and-periphery, and the rel-
evance of the body is what characterises the use of αὐτός with Hippolytus as
the referent in Euripides’ homonymous tragedy. Out of twelve masculine sin-
gular forms of αὐτός used in third-person (two extra times, the marker is used
in first or second person, ‘I’ αὐτός and ‘you’ αὐτός), nine occurrences have the
protagonist as the referent. Here is a synopsis of the occurrences throughout
the play:
Line Form Speaker Local co-text
54 ἅμ’ αὐτῶι Aphrodite The κῶμος following him
895 αὐτόν Theseus Poseidon will send him to Hades
899 αὐτός Chorus He ipse is here
1084 αὐτόν Theseus Drag him away
1166 αὐτόν Messenger His own chariot destroyed him
1172 αὐτόν Theseus The cudgel of Justice struck him
1187 παρ’ αὐτόν Messenger We set the horses beside him
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Line Form Speaker Local co-text
1236 αὐτός Messenger He, entangled …
1265 αὐτόν Theseus Bring him
Each of these occurrences is meaningful if we take only the local co-text into
account. Lines 54 and 1187 (including ἅμ’ αὐτῶι and παρ’ αὐτόν respectively)
feature a centre-periphery construction: in 54 the κῶμος of the servants (peri-
phery) is following him (centre) as soon as he returns from the hunt; in 1187
the servants (again, the periphery) prepare the chariot with the horses (peri-
phery) beside the master (the centre). In 1084, 1166, 1172 (metaphoric action),
1236, and 1265, the semantic relevance of Hippolytus’ body simply emerges
from the semantics of the host clause (‘drag him away’, ‘the chariot destroyed
him’, ‘the cudgel struck him’, ‘he, entangled …’, and ‘bring him’ respectively). I
link these occurrences to the thematic relevance of the male body in pain:25
just as the visualisation of dying bodies comes to the fore with gripping details
in other plays, the tragedy of Hippolytus cannot prescind from the reported
spectacle of his disfigured body. Perhaps the most striking of these passages is
1169–1172 where Theseus is eager to learn from Poseidon how he wrecked Hip-
polytus:
[12] Euripides Hippolytus 1169–1172
Θη. ὦ θεοί, Πόσειδόν θ’· ὡς ἄρ’ ἦσθ’ ἐμὸς πατὴρ
ὀρθῶς, ἀκούσας τῶν ἐμῶν κατευγμάτων.
πῶς καὶ διώλετ’; εἰπέ, τῶι τρόπωι Δίκης
ἔπαισεν αὐτὸν ῥόπτρον αἰσχύναντά με;
Th. (stretching out his arms, palms upward, in prayer) Merciful gods! So
after all you are trulymy father, Poseidon, since youheardmyprayer!
How did he perish? Tell me, how did the cudgel of Justice strike him
for dishonoring me?26
25 See in particular Hawley (1998).
26 The translations of the Hippolytus are from Kovacs (1995).
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The question πῶς καὶ διώλετ’ (1171) shows no encoding of the grammatical
subject, which tells us that Hippolytus is fully in focus in Theseus’ mind. This
makes the following αὐτός significant: within the metaphorical expression ‘the
cudgel of Justice stroke him’ αὐτός is almost required if the intended referent is
Hippolytus’ body.27
The remaining instances occur in the following passage:
[13] Euripides Hippolytus 887–900
Θη. … ἀλλ’, ὦ πάτερ Πόσειδον, ἃς ἐμοί ποτε
ἀρὰς ὑπέσχου τρεῖς, μιᾶι κατέργασαι
τούτων ἐμὸν παῖδ’, ἡμέραν δὲ μὴ φύγοι
τήνδ’, εἴπερ ἡμῖν ὤπασας σαφεῖς ἀράς.
Χο. ἄναξ, ἀπεύχου ταῦτα πρὸς θεῶν πάλιν,
γνώσηι γὰρ αὖθις ἀμπλακών· ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ.
Θη. οὐκ ἔστι. καὶ πρός γ’ ἐξελῶ σφε τῆσδε γῆς,
δυοῖν δὲ μοίραιν θατέραι πεπλήξεται·
ἢ γὰρ Ποσειδῶν αὐτὸν εἰς Ἅιδου δόμους
θανόντα πέμψει τὰς ἐμὰς ἀρὰς σέβων
ἢ τῆσδε χώρας ἐκπεσὼν ἀλώμενος
ξένην ἐπ’ αἶαν λυπρὸν ἀντλήσει βίον.
Χο. καὶ μὴν ὅδ’ αὐτὸς παῖς σὸς ἐς καιρὸν πάρα
Ἱππόλυτος·…
Th. … But, father Poseidon, those three curses you once promisedme—
with one of them kill my son, and may he not live out this day, if
indeed you have granted me curses I may rely on.
Ch. My lord, I beg you by the gods, take back your prayer! For you will
learn in time that you have made a mistake. Take my advice!
Th. It cannot be. And what is more, I shall banish him from this land,
and of two fates one shall strike him: either Poseidon, honoring my
curses, will send him dead to the house of Hades or being banished
from here he will wander over foreign soil and drain to the dregs a
life of misery. [Enter Hippolytus by Eisodos B.]
Ch. Look! Your son Hippolytus is here himself, a timely arrival!
27 Something similar happens in line 761; see above, section 5.2.
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In this excerpt, Hippolytus is primed in 889 (ἐμὸν παῖδα) and recalled in 893
by the means of σφε. Then, Theseus formulates two alternatives for ruining his
son’s life. In the first, we findαὐτόν, whereas in the alternative there is nomarker
for Hippolytus (null anaphora; see the finite verb ἀντλήσει, 898, and the two
participles ἐκπεσὼν ἀλώμενος, 897). The full accessibility of Hippolytus as the
referent from 889 through 900 makes αὐτόν in 895 useless unless something
else is implied by its use. The semantics of the host clause disambiguates the
sense: what Theseus wishes is that Poseidon sends his dead body to Hades.
The later αὐτός (899) is, conversely, a deictic marker of identity: the chorus
points to Hippolytus (see καὶ μήν and ὅδε) by denoting him (παῖς σὸς), calling
him (Ἱππόλυτος), and confirming his identity (αὐτός, ‘in person’).
5.7 αὐτός as a ReflexiveMarker
Towards the end of the Cassandra’s long scene in Agamemnon (1172–1330), the
prophetess announces her own imminent death by setting forth a contradic-
tion that is in line with further shocking predictions about Agamemnon and
about Orestes.28
[14] Aeschylus Agamemnon 1322–1323
Κα. ἅπαξ ἔτ’ εἰπεῖν ῥῆσιν ἢ θρῆνον θέλω
ἐμὸν τὸν αὐτῆς…
Ca. I would make one speech more, or it may be a dirge—my own.29
Fraenkel (1950: ad 1323) writes: ‘By adding ἐμὸν τὸν αὐτῆς Cassandra points to
the peculiarity of her situation, for it is in itself contrary to the nature of things
that anyone should singor speakhis owndirge.’ Indeed, his translation captures
the paradox by inserting a dash before ἐμὸν τὸν αὐτῆς. My point is that αὐτῆς in
this peculiar construction emphatically refers toCassandra’s own self (‘mine, of
myself ’).30The cognitive andpragmatic implication of αὐτός in this case resides
28 On this as a ‘mad-scene’, see especially Schein (1982).
29 The translation is from Fraenkel (1950).
30 Pearson (1910: ad loc.) provides further Euripidean examples of what he calls a ‘loosely
added genitive’ after ἐμόν. While the Loeb edition (by Smyth; see Sommerstein 2008) has
αὑτῆς with rough breathing, not only Fraenkel but also Denniston and Page (1957) and
West (1990) have αὐτῆς with smooth breathing, thus indirectly acknowledging the form
as being in line with archaic reflexive usages of αὐτόςwith smooth breathing (e.g.Odyssey
4.247), and at the same time as distinct from the more common ἐμαυτόν.
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in the reference to the centre (Cassandra herself ) as indirectly opposed to oth-
ers for whom the dirge may be sung (periphery).
5.8 αὐτός for Someone’s (Actual) Identity, and the Incorporation of
Multiple Perspectives
The final cognitive and pragmatic illocutionary force of αὐτός that I consider
draws from the subtle interplay between Odysseus-in-disguise to the eyes of
many and Odysseus-the-actual-one through αὐτός in the second part of the
Odyssey.31 There, uttering αὐτός as an anaphoric marker can be associated with
different referents-in-the-mind, such as the hero in disguise or the hero recog-
nised; this reveals the following co-existing cognitive and pragmatic possibilit-
ies:αὐτός can imply the reference to theperson justmentioned in thediscourse;
it can convey someone’s specific perspective adopted about the referent (for
example, ‘X the real one’); finally, it can retrieve the deictic value of αὐτός to
point to someone’s identity (ipse, as in Hippolytus 899, in [13]) or sameness
between speaker and the referent of αὐτός. All these possibilities are alluded
to, for example, in the following exchange between Electra and Orestes in Eur-
ipides’Electra:
[15] Euripides Electra 274, 276, 278–280, 282
Ορ. τί δῆτ’Ὀρέστης πρὸς τάδ’,Ἄργος ἢν μόληι;
[…]
Ορ. ἐλθὼν δὲ δὴ πῶς φονέας ἂν κτάνοι πατρός;
[…]
Ορ. ἦ καὶ μετ’ αὐτοῦ μητέρ’ ἂν τλαίης κτανεῖν;
Ελ. ταὐτῶι γε πελέκει τῶι πατὴρ ἀπώλετο.
Ορ. λέγω τάδ’ αὐτῶι, καὶ βέβαια τἀπὸ σοῦ;
[…]
Ορ. φεῦ· εἴθ’ ἦν Ὀρέστης πλησίον κλύων τάδε
Or. Then what should Orestes do about this, if he comes to Argos?
[…]
Or. But if he does come, howmight he kill his father’s murderers?
[…]
Or. And would you dare, with him, to kill your mother?
El. Yes, with that same axe by which my father died.
31 Bonifazi (2012: 127–184).
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Or. Am I to tell him this, and that your purpose is steadfast?
[…]
Or. Ah!Would that Orestes were nearby, to hear that!32
Into the mouth of Orestes-in-disguise, Euripides puts an explicit reference to
Orestes-the-real-one as the former envisions the latter’s hypothetical arrival
(Ἄργος ἢν μόληι, 274). Likewise in 282, Orestes-in-disguise wishes that Orestes-
the-real-one is near and is able to hear the current exchange. However, in
two lines that occur in between, Euripides lets Orestes-in-disguise use αὐτός
ambiguously: in Electra’s perspective the anaphoric marker means ‘Orestes,
the referent I just mentioned’; in the audience’s perspective it means ‘the real
Orestes, who is currently talking to her; they are the same persons’; in Orestes’
perspective, it means ‘Hey, I am exactly him, I am Orestes myself ’.
Overall, this passage shows that αὐτός can be uttered to do several things
at once such as connecting referents at the level of discourse coherence and
suggesting sameness as well as someone’s identity to different people, there-
fore implying the adoption (and the revelation) of multiple perspectives at
once.
6 Conclusion
By taking contemporary accounts of how we process anaphoric markers into
account as well as pragmatic and cognitive readings of third-person pronouns
in modern literary texts as well as in ancient Greek lyric and epic, it is pos-
sible to see what (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός do in tragedies, at least in some passages.
The similarities in language use that I see across ancient Greek lyric, epic, and
drama reinforce the idea that these key words are the result of meaningful
choices rather than metrically convenient solutions. Objections regarding the
value of interpreting what words do not say explicitly are answered by stating
that everythingwe understand fromwords (more so from poetic words) comes
from our inferences (however well-read) about what they meant, individually
and in context.
The pragmatics of (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός in tragedies reside in the inferences
that they invite on multiple levels: about the status of referents in the mind of
the speaker(s), about personal or intersubjective attitudes towards them, and
about how the discourse unfolds (transitions/no transitions; global narrative
32 The translation is from Kovacs (1998).
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trajectories). They may carry their own illocutionary force (e.g. αὐτός mean-
ing ‘someone’s body’) and/or participate in the broader illocutionary force of
the host unit (e.g. ‘I long for κεῖνοι’ conveying a positively-oriented distance
betweenmortals and special persons). Their forcemay reside inmultiple func-
tions carried out at once. This is not different from the multiple functions that
individual deictic markers may fulfil (let us think of the multiple co-working
readings of the referents of ‘we’ in theQueen’s ‘We are the champions’). Finally,
individual occurrences of (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός can remind the audience of over-
arching implicatures (conventional as well as conversational) concerning the
same character through different scenes ormoments of the play, allowing us to
appreciate different facets or, conversely, invariant thoughts associated with a
specific character.33
As I close this paper, I would like to raise a few questions for further (much-
needed) research. Howmany times is Ajax recalled as οὗτος in the Sophoclean
play?When and how does αὐτός occur in open recognition scenes and disguise
situations? What is the frequency of (ἐ)κεῖνος in laments and in choral songs?
Are the discussed as well as other anaphoric markers in drama connected to
someone’s perspective or some intersubjective (traditional) perspective in par-
ticular? How are (ἐ)κεῖνος and αὐτός used in comedy? I hope this contribution
will stimulate more work on such questions or at least foster awareness of the
linguistic and poetic relevance of (ἐ)κεῖνος, αὐτός, and possibly all anaphoric
expressions in Greek drama.
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Pointing to Common Ground in Dramatic Dialogue:
The Case of δή and τοι
Rutger J. Allan
1 Introduction
Every word we speak, every speech act we perform, is only intelligible to our
interlocutor against the backdrop of a body of shared knowledge and beliefs.
Whenweare engaged in a conversation,we assume that our interlocutor knows
such things as the vocabulary and rules of the language in which we hold the
conversation. We naturally assume that our conversation partner is talking
about the same topic, and has not forgotten the preceding part of the con-
versation. We take a certain amount of general world knowledge for granted
and we often also presuppose knowledge of our personal lives. People engaged
in conversation do not only share a considerable amount of information, but
they are also mutually aware that they share this information. This presumed
background information, often left implicit, but no less vital to successful com-
munication, is usually referred to as common ground.
Common ground as a theoretical concept has been developed in the field
of language philosophy in the 1970s by philosophers such as Robert Stalnaker,
who defines common ground as follows:
[1] Stalnaker (2002: 701)
To presuppose something is to take it for granted, or at least to act as if
one takes it for granted, as background information—as common ground
among the participants in the conversation.
The psycholinguist Herbert Clark, a prominent figure in the study of common
ground in conversation, describes common ground in a similar way as: ‘[…] the
sum of [two people’s] mutual, common, or joint knowledge, beliefs, and sup-
positions’ (Clark 1996: 93). Fundamental to Clark’s view on communication is
that communication is a form of joint action:
[2] Clark (1996: 92)
Everything we do is rooted in information we have about our surround-
ings, activities, perceptions, emotions, plans, interests. Everything we do
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jointly with others is also rooted in this information, but only in that
part we think they share with us. The notion needed here is common
ground. […]Whenmy son and I enter a conversation, we presuppose cer-
tain common ground, and with each joint action—each utterance, for
example—we try to add to it. To do that, we need to keep track of our
common ground as it accumulates increment by increment.
Common ground typically plays a dual role in communication. First, speak-
ers will normally tailor their utterances in order to bring them in alignment
with the common ground; that is, to relate them to what they presume their
interlocutors know or believe. The most obvious way to adapt your utterance
to the common ground is by simply leaving out information you suppose your
interlocutor already possesses. However, also many choices regarding vocab-
ulary and grammatical constructions are dependent on the common ground.
For example, speakers will use a definite article if they presume that the entity
at issue will already be known and identifiable to the addressee.
In a similar way, common ground management is relevant to Greek word
order. It is by now commonly accepted that the crucial factor determining
the position of a constituent in a Greek clause is its information status: does
the constituent at issue refer to given information (i.e. is it a Topic) or does
it provide new or otherwise salient information (i.e. is it Focus)? The distinc-
tion between topicality and focality, which is at the heart of the grammar of
Greek word order, can readily be described in terms of common ground man-
agement. Topical referents are referents that are already (presumed to be) part
of the common ground, while focal information is not yet part of the common
ground but is mentioned in order to add information to the common ground.
This brings us to the second aspect of common ground.
The second key aspect of common ground in communication relates to the
fact that the common ground is not a static entity: it changes in the course
of the conversation through a process referred to as grounding (Clark and
Brennan 1991). During a conversation, common ground is being negotiated
by the interlocutors. Utterances can be seen as proposals to add to the com-
mon ground, or to correct an element in the common ground. By accepting
the proposal—sometimes implicitly—the interlocutor effects an update of the
common ground. The updated common ground then serves as a basis for fur-
ther communication.
In order to add to their common ground, interlocutors will have to engage
in a process of aligning their, possibly different, perspectives on the world. In
Arie Verhagen’s cognitive linguistic approach to common ground negotiation,
speakers are seen as subjects of conceptualisation co-operating in order to co-
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ordinate their perspectives with respect to some object of conceptualisation to
which their joint attention is directed, a process called intersubjective coordin-
ation by Verhagen:
[3] Verhagen (2005: 7)
[The] subjects of conceptualization engage in cognitive coordination by
means of the utterance, with respect to some object of coordination. […]
The point of a linguistic utterance, in broad terms, is that the first concep-
tualizer invites the second to jointly attend to an object of conceptualiz-
ation in some specific way, and to update the common ground by doing
so.
According to Verhagen, the interlocutors’ cognitive coordination is a crucial
function of many linguistic (lexical as well as grammatical) phenomena:
[4] Verhagen (2005: 4)
For a range of linguistic phenomena which are arguably quite basic (neg-
ation and negation-related constructions, complementation, discourse
connectives) it can be demonstrated that connecting, differentiating, and
‘tailoring’ the contents of points of viewwith respect to each other (rather
than organizing a connection to the world) is essential for understanding
their semantics and, perhaps surprisingly, their syntax.1
A cognitively-oriented approach to discourse, very similar to Verhagen’s, is that
of Ronald Langacker, who defines the common ground—which he refers to
as Current Discourse Space—as: ‘the mental space comprising those elements
and relations construed as being shared by the speaker and hearer as a basis for
communication at a given moment in the flow of discourse’ (Langacker 2001:
144). In Langacker’s insightfulmodel, theCurrentDiscourse Space, i.e. common
ground, is structured as represented by Figure 1.
Langacker distinguishes a number of elements that, together, constitute the
Current Discourse Space, i.e. common ground. Central to the common ground
are the speaker (S) and the hearer (H) as the subjects of conceptualisation, and
the time and space of the speech event.2
1 A helpful introduction to the cognitive linguistics approach to joint cognition and common
ground is Verhagen (2015).
2 Langacker calls the ensemble of speaker, hearer, time and space of the speech event the
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figure 1 Common ground/Current Discourse Space in Cognitive Grammar
Usage Event = utterance, actual instance of language use (typically a clause)
Langacker 2001: 145
The second element of the common ground is the speaker’s and hearer’s
joint attention (indicated in Figure 1 by the dashed arrows) directed at some
real or imagined entity or situation, i.e. the object of conceptualisation. This
entity or situation is in the focus of their attention.3 This focused entity is loc-
ated within a viewing frame, a window (or, to use a theatre metaphor, an ‘on
stage’ region) through which we are viewing the world. The speech act par-
ticipants are also mutually aware of one another’s knowledge and perspect-
ives (see the double-headed dashed arrow between S and H in Figure 1). The
third element of the common ground is the immediate context of the speech
event: the various physical, mental, social, and cultural circumstances of the
conversation. The fourth element is the body of knowledge shared by the inter-
locutors. Shared knowledge can have roughly two sources: it is either general
knowledge, which is often based on a shared community, or culture. Shared
cultural knowledge includes knowledge of social practices, cultural norms, ste-
Ground. In Langacker’s terminology, in other words, the Ground is only a part of the com-
mon ground, i.e., in his terms, Current Discourse Space.
3 It should be noted that the term focus, as it is used here, is not equal to the information-
structural notion of Focus, i.e. new information. In this context, it is used in a broader sense,
as the conceptual content referred to by an utterance, typically a clause or an intonation unit,
which is fully active in the consciousness (that is, in the focus of attention) of the interlocutors
at some point in time.
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reotypes, topoi, genre conventions, etc. Shared knowledge can also be based
on shared personal experiences. The fifth element relates to the discourse con-
text of the utterance. A speaker can presuppose that the information conveyed
by their previous utterances is known to the addressee, and the speaker may
also presume that the addressee entertains specific expectations about how
the conversation will further develop.
Elements of the Current Discourse Space/Common Ground:
(1) Speaker (S),Hearer (H), speech time and space (Ground)
(2) Joint directing of attention on a focal entity (Focus)
(3) Context of speech: immediate perceivable physical, mental, social, and
cultural circumstances (+ simple inferences based on them)
(4) Shared knowledge:
– general world knowledge, typically based on shared culture (social/
religious practices, cultural norms and values, stereotypes, topoi, genre
conventions etc.)
– shared personal experience
(+ simple inferences based on shared knowledge)
(5) Discourse context: shared knowledge of preceding discourse, shared ex-
pectations about subsequent discourse (+ simple inferences based ondis-
course context)
Let us nowmove away from the theory and turn to particles.What I would like
to show is that the notion of common ground can also be helpful in under-
standing what the function of Greek particles in discourse is. More specifically,
what I will argue is that particles play an important role in what youmight call
common ground management. Particles can be seen as instructions from the
speaker to the addressee on how to cognitively anchor the utterance at issue to
the commonground.4As an illustrationof this aspect of particlemeaning, Iwill
examine two particles more closely, namely δή and τοι, particles that are usu-
ally classified as modal or interactional particles but whose precise meaning is
not easy to pinpoint.5 What I would like to show is that it is helpful to analyse
4 In Allan and van Gils (2015) and Allan (2017a), I argued that Greek adversative particles such
as ἀλλά, καίτοι, μέντοι, and μήν can also be insightfully analysed as devices used to anchor
their host utterance in the common ground. There is also an increasing number of studies
approaching particles in modern languages in terms of common ground management, e.g.
Karagjosova (2003), Verhagen (2005), Fetzer and Fischer (2007), Simon-Vandenbergen and
Aijmer (2007).
5 For this classification, see e.g. Wakker (1997: 211), van Emde Boas et al. (2018: 686–688).
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δή and τοι as grounding devices, that is, as a signal from speaker to addressee
specifying the relationship between the utterance and the common ground.
More specifically, I will argue that δή and τοι are used to communicate that the
proposition or the speech act is supposed to be cognitively accessible to the
addressee as part of the common ground, or otherwise easily inferrable on the
basis of the common ground.
2 The Particle δή: Pointing to Common Ground
A convenient starting point for our discussion is the particle δή, since it is prob-
ably the particle that relates to the common ground in the most direct and
obvious way. There has been, and still is, considerable discussion on the exact
function of δή. Since space prevents me from rehearsing the extensive schol-
arly discussion on the particle, I will here only present the twomost prominent
approaches to the particle.6
One approach stresses the particle’s function as a marker of evidentiality,
that is, the particle as a marker of information that is visible, evident, or other-
wise known to the addressee. An influential proponent of this view is Kühner’s
and Gerth’s grammar:
[5] Kühner and Gerth (1898: II 123)
[…] aus dieser [temporalen Bedeutung, RJA] entwickelte sich die bild-
liche, in der es auf bereits (iam) Bekanntes, Offenbares, Augenschein-
liches hinweist, so dass es sich oft durch gewiss, offenbar erklären lässt.
More recently, this viewhas also been advocated by Sicking and vanOphuijsen,
who characterise the particle’s function as:
[6] Sicking and van Ophuijsen (1993: 52, 141)
[I]t is possible to describe δή as a primarily ‘evidential’ sentence particle
which presents a statement as immediately evident to the senses or the
understanding or as common knowledge. It thus implies that the speaker
and hearer are in the same position with respect to this statement.
6 For a very helpful overview of the discussion, see now the Online Repository of Particle Stud-
ies (Volume 5 of Bonifazi et al. 2016).
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[…] the basic value of the particle relates towhat is visible to themind’s
eye as well as to the organ of sight […]
Sicking and van Ophuijsen’s characterisation of δή as a marker of what is evid-
ent and commonknowledge, of course, comes very close to viewing theparticle
as a marker of common ground.7
Beside the ‘evidential’ view on δή, there is an approach to δή which states
that the particle serves to draw attention to the proposition in which it occurs
and to point out to the addressee that it is of special importance. This is the
approach proposed by linguists such as Ruijgh and Wakker who describe the
particle’s function respectively as:
[7a] Ruijgh (1971: 646–647)
En effet, δή semble souligner l’ importance du fait nouveau qui est le con-
tenu de la phrase. En exagérant beaucoup, on pourrait rendre δή par ‘voici
un fait important’.
[7b]Wakker (1994: 351)
an attitudinal particle which demands the addressee’s special attention
for the (important and interesting) proposition presented by the speaker.
How to overcome this deadlock of opposing views? My answer would not be
to accept one in favour of the other, but to acknowledge that both approaches
capture important aspects of the particle’s meaning. In other words, it is more
attractive to come to a synthesis between the two approaches, recognising that
δή combines two functions: it is both a common groundmarker (its ‘evidential’
function) and an attention-focuser.8 A characterisation of δή’s function along
these lines would run as follows:
7 The new Cambridge Grammar of Classical Greek (CGCG), which has an excellent chapter
on particles, also seems to side with the ‘evidential’ view (van Emde Boas et al. 2018: 686–
688). The term ‘evidential’, in the sense of ‘marking what is evident’, is somewhat unfortunate
because it is potentially confusing: the term is more often used in a different sense, namely
referring to the grammatical system found in many languages which indicates the source of
knowledge.
8 In their monumental study of Greek particles, Bonifazi et al. (2016) also acknowledge these
two central, i.e. ‘intensifying’ and ‘evidential’, functions of δή. However, they do not seem to
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[8] The particle δή focuses the joint attention on an entity (i.e. a person,
object, property, proposition, or speech act)which is (construed as being)
part of the common ground.9
The fact that δή may focus on the attention on different types of entities, e.g.
properties, persons, objects, states of affairs, propositions, and even speech
acts, has consequences for the syntactical scope of δή: the particle may scope
over adjectives, (pro)nouns, verbs, and whole clauses. According toWackerna-
gel’s Law, δή is normally placed in the second position in the syntactic unit it
has scope over, i.e. a word, phrase, or clause.10
To fully understand the use of δή, it is not sufficient to solely consider its
inherent semantic features, but it is also important to take a number of its—
contextually evoked—pragmatic features into account. More specifically, δή’s
attention-focusing property tend to be associated with a number of additional
pragmatic side-effects (implicatures).
A natural side-effect of the attention-focusing function of δή is that the
speaker wishes to point out to the addressee that an entity is noteworthy for
some reason. Depending on the context, this sense of noteworthiness may be
accompanied bymore specificmental attitudes or emotions such as contempt,
indignation, irony, sarcasm, or scepticism.11 Another occasional side-effect of
the focusing function of δή is exclusivity. In some contexts, δή emphasises that
a proposition is true only for the entity in its scope, in contrast to a set or scale
of (implicit) potential alternatives.12
assume that these two functions operate simultaneously. KeesThijs is preparing a doctoral
disseration on δή (and other particles) in which δή is also analyzed in terms of Common
Ground and focus of attention.
9 The combination of focaliser and common groundmarker should not come as a surprise.
Cross-linguistically, discourse markers and adverbs, e.g. English indeed, often combine
functions such as common ground marking, expectation marking, emphasis, and focal-
isation (see e.g. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007).
10 Occasionally, however, δήmay also be separated from the item in its scope by one ormore
words or it may be placed before the item in its scope (Denniston 21954: 228–229). For its
scope, see also Bonifazi et al. (2016: IV.4 §100).
11 Irony may also be a side-effect of the common-ground-marking function of δή: cross-
linguistically, irony is frequently associated with common ground markers, cf. English no
doubt (Simon-Vandenbergen andAijmer 2007). For theuse of δήwith an ironic undertone,
see also Bonifazi et al. (2016: IV.4.5.5, 4.6.4).
12 As a marker of exclusivity (or restrictiveness), δή shows some similarity to more typical
focus (or scope) particles such as γε, -περ and καί ‘also, even’.
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figure 2 Occasional pragmatic side-effects of δή’s
attention-focusing function
3 δή in Drama
The dual function of δή as an attention-focusing device and a common ground
marker can also be observed in its use in drama.13 δή seems to be capable
of invoking all possible components of the common ground, such as (i) the
immediate physical context, (ii) shared personal and communal knowledge
(and inferences based thereon), and (iii) shared knowledge of, and expecta-
tions about, the discourse. In other words, δή may mark out an entity that is
supposed to be perceptually or cognitively accessible to the addressee, e.g. ‘as
you can see/hear’, ‘as you know’, ‘as expected’, ‘evidently’, ‘obviously’, ‘clearly’, ‘of
course’, ‘indeed’.
3.1 Immediate Context: Focus on aVisible Entity or State of Affairs
The first category concerns cases in which δή is used to direct the addressee’s
attention to a person or an event in the immediate physical context of the
speaker and addressee. In the following example, δή is used ‘marking the
13 The corpus examined consists of Aeschylus’Agamemnon and Persae, Sophocles’Ajax and
Antigone, and Euripides’Bacchae and Medea (96 instances of δή in total). I will, at times,
also cite examples from other plays in case a particular type of particle use did not occur
in the corpus of these six plays.
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appearance of a new character on stage’ (Denniston 21954: 103): the chorus
interrupt their song to announce the arrival of Creon on the scene.
[9] Sophocles Antigone 155–158
ἀλλ’ ὅδε γὰρ δὴ βασιλεὺς χώρας,
†Κρέων ὁ Μενοικέως,†… νεοχμὸς
νεαραῖσι θεῶν ἐπὶ συντυχίαις
χωρεῖ […]
But here comes the new king of the land, … Creon, under the new condi-
tions given by the gods […]14
The function of δή in [9] is related to the function of the combination καὶ δή as a
marker of entries. According to van Erp Taalman Kip, καὶ δή ‘is used tomark an
entry that has been prepared for by the words that precede it’.15 The use of καὶ
δή can be contrasted with the use of καὶ μήν which ‘marks an entry that is not
prepared for by the words that immediately precede it […]’ (van Erp Taalman
Kip 2009: 128). δή in the context of entries seems to evoke two different aspects
of common ground: not only does it draw the attention to a person that is vis-
ible in the direct physical context (note the presence of the deictic pronoun ὅδε
in [9]), it also points out to the addressee that the entry is somehow expected
on the basis of (or prepared for by) the preceding discourse. In [9], the chorus
of elders already expect Creon’s arrival since he has summoned the elders in
order to address them. The function of ἀλλ’, incidentally, can also be described
in terms of common ground management. What we have here is ἀλλά in its
function as a marker of discourse boundaries: it signals that the speaker inter-
rupts the expected flow of discourse and shifts the interlocutors’ joint focus of
attention to another discourse topic.16
[10] Sophocles Antigone 441–442
σὲ δή, σὲ τὴν νεύουσαν ἐς πέδον κάρα,
φής, ἢ καταρνῆι μὴ δεδρακέναι τάδε;
14 The Greek texts are taken from the OCT editions of Aeschylus (Page 1972), Sophocles
(Lloyd-Jones and Wilson 1990) and Euripides (Diggle 1981–1994). The translations are
taken, sometimes with minor adaptations, from the editions of Fraenkel (1950) (Aesch.
Ag.), Lloyd-Jones (1994–1996) (Sophocles) and Kovacs (1994–2003) (Euripides), unless
otherwise indicated.
15 E.g. Soph. Aj. 544, Eur. Med. 1118.
16 For this function of δή in drama, see Drummen (2009: 151–152), Allan (2017a: 287).
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You there, you that are bowing down your head towards the ground, do
you admit, or do you deny, that you have done this?
Creon is calling Antigone’s attention in a rather harsh way by means of an
accusative (suggesting an ellipse of a verb like καλῶ). The use of δή can again
be interpreted in terms of its two functional aspects: it focuses the attention on
Antigone (‘you there!’), who is as the addressee by definition part of the com-
mon ground. As often, δή in combination with a personal pronoun conveys an
additional sense of the speaker’s contempt for the addressee.17
[11] Sophocles Antigone 937–939
ὦ γῆς Θήβης ἄστυ πατρῶιον
καὶ θεοὶ προγενεῖς,
ἄγομαι δὴ ’γὼ κοὐκέτι μέλλω.
O city of my fathers, land of Thebes, and you gods, our ancestors! I am led
away now; there is no more delay!
In a final emotional appeal to the Thebans, Antigone draws attention to the
outrageous fact, visible to the Thebans, that she is being led away. δή seems to
convey an additional sense of indignation.18
3.2 Shared Communal Knowledge: Common Knowledge, Gnomic
Knowledge
With δή, a speaker may also invoke general knowledge that is shared among
members of a particular community. For example,
[12] Sophocles Antigone 162–163
ἄνδρες, τὰ μὲν δὴ πόλεος ἀσφαλῶς θεοὶ
πολλῶι σάλωι σείσαντες ὤρθωσαν πάλιν· (Soph. Ant. 162–163)
17 More examples in Denniston (21954: 208).
18 Other examples of δή drawing attention to observable entities or events in the immediate
context are: A. Pers. 1071 (sounds of wailing), A. Ag. 887 (dried up eyes), Soph. Aj. 877 (Ajax
has clearly not appeared), Soph. Aj. 1271 (ἀλλ’ οἴχεται δὴ πάντα ταῦτ’ ἐρριμμένα. ‘All this is
clearly cast and gone!’ [indignant tone also present?]).
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Sirs, the gods have shaken the city’s fortunes with a heavy shaking, but
now they have set them right in safety.
As a strategical starting-point of his maiden speech as a ruler of Thebes, in
which he is to proclaim a number of rather controversial issues, Creon refers to
what is undoubtedly themost salient element in the common ground between
him and the elders: their shared experience of the recent civil war (‘Sirs, we all
know the gods have shaken …’).
δή also occurs in gnomic expressions, emphatically pointing out that the
content of the utterance is supposed to bewell-known to the addressee. In [13],
γὰρ δή (‘for, after all’) stresses that it is an obvious fact that hope brings profit
as well as deceptions:
[13] Sophocles Antigone 613–617
οὐδέν’ ἕρπει
θνατῶν βίοτος πάμπολυς ἐκτὸς ἄτας.
ἁ γὰρ δὴ πολύπλαγκτος ἐλ-
πὶς πολλοῖς μὲν ὄνησις ἀνδρῶν,
πολλοῖς δ’ ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων·
To none among mortals shall great wealth come without disaster. For,
after all, widely wandering hope brings profit to many men, but to many
the deception of thoughtless longings.
In the following example, in Euripides’Bacchae, δή once againmarks out a fact
that is common knowledge: we all know what kind of schemes the gods are
inclined to devise.
[14] Euripides Bacchae 290–291
Τε. …Ἥρα νιν ἤθελ’ ἐκβαλεῖν ἀπ’ οὐρανοῦ,
Ζεὺς δ’ ἀντεμηχανήσαθ’ οἷα δὴ θεός.
Ti. Herawanted to hurl him it out of heaven. But Zeus in return devised
a scheme such as a god indeed devises.19
19 The translation is from Seaford (2001).
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However, as is often the case when δή is used in a relative clause, additional
pragmatic effects come into play.20 In this case, δή might have a disapprov-
ing, or even sarcastic, undertone vis-à-vis the notorious wiliness of the gods.
Another pragmatic effect which is also frequently found with δή in relative
clauses is that δήmarks exclusivity, contrasting the referent with possible alter-
natives: ‘precisely such a scheme as a god devises’ (‘a scheme typical of a god’).
A comparable effect can be observed in the following example:
[15] Sophocles Ajax 1045
Μενέλαος, ὧι δὴ τόνδε πλοῦν ἐστείλαμεν.
Menelaos, for whom we launched this expedition.
Again, the speaker, namely the chorus of Salaminian sailors, who are friends
of Ajax, refer to the well-known fact that the Trojan expedition was launched
for the sake of Menelaos. Again, one may also sense an additional notion of
exclusivity (‘precisely for whom’, ‘for whom alone’, ‘the very man for whom’),
accompanied by a sense of contempt.
3.3 Shared Knowledge of Preceding Discourse and Shared Expectations
about Subsequent Discourse
δήmay also refer to common ground which is based on the discourse in which
the speaker and addressee are currently engaged. For example, in [16], Anti-
gone and Ismene are coming to the end of their heated discussion whether or
not they should bury Polyneices:
[16] Sophocles Antigone 78–81
Ισ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἄτιμα ποιοῦμαι, τὸ δὲ
βίαι πολιτῶν δρᾶν ἔφυν ἀμήχανος.
Αν. σὺ μὲν τάδ’ ἂν προὔχοι’· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τάφον
χώσουσ’ ἀδελφῶι φιλτάτωι πορεύσομαι.
Is. I am not dishonouring them, but I do not have it inme to act against
the will of the people of the city.
20 See also Denniston (21954: 218–220). For the meaning of οἷα in this line, see Rijksbaron
(1991: ad loc.).
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An. Youmay offer that excuse; but I go to heap up a tomb for my dearest
brother!
Toput an end to their discussion,Antigone emphatically repeats her firm inten-
tion to bury their brother, thus hammering home to Ismene, once and for all,
that she will bury Polyneices (‘As should be clear to you by now, I will go to bury
my brother’).
The particle is also used in reference to words that have been spoken at an
earlier stage of the conversation and are, therefore, presumed to be familiar to
the addressee.21
[17] Aeschylus Agamemnon 539, 550
Κη. χαίρω τὸ τεθνάναι δ’ οὐκέτ’ ἀντερῶ θεοῖς.
[…]
Χο. ὡς νῦν, τὸ σὸν δή, καὶ θανεῖν πολλὴ χάρις.
Her. Joy I have; and I no longer object to being dead.
[…]
Ch. [I had to fear] So much that now, in your own words, even death is
a great joy.
In [17], δή is used by the chorus to remind the Herald of his own words, spoken
a dozen lines earlier (539).
A very frequent discourse-oriented use of δή relates to its occurrence in com-
mands and questions. In such contexts, too, δή shows its dual function as an
attention-getter and a common ground marker.
[18] Sophocles Antigone 531–535
σὺ δ’, ἣ κατ’ οἴκους ὡς ἔχιδν’ ὑφειμένη
λήθουσά μ’ ἐξέπινες, οὐδ’ ἐμάνθανον
τρέφων δύ’ ἄτα κἀπαναστάσεις θρόνων,
φέρ’, εἰπὲ δή μοι, καὶ σὺ τοῦδε τοῦ τάφου
φήσεις μετασχεῖν, ἢ ’ξομῆι τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι;
21 For δή’s quoting function, see alsoDenniston (21954: 235), Sicking and vanOphuijsen (1993:
142) and Bonifazi et al. (2016: III.2 §76).
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You, whom I never noticed as like a viper hiding in the house you sucked
my blood—nor did I know that I was rearing up two plagues and two sub-
verters of the throne—come, tell me, do you admit being a party to this
burial, or will you swear that you know nothing?
δή combined with an imperative shows two functions: (1) it reinforces the
imperative by urging the addressee to pay attention to it, and (2) it construes
the command as a part of the common ground. More specifically, it presents
the discourse act to the addressee as expected and understandable, and as a
logical consequence prepared by the preceding discourse (‘then’, ‘therefore’).22
Thus δή often implies that the addressee is supposed to comply with the order
without any hesitation.
In [18], Creon expresses his suspicion against Ismene. He presents his re-
quest to Ismene—to tell him whether or not she has been an accomplice—as
a discourse act following logically from the preceding discourse (‘tellme, there-
fore, …’).
In questions, as well, δή invokes the common ground: its function might be
compared to its function in directives, expressing that the speech act at issue,
be it a command or a question, should be seen as an expected continuation of
the preceding discourse.23
[19] Euripides Bacchae 821–822
Δι. στεῖλαί νυν ἀμφὶ χρωτὶ βυσσίνους πέπλους.
Πε. τί δὴ τόδ’; ἐς γυναῖκας ἐξ ἀνδρὸς τελῶ;
Di. Then dress yourself in a long linen robe.
Pe. Why that? Shall I become a woman instead of a man?
22 See also Kühner and Gerth (1898: II 127), Denniston (21954: 216).
23 See also Bonifazi et al. (2016: III.2 §78). In commands andquestions, δή functions, in terms
of the layeredmodel of FunctionalDiscourseGrammar (Hengeveld andMackenzie 2008),
on a different linguistic layer from the uses mentioned earlier. While, in the uses men-
tionedearlier, theparticle functions as anoperator on the level of theCommunicatedCon-
tent (as itmarks that theCommunicatedContent or somepart of it is known information),
in commands and questions the particle can be analysed as an operator on the level of the
Discourse Act: it reinforces the illocution and signals that the speech act is an expected
consequence of the previous discourse. In the FDG model, both the layer of the Commu-
nicated Content and the layer of the Discourse Act are part of the Interpersonal Level. It is
incorrect to interpret δή as only having scope over (and thus emphasising) the interrogat-
ive pronoun since the particle also occurs in yes/no-questions, with an identical function.
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Dionysus orders Pentheus to put on a linen robe. With δή, Pentheus signals
that his question (‘Why that then?’) is an understandable reaction to the order,
given by Dionysus, to put on a linen robe. The use of δή in questions is often
also associated with emotions such as indignation or impatience (Denniston
21954: 236), a contextual side-effect of its attention-getting function.
Another frequent context in which δή appears in drama is in the combina-
tion καὶ δή. As we have seen earlier, καὶ δή can be ‘used to mark an entry that
has been prepared for by thewords that precede it’ (van ErpTaalmanKip 2009:
128). The particle combination καὶ δή is also used in other contexts, such as in
responses to requests. In this context, too, we may recognise δή’s twofold func-
tion as a common ground marker and attention-focuser.
[20] Sophocles Antigone 244–245
Κρ. οὔκουν ἐρεῖς ποτ’, εἶτ’ ἀπαλλαχθεὶς ἄπει;
Φυ. καὶ δὴ λέγω σοι.
Cr. Will you not speak out, and leave after having been discharged?24
Guard I am already telling you.25
καὶ δή, in reactions to a request, is used to express that—or at least to pre-
tend as if—the order has already been carried out, or is in the course of
being carried out: in most cases, the tense used is either a present (cf. λέγω
in 245) or a perfect indicative.26 With καὶ δή, the speaker suggests to the per-
son giving the order not to insist any longer, as the speaker has no intention
to hesitate to comply with the order. In [20], Creon commands the guard
finally to speak out as to why he has come (οὐ plus future indicative is often
used to express an emphatic command; see Rijksbaron 32006: 34). δή, on the
one hand, signals to the addressee to pay attention (‘Look!’); on the other
hand, δή suggests that the addressee should be able to observe (‘as you can
see’) that the action ordered is already being performed (or has been per-
formed).
There may be a further element relating to common ground management
that is relevant in such contexts—that the speaker’s compliance to the order
should come as expected to the addressee (‘of course’). That the element of
expectation does indeed play a role in this use of (καὶ) δή may be gathered
24 For ἀπαλλαχθείςmeaning ‘having been discharged’ here, see Allan (2006: 119).
25 My translation.
26 See also Denniston (21954: 251), Wakker (1997: 216–217).
- 978-90-04-44026-5
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com10/12/2020 08:49:24PM
via free access
pointing to common ground in dramatic dialogue 59
from the contrasting use of καὶ μήν in reactions to orders, which expresses that
the speaker somehow counters an expectation entertained by the person giv-
ing the order: speakers use καὶ μήν to indicate that their compliance27 or their
non-compliance28 with the command may come as unexpected to the person
ordering. In short, καὶ μήν and καὶ δή show complementary pragmatic func-
tions: while the former signals that the speaker’s reaction is somehow contrary
to expectation, the latter suggests that the compliance should not come as a
surprise to the addressee.29
There is still one other intriguing use of καὶ δή worth discussing in more
detail. We have seen that καὶ δή usually points out that some entity or event
is perceivable (and often also according to expectation) to the addressee, and,
thus, part of the common ground. Building on the notions of perceivability and
joint attention, the combination καὶ δή is also used to invite the addressee to
vividly imagine (‘before the inner eye’), for the sake of the argument or by way
of thought experiment, that a particular situation has indeed (already) been
realised. For example,
[21] Euripides Medea 1107–1111
καὶ δὴ γὰρ ἅλις βίοτόν θ’ ηὗρον
σῶμά τ’ ἐς ἥβην ἤλυθε τέκνων
χρηστοί τ’ ἐγένοντ’· εἰ δὲ κυρήσαι
δαίμων οὕτως, φροῦδος ἐς Ἅιδου
θάνατος προφέρων σώματα τέκνων.
Suppose they have found a sufficient livelihood, suppose the children’s
bodies have arrived at young manhood and their character is good: yet if
their destiny so chances, off goes death carrying the children’s bodies to
Hades.
27 Denniston cites a considerable number of instances of καὶ μήν ‘expressing, directly or
by implication, agreement or consent’ (Denniston 21954: 353). As Wakker (1997: 216) has
shown, however, καὶ μήν in consenting reactions does not express the consent itself, but
the fact that the consent is (presumably) not expected by the addressee (the person com-
manding).
28 For example, Αι. κόμιζέ νύν μοι παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν, ὡς ἴδω. Τε. καὶ μὴν φόβοισί γ’ αὐτὸν ἐξελυσά-
μην. (‘Ajax: Then bringmemy son so that I can see him. Tecmessa:Why, I was afraid and
sent him away’, Soph. Aj. 530–531).
29 Note that solitary δή, without καί, can also be used in assentient reactions (Denniston
21954: 227).
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In such contexts, καὶ δή introduces a presupposition (‘let us assume that …’,
‘suppose that …’), functioning as common ground between the interlocutors
and serving as a starting point for further reasoning.30
Let us move away from the combination καὶ δή and examine yet another
combination inwhich δή tends to occur:with anaphoric pronouns and adverbs.
In narrative texts, as we know, combinations such as οὗτος δή, τότε δή, ἐνταῦθα
δή abound. Although in drama occurrences of this combination are few and
far between, it is not difficult to recognise the double function of δή. On
the one hand, δή marks that the element in its scope is part of the com-
mon ground. In the case of an anaphoric pronoun, this is not very surpris-
ing since an anaphoric pronoun by definition refers to an entity which has
already been mentioned, and which is therefore necessarily part of the com-
mon ground.31
On the other hand, the attention-focusing function of δή serves to single out
the referent of the anaphoric pronoun while excluding potential alternative
candidates.32 Thus, a combination such as ταῦτα δή can be paraphrased by ‘that
alone’, ‘precisely that’, or ‘that and nothing else’.
[22] Aeschylus Persians 159
[Chorus: Queen, you were wife and are mother of a god, unless ancient
fortune has abandoned our army.]
30 More examples can be found in Denniston (21954: 252).
31 I do not see the necessity to distinguish an additional function of δή as a marker of larger
narrative steps (Bonifazi et al. 2016: II.3.3.1, IV.4.5.1). In my view, δή in combinations such
as ἀλλ’ ὅτε δή or δὴ τότε/τότε δή can be explained well on the basis of its focusing func-
tion, excluding alternative (earlier or later) moments on the time line (‘once’, ‘as soon as’,
‘at the very moment’, ‘only when’, ‘not until’), e.g. Soph. Ant. 91: οὐκοῦν, ὅταν δὴ μὴ σθένω,
πεπαύσομαι ‘Then, not until my strength fails, will I be at rest’ (my translation). The fact
that, in narrative, there is often a discourse boundary should be ascribed to contextual
elements rather than to the function of δή: e.g., the boundary marking should be ascribed
to the presence of ἀλλά, or to δή’s occurrence in preposed temporal clauses, which typic-
ally mark transitions to a new narrative episode/move/paragraph (see Buijs 2005). In the
same vein, frequent combinations such as πρὶν δή (‘until the very moment’, ‘until at last’),
δή ποτε and τότε δή (‘only then’, ‘at that very moment’, ‘not until then’, ‘then at last’) can
be explained well on the basis of the exclusive function of δή—it is, again, unnecessary to
invoke an additional function of δή as a marker of narrative steps.
32 Depending on the context, the set of alternative referents may be ordered on an implicit
scale, e.g. a temporal scale, as in the case of τότε δή ‘at that very moment’, ‘only then’ (i.e.
neither at an earlier, nor at a later moment in time).
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Βα. ταῦτα δὴ λιποῦσ’ ἱκάνω χρυσεοστόλμους δόμους…
Qu. For this very reason I have left the gold-deckedpalace and comehere
…33
In some contexts, the combination of δή + anaphoric demonstrative seems to
be associated with an indignant undertone (‘that—of all things!’):
[23] Sophocles Electra 385
[Chrysothemis tells Electra that they plan to lock her up in a dungeon.]
Ηλ. ἦ ταῦτα δή με καὶ βεβούλευνται ποεῖν;
El. Is that really what they have decided to do with me?
The particle ἦ in questions usually expresses a sense of unbelief (‘really?’).
That δή is indeed also a common ground marker and not only an attention-
focusing device, as is sometimes claimed, can be concluded from the fact
that δή only combines with anaphoric (backwards-referring) pronouns—that
is, referring to entities already known from the preceding discourse—, and
not with cataphoric (forwards-referring) pronouns. If δή would merely be an
attention-focusing device, there would be no reason why it would not also
be combined with cataphoric pronouns. However, the striking asymmetry
between its distribution with anaphoric and cataphoric pronouns shows that
δή is indeed also a common ground marker.
The last context of use to be addressed here is δή’s combination with lexical
items which inherently tend to attract the clausal focus, such as αὐτός, μόνος,
πᾶς, πολύς, and superlatives. An example from drama of δή with a superlative
is:
[24] Aeschylus Persians 331
αἰαῖ, κακῶν ὕψιστα δὴ κλύω τάδε.
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The fact that δή is so often combined with these inherently focus-oriented
words should not be surprising, given its function as an attention-focuser: δή
reinforces the focality of the item in its scope. As often, the attention-focusing
aspect of δή is also accompanied by additional senses, such as exclusivity (i.e.
‘only’, ‘the very …’ + superlative) and noteworthiness (or, more specifically,
mental attitudes such as indignation, contempt or amazement).
However, when combined with such focus-attracting items, not only δή’s
focusing function is relevant, but I would argue that δή also invokes the inter-
locutors’ common ground. For example, in [24], δή not only focuses the atten-
tion to ὕψιστα (‘the very worst’, ‘absolutely the worst’), but it also used by
the Queen to signal that it should be obvious to the messenger (i.e. common
ground) that the catastrophic lost battle at Salamis is indeed the worst disaster
she has ever experienced.
4 The Particle τοι: Reminding the Addressee of Common Ground
It is not easy to pinpoint what τοι exactly does in the interaction between the
speaker and the addressee. There is a general consensus that its function is
strongly interactive: it serves to make an urgent appeal to the addressee. In
this interpretation, the particle’s origin as an ethic dative of the second person
pronoun (‘to you’, ‘for you’) undoubtedly plays an important role.35 A helpful
characterisation of the particle’s function, reflecting the common opinion, is
given by Annemieke Drummen:
[25] Drummen in Bonifazi et al. (2016: III.4 §58); Drummen (2017: 258)
The particle τοι […] works to further a speaker’s persuasive ends. The
particle’s function is to signal an appeal to the addressee, who is strongly
encouraged to take note of, and believe, the statement being uttered.
Drummen rightly stresses strong persuasive force of τοι as a device to appeal to
the addressee to take note and to believe the truth of the statement.36 Although
this characterisation of τοι is correct, I would like to argue that it is possible to
arrive at amore precise definition if one takes into account its function in com-
mon groundmanagement. I, therefore, propose to describe τοι’s function along
the following lines:
35 For the diachronical development (grammaticalisation) of τοι, see Allan (2017b).
36 A similar characterisation of τοι is given by the CGCG (van Emde Boas et al. 2018: 691).
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[26] The particle τοι is used by a speaker to emphatically appeal to the
addressee to pay attention to the speech act, typically serving to remind
the addressees of common ground information which the addressee
seems to ignore or to have forgotten.
What τοι shares with δή is its function to point out an element in the com-
mon ground to the addressee. Themain difference, however, is that δή typically
refers to an element in the common ground that is already relatively active
in the addressee’s consciousness or, at least, (supposed to be) easily access-
ible to the addressee’s mind or perception. τοι, on the other hand, is used to
bring information to the addressee’s attention that, for some reason or another,
has been lying dormant in the addressee’s memory, or information which the
addressee might even be unwilling to recall to mind.37 In other words, τοι,
unlike δή, implies that the speaker confronts, or expects to confront, a certain
degree of resistance on the part of the addressee to acknowledge a piece of
information in the common ground.
A typical context for the use of τοι in Greek drama is a speaker’s attempt to
persuade an addressee to perform a particular action; that is, τοι is not somuch
employed for the purpose of conveying information as it is part of a rhetor-
ical strategy to bring the addressee to change his or her behaviour: it points
out to the addressee that there is some sort of conflict between the addressee’s
present behaviour or beliefs on the one hand, and an element in the common
ground on the other.38
4.1 Shared Communal Knowledge: Common Knowledge, Gnomic
Knowledge
In drama, τοι frequently appears in gnomic statements. As general truths ex-
press shared communal knowledge, they are by definition presumed to be
known to the addressee and as such part of the common ground. In gnomic
expressions, τοι is used to remind the addressee of some conventional wisdom
as the addressee seems to be behaving or thinking contrary to the content of
the gnomic statement at issue. For example,
37 Compare also Denniston’s formulation: ‘Its primary function is to bring home to the com-
prehension of the person addressed a truth of which he is ignorant, or temporarily oblivi-
ous’ (Denniston 21954: 537).
38 The corpus examined, again, consists of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon and Persae, Sophocles’
Ajax and Antigone, and Euripides’Bacchae and Medea (59 instances of τοι in total).
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[27] Sophocles Antigone 241–243
Κρ. εὖ γε στοχάζηι κἀποφάργνυσαι κύκλωι
τὸ πρᾶγμα. δηλοῖς δ’ ὥς τι σημανῶν νέον.
Φυ. τὰ δεινὰ γάρ τοι προστίθησ’ ὄκνον πολύν.
Cr. You are skilfully setting fences and palisades around the matter,
and it is clear that you have some news to tell us.
Guard Yes, serious matters make one very nervous.
Creon is annoyed by the guard’s circuitous approach to thematter at hand and
urges him to get to the point. The guard defends himself by reminding Creon of
a gnomic truth which states that terrible things normally bring about a strong
hesitation.
The particle also occurs in other expressions of common knowledge:
[28] Sophocles Antigone 834–835
[Antigone: Like Niobe, I will die the saddest death.]
Χο. ἀλλὰ θεός τοι καὶ θεογεννής,
ἡμεῖς δὲ βροτοὶ καὶ θνητογενεῖς.
Ch. But she was a goddess and the child of gods, and we are mortal and
the children of mortals.
Antigone tells the story of Niobe, who died a terrible death, while comparing
herself to Niobe, since the gods also bring death upon her. The chorus reject
Antigone’s identification with Niobe by reminding Antigone of Niobe’s divin-
ity (‘But don’t forget she was a goddess and the child of gods etc.’).39
In the following instance from Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, Agamemnon em-
phatically reminds Clytaemestra of the fact that the tokens with which she
wishes to honour him are only fitting to the gods:
39 Other examples from my corpus of τοι in gnomic expressions and other statements
of common communal knowledge: A. Ag. 974, 1014, 1040, 1304, Pers. 287, 706; Soph.
Aj. 520, 580, 988, 1119, 1350, Ant. 473, 522, 580, 1028. See also Denniston (21954: 542–
543).
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[29] Aeschylus Agamemnon 922
θεούς τοι τοῖσδε τιμαλφεῖν χρεών·
The gods we must honour in this way.
4.2 Immediate Context
τοι is also used to draw the addressee’s attention to an element present in
the immediate physical environment which is ignored by the addressee, even
though it is (supposed to be) perceivable and obvious. An illustrative example
of this use of τοι is from a messenger speech in Euripides Bacchae.
[30] Euripides Bacchae 1118–1119
[Messenger, quoting Pentheus’ words:]
ἐγώ τοι, μῆτερ, εἰμί, παῖς σέθεν
Πενθεύς, ὃν ἔτεκες ἐν δόμοις Ἐχίονος·
‘It’s me, mother, Pentheus, the son you bore in Echion’s house!’
The messenger is describing the events leading to Pentheus’ death, citing Pen-
theus’ lastwords. Failing to recognise his true identity, Agauehurls herself upon
Pentheus, who tries to stop her by reminding her that he is, in fact, her son.
Again, τοι is used in an appeal to alert the addressee to an obvious fact which
the addressee fails to acknowledge. A similar example is seen in the Ajax:
[31] Sophocles Ajax 356–360
ἰὼ
γένος ναΐας ἀρωγὸν τέχνας,
ἅλιον ὃς ἐπέβας ἑλίσσων πλάταν,
σέ τοι, σέ τοι μόνον δέδορ-
κα πημονὰν ἐπαρκέσοντ’·
Hail, race helpful with the seaman’s skill, you who came on board to ply
the oar at sea, you, you are the only guardians I see who will help me!
Ajax is inside the hut in which he killed the cattle which he took for the Greek
commanders. Tecmessa opens the door of the hut and Ajax is revealed sitting
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motionless among the slaughtered cattle. Ajax catches sight of his friends, the
sailors from Salamis, who are with Tecmessa, and he calls upon them to help
him. The sailors ignore Ajax’s call for help and, instead, say to Tecmessa that
Ajax is still beside himself. Ajax, then, for a second time attempts to appeal to
the sailors.With the use of τοιAjax desperately tries to finally establish contact
with the sailors by stressing (cf. the emphatic repetition σέ τοι, σέ τοι) the evid-
ent fact, ignored by the sailors, that they are indeed the only ones to be seen
(δέδορκα) in the immediate environment who are able to help him.
4.3 Shared Knowledge of Preceding Discourse: Reminding the Addressee
of What Has Been Said Earlier
τοι can also relate to the discourse context, serving to remind the addressee
of what has been said earlier. In [32], from the Ajax, the messenger asks the
chorus where Ajax is. The chorus reply that Ajax is not in his hut but has just
left. The messenger tells that Teucer has said that they should not allow Ajax
to leave until Teucer himself would be present. In line 734, the chorus ignore
the messenger’s words (note the particle ἀλλά at the beginning of their turn,
forcefully redirecting the discourse) and emphatically remind the messenger
that they had already mentioned that Ajax had left.
[32] Soph. Ajax 735–736, 743–744
[Messenger: Teucer is here fromMysia. Where is Ajax?]
Χο. οὐκ ἔνδον, ἀλλὰ φροῦδος ἀρτίως, νέας
βουλὰς νέοισιν ἐγκαταζεύξας τρόποις.
[Messenger: Teucer said that you should not allow him to go out until
Teucer himself would be there.]
Χο. ἀλλ’ οἴχεταί τοι, πρὸς τὸ κέρδιστον τραπεὶς
γνώμης, θεοῖσιν ὡς καταλλαχθῆι χόλου.
Ch. He is not in, but departed lately, with fresh counsels harnessed to a
fresh mood.
[…]
Ch. Well, as I said, he has gone. He had turned his thoughts in a more
profitable direction, to be reconciled with the gods with whom he
had been angry.
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A similar example is:
[33] Euripides Bacchae 489–490, 515–517
Πε. δίκην σε δοῦναι δεῖ σοφισμάτων κακῶν.
Δι. σὲ δ’ ἀμαθίας γε κἀσεβοῦντ’ ἐς τὸν θεόν.
[…]
Δι. στείχοιμ’ ἄν· ὅ τι γὰρ μὴ χρεών, οὔτοι χρεὼν
παθεῖν. ἀτάρ τοι τῶνδ’ ἄποιν’ ὑβρισμάτων
μέτεισι Διόνυσός σ’, ὃν οὐκ εἶναι λέγεις·
Pe. You’ll pay for your knavish cleverness.
Di. And you for your obtuseness and impiety against the god.
[…]
Di. I’m ready to go: I shall not suffer anything I am not meant to suf-
fer. But Dionysus, you know, will punish you for this highhanded-
ness.
Pentheus has just ordered to lock Dionysus up. Dionysus has the last word
before he is led away and he reminds Pentheus one last time that he will not
escape punishment for his impiety.
5 Conclusion
It is certainly no overstatement that Greek particle research has been flourish-
ing over the last two decades. Thanks to a number of significant studies, we are
slowly getting to grips with these ‘intangible and elusive words’—as Dennis-
ton called them in his preface to the first edition of The Greek Particles. What I
have tried to show here is that the notion of common groundmay be a helpful
addition to the existing theoretical apparatus that has been brought to bear on
the Greek particles. It seems worthwhile to analyse Greek particles as ground-
ing devices, that is, as the speaker’s instructions to the addressee how to relate
the utterance to the common ground. In the case of δή and τοι, for example, a
common ground approach helps to distinguish the two particles more clearly
from one another and from other attitudinal or interactional particles such as
ἦ or μήν. An additional advantage of a common ground approach as a gen-
eral framework for discourse analysis is provided by Occam’s razor: common
ground management is a crucial factor in many different discourse-pragmatic
phenomena, including such basic linguistic phenomena as the use of negation,
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the article, deictic pronouns, conjunctions, clausal complementation, tense-
aspect, modality, and word order.
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The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the position of a given term of
address (TAd) bears any meaning for the understanding of the utterance and
the context to which it relates (Dik 2007: 253).1 The idea that the placement of
TAds can be meaningful has been considered under the framework of Conver-
sation Analysis (Sidnell 2010: 261–264). As will be seen, CA has provided many
clues as to how this research onGreekdrama is to be conducted.There are obvi-
ous limitations. For instance, stand-alone items are rarely found due to formal
constraints,2 such as the metre (Shalev 2003: 359 n. 12). Accordingly, the focus
of this paper will be on TAds at the end of a clause, i.e. on the right periphery
(RP). RP-TAds are rare compared to the frequency with which TAds appear at
the start of a clause (left periphery [LP]) or in the middle (M). LP-TAds (266)
are, in fact, more than twice as frequent as RP-TAds (125) in the sample (see
Section 2.1). The question arises as to whether there are differences concerning
the distribution of RP-TAds and that of the other positions, and what implic-
ations this may have. The distribution of LP-, M- and RP-TAds from a selected
sample of Greek drama will be examined in accordance with the same range
of parameters.
Few studies on TAds have been conducted and research on the placement
of TAds in Ancient Greek remains scarce. Bassett (1934: 140 n. 1) expresses an
interest inwhether the vocative appears at the start, in themiddle, or at the end
of a clause. No research on this issue, however, has come to fruition. Fraenkel
(1965) focuses on M-TAds. The way in which he describes the position of TAds
mainly relies on syntactic categories. Donati (2013: 74) only considers LP-TAds.
Dickey (1996: 195) includes a section on the ‘position of addresses within the
1 The following abbreviations are used in this paper: TAd = term of address, LP = left periphery,
M = term of address in the middle, RP = right periphery, IC = independent clause-TAd, DP =
doubtful position, 2PP = second pair part of an adjacency pair, ECC = extra-clausal constitu-
ent, FTA = Face Threatening Act.
2 See Parkinson (1985: 37) and Haverkate (1984: 69) on the use of TAds as stand-alone items.
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sentence’ (197). By ‘postpositive vocatives’, shemeans only those vocatives that
do not head a sentence, but which are immediately preceded by another word
or phrase.3
I subscribe to the approach by Dik (2007: 253–254), which is opposed to tak-
ing only the line and not the clause as a unit when analysing word order in
Greek drama, thereby leading to the worn-out metri causa argument. I speak
of left and right periphery because only free and not bound TAds are con-
sidered in this paper (following Dickey [1996: 5–6, 23], Parkinson [1985: 36],
and Kleinknecht and Souza [2017: 260]). TAds are not bound if they are extra-
clausal constituents4 that relate to the corresponding clause while being syn-
tactically independent. From a formal standpoint, these TAds are prototypic-
ally in the vocative, including the usage that is traditionally known as nominat-
ivus pro vocativo. Note that vocatives can hardly be considered as cases under
the framework of traditional case grammar since they perform no syntactical
function within the clause nor within any noun phrase of the proposition.5 The
following are examples of TAds on LP and RP:
[1] LP: Euripides Alcestis 476–477 (Heracles to the chorus)
ξένοι, Φεραίας τῆσδε κωμῆται χθονός,
Ἄδμητον ἐν δόμοισιν ἆρα κιγχάνω;
Strangers, dwellers in this land of Pherae, will I find Admetus at home?6
3 In a later work, Dickey (2010: 330–331) speaks of ‘expressive addresses’, but only from a
semantical standpoint. Wendel (1929) is mainly a compilatory work. Scott (1903, 1904, 1905)
explains theuse andomissionof ὦ. Brioso-Sánchez (1971) questionedmanyof Scott’s findings.
Bassett (1934) focuses especially on omission. Donati (2013: 116–136) analyses ὦ diachronic-
ally andconsiders it a case of grammaticalisation.McClure (1995: 50–56) attempts to establish
female speech in Euripides by consideringTAds, among other features. Dickey’s seminalwork
(1996: 20) generally leaves out tragedy. Rutherford (2012: 101–109) addresses the issue briefly
but acutely. See Dickey (2002) on Latin forms of address and Brioso-Sánchez (1971: 35) for
prior bibliography on the vocative. Berger (forth.) has recently devoted a study on a sim-
ilar topic regarding TAds in Latin. According to this work, TAds are important elements of
turn design and they function on three different levels: dialogical (turn-taking), interpersonal
(stance-taking and politeness) and textual (discourse organisation).
4 ECCs as coined in Functional Grammar (Dik 1997: 379–407). See also Haverkate (1984: 67):
‘[…] vocatives typically fill the peripheral slots at the beginning or the end of the sentence’.
5 Haverkate (1984: 68). The matter remains controversial: see Donati (2013: 19–74, 95–96).
6 Unless stated otherwise, translations for Eur. Alc. are taken from Conacher (1988), for Eur.
Andr. from Lloyd (1994), for Soph. Trach. from Jebb (21908). The remaining translations are
my own.
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[2] RP: Euripides Andromache 234–237
Ερ. τί σεμνομυθεῖς κεἰς ἀγῶν’ ἔρχῃ λόγων,
ὡς δὴ σὺ σώφρων, τἀμὰ δ’ οὐχὶ σώφρονα;
Αν. οὔκουν ἐφ’ οἷς γε νῦν καθέστηκας λόγοις.
Ερ. ὁ νοῦς ὁ σός μοι μὴ ξυνοικοίη, γύναι.
He. Why do you preach and enter into a contest of words, alleging that
you are virtuous and I am not virtuous?
An. You are certainly not on the evidence of your recent words.
He. May your ‘sense’ never be mine, Andromache.
Combined with TAds in the middle of a clause, a further category should be
added, labelled here as ‘Independent-Clause-TAd’ (IC-TAd). A typical example
is given by what Lee (1997: 212) calls ‘extended apostrophe’, e.g. Eur. Ion 492–
506, which generally consists of a vocative in combination with a relative
clause.7 Lastly, the position of a small number of cases is hard to establish,
mainly due to the various possibilities of punctuation or due to asyndeta, i.e.
when no particle or postpositive makes a clear split between utterances (Dik
2007: 11). This often happens when a TAd lies between two interrogatives, since
it can be difficult to decide whether the TAd should be ascribed to the previous
or to the following question. The position can also be difficult to establishwhen
subordination is loose, as in the caseof certain correlatives, andwhenever there
is no conjunction clearly establishing the ties between clauses.8 These TAds
could correspond to ‘pivotal turn extensions’ according to Clayman (2012),
where they simultaneously complete the prior syntactic unit and initiate the
subsequent unit as a resource for extending turns at talk.
Unmarked cases seem to be in LP since they often appear just as part of
the mechanics of conversation, in that they are used ‘to get the attention of
the addressee or to single him out of a group’.9 From the standpoint of Con-
versation Analysis (CA), this implies establishing contact or selecting the next
addressee, respectively. As will be seen, this is not the case when it comes to
RP-TAds. In principle, characters who use TAds are deferential or at least con-
siderate towards their addressee, excluding, obviously, overt insults. Bassett
(1934: 142) speaks of the ‘vocative of courtesy’, i.e. the vocative addressed in
7 See Kannicht (1969: ad 1451–1464).
8 Other cases include e.g. Eur. Alc. 510Ἄδμητε, καὶ σὺ χαῖρε, Θεσσαλῶν ἄναξ. The phrase Θεσσα-
λῶν ἄναξ seems to be an apposition toἍδμητε rather than an independent RP-TAd.
9 Dickey (1996: 198–199); Parkinson (1985: 37).
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the first speech of one character to another, which can be omitted in further
turns. Other reasons for omission include that of the addressee being greatly
inferior to the speaker in status, the urgency of the situation, and the identity
of the addressee remaining unknown (Bassett 1934: 144–146; Dickey 1996: 193,
247). Consequently, the omission of TAds could be felt as being rude, abrupt,
or unfriendly.10 Eustathius (806.27) describes Hector as rude when compared
to Nestor because the latter begins a similar call for volunteers with ὦ φίλοι (Il.
20.204), whereas Hector (Il. 20.303) uses no TAd.
I have looked into whether RP-TAds fulfil conversational functions, such as
contact establishment, next addressee selection, and turn allocation, and com-
pared themwith LP- andM-TAds. I have also examinedwhich types of TAds are
more frequently employed in RP, which kinds of characters utter these TAds,
and in connection with which speech acts they do so. These and other para-
meters could eventually shed light onwhether RP-TAds behave in the sameway
as do LP- and M-TAds.
2 Method
2.1 Corpus
I have selected the following plays for my research: Aesch. Supp.; Soph. El.,
Trach.; Eur. Alc., Heracl., Andr., Ion; Ar. Nub. The base texts are drawn from TLG
online, although later editions and commentaries have been checked in every
case.11 My preference is for the manuscript reading, unless it is impracticable.
The following sample of TAds, classified in terms of position, emerges from
this corpus: LP-TAds (266), M-TAds (272), RP-TAds (125), IC-TAds (51), uncertain
(51), total (765).
2.2 Parameters
The distribution of everyTAd has been analysed in accordancewith the follow-
ing parameters: CA-functions (i.e. turn allocation and contact establishment),
10 Rutherford (2012: 101, 103–109, esp. 105); Dickey (1996: 193). The same applies to other lan-
guages, such as Egyptian Arabic (Parkinson 1985: 39). See alsoVenegas-Lagüéns (1991: 135).
From a broader perspective, this could be analysed under the framework of the impolite-
ness strategy ‘withhold politeness’, consisting on ‘the absence of politeness work where it
would be expected’ (Culpeper 1996: 357, 2016: 425).
11 The main editions and commentaries followed are: Johansen and Whittle (1980); Jebb
(31894), Finglass (2007); Jebb (21908), Davies (1991); Dale (1954), Conacher (1988), Parker
(2007); Wilkins (1993); Stevens (1971), Lloyd (1994); Lee (1997), Martin (2018); Starkie
(1966), Dover (1968), Wilson (2007) respectively.
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TAd types, speech act types, and non-redressive action. I consider as ‘non-
redressive action’ every case where a TAd is uttered in the context of an FTA
(Face Threatening Act) that is performed explicitly and as a direct speech act
(bald-on-record FTAs).
Threemoreparameters deserve tobementioned, namelydistance (D factor),
i.e. the degree of familiarity between participants (Brown and Levinson 21987:
15–16, 74–82, 249–253), text type, and TAd-variation. Distance has turned out
not to be a relevant parameter. Out of 765 TAds, there are 402 examples with
a negative D factor (i.e. characters are close to each other), compared to 146
where theD factor is positive (i.e. characters are not familiarwith each other).12
This is, perhaps, due to the fact that characters in tragedy are often acquaint-
ances or relatives.13
Similarly, TAds in any position are more common in dialogue than in long
speeches (exceeding 10 lines), odes, and distichs by the chorus. Nonetheless,
RP-TAds belong, more significantly (72.8%, 91), in dialogue than the TAds in
the other positions do, since this figure exceeds both the percentage of TAds
in dialogue of the whole sample (55.69%, 426), as well as the corresponding
percentage of LP-TAds (53.01%, 141) and M-TAds (49.26%, 134).
Finally, the variation of TAds within a speech or play raises an interesting
question (Haverkate 1984: 71–76), but this, unfortunately, lies beyond the scope
of this research. The use of ὦ also falls outside the scope, especially since the
sample is too limited for the purpose. The matter is, moreover, truly controver-
sial (Dickey 1996: 205).
2.2.1 TAd Types
My TAd typology roughly follows that of Dickey (1996),14 although it is sim-
plified in accordance with what was actually found in the sample. Wendel’s
labelling is added in brackets and followed by an example:
A. Names:
a. Anthroponym (Eigenname).
b. Patronymic, origin (Patronymika, Völkername). Patronymics convey
formality and respect (Dickey 1996: 52–56, 90–98, 248).
B. Age (Lebensalter) and kinship terms (e.g. πόσι). When παῖ is addressed
to slaves it is probably derived from an age term and not from a kinship
12 The remaining 217 cases are ‘non-applicable’ since the degree of closeness of the parti-
cipants is difficult to ascertain.
13 Dramatic plots seem to work more effectively when focused on family relationships: see
Rutherford (2012: 103) and Aristotle (Poet. 1453b19–22).
14 See also Rutherford (2012: 101).
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term (i.e. the address to one’s own child) (Dickey 1996: 258). In any case,
παῖ, both when addressed to slaves and to one’s own offspring, is in this
paper classified as an ‘age’ term (Rutherford 2012: 105 n. 107) in contrast
to τέκνον, which is clearly a kinship term, and possibly more emotional.
C. Indefinite addresses and ξένε. The standard TAd was the anthroponym,
to which Dickey (1996: 46, 2010: 329) refers as the first name, ‘unless the
addressee was a woman, a child, a slave, a foreigner, or a close relative of
the speaker’. Deviations thereof were accordingly salient except for γύναι
when a male addressed a female who was not his wife. Thus, γύναι was
the standard TAd for respectable women in these contexts (Dickey 1996:
243–248; Wendel 1929: 60).
D. Doubtful TAds (Beinamen).15 Among others, I include ὦ μέλε, ὦ τᾶν (see
McClure 1995: 55) as well as ὦ δαιμόνιε.
E. Invocations, e.g. ὦ λέκτρον. Dickey (1996: 24) only includes exclamations
when they are actual addresses or prayers to the gods. For a more accur-
ate comparison, all the examples of freeTAds are considered in this paper,
including TAds to offstage characters, self-addressed TAds, and oaths.
F. Titles (rank), e.g. ἄναξ, δέσποινα, and δμῶες.
G. Endearment terms, e.g. ὦ φίλταθ’ Ἕκτορ. The endearment term in the
example is just ὦ φίλταθ’, but ὦ φίλταθ’ Ἕκτορ is counted as unit and ana-
lysed as an endearment term. The same is true in H.
H. Deferential terms, e.g. ὦ σοφώτατοι θεαταί.
I. Derogatory terms, e.g. ὦ μῖσος.
2.2.2 Speech Act Types
Busse (2006: 112) claims that ‘speech act theory is of particular importance’ in
her study on the vocative constructions in Shakespeare. I have implemented
a typology of speech acts based on Risselada (1993: 32–49). Speech acts are
classified in accordance with two dimensions: orientation towards the speaker
or towards the addressee;16 and whether ‘the content […] primarily refers to
action, information or emotions’ (Risselada 1993: 35). The following diagram
displays these two criteria, combined in the formof intersecting horizontal and
vertical axes respectively, and should be taken as a continuum since no clear-
15 Beiname (‘epithet’) is something different than ‘doubtful TAd’, but the content denoted by
these two terms is roughly the same.
16 I have not considered orientation towards a definite or indefinite third person (Risse-
lada 1993: 36), since this can be subsumed by the declarative type and, depending on
the context, can be understood as an impersonalisation strategy under the framework of
Politeness Theory (Brown and Levinson 21987: 191; House and Kasper 1981: 168).
- 978-90-04-44026-5
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com10/12/2020 08:49:24PM
via free access
76 rodríguez-piedrabuena
figure 1 Typology of speech acts
modified from Risselada 1993: 37
cut categorisation is intended. Accordingly, a number of borderline speech acts
are represented in brackets (Figure 1).
I have included several modifications (in italics), especially by further elab-
orating on the speech acts about emotions.17
Risselada (1993) focused on the subtype of directive speech acts, which are
in turn classified in accordancewith the schemebelow.18 There are two criteria:
the degree to which the speech act is presented as compulsory,19 and whether
the benefit is addressed towards the speaker or the addressee. Again, it is a con-
tinuum (Figure 2).
I have also elaborated on the commissive speech acts by distinguishing
between promises, threats, and warnings in accordance with two criteria,
namely whether the speaker is the agent and whether a benefit or detriment
is addressed more or less directly towards the recipient, i.e. the eventual per-
locutionary effect. Thus, in promises, the speaker is the agent and there can be
a benefit directly towards the addressee. In turn, the agent does not explicitly
identify with the speaker in warnings and the damage is not explicitly oriented
towards the addressee. In contrast, threats are detrimental for the addressee
17 While reproaches and laments relate to the past and the state of affairs is not likely
to change (Risselada 1993: 78), speech acts about emotions which belong in a more
non-factual dimension, e.g. wishes and complaints, lie between expressive and directive
speech acts.
18 Hindelang (1978: 19, 119, 131, 141) also distinguishes between bindende and nicht-bindende
Aufforderungen, which, in turn, are subclassified; see also Haverkate (1984: 19).
19 Thus, in requests ‘the decisionwhether or not to realize the content is left to the addressee’
(Risselada 1993: 47; see also Berger on bindingness in this volume).
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figure 2 Typology of directive speech acts
Risselada 1993: 48
and the speaker is the agent. Finally, the concept of ‘metadirectivity’ should be
considered for a better account of the speech act types:
[…] there is […] a metadirective element in every speech act type. This
metadirective element results from the systematic perlocutionary effects
[…] this concept […] is needed for an adequate description of utterances
which contain the imperative of a ‘perlocutionary’ verb (e.g. crede mihi
‘believe me’ or dic mihi ‘tell me’). These metadirective utterances […] are
often misinterpreted as ordinary directives. They constitute, in fact, the
functional counterparts of performative expressions like I tell you that
or I ask you whether […]. Just as I promise that I will be here is not an
assertive speech act, but an emphatically expressed commissive, believe
me that I never sawhimdo that before is not a directive but an emphatically
expressed assertion.20
An example of this in Greek is Soph. Trach. 598 (τί χρὴ ποεῖν; σήμαινε. ‘what are
thy commands? Givememy charge.’). σήμαινε is not an order but ametadirect-
ive relating to the previous question.
2.2.3 CA-Functions (Turn Allocation and Contact Establishment)
Here, I consider functions that are normally studied under the framework of
Conversation Analysis (see Sacks et al. 1974: 701), to which Parkinson referred
(1985: 36) in the following way: TAds ‘play an important role in some speech
acts, and also an important part in the “mechanics” of conversation’. From
a broader perspective, Geluykens (1987: 121) similarly considered two major
functional domains (informational and interactional) when analysing ‘tails’
(right-dislocations) under the framework of Functional Grammar. He does in
20 Risselada (1993: 44–45; her emphases).
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fact point out that ‘tails are an interactional process rather than a mere word
order variation’ and that ‘tails are interactional patterns, and they have to be
studied in relation to the turn-taking process’ (Geluykens 1987: 122, 127). In
line with this proposal, the distribution of TAds in terms of position is ana-
lysed according to whether or not LP-, M- and RP-TAds fulfil a CA-function. A
TAd performs a CA-function whenever it is used for the establishment of con-
tact (seeMastronarde 1979), for turn assignment (when the speaker selects the
next addressee or allocates the next turn in trilogues), and in second pair parts
of an adjacency pair (2PP). On the other hand, TAds do not always perform
one of these CA-functions, since they can be used even when the speaker has
already established contact and/or has already selected the next addressee.
These cases are labelled as interactive. Finally, TAds that do not perform CA-
functions can also be non-interactive, whenever there is no direct interaction,
e.g. invocations, TAds to offstage characters, and self-references. Thus, TAds
performing a non-CA-function are labelled as either interactive or not inter-
active.
3 Data
The following data lead to results in the form of tendencies, since no TAd dis-
tribution is absolutely neat. However, there are trends that are well supported
by the data which point to differences, particularly between LP- and RP-TAds,
and which support the idea that TAd position is not random but can convey
a variety of nuances. For several parameters some subtypes are badly attested
in the sample. For instance, there are only eight examples of suggestions and
warnings; in all, there are four threats (Table 4). The low percentages of these
cases probably have less to do with the TAd position than with the fact that the
sample is small. For this reason, results in Section 4 are drawn only from those
parameters that are sufficiently attested.
3.1 TAd Position and theMechanics of Conversation
There are significant differences in how the TAd position relates to the mech-
anics of conversation. LP-TAds are employed to establish contact between the
characters (30.83%). If they are not uttered to fulfil turn-allocation functions,
then they are not used in direct interactions (39.1%) but in invocations to the
gods, to offstage characters, or in self-references.M-TAds aremore or less evenly
distributed across the various categories. Conversely, RP-TAds are rarely used to
establish contact and are uttered mostly when they are not strictly needed for
turn allocation, since contact is already established and/or the next addressee
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table 1 Distribution of TAd position by CA-functions. Row percentages by the number of
coded references
CA-functions




LP 7.14% (19) 39.1% (104) 7.89% (21) 15.04% (40) 30.83% (82)
M 25.74% (70) 19.12% (52) 17.65% (48) 22.06% (60) 15.44% (42)
RP 49.6% (62) 8.8% (11) 20% (25) 14.4% (18) 7.2% (9)
IC 9.8% (5) 70.59% (36) 3.92% (2) 1.96% (1) 13.73% (7)
DP 27.45% (14) 23.53% (12) 9.8% (5) 23.53% (12) 15.69% (8)
To 22.22% (170) 28.1% (215) 13.2% (101) 17.12% (131) 19.35% (148)
is already selected (49.6%). Unlike LP-TAds, they are rare when there is no dir-
ect interaction (e.g. invocations or self-references), see Table 1.
These results match those of Zwicky (1974), whereby he proposes a correl-
ation between the function of the vocative and its position in comparable
terms, namely that vocatives in the form of calls are limited to the first posi-
tion, whereas the M- and RP-positions are for vocatives as addresses. Similarly,
Slocum (2016: 18–20) claims that ‘callsmust occur sentence initially’ in English,
whereas ‘addresses may appear in a wide variety of positions’. Further similar
typologies have been proposed, in which the TAd position appears to be a rel-
evant factor in the determination of its function.21
3.2 Distribution of TAd Position by TAdType
There are several differences, particularly between LP and RP, in terms of the
distribution of TAd types. Invocations to gods (27.07%) and endearment terms
(18.8%) score the highest in LP. In turn, RP-TAds are most frequently kinship
(23.20%)or indefinite (21.60%) forms,where they have thehighest proportion.
21 See Kleinknecht and Souza (2017: 260–261).
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table 2 Distribution of TAd position by TAd type. Row percentages by the number of
coded references. Inv.: invocations; Dear.: endearment terms; IA: indefinite; Der.;
derogatory; Def.: Deferential; Kin.: kinship; FN: first name; Patr.: patronymica






































































































a The remaining 16 TAds are doubtful.
On the other hand, other trends which could be revealing can be at risk of
being neglected, sinceTAd types aremany and the figures associatedwith them
remain low. For this reason, it is particularly instructive not only to consider
the raw percentages but also to account for them in relation to the average per-
centages across the whole sample (see the last row in Table 2). For instance,
although RP-TAds present the highest rate of derogatory forms, this makes up
only 8%. However, insults are not as common in tragedy as the other types:
only 6.27% of the TAds from the sample are insults, and hence 8% is already a
higher rate regarding the overall sample. The same over-representation applies
to rank, actually the highest percentage (10.40% of RP-TAds), and first names
(8% of RP-TAds): these percentages are proportionally higher in RP-TAds if we
consider the average scores of rank TAds and first names (6.67% and 6.54%
respectively). Conversely, deferential TAds on the RP are very rare and present
the lowest proportion (0.8%). In this regard, it is also worth noting the over-
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table 3 Distribution of TAd position by speech act type. Row percentages by the number
of coded references
Facts Actions Emotions Metadirectives
LP 27.44% (73) 17.67% (47) 53.76% (143) 1.13% (3)
M 34.93% (95) 28.31% (77) 31.62% (86) 5.15% (14)
RP 27.2% (34) 46.4% (58) 24% (30) 2.4% (3)
IC 1.96% (1) 0% (0) 98.04% (50) 0% (0)
DP 27.45% (14) 25.49% (13) 43.14% (22) 3.92% (2)
Total 28.37% (217) 25.49% (195) 43.27% (331) 2.88% (22)
all sample (3.53%), the LP-TAds (4.89%), and especially the IC-TAds, namely
wordy apostrophes, where deferential TAds rate the highest (7.84%).
3.3 Distribution of TAd Position by Speech Act Type
The position of TAds also depends on the kind of speech act type (Table 3).
While LP-TAds are found significantly more often in speech acts about emo-
tions or facts (53.76% and 27.44% respectively), RP-TAds mainly appear in the
context of speech acts about actions (46.4%). Indeed, this is the highest per-
centage, followed by those about facts (27.2%) and emotions (24%). In turn,
M-TAds are more evenly distributed.
The distribution of the subtypes is presented below (Section 3.3.1–3.3.2)with
the exception of speech acts about facts, since there are no significant differ-
ences regarding the distribution of the corresponding subtypes (i.e. declarat-
ives and interrogatives).
3.3.1 Distribution of TAd Position by Directive Speech Acts
More than half of the RP-TAds in the context of directive speech acts appear
in orders (53.45%), which is well above the average rate (34.36%). This is a
property shared with stand-alone TAds.22 In contrast, LP-TAds in the context
22 Haverkate (1984: 70): ‘[…] impositive speech acts in particular […] are performed by the
- 978-90-04-44026-5
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com10/12/2020 08:49:24PM
via free access
82 rodríguez-piedrabuena
table 4 Distribution of TAd position by directive speech act type. Row percentages by the
number of coded references. IC-TAds are not attested. Sugg.: suggestions; Adv.:
advice; Prop.: proposals; Req.: requests; Warn.: warnings; Prom.: Promises
Sugg. Adv. Prop. Req. Orders Threats Warn. Prom.
LP
(47)















































2.05 (4) 4.10 (8) 11.28
(22)
of directive speech acts are more common in non-binding speech acts, such as
in requests (34.04%) and proposals (17.02%), especially if we take into account
the overall score for the sample (25.13% and 11.28% respectively), see Table 4.
3.3.2 Distribution of TAd Position by Speech Acts about Emotions
The distribution of speech acts concerning emotions also points to the dif-
ferent nuances between LP- and RP-TAds. RP-TAds are more often uttered in
reproaches (30%) whereas LP-TAds are more common in laments (38.46%).
Since laments are self-addressed or addressed to offstage characters, normally
gods, this distribution corresponds to that previously discussed about LP-TAds,
namely that they are often non-interactive (invocations, self-addresses, and
addresses to offstage characters) in most of the remaining cases, in which they
are not mechanically used to fulfil CA-functions (particularly that of establish-
ing contact).
utterance of a vocative alone. [I]f someone is ringing at the door, […] a vocative like ¡ Juan-
ita! perfectly serves the purpose of requesting or ordering the person addressed […] to
open the door.’
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table 5 Distribution of TAd position by speech acts concerning emotions. Row percent-
ages by the number of coded references. Compl.: complaints; Repr.: reproaches;
Greet.: greetings



















































































RP-TAds rate the highest in non-factual speech acts about emotions, namely
wishes (16.67%) and particularly complaints (23.33%), both in comparison
with the other positions andwith the average percentage. Note that wishes and
complaints are borderline speech acts which are closer to directives. On the
other hand, RP-TAds barely occur in prayers (6.67%) or praise (3.33%), with a
score below the general rating (13.9% and 7.25% respectively), see Table 5.
3.4 TAd Position and Non-redressive Action (Bald-on-Record FTAs)
There are significant differences between RP-, M- and LP-TAds if we look into
how these speech acts are performed. RP-TAds stand out for being used in
the context of FTAs with non-redressive action, i.e. bald on record. Over half
of the RP-TAds (55.2%, 69 occurrences) are performed in explicit FTAs with
no hedging strategies, and they even score the highest percentage (35.75%)
of the overall sample (193 occurrences) despite being much fewer in number
(125) than LP- (266) andM-TAds (272). In contrast, only 16.92% (45) of LP-TAds
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table 6 Distribution of TAds by age. Row percentages by the number of coded references














1.6% (2) 29.6% (37) 2.4% (3) 32% (40) 34.4% (43)
IC
(51)
0 25.49% (13) 0 49.02% (25) 25.49% (13)
DP
(51)
3.92% (2) 25.49% (13) 1.96% (1) 25.49% (13) 43.14% (22)
Total 1.18% (9) 26.41%
(202)
2.88% (22) 28.5% (218) 41.05%
(314)
are employed in overt FTAs and they amount for only 23.32% of the sample,
although the number of LP-TAds stands at over twice as many as the number
of RP-TAds.
3.5 TAd Position and Socio-Demographics
According to Bassett (1934: 148–149), the omission of TAds characterises Odys-
seus and Diomedes in their speeches in the Iliad, i.e. a mature vs. a younger
character respectively. The latter omits TAds in his speech and is ‘youthful,
high-spirited and impetuous’, whereas the former uses TAds and speaks with
‘caution, deliberateness and tact’. Regarding the position of TAds, the oppos-
ite age groups seem to share a tendency for RP-TAds. The young and the old
score 32% and 29.6% of the total of RP-TAds respectively, even though there
are only 14 young characters (15,187words) and 14 elders (14,110words), whereas
31 adult characters utter 25,850 words. These percentages are higher than the
average number of TAds uttered by these age groups regardless of the position
of the TAds (28.5% and 26.41%, for the young and the old respectively), which
makes these figures all the more significant, see Table 6.
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I have deliberately excluded the distribution of TAd position by gender and
status: tests of the type run in this paper can lead tomisleading results in these
categories, since they fail to account for the differences regarding whether
female characters interact with other female characters or, e.g., with male ser-
vants, whether the women are older than their interlocutors, etc. Even more
difficulties arise regarding status, as this can be a shifting attribute not only in
each interaction but also throughout a play (e.g. E. Ion, Ar. Nub.).
4 Results
The most significant findings are summarised in Figure 3.
There is a hierarchy concerning the analysed parameters as well as correl-
ations between said parameters. CA-functions are the defining parameter, as
they constrain the use or omission of a given TAd in the first place.23 Unlike
RP-TAds, LP-TAds can be unmarked in that they are often required simply for
the establishment of contact or the allocation of the next turn. In turn, RP-
TAds seldom play such a part in the mechanics of conversation. In this sense,
RP-TAds tend to bemarked since they are of amore expletive nature.24 Second,
if we rule out the cases when LP- and RP-TAds are ‘mechanical’ and just com-
pare the remaining examples where LP- and RP-TAds are both unconstrained
by the mechanics of conversation, then we find that LP-TAds are mainly used
for invocations, self-addresses, or addresses to off-stage characters, i.e. they are
no longer directly interactive. In contrast, unconstrained RP-TAds are still dir-
ectly interactive and convey nuances which range from self-initiated repair
strategies to reinforcement of the previous clause.25 Self-initiated repair is
linked to the choice of respectful or rank TAds, such as ἄναξ (see [5]); it takes
place when the urgency of the situation pushes the content into the first posi-
tion. Nevertheless, these cases remain rare.
The other parameters also correlate: for instance, orders are more common
with non-constrained RP-TAds and this in turn is related to more RP-TAds in
the context of bald-on-record actions. TAd-types also correlate, as not many
RP-TAds are deferential.
23 See Haverkate (1984: 69): ‘[…] the attention-getting function of the vocative needs to be
set apart from its other functions, since it is not related to the internal structure of the
speech act.’
24 This is regardless of the fact that, from a traditional syntactical and semantic standpoint,
any vocative is optional, see Haverkate (1984: 68).
25 See Haverkate (1984: 71–72), precisely with RP-TAds examples.
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figure 3 Distribution patterns of LP- and RP-TAds
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5 Discussion
As seen, there are distribution patterns that argue for differences between LP-
and RP-TAds. However, it is difficult to pin down a single function of RP-TAds
as opposed to LP-TAds, especially since the context has a significant bear-
ing on each specific case.26 Thus far, RP-TAds relate to bald-on-record orders,
reproaches, and complaints; they are uttered especially by the young and the
old. Most importantly, they are employed when there is no longer any need
either for the establishment of contact or for the selection of the addressee.
In this regard, while the omission of LP-TAds can be salient, that which is sali-
ent concerning the use of RP-TAds is precisely the fact that they are used (see
Kleinknecht and Souza 2017: 261). Accordingly, there should be an input of
some sort, even in the deviant cases where RP-TAds do not follow the above-
mentioned trends, e.g. the fewer cases of RP-TAds in the context of interrogat-
ives, factual statements, prayers, and generic reflections. The observed distri-
bution patterns (see Figure 3) can shed light on the input of RP-TAds in these
non-prototypical cases, as will be presently seen.
In view of the majority of the examples, it seems that RP-TAds, probably
utteredwith distinctive intonation, add a note of insistence, impatience, worry,
or unease with a varying degree of im/politeness depending on each case.27
This can bemade explicit by the lexical items—a fact that is not very revealing
as to the nuance of the RP-TAd itself, since the semantic elements already con-
vey the character’s discomfort, e.g. Ar. Nub. 790, 854–858. More revealing are
the cases in which querulousness, insistence, or unease can be hinted at by the
context in which the RP-TAd plays a part, regardless of the lexical elements:
[3] Aristophanes Clouds 80
Στρ. Φειδιππίδη, Φειδιππίδιον. Φε. τί, ὦ πάτερ;
Str. Pheidippides! Pheidippides, my little one!
Ph. What, o father?
26 See Dik (1997: 383); Sonnenhauser and Noel Aziz Hanna (2013: 14); Kleinknecht and Souza
(2017: 262).
27 NB: in natural conversation there are other situations that can account for RP-TAds which
are probably not found in dramatic texts, at least not in this sample. For instance, a teacher
could pose a question in a classroom and then select the next speaker, especially if there
are no volunteers for the answer or because the speaker was not actually thinking about
any specific addressee when uttering the question. Cf. Parkinson (1985: 37).
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Strepsiades is insisting on calling his son and waking him up. Pheidippides
wants to continue sleeping, and he already asked his father to let him do so (Ar.
Nub. 38). Consequently, he is annoyed and the way he replies, together with a
certain intonation in antilabe, could convey his querulous attitude.28
LP- and M-TAds can also convey unease, insistence, querulousness, or
reproach but the context needs to be semantically overt in this respect. On the
other hand, when a character utters an insult in the form of a TAd, needs to
establish contact as well, or to allocate a turn, said TAd moves mechanically
into the first position (i.e. LP). In the absence of such constraints,M- or RP-TAds
are preferred. This is because CA-functions prevail in the case of LP-TAds unlike
RP-TAds. In contrast, RP-TAds can, as it were, ‘modalise’ the meaning of speech
acts that are initially neutral, even in the absence of explicit lexical items or a
clearer given context, as in the following examples, which are precisely non-
prototypical considering the distribution patterns of RP-TAds:
a. Generic reference. The RP-TAd in [4] makes it explicit that what Heracles is
expressing is not just a general reflection but a reproach to Admetus for his
deceitful behaviour:
[4] Euripides Alcestis 1007–1008
φίλον πρὸς ἄνδρα χρὴ λέγειν ἐλευθέρως,
Ἄδμητε.
A man should speak frankly to his friends, Admetus.
The entire clause is not as neutral as it would be without the RP-TAd, which is
not needed for the selection of the addressee.29
b. Statements30. There are other instances in which there is no bald-on-record
action but where the characters insist upon something. Admetus insists on
hosting Heracles:
28 See also Ar. Nub. 86–93, 731–736, 776–784; Eur. Ion 999, 1211; Soph. El. 673–675.
29 See also Aesch. Supp. 99–102.
30 See Eur. Alc. 516–517, where there is a prima facie indifferent declarative sentence with an
RP-TAd, which, if uttered with a certain intonation at the end, would probably increase
Admetus’ discomfort with the situation later disclosed (Eur. Alc. 629). See also Ar. Nub.
1325; Eur. Alc. 529, 536–539; Andr. 1073–1074; Supp. 403; Ion 309, 645; Soph. El. 924–925 (ὦ
τάλαινα), 1179–1182.
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[5] Euripides Alcestis 536–539
Ηρ. … εἴθ’ ηὕρομέν σ’,Ἄδμητε, μὴ λυπούμενον.
Αδ. ὡς δὴ τί δράσων τόνδ’ ὑπορράπτεις λόγον;
Ηρ. ξένων πρὸς ἄλλων ἑστίαν πορεύσομαι.
Αδ. οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦναξ· μὴ τοσόνδ’ ἔλθοι κακόν.
Her. … I wish, Admetus, that I had not found you in mourning.
Ad. What action do you hint at by these words?
Her. I’ll travel to the hearth of other hosts.
Ad. My lord, that cannot be! May such a dreadful thing not come to
pass.
In view of examples like these, it is possible to distinguish between two types
of contexts that would account for the placement of TAds at RP:
(a) Contexts, often of urgency, in which the content pushes itself into first
position and an RP-TAd is added as self-initiated repair. This would be
a property shared with tail material from the standpoint of Functional
Grammar.31 Thus, Admetus shifts from the first name (Ἡράκλεις), which
he had been previously using (Eur. Alc. 517, 529), to a rank term (ἄναξ)
in [5] in order to balance out and avoid a possible note of disrespect after
his hasty reaction (οὐκ ἔστιν). Example [3] could also be interpreted along
these lines.
(b) Contexts in which the RP-TAd is added as a modifier of tone, generally as
reinforcement of the previous utterance.
In example [5], (a) would be possible: Admetus is self-repairing a potential
FTA. This, however, does not seem to be exactly an FTA but instead a way of
insisting that there is no problem if Heracles wants to stay at home. Altern-
atively, another interpretation is possible, which relates to a usage found in
modern Spanish andwhichwould be closer to (b).We can distinguish between
two expressions with different punctuation and inflection:
[6] No, señor, ‘no sir’
[7] **Noseñor / Noseñora
31 Geluykens (1987: 122); Dik (1997: 403).
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I purposely misspelled [7] in order to represent the difference in intonation
and punctuation. No. [6] corresponds to ‘no sir’; it is respectful and formal, and
it normally appears in the second term of an adjacency pair. However, [7] is
far from respectful. It appears in contexts where there is familiarity between
the speakers and the speaker feels close enough to overtly disagree with the
addressee. Otherwise, it is impolite. With noseñor the speaker seems to rein-
force his stance by distancing himself from the addressee. In abstract terms,
expressions ending in noseñor would result in ‘closeness + reinforcement of
one’s own stance by generating distance’.32 This seems to match that which
Admetus does in [5]: he had been addressing his friend by his first name (Eur.
Alc. 517, 529), and now he insists on his invitation and disagrees with him,
increasing the distance by the shift of the TAd type (from Ἡράκλεις to ἄναξ)
in RP. Note that noseñor seems to have been pragmaticalised, if not already
grammaticalised, in Spanish, as can be found in its invariable form (only mas-
culine33) and in contexts other than direct dialogues, becoming an emphatic
stance-taking expression:
[8] J. Sámano, “Con lo que tenía, debía haber firmado a Karpin” (El País).
Mi meta no es salir en EL PAÍS o en la primera del As o el Marca, no
busco eso, no quiero notoriedad. Mucha gente piensa que como técnico
de Primera mi ambición es ir al Madrid, al Barça, al Athletic … ¡Pues no
señor! No es mi caso, no tengo ninguna necesidad.
My goal is not to be in EL PAÍS nor in the front page of the AS orMarca. I’m
not looking for that, I don’t seek fame. Many people think that my aspira-
tion as a Premier Leaguemanager is to become the head coach of Madrid,
Barça, Athletic … Not at all, mister! It is not the case forme, I don’t need it.
Another example in which an RP-TAd appears in the context of a declarat-
ive is Eur. Alc. 821 (Θε. γυνὴ μὲν οὖν ὄλωλεν Ἀδμήτου, ξένε ‘it is Admetus’ wife
who is dead, stranger’ [my translation]). However, the utterance is not somuch
informative as tense. Thus, Dale states that ‘the Servant might intend 821 as a
reproachful correction (μὲν οὖν)’.34 The indefinite RP-TAd in the last line of the
32 In this regard, see also Haverkate (1984: 77–78) on the ironic use of señorito and of usted
as ‘typical of conflictive forms of verbal interaction’ by generating distance through the
code-switching.
33 Cf. Kleinknecht and Souza (2017: 257, 259, 261, 280–281).
34 Dale (1954: 111). See also Parker (2007: 214).
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stichomythia can also contribute towards conveying the servant’s uneasy atti-
tude and his insistence on the fact that Heracles should leave now. This is com-
parable to an example by Haverkate (1984: 75–76), in which an RP-TAd appears
in a similar context of a declarative fromwhich an inference can be drawn: Está
lloviendo a cántaros, Adela (‘It’s pouring with rain, Adela’). Haverkate relates
this example to the implication ‘You cannot play tennis now’ and concludes:
In the performance of indirect speech acts vocatives […] serve as a sig-
nal for the hearer to infer that a multiple speech act is performed by the
speaker.
c. Prayers. In Aesch. Supp. 811–816, there is an RP-TAd in the context of a prayer
(γαιάοχε παγκρατὲς), which is already rare. This prayer is also unusual in that
a present imperative is used instead of an expected aorist imperative. Note
Johansen andWhittle’s comment (1980: ad 814–815):
The shift from an aor. (811 ἔπιδε) to a pres. imperat. […] would indicate an
emotional crescendo—an interpretation which is not improbable here
but cannot be supported by other indications in the context.
It seems that the need of ‘other indications’ is provided by the RP-TAd and
that this prayer could be considered especially urgent and emotional not just
because of the present imperative but also because of the position of the invoc-
ation. Further, note that γαιάοχε παγκρατές in RP is a strong epithet which,
added to the prayer, can work as a way of reinforcement. All these examples
allow us to conclude that RP-TAds are less often employed to fulfil CA-functions
than to reinforce or change the illocutionary force of (indirect) speech acts
(Busse 2006: 114–115).
Both Bassett (1934: 146) and Dickey (1996) consider TAds as devices for
characterisation. TAds can be a source for characterisation not only through
semantic variation35 or omission (Bassett 1934: 145–146) but also through pos-
ition, especially since RP-TAds are rare. Thus, there are (clusters of) RP-TAds
instead of the expected LP- or M-TAds in the first words36 of troubled, hos-
35 Already at the very beginning of hermonograph, Dickey (1996) considers TAd-variation as
a device for characterisation, e.g. Hdt. 1.35.3, 41.1, 42.1, 45.2; Pl. Phd. 80b–81c, and Socrates
in Pl. Ap. (Dickey 1996: 179). See, likewise,Wendel (1929: 62–63) andRutherford (2012: 102–
109).
36 See Rutherford (2012: 101) on the relevance of the first words addressed to a character and
of the use of TAds.
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tile, and unsympathetic characters: Thanatos (Eur. Alc. 30), Alcmene (Heracl.
646–647[?], 648, 1050–1051), Peleus (Andr. 590, 631), Pheres (Alc. 614, 620), Her-
mione (Andr. 170, 234–237), Menelaus (Andr. 309–313), and Ion (Ion 237–240,
244, 255, 289, 309, 333, 339, 372, 379). These characters are either young or old
and/or unsympathetic. In light of these examples, the correlation between RP-
TAds and age seems to be of a secondary nature, in that RP-TAds do not depend
on age in the way that, for instance, the use of the term παῖ does (which is used
predominantly by significantly older characters). RP-TAds seem to occur par-
ticularly frequently with eagerness or excitement in behaviour. This in turn
appears to be linked to a tendency to portray impetuous characters either as
old or young.
6 Conclusion
TAds are mostly uttered in upward interactions, i.e. from lower-status charac-
ters to higher-status characters. In this regard, their omission can be salient
from the standpoint of politeness. Regardless of their position, TAds were gen-
erally considered as devices for the establishment of contact and turn alloca-
tion. These considerations are still valid with regard to LP- andM-TAds. In con-
trast, RP-TAds are generally uttered when contact has already been established
orwhen the next addressee has already been selected. Thus, the omission is not
salient, and this leads to the question as towhy they are used at all. On the other
hand, RP-TAds are commonly uttered by impetuous characters, e.g. characters
who are hostile and/or young/old.
In sum, LP- and RP-TAds are not randomly distributed. This leads us to the
conclusion that not only the lexical meaning or the omission allow us to recog-
nise the input of a specificTAdbut also its position. LP-TAds relate topoliteness,
to CA functions, or to both. In either case, omissions are salient, in that they
are either rude or urgent. RP-TAds are a way of conveying nuances that range
from insistence, impatience, uneasiness, or worry to even greater feelings of
hostility that challenge the addressee. A few instances could be interpreted as
self-initiated repair: generally, when the content pushes itself into the first pos-
ition and the RP-TAd is a respectful term. Thus, depending on the TAd type
and the context, the degree of im/politeness varies.37 From a wider perspect-
ive, this is yet another example of how meaningful word order is, especially in
37 Similar conclusions were reached by Hill (1994: 325) on the familiariser dude in American
English.
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Ancient Greek, whereword order is syntactically less constrained than in other
languages, such as English.
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The Linguistic Characterisation of Oedipus in OT:
A Pragmatics-Based Approach to ‘Mind Style’
Evert van Emde Boas
1 Introduction: Mind Style and Linguistic Characterisation in Greek
Tragedy
[I]f a character talks with the power of the Deception Speech in Ajax or
Electra’s opening anapaests […] we are forced to recognize the reality of
the person portrayed. I am not of course suggesting that Sophocles consist-
ently gives each character a style of his own. There are habits of style that
any character will use in certain circumstances […] in response to what
MissDale called ‘the rhetoric of the situation’ […]However, one candetect
some degree of characterization by style, for example in contrasts between
noble and lower characters …1
So writes Easterling, in a characteristically lucid and insightful discussion of
Sophoclean characterisation. The ‘of course’ in ‘I am not of course suggest-
ing’ is revealing of an entrenched view, relevant not just to Sophocles but to
all Greek tragedy, which appears to have gone largely unchallenged in the 40-
plus years since Easterling’s article. The consensus remains that while some
stylistic variation occurs, mostly on the margins and mostly used to delineate
relatively minor characters, the language of the characters of Greek tragedy
is still for the most part evened out by the weight of tragedy’s all-levelling
stylisation (of dialect, register, tone, and indeed situational rhetoric). In the
words of another scholar, ‘the conventional tragic Kunstsprache serves to dis-
guise individual mannerism.’2 What remains difficult to see, however, is how
this notion of linguistic uniformity can coexist with the ‘power’ of charac-
ters’ language which forces us ‘to recognize the reality of the person por-
trayed’.What kind of ‘reality’ could there be if every character speaks the same
way, if no one is lifted out somehow from the homogeneous mass of tragic
style?
1 Easterling (1977: 127–128); my italics.
2 Griffith (1977: 170). Griffith himself, to be fair, has since offered nuanced discussions of differ-
ence between the linguistic habits of some tragic figures, particularly those of Antigone (1999:
36–37, 2001).
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I have argued in previous publications (van Emde Boas 2017b, 2018) that
a great deal more stylistic variation may be detected in the language of dif-
ferent characters in Greek tragedy, so long as one allows for a suitably broad
conception of what falls under the header ‘style’.3 It is true, of course, that tra-
gic diction is circumscribed in various respects—a character will not stand out
for his or her use of obscenities or foreign-language words and constructions,
as such things simply do not occur in tragedy—but within these constraints
the range with which tragic playwrights could operate was still significant.
Modern linguistic approaches, not least pragmatics, furnish a wealth of meth-
odological techniques that can help us to isolate and identify such stylistic
variations, in ways that more traditional approaches to style do not always per-
mit.4
A broad conception of style, informed by modern linguistics, is in fact
entirely in linewith the overall approach of stylistics (awell-established field of
research, conspicuously underused on thewhole by classicists).5My aim in this
chapter is to bring to bear on Greek tragic characterisation the methodology
and findings of a particular subfield of that discipline, namely work concerned
with so-called ‘mind style’. This is in itself a fairly broad field, at least in terms of
methodological inclusiveness (as we shall see), but mymain focus, in line with
that of the volume, will be on its use of different areas of linguistic pragmatics
as a key to getting at the distinguishing features of any individual character’s
style, and through that style, at the workings of the underlying represented
mind.6The particularmind I have inmind is that of Oedipus in Sophocles’Oed-
3 For an excellent recent book-length approach to Greek tragic style, see Rutherford (2012). It is
noticeable that after a good discussion of definitional issues and previous approaches to style
(2012: 4–27), the word ‘style’ is in fact not much used throughout the rest of that book, which
includes chapters on such not obviously stylistic topics as ‘The characters of Greek tragedy’,
‘The irony of Greek tragedy’, and ‘The wisdom of Greek tragedy’. This demonstrates a suitably
loose and inclusive (if perhaps slightly undertheorised) approach as to what counts as tragic
style.
4 For an example of such a ‘traditional’ approach to style, see Earp (1944) (still a useful book,
even if not for my present purposes).
5 For good introductions and general overviews of the field, see e.g. Toolan (1998); Simpson
(2004); Leech and Short (22007); Nørgaard et al. (2010); Sotirova (2016).
6 This presupposes, as do notions such as Easterling’s ‘reality’, that audiences approach charac-
ters on stage as if endowedwithminds that canbe read. For this presupposition as a necessary
corollary of pragmatic approaches, see the Introduction to this volume; for mindreading in
Greek tragedy see also Budelmann and Easterling (2010). I have discussed the notions of real-
ism and mind-reading in tragic characterisation myself at greater length in van Emde Boas
(2018, forthcoming b). A recent general treatment of characterisation in Sophocles (with fur-
ther references, and including some discussion of characterisation by style) is Lloyd (2018).
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ipus Tyrannus, a character that, as we will see, has long challenged notions of
tragic stylistic uniformity.
Although the tradition appears to be entirely untapped by classicists, ‘mind
style’ as a term and concept has had considerable currency within stylistics
since the late 1970s, and particularly since Leech and Short devoted a chapter
to it in their Style in Fiction—a key text in the field.7 The term was originally
coined by Fowler in his work Linguistics and the Novel (1977), as follows:
Cumulatively, consistent structural options, agreeing in cutting the pre-
sented world to one pattern or another, give rise to an impression of a
world-view, what I shall call a ‘mind style’.
We may coin the term ‘mind style’ to refer to any distinctive linguistic
representation of an individual mental self.8
As these definitions make clear, mind style refers to the way that linguistic
patterns can reveal the mind of a writer or speaker (mind style research has
investigated, variously, such patterns of authors, narrators, and characters). At
the heart of mind style research lies a two-pronged methodological approach,
neatly summarised by Semino:
The application of the notion of mind style requires two interrelated
analytical steps, namely, the identification in a text (or part of a text)
of linguistic patterns that are distinctive and systematic, and the inter-
pretation of these patterns as the reflection of the characteristic, often
idiosyncratic, workings of an individual’s mind.9
Neither of these steps is straightforward. The identification of linguistic pat-
terns is a difficult proposition for at least two reasons: first—and this is where
the broad conception of style comes in—there is no obvious limit to the num-
ber of aspects of language use that might be relevant. Indeed, mind style
research has focused on a great variety of linguistic phenomena, including not
merely pragmatic aspects (such as adherence or non-adherence to Gricean
7 Leech and Short (1981, second edition 2007). For general discussions of mind style and over-
views of the relevant literature, see Semino (2006, 2007); Shen (2010); Hoover (2016). The
latter piece byHoover argues for a restrictive applicationof mind style researchwhich focuses
mainly on ‘narrators or characters with relatively abnormal minds’ (2016: 338). This has,
indeed, been the main focus of mind style research; to be clear, I do not mean to suggest
anything about the (ab)normality of the mind of any individual Greek character.
8 Fowler (1977: 76 and 103 respectively).
9 Semino (2006: 143).
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maxims, marked use of deixis, marked conversational patterns),10 but also
grammatical structure (sentence length and complexity, transitivity patterns,
etc.),11 lexis (‘key words’ and semantic fields, over- and underlexicalisation,
etc.),12 ‘cognitive stylistic’ approaches (blending theory, conceptual metaphor
theory, schema theory, cognitive grammar, etc.),13 and other aspects such
as formal logic, narrative focalisation, and second-language use and code-
switching.14
The second challenge on the identification side is getting the label ‘dis-
tinctive and systematic’ to stick to any individual pattern: quantitative analysis
serves a key function here (as it will in my discussion below), but is not the
whole story, particularly as it cannot be used for all of the areas of interest just
listed.
As for the interpretation of linguistic patterns as reflective of an individual
mind, this is no less tricky an enterprise, and necessarily dependent on a critic’s
subjective take—particularly, of course, when dealing with works from a cul-
turally and historically remote society.15 As my own analysis of Oedipus’ lan-
guage may demonstrate, such interpretations have a greater chance at being
plausible if several features point in the same direction—and, of course, if the
interpretation arrived at is compatible with interpretations previously derived
otherwise.
10 E.g. Culpeper (2001); Semino (2002, 2014).
11 E.g. Halliday (1971); Bockting (1994); Hoover (1999); Leech and Short (22007: ch. 6);
McIntyre and Archer (2010); Glotova (2014); MacMahon (2014).
12 E.g. Fowler (1986); Black (1993); Bockting (1994); Culpeper (2001, 2009a); Semino (2002);
Leech and Short (22007: ch. 6); McIntyre and Archer (2010).
13 The advent of cognitive stylistics has been the most significant recent driver of mind
style research. Under this (itself very broad) header fall such approaches which ‘com-
bin[e] the kind of explicit, rigorous and detailed linguistic analysis of literary texts that
is typical of the stylistics tradition with a systematic and theoretically informed consider-
ation of the cognitive structures andprocesses that underlie the production and reception
of language’ (Semino and Culpeper 2002: ix). Relevant publications include Semino and
Swindlehurst (1996); Culpeper (2002, 2009b); Semino (2002, 2014); Glotova (2014); Nuttall
(2018). Given this volume’s focus on pragmatics, my own will not lie narrowly on cognit-
ive approaches, although one of the branches of pragmatics with which I will deal briefly,
Relevance Theory, could easily be ranged under that header. For a cognitive perspective
on pragmatics more generally see e.g. Bara (2017), with references.
14 E.g. Nischik (1993); McIntyre (2005); Lugea (2016).
15 In the case of present-day speakers, amore ‘objective’ method is becoming a possibility, as
a speaker’s language can be compared to large databases that correlate linguistic features
with independentlymeasured personality traits (cf. e.g. the tool developed byThe Psycho-
metrics Centre at the University of Cambridge, https://applymagicsauce.com/ [accessed
1/07/2019]).
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2 Character by Numbers
When it comes to previous interpretations of Oedipus (in OT), a memorable
and hugely influential one is that of Bernard Knox, expounded first in his Oed-
ipus atThebes (1957)16 and later in the broader context of hisTheHeroicTemper
(1964). Knox sums up his version of Oedipus, who he thinks was modelled by
Sophocles on ‘Athens itself, its heroic energy’,17 by way of the following charac-
ter vignette:
Such is the character of Oedipus: he is a great man, a man of experience
and swift courageous action, who yet acts only after careful deliberation,
illuminated by an analytic and demanding intelligence. His action by its
consistent success generates a great self-confidence, but it is always dir-
ected to the common good. He is an absolute ruler who loves and is loved
by his people, but is conscious of the jealousy his success arouses and
suspicious of conspiracy in high places. He is capable of terrible, appar-
ently ungovernable anger, but only under great provocation, and he can,
thoughgrudgingly andwithdifficulty, subduehis angerwhenhe seeshim-
self isolated from his people.18
Individual scholars and critics will agree or disagree to a greater or lesser extent
with the terms of this sketch (and/or the very nature of it, depending on one’s
views about tragic characterisation): I myself am highly sympathetic to it.19
What I am more interested in, however, is the particular way in which Knox
arrives at his description: his approach is relatively unusual in that it involves,
in fact, a good amount of stylistic research. In a demonstration of whatmodern
stylisticians might call ‘key words’ analysis,20 Knox runs through a number of
specific Greek terms and semantic fields which, he thinks, are used especially
by Oedipus or about him, and are revealing of his character:21
16 The book was republished, with a new preface by Knox, in 1998.
17 Knox (1964: 60); the full argument for this reading is presented in Knox (21998: ch. 2).
18 Knox (21998: 29).
19 Itmay beworth noting that Knox’s sketch is not dissimilar from howOedipus is described
in the tragic scholia, e.g. schol. ad Soph. OT 1 φιλόδημον καὶ προνοητικὸν τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέρον-
τος τὸ τοῦ Οἰδίποδος ἦθος καὶ εὔνοιαν ἔχων ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους δι’ ὧν αὐτοὺς εὐηργέτησεν· (‘The
êthos of Oedipus is patriotic and shows forethought for the public good, and the people
favour him on account of the good he has done for them.’)
20 For key words analysis as an approach to characterisation in drama, see Culpeper (2001,
2009a).
21 Such an approach is inexplicably infrequent in tragic scholarship, even if not in Knox’s
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– ‘The words which express action (dran, prassein) are typical of his own
speech and of the opinions of him expressed by others.’ (Knox 21998: 14)
– ‘ “Swift”, tachys, is his word.’ (Knox 21998: 15)
– ‘ “I” (egô) is aword that is oftenonhis lips: in the first 150 linesOedipus speaks
there are fourteen lines ending with some form of “I” or “my”, and fifteen
beginning in the same way.’ (Knox 21998: 21)
Such features of Oedipus’ diction could be taken, then, as the ‘distinctive and
systematic’ indicators of a particular mind style, one geared towards swift
action and self-confidence. But how distinctive are these features, really? In
other words, how likely is it that such terms as caught Knox’s eye and ear would
have also jumpedout at a fifth-century audiencemember sitting in the theatre?
We have, of course, no hope of deriving any conclusive proof about such
questions, but some (rudimentary) statistics may at least help us get a sense.22
A good place to start may be to compare the features that Knox identifies—
words relating to action, relating to speed, and first-person pronouns—in the
language of Oedipus himself and that of the other characters of Oedipus Tyr-
annus.23 The relevant figures are given in Table 1 (the percentages indicate
frequencies relative to the total number of words uttered by each speaker).
What these figures seem to suggest, at first glance, is that Oedipus does not
use the relevant terms much more frequently than the other characters in the
play, with the possible exception of first-person pronominal forms.24 There is,
of course, more to Knox’s claims, and such statistics in themselves cannot cap-
ture their full extent: thus Knox is interested not just in things ‘typical of [Oed-
own further work (not merely in The Heroic Temper [ch. 1], but also e.g. in his analysis of
Medea in Euripides’ play [Knox 1977]).
22 Almost all the figures presented below are based on searches using Perseus under PhiloLo-
gic (http://perseus.uchicago.edu/ [1/07/2019]), maintained at the University of Chicago.
This search tool permits, at least for the Greek tragic and comic corpus, searches by
speaker (as well as by word class, morphological features, lemma, etc.). One minor draw-
back is that searches are necessarily based on Perseus’ somewhat antiquated text editions,
in the case of Sophocles those of Jebb.Variations betweeneditions of Sophocles are largely
insignificant, however, for the data presented below; for OT, I have checked relevant pas-
sages against the edition of Finglass (superior, in my view, to those of Dawe and Lloyd-
Jones andWilson).
23 I have excluded the chorus from these figures, on the grounds that they do not offer a
fully suitable comparison to any individual character, and that their lyric passages (which
are not easily excluded from automatic searches) would unhelpfully skew any data about
them.
24 This should be seen against the backdrop, however, of the very high frequency of first-
personpronouns inOT and Sophocles’ oeuvremore generally. The singular possessive ἐμός
is, in fact, the most frequent lemma both in OT and in all of Sophocles (see e.g. Rigo 1996,
or the new ‘Statistics’ feature of the online TLG).
- 978-90-04-44026-5
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com10/12/2020 08:49:24PM
via free access
102 van emde boas
table 1 Word counts and frequencies in OT
Oedipus Priest Creon Tiresias Iocasta Corinthian Servant Messenger




10 0 1 1 2 2 0 1
0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.0% 0.2%
δρα- (δράω, etc.) 12 0 9 0 1 1 1 1
0.3% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.2%
ἐργ- (ἔργον, ἐργάζομαι, etc.) 12 0 2 0 0 0 0 1
0.3% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2%
total 34 0 12 1 3 3 1 3
0.8% 0.0% 1.4% 0.2% 0.4% 0.8% 0.5% 0.7%
Speed words
ταχ- (ταχύς, τάχος, ταχύνω,
etc.)
12 0 2 2 2 1 1 2
0.3% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.5% 0.5%
σπουδ- (σπουδή, σπουδάζω,
etc.)
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
total 13 0 2 2 2 1 1 2
0.3% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.5% 0.5%
First-person pronouns
personal (ἐγώ, ἡμεῖς) 165 8 30 20 15 10 3 3
3.9% 2.5% 3.4% 3.8% 1.9% 2.6% 1.6% 0.7%
possessive (ἐμός, ἡμέτερος) 42 1 4 3 1 2 1 0
1.0% 0.3% 0.5% 0.6% 0.1% 0.5% 0.5% 0.0%
reflexive (ἐμαυτοῦ) 12 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0%
total 219 9 34 24 16 13 4 3
5.2% 2.8% 3.9% 4.6% 2.0% 3.4% 2.1% 0.7%
ipus’] own speech’ but also of ‘the opinions of him expressed by others’; and
his discussion of first-person pronouns is attentive to local clustering (in the
first 150 lines) and to word placement,25 not just to raw frequencies. Even such
amendments leave a mixed picture, however: for instance, none of the twelve
25 But for helpful correctives to the notion that line-initial or line-final placement in itself
means very much in Greek tragedy in general (and Sophocles in particular), see Dik
(2007).
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action words uttered by the most frequent user of such vocabulary, Creon (we
may wonder how applicable the label ‘man of swift courageous action’ is to
him), refers unambiguously to action by Oedipus alone. Similarly, while there
are numerous stretches of Oedipus’ language that contain interesting cluster-
ing of first-person pronouns, none of them approaches the density of Tiresias’
first few turns, where the priest uses such forms at a rate of once per line.26
I do not wish to minimise the relevance of the semantic fields identified by
Knox, all of which are indeedof some significance in theplay. It ismore difficult
to maintain, however, that these areas of the lexicon are specifically character-
istic of the language of any individual speaker, Oedipus or anyone else. Nor, as
it turns out, does Oedipus stand out in this respect in a very noticeable way
from speakers in other Sophoclean plays. We may compare him, for instance,
to all other Sophoclean males with major speaking roles: see Table 2.27
Again, Oedipus scores high on the use of first-person pronouns, but again he
is not exceptional evenon this front (and indeedoutperformedbyHeracles and
Philoctetes). Even if, then, these lexical items are thought to be significant, that
significance is not easily mapped onto the distinctive nature of the language of
an individual speaker or, by extension, the underlying working of his mind.
It may be in part for this reason that many of the traits and characterist-
ics that Knox originally (in Oedipus at Thebes, 1957) presented as peculiar to
Oedipus became, by the time of his Sather lectures (The Heroic Temper, 1964),
featuresmore generally of the ‘Sophoclean hero’ (male or female, incidentally).
To be clear, I am not arguing that all Sophoclean heroes are exactly alike in
their language—in fact over-generalisation is one of the criticisms sometimes
levelled at Knox’s work: rather, I argue that meaningful variation is best sought
elsewhere—and this is precisely where pragmatics can come in.28
26 Possibly significant clusters of first-person pronouns in Oedipus’ language may be found
(in addition to the first 150 lines identified by Knox) at 774–834, 964–972, 1076–1085, 1369–
1415, 1446–1475. Tiresias uses 14 of his 24 first-person pronouns in his first 14 lines (107
words, with a frequency of 13.1%, i.e. roughly once every eight words).
27 I have set the benchmark for ‘major role’, entirely arbitrarily, at 1000 spokenwords ormore
(in the complete plays only).
28 As regards key words and semantic fields, some other aspects identified by Knox as rel-
evant for the Sophoclean hero in general do show unusual distributions in OT, if not
always weighted towards Oedipus himself. Knox observes: ‘The use of the verbal adject-
ive, a form expressing necessity, of the future tenses, above all of the tone which brooks
no argument—all this is characteristic of the hero’s resolve to act’ (1964: 10). In OT, forms
of χρή are used only by Oedipus (10×) and, once, by Jocasta (the verbal adjective and δεῖ
are somewhat more regularly distributed). Tiresias is a significant outlier with respect to
the future stem (using it roughly twice as often as other speakers in the play). For other
semantic fields, see Knox (1964: 11–26).
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1625 1317 1006 4208 2088 1182 1063 1058 2423 3769 3849 1218
Action words
πραγ- 2 1 1 10 4 1 4 2 4 4 6 6
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5%
δρα- 3 4 2 12 8 5 4 5 14 12 7 6
0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.5%
ἐργ- 5 4 4 12 4 4 4 4 3 6 7 0
0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0%
total 10 9 7 34 16 10 12 11 21 22 20 12
0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.6% 0.5% 1.0%
Speed words
ταχ- 9 3 3 12 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 3
0.6% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
σπουδ- 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
total 9 3 3 13 3 2 2 4 4 6 7 4
0.6% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3%
First-person pronouns
personal 55 32 28 165 52 53 28 38 74 183 164 44
3.4% 2.4% 2.8% 3.9% 2.5% 4.5% 2.6% 3.6% 3.1% 4.9% 4.3% 3.6%
possessive 22 6 5 42 10 14 7 2 12 19 21 8
1.4% 0.5% 0.5% 1.0% 0.5% 1.2% 0.7% 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7%
reflexive 0 0 0 12 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
total 77 38 33 219 64 67 35 40 86 202 188 52
4.7% 2.9% 3.3% 5.2% 3.1% 5.7% 3.3% 3.8% 3.5% 5.4% 4.9% 4.3%
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table 3 Sentence-ending punctuation in OT
Oedipus Priest Creon Tiresias Iocasta Corinthian Servant Messenger
Sentence-ending
punctuation
430 22 97 57 86 49 31 32
frequency
(every # words)
9.8 14.5 9.1 9.1 9.2 7.7 6.1 13.5
Full stop 200 10 64 33 44 32 20 25
proportion
(of all sentence-enders)
46.5% 45.5% 66.0% 57.9% 51.2% 65.3% 64.5% 78.1%
frequency 21.0 31.8 13.7 15.8 18.0 11.8 9.5 17.3
High dot 101 12 16 16 19 6 2 7
proportion
(of all sentence-enders)
23.5% 54.5% 16.5% 28.1% 22.1% 12.2% 6.5% 21.9%
frequency 41.7 26.5 54.9 32.5 41.7 63.2 9.5 61.7
Questionmark 129 0 17 8 23 11 9 0
proportion
(of all sentence-enders)
30.0% 0.0% 17.5% 14.0% 26.7% 22.4% 29.0% 0.0%
frequency 32.6 n/a 51.7 65.0 34.5 34.5 94.5 n/a
Bare statistics may still serve as a useful starting point for isolating distinct-
ive aspects, however. In Table 3 and Table 4, I have done no more than count
every instance of sentence-ending punctuation—i.e. full stops, high dots, and
question marks—in digitally available editions. Here, Oedipus does stand out,
both with respect to the other characters of Oedipus Tyrannus and those of
Sophocles’ work more widely.
Some of the more notable figures in these tables are in fact fully expected:
that the messenger of Oedipus Tyrannus, for instance, does not use questions
(and overwhelmingly favours full stops) is fully in line with his role: he is on
stage to relate a series of narrative facts.29 But the finding that I am interested
in here, of course, pertains to Oedipus’ use of questions. No other character,
either in his play or in the rest of the Sophoclean oeuvre, can match the fre-
quency with which he utters them. There are, of course, plot reasons for this:
29 It is significant here that the messenger’s speech does not include quoted direct speech.
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152 157 128 430 207 111 110 116 286 386 372 115
frequency 10.7 8.4 7.9 9.8 10.1 10.6 9.7 9.1 8.5 9.8 10.3 10.6
Full stop 85 94 72 200 121 67 61 61 153 194 194 60
proportion 55.9% 59.9% 56.3% 46.5% 58.5% 60.4% 55.5% 52.6% 53.5% 50.3% 52.2% 52.2%
frequency 19.1 14.0 14.0 21.0 17.3 17.6 17.4 17.3 15.8 19.4 19.8 20.3
High dot 43 30 31 101 36 27 32 31 75 96 76 26
proportion 28.3% 19.1% 24.2% 23.5% 17.4% 24.3% 29.1% 26.7% 26.2% 24.9% 20.4% 22.6%
frequency 37.8 43.9 32.5 41.7 58.0 43.8 33.2 34.1 32.3 39.3 50.6 46.8
Question
mark
24 33 25 129 50 17 17 24 58 96 102 29
Proportion 15.8% 21.0% 19.5% 30.0% 24.2% 15.3% 15.5% 20.7% 20.3% 24.9% 27.4% 25.2%
frequency 67.7 39.9 40.2 32.6 41.8 69.5 62.5 44.1 41.8 39.3 37.7 42.0
the Oedipus Tyrannus is in many ways a detective story, with Oedipus as the
lead investigator asking the questions. But it is difficult not to broaden such
interpretations to include notions of characterisation: what Knox described
as Oedipus’ ‘analytic and demanding intelligence’ makes him into a particu-
larly persistent asker of questions. His investigative performance stands out,
not merely within his own play but within Sophocles’ oeuvre. This becomes all
the more clear when we examine (in the next section) his style of questioning
in more detail, as a pragmatics-based approach will allow us to do.
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3 Pragmatics and Oedipus’ Mind Style
3.1 ‘Oh Really?’: Oedipus the King of Post-expansions
Looking at Oedipus’ questions more closely reveals some interesting and per-
tinent pragmatic aspects of his language. First, it is notable how fewof Oedipus’
interrogatives arenot genuine information-seeking questions: overwhelmingly,
Oedipus asks questions in order to get answers.30 More striking still, though, is
Oedipus’ use of a particular kind of follow-up question, one that we see very
frequently repeated in his investigations.
This questioning technique may well be captured in the terms of Conversa-
tion Analysis (CA), particularly insofar as that field (a subdiscipline of prag-
matics, on some accounts) is concerned with ‘sequence organisation’.31 CA
has well established that the most basic organisational resource of naturally
occurring talk-in-interaction is the ‘adjacency pair’, a sequence of two related
turns by two speakers, with a ‘first pair part’ (FPP) which projects its own
completion by a particular kind of ‘second pair part’ (SPP). Common action
sequences performed by adjacency pairs include greeting–greeting, request–
acceptance/refusal, assessment–agreement/disagreement, and indeed ques-
tion–answer.A further crucial notion is that of ‘expansion’: adjacencypairsmay
bepreceded, interrupted, or followedby expansion sequences (themselves typ-
ically adjacency pairs), which are oriented to the most efficient resolution of
the ‘base pair’ to which they belong. The basic schema is set out in Figure 1.
pre-expansion
base pair FPP (first pair part)
insert-expansion
base pair SPP (second pair part)
post-expansion
figure 1 Expansions in CA
The following (fictional) English example contains each of the three kinds of
expansion, organised around a question–answer base pair:
30 For different uses of questions in tragedy, see Mastronarde (1979: ch. 1); for a linguistic
account of non-information-seeking questions more generally see Ilie (1994). Exceptions
among Oedipus’ questions include 334–336, 339–340, 429–431, 1489–1490.
31 For CA as applied to Greek tragedy, see Schuren (2015); Drummen in Bonifazi et al. (2016);
van Emde Boas (2017a, 2017b, forthcoming a). Of these, Drummen and van Emde Boas
(2017a) have fuller introductions to the discipline. Good surveys of the field are Sidnell
(2010); Sidnell and Stivers (2012). The best work specifically on sequence organisation is
Schegloff (2007).
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A: Could you help me? FPP1 (pre-expansion)
B: Of course. SPP1
A: Howmuch does that phone cost? FPP2 (base pair first part)
B: Pounds or euros? FPP3 (insert-expansion)
A: Pounds, please. SPP3
B: It’s three-nine-nine, then. SPP2 (base pair second part)
A: Sorry, howmuch? FPP4 (post-expansion;
other-initiated repair)
B: Three-nine-nine. SPP4
This passage also exemplifies another significant notion in CA, that of ‘repair’.
This term refers to ‘overt efforts to deal with trouble sources or repairables’, that
is,with any troubles or problems ‘in speaking, hearing, or understanding’ (Sche-
gloff 2007: 100–101). The primary locus of repair, particularly ‘other-initiated
repair’, tends to be in insert- or (as in the example above) post-expansions spe-
cifically initiated for the purpose.
Something quite like this kind of post-expansion is a noticeable staple of
Oedipus’ language in Oedipus Tyrannus. A first highly pertinent example will
set the stage here:
[1] Sophocles Oedipus the King 356–36232
Τε. πέφευγα· τἀληθὲς γὰρ ἰσχῦον τρέφω.
Οι. πρὸς τοῦ διδαχθείς; οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τῆς τέχνης. question
Τε. πρὸς σοῦ· σὺ γάρ μ’ ἄκοντα προὐτρέψω λέγειν. answer
Οι. ποῖον λόγον; λέγ’ αὖθις, ὡς μᾶλλον μάθω. question
—post-exp. (repair)
Τε. οὐχὶ ξυνῆκας πρόσθεν; ἦ ’κπειρᾶι †λέγειν†; question
—insert-exp.
Οι. οὐχ ὥστε γ’ εἰπεῖν γνωτόν· ἀλλ’ αὖθις φράσον. answer
Τε. φονέα σέ φημι τἀνδρὸς οὗ ζητεῖς κυρεῖν. answer
Ti. I have escaped it; for I nourish the strength of truth.
Oe. Taught by whom? Not by your art, at any rate.
Ti. By you. For you made me speak although I was unwilling.
Oe. Speak what? Tell me again, so I can learn once more.
Ti. Did you not understand before? Or are you trying … ?
32 All texts and translations are taken from Finglass (2018), unless otherwise indicated.
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Oe. Not so that I could say that I knew; come, say it again.
Ti. I say that you are the killer of the man whose killer you are seeking.
In the context of the (at this point very angry) conversation between Oed-
ipus and Tiresias, and more generally given the conventions of tragic dialogue,
it seems unlikely that we are dealing here with a genuine mishearing, nor is
this, presumably, a ‘normal’ kind of misunderstanding: Oedipus (mis)under-
stood Tiresias full well the first time (350–353), in the same way that he will
(mis)understand him throughout the rest of scene.33 Rather, Oedipus here uses
the resources of repair-sequences (particularlymarked as such byhis λέγ’ αὖθις,
ὡς μᾶλλον μάθω) to initiate a further sequence of questioning.34 This particular
type of post-expansion, which looks like a repair-sequence but is in fact geared
towards eliciting further talk on a topic mentioned in the second pair part of
the base pair, has been well investigated within CA under the header of ‘topic-
alisation’:
Several of the turn types which can be used for other-initiation of repair
can also be used to mark some utterance or utterance part as of spe-
cial interest, and worthy of further on-topic talk. [… This] type of post-
expansion […] is the topicalization of something done or mentioned in
the base second pair part. Such expansions then become subject to the
organizational contingencies of topic-talk.35
In English such topicalisation sequences are regularly marked by (partial)
repeats or ‘pro-repeats’ (‘he is?’) or by ‘(oh) really’.36 In Greek tragedy, an appar-
ently fairly conventional marker of this kind of sequence is the use of the
interrogative adjective ποῖος ‘what kind of …?’, as in [1] above.37 Oedipus, I
contend, is a uniquely fervent user of this type of post-expansion, especially
with ποῖος. He repeatedly puts it in to play to pick up a particular point of
information from a preceding second pair part as a topic for more precise
33 See Battezzato in this volume.
34 Cf. Dawe (22007: ad 359): ‘More than once in tragedy one character asks another to repeat
what he has said, so that the audience may fully grasp some important point … Here
Sophocles puts new life into an old convention by making the very request for repetition
the material for generating further ill-will between the two parties.’ On this passage, see
also Battezzato’s paper in this volume.
35 Schegloff (2007: 155–158).
36 See Heritage (1984: 339–344); Schegloff (2007: 155).
37 The device is also frequently used in post-expansions in comedy, but there is no need to
assume a coarse or colloquial tone: see Bond (1981) on Eur. Her. 518, Collard (2018: 87–89).
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questioning. He is, I should add, not the only character to use the technique
in the play, but he uses it much more frequently than anyone else, and the
device could easily be described as a ‘distinctive and systematic’ Oedipodean-
ism.38
Most of the relevant examples, like [1], are ‘follow-ups’, in which Oedipus
attaches a post-expansion to a question–answer sequence which he himself
has initiated, when he is not satisfied that the answer provided has told him all
he needs to know:
[2] Sophocles Oedipus the King 116–121
Οι. οὐδ’ ἄγγελός τις οὐδὲ συμπράκτωρ ὁδοῦ question
κατεῖδ’, ὅτου τις ἐκμαθὼν ἐχρήσατ’ ἄν;
Κρ. θνήισκουσι γάρ, πλὴν εἷς τις, ὃς φόβωι φυγὼν answer
ὧν εἶδε πλὴν ἓν οὐδὲν εἶχ’ εἰδὼς φράσαι.
Οι. τὸ ποῖον; ἓν γὰρ πόλλ’ ἂν ἐξεύροι μαθεῖν, question—post-exp.
ἀρχὴν βραχεῖαν εἰ λάβοις ἐλπίδος.
Oe. Didn’t either some messenger or fellow-traveller see anything, from
whom one would have learned something, putting him to use?
Cr. No, because they aredead—apart fromone,who fled in fear andwas
not able to state anything reliably aboutwhat hehad seen, except for
one thing.
Oe. What is that? One thing might lead to the discovery of many for us
to learn, if we could grasp some brief beginning of hope.
38 Oedipus’ examples with ποῖος are 89, 99, 120, 291, 359, 437, 1176; he also has similar post-
expansionswithoutποῖος, e.g. at 1017, 1041.Heusesποῖος also in new sequences that are not
obviously post-expansions, at 102, 128, 1124, 1164 (the distinction between new sequences
and post-expansions in extended talk-in-interaction is often slight). Different again are
1489 and 1490, rhetorical ποῖος-questions addressed to his children (1371, lastly, is similar,
but in an indirect question). Other characters use ποῖος-post-expansions at 935 (Jocasta),
989 (Corinthian) and 1129 (Servant). Creon’s two instances of ποῖος are interestingly differ-
ent: at 559 and 571 he uses ποῖος questions in interruptions, anticipating (syntactically as
well as in terms of content) Oedipus’ own questions. As this survey shows, raw frequen-
cies of ποῖος-usage are only partly indicative: Oedipus scores high on this front (14×), but is
matched or outstripped byTiresias (2 instances, not post-expansions), Jocasta (2×, includ-
ing the case at 935 mentioned above), and the Servant (1×, 1129). Elsewhere in Sophocles
only Theseus in OC approaches Oedipus’ level of usage (5× ποῖος, three of which are com-
parable post-expansions).
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This restive style of questioning is, of course, dramatically important, in that
it causes Oedipus to pick at all the threads which, for his own sake, he had bet-
ter left unpicked. In this way, as so often in tragedy, characterisation and plot
design are inextricably intertwined: as Oedipus is relentless in his pursuit of
every last detail of fact, so the plot drives relentlessly, through every new revel-
ation, towards the final discovery of the truth. Example [2] indeed thematises
this point explicitly early on in the play: one discovery will lead to many.39
We see the same impulse to pick at threads, at similar points of dramatic
significance, demonstrated in a few other cases whereOedipus attaches a post-
expansion to second parts which do not form part of an ongoing question–
answer sequence. Oedipus’ interlocutors in these cases seem to want to close
off an ongoing sequence, but Oedipus refuses to let things lie and immediately
‘reactivates’ the sequence with a post-expansion to further interrogate an ele-
ment that has come up in his interlocutor’s turn:
[3] Sophocles Oedipus the King 284–291
Χο. ἄνακτ’ ἄνακτι ταὔθ’ ὁρῶντ’ ἐπίσταμαι
μάλιστα Φοίβωι Τειρεσίαν, παρ’ οὗ τις ἂν
σκοπῶν τάδ’, ὦναξ, ἐκμάθοι σαφέστατα.
Οι. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν ἀργοῖς οὐδὲ τοῦτ’ ἐπραξάμην.
ἔπεμψα γὰρ Κρέοντος εἰπόντος διπλοῦς
πομπούς· πάλαι δὲ μὴ παρὼν θαυμάζεται.
Χο. καὶ μὴν τά γ’ ἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ παλαί’ ἔπη. telling/assessment
(sequence-closer?)
Οι. τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; πάντα γὰρ σκοπῶ λόγον. question—post-exp.
Cho. I know that lord Tiresias sees the same things as does lord Phoe-
bus, and from him, my lord, one might learn these things most
truly in the course of investigation.
Oe. Well, I saw to it that not even this act should be among things neg-
lected. For at Creon’s request, I have sent twomessengers, and for
some time it has been a source of wonder that he is not here.
Cho. Yes, and as for the rest, they are mute, ancient tales.
Oe. What is that rumour? I am examining the whole question.40
39 As Finglass points out (2018: ad loc.), ‘[t]he sententious remark ismore relevant thanOed-
ipus realises, since the information provided by the witness is centred on the distinction
between singular and plural’ (i.e. the question of howmany robbers there were).
40 The translation of the last line is mine.
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[4] Sophocles Oedipus the King 432–437
Tε. οὐδ’ ἱκόμην ἔγωγ’ ἄν, εἰ σὺ μὴ ’κάλεις.
Οι. οὐ γάρ τί σ’ ἤιδη μῶρα φωνήσοντ’, ἐπεὶ
σχολῆι σ’ ἂν οἴκους τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἐστειλάμην.
Tε. ἡμεῖς τοιοίδ’ ἔφυμεν, ὡς μὲν σοὶ δοκεῖ,
μῶροι, γονεῦσι δ’, οἵ σ’ ἔφυσαν, ἔμφρονες.
Οι. ποίοισι; μεῖνον. τίς δέ μ’ ἐκφύει βροτῶν; question—post-expansion
Te. I would not have come, if you had not called me.
Oe. Yes, because I had no idea that you would speak words of foolish-
ness, since otherwise I would scarcely have had you summoned to
my house.
Te. That is what I am, as it seems to you—foolish; but to your parents,
who begot you, I seemed wise.
Oe. What parents? Stay! Who among mortals was my parent?
Commentators’ observations on these moments are revealing: on [4], Finglass
(2018: ad loc.) notes that ‘for the first time in nearly a hundred lines, Oedipus
suddenly becomes desperately eager to hear what the prophet has to say […]
the staccato language expresses agitation’; on [3], Dawe (22007: ad loc.) notes
that the chorus’ ‘casual throwaway remark instantly excites Oedipus’ detective
instincts’. Such remarks show how natural it is to interpret Oedipus’ style of
questioning in terms of his frame of mind, and indeed (as Dawe does) as an
indication of his more permanent ‘instincts’.
Dawe is more reluctant, however, to adopt a similar explanation for a fur-
ther instance in the final sleuthing scene of the play, in which Oedipus at last
discovers the truth:
[5] Sophocles Oedipus the King 1173–1176
Oι. ἦ γὰρ δίδωσιν ἥδε σοι; question
Θε. μάλιστ’, ἄναξ. answer
Oι. ὡς πρὸς τί χρείας; question—post-expansion (?)
Θε. ὡς ἀναλώσαιμί νιν. answer
Oι. τεκοῦσα τλήμων; question—post-expansion (?)
Θε. θεσφάτων γ’ ὄκνωι κακῶν. answer
Oι. ποίων; question—post-expansion
Θε. κτενεῖν νιν τοὺς τεκόντας ἦν λόγος. answer
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Oe. So it was she who gave it to you?
Shep. Yes, my lord.
Oe. For what purpose?
Shep. So that I would kill it.
Oe. She brought herself to do that, after giving birth to the child?
Shep. Yes, through fear of dire prophecies.
Oe. What prophecies?
Shep. The story was that it would kill its parents.
Dawe comments:
In real life no one would ever ask these supplementary questions after
facts of incomparably greater importance had been revealed, not even a
man as remorseless in the pursuit of the truth as Oedipus. It is for the
audience’s benefit that Sophocles is giving the final clarification here.41
Yet givenwhatwehave seen fromOedipus ‘remorseless […]pursuit of the truth’
previously in the play, I would argue that Oedipus’ style of questioning in this
scene is entirely in character. It is, in fact, in the build-up to this scene that
we have had the most explicit statement by Oedipus of his own investigative
approach, a self-assertionwhichmaywell be taken as emblematic for his beha-
viour throughout the play:
[6] Sophocles Oedipus the King 1064–106542
Ιο. ὅμως πιθοῦ μοι, λίσσομαι, μὴ δρᾶ τάδε.
Οι. οὐκ ἂν πιθοίμην μὴ οὐ τάδ’ ἐκμαθεῖν σαφῶς.
Jo. All the same do as I wish, I beg you! Do not do this!
Oe. You will never persuade me not to find out the truth!
3.2 Maximising Relevance: Oedipus the King of Implicatures
Oedipus in Oedipus the King is the conscientious ruler of a city gripped
by plague, confident in his ability to solve problems through energy and
41 Dawe (22007: ad 1176).
42 The translation in this case is taken from Lloyd-Jones (1994).
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intelligence. […] As the play continues, this energy turns out to have a
darker side. Oedipus is impatient, hot-tempered, prone to jump to con-
clusions.43
Scodel’s character sketch, which of course shares many features with Knox’s
(cited above) and those of others,44 explicitly draws the link between on the
one hand the ‘energy and intelligence’ that we have seen come through in
Oedipus’ uncompromising style of questioning, and on the other his overly sus-
picious nature, which he demonstrates particularly in the scene with Tiresias
and in the subsequent exchange with Creon.
A pragmatics-based reading, too, invites us to see these two traits—intelli-
gence and distrust verging on paranoia—as two sides of the same coin. What
appears to drive Oedipus, in all parts of the play, is primarily an overdeveloped
desire for ‘relevance’, meant in the technical sense that that term has in Rel-
evance Theory. In Relevance Theory, Sperber and Wilson’s cognitively inflec-
ted update of Grice’s foundational model of conversational maxims and con-
versational implicatures,45 communication operates as a constant balancing
exercise. On the one hand an individual confronted with any given input will
attempt to extract as much useful information as possible from that input, but
on the other hand he or she will attempt to exert as little cognitive processing
effort as possible in order to do so. In the formal terms used by Wilson and
Sperber, these two competing ‘principles of relevance’ are formulated as fol-
lows:
Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects
achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input
to the individual at that time.
Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended,
the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.46
43 Scodel (2005: 240–241).
44 So, Gould (2002 [1988]: 257) writes of the ‘quickness of rationality’ of Oedipus’ mind, and
of the ‘swiftness with which one inference follows on another’: ‘it is […] the habit of his
mind to leap ahead inmaking connections, in picking on the link in the chain of reasoning
that must be tested.’
45 Agood introduction toRelevanceTheory (RT) isWilson andSperber (2004) (but it isworth
going straight for the fuller discussions in Sperber andWilson 21995). For RT andmind style
see Semino (2014). Some rudimentary attempts to apply RT to tragedymay be found in van
Emde Boas (2017b).
46 Wilson and Sperber (2004: §2).
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Grice’s notion of conversational implicature—that is, meaning that is
implied and inferred rather than ‘literal’—is recast on this model as the con-
tinued processing of an input (beyond a literal surface reading) until sufficient
relevance is extracted: we keep deriving implicatures until (but only until) the
information we have derived is worth the effort.
What we may observe in Oedipus is that the balance of this calculation is
off: the ‘positive cognitive effects’ that Oedipus achieves in his interactions are
never enough for him. As we have seen in his style of questioning, he is always
hungry for more inputs, always probing his interlocutors for any bit of inform-
ation that can still his hunger for relevance. The other direction that he can
swing in, however, is to extract unreasonable amounts of relevance from min-
imal (and as such deficient) inputs: where ‘normal’ people might stop deriving
implicatures from such deficient information, Oedipus just never stops pro-
cessing, and jumps to entirely unfounded conclusions about what it means
when (particularly) Tiresias and Creon tell him (or do not tell him) things.
Again, we are given, fairly early on in the play, an almost programmatic state-
ment of this feature of Oedipus’ behaviour, in his own words:
[7] Sophocles Oedipus the King 342–349
Οι. οὔκουν ἅ γ’ ἥξει καὶ σὲ χρὴ λέγειν ἐμοί;
Τε. οὐκ ἂν πέρα φράσαιμι. πρὸς τάδ’, εἰ θέλεις,
θυμοῦ δι’ ὀργῆς ἥτις ἀγριωτάτη.
Οι. καὶ μὴν παρήσω γ’ οὐδέν, ὡς ὀργῆς ἔχω,
ἅπερ ξυνίημ’. ἴσθι γὰρ δοκῶν ἐμοὶ
καὶ ξυμφυτεῦσαι τοὔργον εἰργάσθαι θ’, ὅσον
μὴ χερσὶ καίνων· εἰ δ’ ἐτύγχανες βλέπων,
καὶ τοὔργον ἂν σοῦ τοῦτ’ ἔφην εἶναι μόνου.
Oe. Ought you not actually to tell me what is going to come?
Ti. I will speak no further. In the face of that, if you want to, rage with
the anger that is fiercest.
Oe. Well, I will leave out nothing—such is my anger—of what I under-
stand. Know that you seem to me to have actually plotted the deed
andcarried it out, except that youdidnot commit the actualmurder;
and if you happened to have sight, I would have said that this deed
too was yours alone.
‘I will leave out nothing […] of what I understand’, indeed: Oedipus under-
stands much. In some cases, though, what he understands is far toomuch, and
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horribly misguided. This, then, is the ‘darker side’ of Oedipus’ probing intelli-
gence and his relentless commitment to uncovering the truth, the same traits
which propel him to ask ever more searching questions and to never be satis-
fied with the answers.
4 Conclusion
It is hugely telling that Oedipus himself would connect, in [7], his commu-
nicative behaviour to his own mental and emotional state—his ὀργή (344). In
a play in which, as Lloyd has well noted, ‘there is relatively little direct char-
acterisation of Oedipus […] either by himself or by others’,47 there is added
significance to such moments, in which the characters themselves draw con-
nections betweencertain kinds of behaviour and certainmental andemotional
frames.
The particular contribution that pragmatics canmake to the analysis of such
moments is first of all to bring into clearer focus that the ‘kinds of behaviour’
that wemay be interested in go well beyond the outward and physical (such as
striking down a driver in an altercation on crossroads: παίω δι’ ὀργῆς, 807) but
include verbal and communicative behaviour: it is in the ways in which Oed-
ipus engages conversationally with everyone with whom he shares the stage
that we see the workings of his mind most clearly. Those interactions vary in
tone—as can only be expected, seeing that the king is confronted variously
with a co-operative interviewee, an enigmatic priest, an aggrieved brother-in-
law(/uncle), a concernedwife(/mother), and an unforthcoming servant. For all
their variety, however, there is remarkable consistency in what Oedipus’ inter-
actions reveal about him.
What pragmatics can offer us above all is the detailed tools to make sense of
the precise nuances of communicative behaviour. It is through some of these
details, as we have seen, that playwrights are able to draw fine-grained distinc-
tions between individual characters. As long as we are happy to class these
aspects of language use under the header ‘style’, it turns out that it is precisely
in them that we can find the kinds of stylistic variation that the Greek tragedi-
ans used, even within the superficially homogeneous tragic Kunstsprache, to
achieve remarkably subtle characterisation.
47 Lloyd (2018: 344). ‘Direct characterisation’ refers to the explicit anddirect verbal ascription
of (relatively stable) traits to a character (in drama always by the character him/herself or
another character, in narrative also by the narrator).
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Resonance in the Prologue of Sophocles’Ajax
Severin Hof
1 Doing Things withWords Together
In the mid-twentieth century, the American classicist G.M. Kirkwood wrote
about the functioning of Sophoclean drama that it depended,more than in the
cases of Aeschylus and Euripides, on ‘character interaction’.1 While I am not
going to probe the claim concerning Aeschylus and Euripides, I will undertake
a reading of a scene of a Sophoclean drama, the prologue of the Ajax (1–133),
where I will pay close attention to the way the characters interact, utterance
for utterance, and show how intimately the communicative mechanisms that
are displayed in the characters’ dialogue are tied upwith the functioning of the
prologue as a dramatic text.2
Looking at interaction means, first and foremost, being aware of the fact that
dialogue is a joint product of the interlocutors involved, hence something they
do together. Doing things together with words is where pragmatics—or, for the
sake of this paper, the concept of resonance—enters the picture. Central to
this concept, developed by the American linguist J.W. du Bois within his the-
ory of dialogic syntax, is the insight that not only is a dialogue as a whole a
joint product, but so is, to a certain extent, also every single contribution by
the interactants.3 For, to understand the meaning of a single turn-at-talk, it is
not sufficient to look at it by itself, but it needs to be considered in the light
of what has been said before, i.e. of the material already present in the ‘his-
1 Kirkwood (1958: 99–101).
2 In doing so, my paper is firmly anchored within the domain of pragmatics, since both com-
municative systems, the external and the internal one in the terms of Pfister (1988: 3–4), are,
for the fact of being communicative, open to a pragmatic analysis (cf. Jucker and Locher 2017:
in particular 1–2; an analysis of the external system inevitably shows overlaps with domains
such as narratology and reception theory). This is even more the case since the paper does
not analyse these two systems alongside each other (if such a thing is possible) but shows
how understanding the external communicative system depends on a precise understanding
of the internal one.
3 Du Bois (2014), especially 372–375. The genesis of the theory of dialogic syntax is influenced
by the concept of dialogism famously developed by Bakhtin (1986: 87–100; see also 1981: 275–
294) andVološinov (1973: 83–98); see Clark (1996) on language use as a ‘joint action’ and Linell
(1998: 86–87, 127–154) on dialogue as a ‘joint construction’; see also Drummen (2016b: §§1–7)
and cf. the concept of ‘common ground’ (Allan in this volume).
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tory’ of the dialogue (the ‘co-text’) with which the speaker makes it ‘resound’:4
how does an interactant embed his or her contribution in the dialogue? How
does he or she, at the different levels of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, take
up and make use of what has been said before and expand on it, thus adding
new elements to the ‘history’ of the conversation?5 I shall explain this bymeans
of an example from the play under discussion. In the second half of the Ajax,
Teucer and Menelaus argue about the latter’s denial of burial to Ajax. In their
dispute, the following exchange occurs:6
[1a] Sophocles Ajax 1139–1141
Τευ. οὐ μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ λυπήσομεν.
Μεν. ἕν σοι φράσω· τόνδ’ ἐστὶν οὐχὶ θαπτέον.
Τευ. ἀλλ’ ἀντακούσηι τοῦθ’ ἕν, ὡς τεθάψεται.
Teu. To no more pain, I think, for me than for you.
Men. I will say one word to you; this man must not be buried!
Teu. But you shall hear one word in reply, that he shall be buried!
The pragmatic value of Menelaus’ affirmation consists not only of his denial of
Ajax’s burial, but also of claiming unconditional authority by virtue of hisword,
as is shown by his breaking off the preceding discussion. Instead of continuing
the discussion, he affirms without further argument, but with the metalin-
guistic expression ‘I will say one word to you’, that Ajax will not be buried (note
the verbal adjective θαπτέον 1140, ‘must [not] be buried’).
Teucer’s riposte also dispenses with any supporting argument but states as
a fact that Ajax will be buried. Thus, not only does he affirm his determination
to bring about the burial, but he also challenges Menelaus’ claim to authority
by virtue of his word that he has made before. (Note that Teucer, as well, pre-
faces his affirmation with a metalinguistic utterance, viz. ‘But you shall hear
one word in reply’, thus echoing—also syntactically—Menelaus’ ‘I will say one
word to you’.) Teucer’s contestation of Menelaus’ claim to authority by vir-
4 Resonance is a concept particularly helpful to investigate Greek particles, which function as
‘contextualisation cues’ (Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz 1976), i.e. as means by which inter-
locutors express the particular pragmatic intention of their taking up elements of preceding
utterances. For the importance of particles to this paper’s argument cf. n. 21, 22, and 30 below.
5 Du Bois (2014: 360–365).
6 Texts are from Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990); translations are adapted from Lloyd-Jones
(1994).
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tue of his word is central to the entire exchange of the two men,7 and, in the
excerpt just discussed, this contestation can be grasped by looking at reson-
ance.
In order to visualise the relationships between single turns-at-talk, I will
make use of typographic means. I will italicise elements taken up and print in
bold new elements with which the interlocutors expand on the preceding dia-
logue (e.g. 1140 beingboldmeans thatMenelaus does conspicuously not engage
with what has been said before, but breaks off the discussion):
[1b] Sophocles Ajax 1139–1141
Τευ. οὐ μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ λυπήσομεν.
Μεν. ἕν σοι φράσω· τόνδ’ ἐστὶν οὐχὶ θαπτέον.
Τευ. ἀλλ’ ἀντακούσηι τοῦθ’ ἕν, ὡς τεθάψεται.
Teu. To no more pain, I think, for me than for you.
Men. I will say one word to you; this manmust not be buried!
Teu. But you shall hear one word in reply, that he shall be buried!
In the following, I amgoing to look at several instances of interaction in thepro-
logueof the Ajaxwhereparticipants engage—orostentatively refuse to engage,
which is, of course, also a sort of engagement (cf. Menelaus’ line 1140 above)—
with the preceding ‘dialogue material’. Doing so will make it possible to better
understand the clues Sophocles gives tohis recipients,8 particularly howhe cre-
ates audience involvement by the depiction of the ways his characters engage
with preceding utterances.
2 The Participation Framework(s)
The Ajax starts with what is often called a dumb-show: a Greek warrior is
seen lurking around a hut, looking to the ground, obviously searching for
something. This warrior—Odysseus—is then joined by the goddess Athena.
Their exchange starts as follows:
7 Barker (2009: 299–302).
8 The word ‘clue’ is important: When talking about the audience, I do not claim to reconstruct
the reaction of an ‘empirical’ recipient, but the signals contained in the text for its ‘implied
recipient’ (see Iser 1978: 34).
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[2] Sophocles Ajax 1–17, 21–24, 31–35
Αθ. ἀεὶ μέν, ὦ παῖ Λαρτίου, δέδορκά σε
πεῖράν τιν’ ἐχθρῶν ἁρπάσαι θηρώμενον·
καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ σκηναῖς σε ναυτικαῖς ὁρῶ
Αἴαντος, ἔνθα τάξιν ἐσχάτην ἔχει,
πάλαι κυνηγετοῦντα καὶ μετρούμενον
ἴχνη τὰ κείνου νεοχάραχθ’, ὅπως ἴδηις
εἴτ’ ἔνδον εἴτ’ οὐκ ἔνδον. εὖ δέ σ’ ἐκφέρει
κυνὸς Λακαίνης ὥς τις εὔρινος βάσις.
ἔνδον γὰρ ἁνὴρ ἄρτι τυγχάνει, κάρα
στάζων ἱδρῶτι καὶ χέρας ξιφοκτόνους.
καί σ’ οὐδὲν εἴσω τῆσδε παπταίνειν πύλης
ἔτ’ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἐννέπειν δ’ ὅτου χάριν
σπουδὴν ἔθου τήνδ’, ὡς παρ’ εἰδυίας μάθηις.
Οδ. ὦ φθέγμ’ Ἀθάνας, φιλτάτης ἐμοὶ θεῶν,
ὡς εὐμαθές σου, κἂν ἄποπτος ἦις ὅμως,
φώνημ’ ἀκούω καὶ ξυναρπάζω φρενὶ
χαλκοστόμου κώδωνος ὡς Τυρσηνικῆς.
[…]
νυκτὸς γὰρ ἡμᾶς τῆσδε πρᾶγος ἄσκοπον
ἔχει περάνας [sc. ὁ Αἴας], εἴπερ εἴργασται τάδε·
ἴσμεν γὰρ οὐδὲν τρανές, ἀλλ’ ἀλώμεθα·
κἀγὼ ’θελοντὴς τῶιδ’ ὑπεζύγην πόνωι.
[…]
εὐθέως δ’ ἐγὼ
κατ’ ἴχνος ἄισσω, καὶ τὰ μὲν σημαίνομαι,
τὰ δ’ ἐκπέπληγμαι, κοὐκ ἔχω μαθεῖν ὅπου.
καιρὸν δ’ ἐφήκεις· πάντα γὰρ τά τ’ οὖν πάρος
τά τ’ εἰσέπειτα σῆι κυβερνῶμαι χερί.
Ath. Always, son of Laertes,my eye is on you as you prowl about to snatch
some opportunity against your enemies; and now I see you by the
hut of Ajax near the ships, where he occupies the last position, a
longwhile onhis trail and scanning his newlymade footprints to see
whether he is inside or not; moving like a Spartan hound with keen
scent, you travel quickly to your goal. Yes, the man is now inside, his
face and hands that have slaughtered with the sword dripping with
sweat. And now you no longer need to peer inside this gate, but you
must tellmewhat is the reason for your efforts, so that youmay learn
fromme who knows.
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Od. Voice of Athena, dearest of the gods to me, how easily do I under-
stand your words and grasp them with my mind, even if I cannot
see you, as though a Tyrrhenian trumpet spoke with brazen mouth.
[…] during last night he [sc. Ajax] has perpetrated a thing appalling,
if indeed he is the doer; we know nothing precise, but we are at sea,
and I, as a volunteer, have been charged with this task. […] and at
once I darted off on the trail. Some things I canmake out, but by oth-
ers I am thrown off course, and I cannot discover [lit. ‘learn’] where
he is. You have come opportunely; because as in the past, so in the
future it is your hand that steers me.
What is of interest here for our purposes is the motif of ‘knowing’ and ‘learn-
ing’. It is brought up by Athena when she tells Odysseus to inform her on what
he is up to, so that he may ‘learn’ from her, who is ‘the one who knows’. Odys-
seus reacts to this by first expressing how well he understands the voice of the
goddess (he calls it εὐμαθές, using a word that derives from the root of ‘learn’)
to whom he is linked by a particular closeness that is already established in the
Iliad (note that he calls her ‘the dearest of the gods’ in line 14).9
Then, he goes on to describe the background of his quest: in the morning,
the Greeks had seen that, during the night, someone had attacked and slain
the cattle they had captured before Troy. This mysterious event had left them
flabbergasted, as Odysseus says at line 23: ‘We knownothing for certain, but we
are at sea.’ In this situation, however, the Greeks thought of Odysseus and gave
him10 the task of elucidating the events that had taken place—a task Odys-
seus energetically took on.11 Although he hasmade some progress, some things
remain unclear to him, as he says at line 33: ‘[…] I am thrown off course, and I
cannot discover [lit. ‘learn’] where he is’. He then closes his remarks by com-
ing back to his closeness to Athena which he mentioned in the beginning.
He reminds her of the fact that she has already ‘steered’ him in the past in
everything and is going to do so in the future as well. These two closing lines
are, of course, an implicit request to Athena to deliver the information, as she
had promised at the end of her turn.
If one now looks at the way in which Odysseus takes up as well as devel-
ops the motif of ‘knowing’ and ‘learning’, two things become clear: first, if he
9 See, e.g., Il. 10.278–279.
10 ὑπεζύγην (24) is passive, see Allan (2006: 118–119).
11 Note the slightly paradoxical expression ’θελοντὴς […] ὑπεζύγην (24), which shows the
readiness with which Odysseus took over the task—an image he draws of himself also
when he says that he ‘at once darted off the trail’ (31–32).
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says that the Greeks at large ‘don’t know anything precise’ and that he still has
only partly made up for this deficit (33), he positions himself vis-à-vis Athena
as representing the Greeks, thus enlarging the initial participation framework
established by the goddess.12
Second, ‘knowing nothing precise’ is not only the situationOdysseus and the
Greeks find themselves in, it also describes the situation of an ancient audi-
ence at the beginning of a play: the mythical material, from which the poet
derived his plot, was familiar to the audience, but the precise handling of it and
the extent to which the playwright would innovate were unknown. If one now
takes into account that precisely what Odysseus is about to discover, namely
Ajax’s attack on the Greeks’ cattle, was probably an innovation by Sophocles,
it becomes highly likely to see here a specific allusion to the audience’s state of
knowledge:13 Odysseus, in his partial knowledge vis-à-vis the ‘knowing’ Athena
and his quest to ‘learn’ from her, acts as a focaliser for the audience.14 Thus, the
first two utterances establish not only an internal, but also what one could call
a ‘metaleptic’ participation framework.
3 Gods and Humans
Athena’s reaction to Odysseus’ implicit request is remarkable:
[3] Sophocles Ajax 34–40
Οδ. … καιρὸν δ’ ἐφήκεις· πάντα γὰρ τά τ’ οὖν πάρος
τά τ’ εἰσέπειτα σῆι κυβερνῶμαι χερί.
Αθ. ἔγνων,Ὀδυσσεῦ, καὶ πάλαι φύλαξ ἔβην
τῆι σῆι πρόθυμος εἰς ὁδὸν κυναγίαι.
Οδ. ἦ καί, φίλη δέσποινα, πρὸς καιρὸν πονῶ;
Αθ. ὡς ἔστιν τἀνδρὸς τοῦδε τἄργα ταῦτά σοι.
Οδ. καὶ πρὸς τί δυσλόγιστον ὧδ’ ἦιξεν χέρα;
Od. … You have come opportunely; because as in the past, so in the
future it is your hand that steers me.
12 On the notion of ‘participation framework’, see Goffman (1981).
13 Heath and OKell (2007: 366).
14 Cf. Ringer (1998: 34); for the use of the concept of focalisation in drama, see Hose (1993:
36).
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Ath. I knew it, Odysseus, and some time ago set out on the way, eager
to guide you in your hunt.
Od. Dear mistress, am I labouring to any purpose?
Ath. Know that these are the actions of that man!
Od. And why did he lash out so foolishly?
In her answer, she does not react to Odysseus’ request. Instead, she just states
that she had already known what he has just told her. By withholding further
information, she makes him ask explicitly for the information she promised.
Odysseus does this and she then provides him with the information in a brief
stichomythia, capped by a longer rhesis (38–65): as a consequence of his hav-
ing been denied Achilles’ arms, which were awarded to Odysseus instead, Ajax
went mad15 and wanted to take revenge on the Greeks and, in a nightly attack,
to slay as many of them as possible. He would have succeeded, had not Athena
intervened by casting delusion upon him and making him attack the Greeks’
cattle instead. At the moment of her encounter with Odysseus, Ajax’s delusion
still prevails and he is in his hut, torturing the ram he thinks is his foe, Odys-
seus.
The way in which Athena provides this information is interesting. For after
havingmadeOdysseus ask explicitly, she gives away the relevant information in
piecemeal fashion (the beginning of which can be seen in the excerpt above).
In this way, she prompts her interlocutor to ask further questions time and
again—abehaviour that has been correctly described as ‘gentle toyingwith her
protégé’.16 What enables her to do so is, of course, that she is a ‘knowing’ god-
dess, whereas Odysseus is amanwhose knowledge is only partial. Moreover, as
a goddess, she is under no threat at all, whereas the humanOdysseus is depend-
ent on learning what has happened in order to counter the danger presented
by the nightly attacker.17 Sophocles thus makes the spectators follow the focal-
iser Odysseus through the stichomythia in the common quest for information.
In a subtle but effective way, he creates awareness of the fact that Odysseus,
notwithstanding his closeness to Athena, is still separated from her by the
insurmountable gulf that exists between gods and humans. Importantly, this
does not lead to any irritation on the part of Odysseus and, per extensionem,
15 The ‘madness’ of Ajax is a famous topic; Athena’s report draws a picture according to
which Ajax wasmad before her intervention, whichmakes it natural to assume the judge-
ment of the arms as tipping-point; that this picture will later be complicated (see the
excellent treatment byWinnington-Ingram [1980: 11–56]) is not of interest here.
16 Finglass (2011: ad 36–37).
17 Cf. Heath (1987: 170).
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on the part of the spectators. The stichomythia thus not only reveals the gap
between gods and humans but also the fact that this difference is a completely
normal state of affairs even between exemplarily close figures such as Athena
and Odysseus.
After the stichomythia has ended in a rhesis by Athena, she starts anew and
wants to show the delusional Ajax to Odysseus. This utterance (66–77) is best
juxtaposed with an earlier statement by Odysseus:
[4] Sophocles Ajax 23, 66–70
Οδ. … ἴσμεν γὰρ οὐδὲν τρανές, ἀλλ’ ἀλώμεθα·
[…]
Αθ. … δείξω δὲ καὶ σοὶ τήνδε περιφανῆ νόσον,
ὡς πᾶσιν Ἀργείοισιν εἰσιδὼν θροῆις.
θαρσῶν δὲ μίμνε, μήδε συμφορὰν δέχου,
τὸν ἄνδρ’· ἐγὼ γὰρ ὀμμάτων ἀποστρόφους
αὐγὰς ἀπείρξω σὴν πρόσοψιν εἰσιδεῖν.
Od. … we know nothing precise, but we are at sea,
[…]
Ath. … And I will show this madness openly to you also, so that youmay
tell all the Argives what you have seen. Stay to meet the man with
confidence, do not expect disaster; I shall divert the rays of his eyes
so that he cannot see you.
Odysseus had presented himself before Athena as representing the Greeks,
who ‘know nothing precise’. If she now wants to show Ajax to him so that he
‘may tell all the Argives what he has seen’, her intention is to enable him to ful-
fill his task as thoroughly as possible. By adding autopsy to her report, she lends
Odysseus even greater credibility vis-à-vis the Greeks.18
18 Finglass (2011: ad 66–67); the scholiast already recognised this as a sign of Athena’s ‘good-
will’ (schol. 66a).
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4 Divine and Human Perspectives
Odysseus, however, reacts negatively at line 74, and this triggers a stichomythic
exchange in which Athena presents several arguments to convince him to give
in (75–88). The first one is a reproach of cowardice, which can again be best
understood by juxtaposing it with a part of the preceding dialogue:
[5] Sophocles Ajax 24, 31–32, 75
Οδ. … κἀγὼ ’θελοντὴς τῶιδ’ ὑπεζύγην πόνωι.
[…] εὐθέως δ’ ἐγὼ
κατ’ ἴχνος ἄισσω, […]
Αθ. οὐ σίγ’ ἀνέξηι μηδὲ δειλίαν ἄρηι;
Od. … and I, as a volunteer, have been charged with this task. […] and at
once I darted off on the trail […]
Ath. Will you not be quiet, and not show yourself a coward?
Odysseus had presented himself, quite confidently, as the person the Greeks
had charged with investigating the mysterious massacre, who then energetic-
ally took over this task (cf. n. 11 above). Yet now, he rejects the occasion to com-
plete his task. Given that Athena’s reproach can be read as taking up Odysseus’
previous self-presentation,19 that reproach does not seem totally unjustified—
even more so, since Odysseus not only endangers the Greeks in their desire
to learn what has happended as precisely as possible but also risks to dis-
appoint the spectators who have been following him closely in his quest for
information (note that Athena has promised she would make sure Ajax would
not see him, which could further justify her charge of cowardice). However,
should the spectators go so far as to shareAthena’s reproach?Odysseus, at least,
stands his ground, to which Athena reacts with a rhetorical question, vary-
ing the cowardice argument, followed by another implicit rejection by Odys-
seus:
19 In this context, it is remarkable that the subject to which Odysseus would ‘show himself a
coward’ remains unspecified: sure, Athena means herself, but could her words also point
to the Greeks at large?
- 978-90-04-44026-5
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com10/12/2020 08:49:24PM
via free access
130 hof
[6] Sophocles Ajax 76–78
Οδ. μὴ πρὸς θεῶν· ἀλλ’ ἔνδον ἀρκείτω μένων.
Αθ. τί μὴ γένηται; πρόσθεν οὐκ ἀνὴρ ὅδ’ ἦν;20
Οδ. ἐχθρός γε τῶιδε τἀνδρὶ καὶ τανῦν ἔτι.
Od. No, I beg you! Be content for him to stay inside!
Ath. What are you afraid of?Was this one not before aman?
Od. Yes, an enemy to this man here, and he still is.
This is an illuminating exchange: Athena asks whether Ajax was not ‘a man’
before. Odysseus replies that he was indeed but points out what is important
to him: not Ajax’s humanity but his enmity (note the particle γε at 7821). He
provides a reason for this by taking up Athena’s words, i.e. ἀνήρ and ὅδ’, by his
self-designation as ‘this man here’ (78 τῶιδε τἀνδρί): he, Odysseus, is ‘a man’
himself, and thus what matters to him is that ‘the man’ Ajax was and is an
enemy—or, to put it differently: vis-à-vis a god, Athena’s argument would be
good, but vis-à-vis aman, it is not. This justifies Odysseus’ rejection of Athena’s
plan as an understandable human reaction, thereby deepening the status of
focaliser: the spectators become aware of the fact that the natural difference
between god and human that was subtly established in the beginning can be
problematic. Themost important point, however, is that, in this way, Sophocles
establishes a pattern that is the key to the rest of the prologue: Athena tries
to do justice to Odysseus’ needs, as she infers them. She does not, however,
succeed; this is not because her presuppositions are false—Ajaxwas ‘aman’—
but because she does not seize on what is relevant for her human interlocutor.
This can be clearly seen in the next exchange, which is best understood when
presented in two separate juxtapositions:
[7a] Sophocles Ajax 78–80
Οδ. ἐχθρός γε τῶιδε τἀνρὶ καὶ τανῦν ἔτι.
Αθ. οὔκουν γέλως ἥδιστος εἰς ἐχθροὺς γελᾶν;
Οδ. ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτον ἐν δόμοις μένειν.
20 Punctuation as in the text of Finglass (2011, cf. ad 77).
21 On γε in such contexts of resonance, seeDrummen (2016b: §§77–79); ἀνήρ has been taken
to mean ‘hero’ (see Finglass 2011: ad 77); however, this meaning would demand rather καί
than γε in Odysseus’ answer: ‘Was this one not a hero before?’—‘Yes, and an enemy to this
man here.’ (on this continuing function of καί, see Drummen 2016b: §§89–94).
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Od. Yes, an enemy to this man here, and he still is.
Ath. Is not laughter at one’s enemies the sweetest kind of laughter?
Od. I am content for him to stay inside.
[7b] Sophocles Ajax 76, 78
Οδ. μὴ πρὸς θεῶν· ἀλλ’ ἔνδον ἀρκείτω μένων.
[…]
Οδ. ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτον ἐν δόμοις μένειν.
Od. No, I beg you! Be content for him to stay inside!
[…]
Od. I am content for him to stay inside.
Odysseushas pointedout the relevanceof Ajax’s enmity.Verywell then,Athena
answers, what could be ‘sweeter’ than to laugh at than one’s enemies in utter
defeat (note the inferential particle oὔκουν at 7922)? In his answer, Odysseus
does not deny that laughing at one’s enemies is the ‘sweetest’ thing;23 he simply
restates the fact that he wants Ajax to stay inside, repeating his initial rejection
and thus making it clear that the fundamental issue, the danger that Ajax con-
stitutes, has not been grasped by Athena.
Then, the exchange gets slightly more complicated: Athena brings forward a
new argument, initiating a new stage of the conversation:
[8] Sophocles Ajax 81–88
Αθ. μεμηνότ’ ἄνδρα περιφανῶς ὀκνεῖς ἰδεῖν;
Οδ. φρονοῦντα γάρ νιν οὐκ ἂν ἐξέστην ὄκνωι.
Αθ. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ νῦν σε μὴ παρόντ’ ἴδηι πέλας.
Οδ. πῶς, εἴπερ ὀφθαλμοῖς γε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὁρᾶι;
Αθ. ἐγὼ σκοτώσω βλέφαρα καὶ δεδορκότα.
Οδ. γένοιτο μεντἂν πᾶν θεοῦ τεχνωμένου.
Αθ. σίγα νυν ἑστὼς καὶ μέν’ ὡς κυρεῖς ἔχων.
Οδ. μένοιμ’ ἄν· ἤθελον δ’ ἂν ἐκτὸς ὢν τυχεῖν.
22 Cf. Denniston (21954: 431) and Drummen (2016a: §§81–82, on οὖν).
23 Cf. Heath (1987: 168).
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Ath. Do you fear to see a man directly who ismad?
Od. Yes, for if he were sane, I would not have shrunk back from him in
fear.
Ath. But now he will not even see you near him.
Od. How so, if he is seeing with the same eyes?
Ath. I shall place his eyes in darkness, even though they see.
Od. Indeed anything can happen if a god contrives it.
Ath. Then stand in silence and remain as you are.
Od. I shall remain; but I wish I were not here.
Whether it is Ajax’s madness that made him reject her offer, she asks. As Odys-
seus’ taking up ‘mad’ by ‘sane’ and ‘Do you fear…?’ by ‘[I would not have shrunk
back] in fear’ shows, the goddess has hit themark with her question: were Ajax
sane, Odysseus would not have ‘shrunk back’. Athena counters this by point-
ing out once more that Ajax will not see him, a claim of which Odysseus at
first remains sceptical: how could he not see him if his eyes do see? She then
explainsmore clearly what shewill do, andOdysseus agrees: he had indeed not
understood how her protection measures would work and will ‘remain’ where
he is. However, even after Athena seems to finally have convinced Odysseus,
he closes the encounter at line 88 by saying that he still would prefer not to
see Ajax. So even after he has given in, the basic pattern remains intact: Athena
still does notmeetOdysseus’ needs, andhis fear, althoughbecoming somewhat
diffuse, remains understandable as a human reaction to an enemy who, being
mad, is dangerous to the point that Odysseus does not want to stand directly
next to him even if he cannot not see him.24
24 Note the continued presence of the god(-and-man) theme in line 86. The only real chal-
lenge to this understanding of Odysseus’ fear (which was already that of the scholiast,
see schol. 74) has come from LaCourse Munteanu (2010: 188), who claims that it is a fear
sui generis caused by the awesome and destabilising potential that is inherent to the act
of directly seeing a madman. This interpretation has the undeniable advantage of doing
away with the diffuse character Odysseus’ fear takes on when he, at line 88, still does not
want to see Ajax, although he has accepted that he will not see him. It is, however, some-
what problematic in that it essentially reads the exchange of Athena and Odysseus from
this line 88. For before it, there is no hint that Odysseus’ fear could be due to anything
else than the fact that his enemy has become even more dangerous in his current state
(at line 82 he says that Ajax’s madness made him ‘shrink back’, but line 84 shows that the
possibility of being seen by the mad Ajax does bother him).
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5 The End of the Exchange and the Beginning of the Drama
Athena then speaks to the delusional Ajax, who triumphs in the middle of the
carcasses of the cattle he thinks are his enemies, whilst cruelly mocking him
in front of the onlooker Odysseus (lines 89–117). Thereafter, she suggests a les-
son to Odysseus from what he has just seen: she asks him to acknowledge the
gods’ power who can bring down even someone as ‘prudent’ as Ajax. Odysseus,
however, draws his own conclusion, opposing Athena’s suggestion by taking up
the word ὁράω, ‘to see’:25
[9] Sophocles Ajax 118–126
Aθ. ὁρᾶις,Ὀδυσσεῦ, τὴν θεῶν ἰσχὺν ὅσην;
τούτου τίς ἄν σοι τἀνδρὸς ἢ προνούστερος
ἢ δρᾶν ἀμείνων ηὑρέθη τὰ καίρια;
Οδ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδέν’ οἶδ’· ἐποικτίρω δέ νιν
δύστηνον ἔμπας, καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ,
ὁθούνεκ’ ἄτηι συγκατέζευκται κακῆι,
οὐδὲν τὸ τούτου μᾶλλον ἢ τοὐμὸν σκοπῶν.
ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν
εἴδωλ’ ὅσοιπερ ζῶμεν ἢ κούφην σκιάν.
Ath. Do you see, Odysseus, how great is the power of the gods? What
manwas found to bemore prudent than this one, or better at doing
what was right?
Od. I knowof none, and I pity him inhismisery, thoughhe ismyenemy,
not thinking of his fate, butmyown; because I see that all of uswho
live are nothing but ghosts, or a fleeting shadow.
In his answer, Odysseus acknowledges the awesome power of the gods. His
reaction, however, is to pity his disgraced fellow human being Ajax. For he
recognises that, from a human perspective, divine power means first and fore-
most human frailty. Again, we see Odysseus correcting the goddess Athena’s
assumptions from a human perspective. He does not prove them false but
points out what is relevant to him—again, the same pattern occurs that has
been established in the first part of the prologue and has been discussed
above. Odysseus’ more humanly adequate reaction entails also a thorough re-
25 Cf. Segal (1989: 397–398).
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evaluation of Ajax: Athena had said that no one had been ‘more prudent and
better at doing what is right’. Whereas these qualities had just served to make
Ajax’s downfall evenmore impressive in her account, Odysseus’ pity brings out
their ethical implications. ItmarksAjax’s downfall as something that is, in a cer-
tain sense, unmerited. This becomes clear if one remembers how intimately, as
far aswe can assess, pity is boundup in classical Greek thoughtwith the unmer-
ited character of a person’s sufferings.26 The message is clear: the Ajax whom
the spectators have just seen cruelly triumphing over his ‘enemies’ and want-
ing to torture ‘Odysseus’ to death cannot be the whole story. In a certain sense,
Ajax’s attack on the cattle and Athena’s intervention must be a ‘misfortune’,27
a ‘tipping’ of a fundamentally ‘good’ character. This becomes even clearer if
one remembers that the qualities attributed to Ajax—prowess in counsel and
action—are akin to traditional heroic virtues.28
Amajor point has been established:Odysseus has, fromhis humanperspect-
ive, found an adequate reaction to the thwarted heroAjax. His reaction is based
on the tragic notion of human frailty which he expresses in traditional terms
already found in Pindar.29 However, the prologue is not over yet; the last word
belongs to Athena, who again takes up Odysseus’ preceding answer:
[10] Sophocles Ajax 125–133
Οδ. … ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν
εἴδωλ’ ὅσοιπερ ζῶμεν ἢ κούφην σκιάν.
Αθ. τοιαῦτα τοίνυν εἰσορῶν ὑπέρκοπον
μηδέν ποτ’ εἴπηις αὐτὸς ἐς θεοὺς ἔπος,
μηδ’ ὄγκον ἄρηι μηδέν’, εἴ τινος πλέον
ἢ χειρὶ βρίθεις ἢ μακροῦ πλούτου βάθει.
ὡς ἡμέρα κλίνει τε κἀνάγει πάλιν
ἅπαντα τἀνθρώπεια· τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας
θεοὶ φιλοῦσι καὶ στυγοῦσι τοὺς κακούς.
Od. … because I see that all of us who live are nothing but ghosts, or a
fleeting shadow.
Ath. Look, then, at such things, and never yourself utter an arrogant word
against the gods, nor assume conceit because you outweigh another
26 Konstan (2001: e.g. 125).
27 Konstan (2001: 108).
28 March (1993: 18).
29 See Finglass (2011: ad 125–126).
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in strength or in profusion of great wealth. Know that a single day
brings down or raises up again all mortal things, and the gods love
the prudent and hate the base.
Odysseus had ‘seen’ Ajax as a pitiable paradigm of human frailty. Athena, in
her turn, takes up Odysseus’ ‘I see’ when she admonishes him to ‘look at such
things’ (note the inferential τοίνυν at 12730).31 Having become aware of human
frailty (131–132), he ought not to say ‘himself ’ (128 αὐτός) ‘an arrogant word’ to
the gods, since they ‘love the prudent and hate the base’ (132–133). This answer
contains, as said above, a newpiece of information: if Athena calls onOdysseus
not to say an arrogant word to the gods himself, we may infer that this is pre-
cisely what Ajax has done. The spectators have now just heard Ajax speak such
a ‘word’ towards Athena in the direct exchange, in which he rudely had his will
against the—albeit hypocritical—objections of Athena. This ‘word’, however,
cannot be the one Athena has in mind here, for the ‘hatred’ which made her
thwart Ajax’s revenge plot against the Greeks must of course be prior to her
intervention.32 Rather, Athena links Ajax’s speaking an arrogant word with his
character by calling him, indirectly, imprudent and base. This challenges the
re-evaluation brought about by Odysseus: was Ajax out of character during his
appearance after all? Was his behaviour really a ‘misfortune’, a ‘tipping’ of a
fundamentally noble character? Ajax, having just been rehabilitated, becomes
problematic again.
But how definitive is Athena’s verdict? The entire conversation between
Athena andOdysseus has beenmarked by the pattern discussed above: Athena
tries to be relevant to her interlocutor but, while not saying anything false,
does not meet the latter’s human needs, whereupon he discreetly opposes his
own point of view to Athena’s. The prologue is thus structured according to
a dialectical pattern between divine and human, which, after Ajax’s appear-
ance, becomes onebetween anegative and amore positive (andmorehumanly
adequate) evaluation of Ajax. This dialectical pattern suggests that, this time as
well, Athena’s information is not false, but that, at the same time, her damning
verdict is not an adequate human reaction to Ajax. This time, however, Odys-
seus does not provide a more adequate reaction on stage. This is precisely
where the central dramatic effect of the prologue lies: the spectators have,
since the beginning, been following Odysseus through the dialogue, whichwas
30 Denniston (21954: 569–570).
31 Cf. Segal (1989: 398).
32 Cf. Heath (1987: 171) for the implications of Athena’s utterance.
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marked by Athena’s repeated attempts at being relevant for her human inter-
locutor and his repeatedly opposing his human perspective to the goddess’
divine perspective—a process that we have retraced by looking at the way
both characters take up preceding utterances in pursuit of their communicat-
ive goals. This dialectical process, however, breaks off after Athena’s statement
in 127–133, the spectators lose their focaliser who had provided them with an
adequatehuman reaction toAthena’s contributions.At the endof theprologue,
they thus ‘inherit’ Odysseus’ functionof dealing fromahumanperspectivewith
Athena’s information that is not likely to be false but needs to be accommod-
ated by the spectators from their human perspective in a more positive image
of Ajax. But how can they do so?The answer is clear: bywatching the tragedy of
Ajax that has just begun and thatwill provide themwith amore comprehensive
picture of its complex hero. They are thus left behind with the question ‘How
do I judge Ajax?’ and called upon to look for an answer to this question in the
continuation of the play: by having the spectators followOdysseus through the
dialectic of the conversation and by then breaking off this dialectic and leaving
them behind in the way described, Sophocles generates audience involvement
for the play to follow.
The further development of the tragedy will indeed enable an accommod-
ation of Athena’s information in a more positive image of Ajax: in the report
from the seer Calchas at 762–777, it will become clear that Athena was right
and that Ajax had indeed, long before the judgement of the arms, uttered an
‘arrogant word’ against the goddess (note ὑψικόμπως at 766), thereby causing
her wrath. However, by then, the play will have presented a more nuanced pic-
ture of Ajax, thereby also confirming his heroic character that lies at the base
of Odysseus’ rehabilitation in the prologue; it will no longer be possible to con-
demnhim simply as ‘imprudent’ and ‘base’. This process of finding an adequate
evaluation of the complex figure of Ajax that does justice both to his undeni-
able greatnessand to his deeply problematic character startswith the prologue.
There, the spectators are prepared for this nuanced reaction through the depic-
tion of the ‘chsracter interaction’, as they watch the characters try to do things
together with words. This makes it clear that it is wrong to privilege Odysseus’
humanperspective, as some critics tend to dowith regard to the prologue:33 the
prologue is marked by deliberate ambiguity, and the most productive critical
attitude towards it is acknowledging the dramatic potential to generate audi-
ence involvement that lies in it.34
33 See Parker (1997: 152–153, especially n. 34).
34 In this focus on the dramatic effect of this ambiguity as rooted in the dialectical structure
that marks the dialogue from a very early stage, the present paper adds to previous dis-
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With this conclusion in mind, it is possible, as a sort of ‘coda’, to return to Kirk-
wood’s statementmentioned at the beginning of this paper. According to Kirk-
wood, ‘character interaction’ is of particular importance to Sophoclean drama.
Whereas references to Aeschylus and Euripides (and to other Sophoclean
plays) are beyond the scope of this paper, it can at least be said that the Ajax
shows how the dialogic nature of the prologue is ingenuously used by the poet
for great dramatic effect. If one now remembers that dialogic prologues are a
particularly Sophocleanphenomenon,35 it could indeedbe the case that hewas
more interested in exploiting the dramatic potential of ‘character interaction’
than the other two great dramatic poets.
Another corollary may be added: the prologue of the Ajax is the only direct
encounter between aman and a god in Sophocles’ extant tragedies.36The inter-
action between the twoparties ismarked by the fact that they have fundament-
ally different outlooks—a fact that is inculcated in spectators as they follow the
focaliser Odysseus through the dialogue.
There are at least two famous passages in the Sophoclean corpus where
characters reproach the gods for having let them down: At OT 1329–1335, Oed-
ipus accuses Apollo of being responsible for his downfall because he had given
the oracle that ordered him to find Laius’ murderer. At Trach. 1264–1278, Hyl-
lus accuses ‘the gods’ in general and Zeus in particular after a misunderstood
oracle by Zeus contributed to the catastrophe and demise of his father Her-
acles. The prologue of the Ajax suggests a possible and genuinely tragic answer
to these reproaches: maybe we humans just do not understand the gods—and
vice versa.
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Pentheus und Dionysos in den Bakchen:
Die Grenzen des klaren Dialogs
Camille Semenzato
Wie das griechischeWort διάλογος und das Verb διαλέγεσθαι zeigen, besteht ein
Dialog aus Worten (λόγοι), die zwischen (δια-) zwei oder mehreren Personen
geäußert werden.1 Das Ziel eines solchen Gesprächs hängt von der Situation
ab, setzt aber ein gewisses offenes Verhalten der Beteiligten voraus, ohne dass
sie sich am Ende unbedingt einigen und das Ziel auch tatsächlich erreichen
müssen. Die sprachlichenMittel, die sie verwenden, um sich zu verstehen und
zu überzeugen, werden heutzutage von derGesprächsanalyse untersucht.2 Der
Dialog, den die zwei Hauptfiguren von Euripides’ Bakchen miteinander füh-
ren, bietet ein sehr interessantes Beispiel, das aber von der Forschung selten
behandelt wird:3 vielleicht weil dieser Dialog, auch wenn seine Struktur der
gewöhnlichen Gesprächsorganisation entspricht, an seine Grenzen stößt, bis
er tödlich scheitert? Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist zu untersuchen, inwiefern der
Sprachgebrauch selbst für dieses Scheitern verantwortlich ist.
1 Ein Kommunikationsproblem
Der Dialog der Bakchen ergibt sich aus einer problematischen Situation: Ein
Fremder, ein Lydier, ist in Theben aufgetaucht. Er hat die thebanischen Frauen
dazu verführt, ihre Männer, ihre Kinder, die Stadt sowie ihren Rang und Platz
zu verlassen. Man erzählt, dass die Thebanerinnen (unter denen sich auch die
Töchter des ehemaligen Königs, des berühmten Kadmos, finden) sich heim-
lich in den Bergen fragwürdigen sexuellen Handlungen hingeben unter dem
Vorwand, dass sie einen neuen Gott, den sie Dionysos nennen, verehren. Die
1 Der Begriff wird hier in einem generellen Sinn gebraucht. Für die antike Gattung des Dialogs
als Gespräch in Prosa siehe Jazdzewska (2014); Dubel (2015: 11–19).
2 Für die Anwendung der Gesprächsanalyse auf die griechische Tragödie siehe insbesondere
Bonifazi u.a. (2016: III.4); Drummen (2017: 198–253); van Emde Boas (2017a, 2017b: 1–50).
3 Was die Gesprächsanalyse der Tragödie von Euripides betrifft, werden die Bakchen nach
Schwinges Analyse (1968) selten erwähnt. Schuren (2015) zitiert zum Beispiel einige Stellen
in Fußnoten, analysiert sie aber nicht gründlich. Drummen (2017: 303–309) konzentriert sich
auf die Verwendung von Partikeln.
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Ordnung und das Gleichgewicht des thebanischen Lebens werden durchein-
andergebracht; Maßnahmen müssen ergriffen werden. Um die Situation zu
klären und zu korrigieren, um das Problem zu lösen, initiiert der amtierende
König Pentheus mit dem direkten Verantwortlichen dieser Unruhe, dem soge-
nannten Fremden – er wird einfach ξένος4 genannt –, den er hat verhaften
lassen, einen Dialog.
Dieser Dialog wird das Problem aber nicht lösen, zumindest nicht in der
Weise, wie Pentheus denkt. Auch wenn er im Laufe der Handlung vier Mal mit
dem Fremden spricht, auch wenn beide während zweihundert Versen versu-
chen, sich zu verständigen und gegenseitig zu überzeugen, verstehen sie sich
kaum. Es liegt,modern gesprochen, ein Kommunikationsproblem vor: Ein Pro-
blem mit schlimmen Folgen, da Pentheus schließlich einen furchtbaren Tod
findet.
Heute würde ein externer Schlichter, der gerufen worden ist, um das Pro-
blem zu lösen, wahrscheinlich die unterschiedliche Herkunft der Beteiligten
als erste mögliche Erklärung nennen: Pentheus ist Thebaner und spricht Grie-
chisch; der Fremde kommt aus Lydien, spricht also Lydisch und ist ein soge-
nannter βάρβαρος.5 In der Situation einer griechischen Tragödie gilt diese Er-
klärung aber nicht. Alle Figuren sprechen Griechisch, auch die fremdländi-
schen.6 Dasselbe in den Bakchen: Die lydischen Frauen, aus denen der Chor
besteht,7 erklären zwar einmal einem Boten, der sie nicht verstanden hat, dass
sie als Fremde barbarische Lieder singen.8 Es ist aber mehr eine Ausrede: Der
Chor hat sich gerade erlaubt, über Pentheus’ Tod zu jubeln – ein Verhalten, das
der Bote als Untertan des thebanischen Königs natürlich nicht verstehen kann.
Ansonsten spricht der Chor griechisch. Fazit: DieMöglichkeit, dass der Fremde
die griechische Sprache vielleicht nicht beherrscht, denüblichenGebrauchder
Sprachenicht kennt, und soPentheus’Wortenicht versteht, ist keineswegs rele-
vant.
4 Der griechischeTextwird nach der Ausgabe vonDiggle (1994) zitiert, außerwenn eine andere
Lesart (der Handschriften L und P und des P.Ant. I 24) angegeben wird. Alle Übersetzungen
sind meine.
5 Nach Hall (2004: 168) wird der Fremde durch seine Charakterisierung als ξένος durch Pen-
theus nicht als Barbar, sondern als „one of the eastern Greeks who were thought to have
adopted the destructive luxury of the Lydians“ betrachtet. Für die etymologische Analyse
von βάρβαρος siehe Chantraine (21999: s.v.); Hall (2002: 112–117: Erörterung des onomatopoe-
tischen Ursprungs).
6 Für die Ausländer bei Euripides siehe Saïd (1984).
7 Die Lydierinnen sind explizit Barbarinnen (Eur. Bacch. 56 ἐκ βαρβάρων).
8 Eur. Bacch. 1034 εὐάζω ξένα μέλεσι βαρβάροις „als Fremde rufe ich eua in barbarischen Tanz-
liedern“.
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Eine zweite Erklärung könnte von der Natur des Fremden abhängen. Logi-
scherweise denkt Pentheus, mit einemMenschen zu sprechen. Dank der gene-
rellen Hinweise, die im Prolog geäußert werden, wissen aber die Leser wie die
Zuschauer, dass ein Gott hinter dem Fremden steckt. Und nicht irgendeiner:
Dionysos selbst hat sich in den Fremden verwandelt. Die Kommunikations-
situation und -schwierigkeiten werden selbstverständlich dadurch nicht ver-
einfacht. Dionysos präsentiert sich aber völlig menschlich9 und wird auch von
Pentheus und den anderen Figuren für einen Menschen gehalten. Sogar die
lydischen Frauen des Chors, welche als Anhängerinnen des dionysischen Kul-
tes in Theben singen und tanzen, sehen im Fremden zwar ihren Anführer, aber
nicht denGott. Anders gesagt:Die doppelteNatur des FremdenalsMenschund
Gott ist für die verschiedenen Figuren auf der reinen Handlungsebene nicht
spürbar und so als Grund des Missverständnisses wenig relevant.
Deswegen wird für die folgende Analyse die Situation zuerst aus Pent-
heus’ Sicht, dann aus demjenigen des Fremden betrachtet. Im Gegensatz zu
Schwinge (1968: 339–433), der die Dialogszenen zwischen Pentheus und dem
Fremden „vom Standpunkt des alles überblickenden Zuschauers aus“ (342)
ausführlich paraphrasiert, hat eine solche innovative Analyse den Vorteil, die
Worte des einen und des anderen ohneApriori oderVorkenntnisse, die sonst in
die Interpretation eingreifen, betrachten zu können, also die kommunikative
Dynamik indenBlick zunehmen.Auf dieseWeisewird es vermieden, Pentheus
von Anfang an als tyrannisch oder gar verrückt und somit an funktionieren-
der Kommunikation nicht interessiert zu betrachten, oder aber die Worte des
Fremden als typisch göttlicheÄußerungen anzusehen, die demMenschenPen-
theus gar keine Verständnischance lassen.
Die leitenden Fragen sind die folgenden: Warum ist die Kommunikation
zwischen Pentheus und seinem Gesprächspartner begrenzt?Wer ist dafür ver-
antwortlich? Und aufgrund welchen (sprachlichen) Verhaltens? Die Analyse
des Dialogs, der Konversationsdynamik, insbesondere der Redebeiträge und
Sprecherwechsel10 im Zusammenhang mit dem Themenmanagement, sowie
der Partikeln, welche auf diese Schritte und Wechsel hinweisen, wird heraus-
stellen, inwiefern das Problem im Sprachgebrauch jedes Gesprächspartners,
der mit seiner eigenenWeltanschauung zusammenhängt, liegt.
9 Eur. Bacch. 53–54.
10 Zu Redebeiträgen vgl. Meibauer (22001: 131–133).
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2 Der Dialog als Lösung?
Pentheusmöchte die Situation, ihre Ursache, den Antrieb des Fremden verste-
hen. Deswegen lässt Pentheus ihn nach seiner Verhaftung nicht sofort töten,
sondern stellt ihm zuerst eine Reihe von Fragen. Die Auseinandersetzung zwi-
schen Pentheus und demFremden, die in Stichomythien undDistichomythien
verfasst ist,11 besteht aus vier Teilen. Alle befinden sich in der Mitte der Tra-
gödie, zwischen dem zweiten und dem vierten Epeisodion. Ihre Struktur und
Rolle in der Handlung können folgendermaßen beschrieben werden:
2.1 Erster Teil (Eur. Bacch. 460–508)
Nach dem ersten Stasimon beginnt die zweite Szene mit den Worten eines
Dieners, der am Ende der ersten Szene mit einigen Kollegen mit der Suche
nach dem sogenannten Fremden beauftragt wurde. NachdemderDiener unter
anderem erklärt hat, wie der Fremde sich bei seiner Verhaftung benommen
hat – er war erstaunlich ruhig und gutgelaunt –, beginnt Pentheus das Verhör
seines Gefangenen.
Über den Fremden weiß Pentheus schon einiges. Er hat vom ihm und sei-
nen Umtrieben gehört12 und sieht jetzt, inwiefern diese Gerüchte zutreffen:
Anziehend, wie der Fremde aussieht, kann Pentheus gut verstehen, dass er die
Frauen verführt. Diese äußerlichen Zeichen genügen dem König aber nicht:
Das Versteckte interessiert ihn; er möchte all das Unklare klären. Deswegen
fängt Pentheus, nachdem er das Aussehen des Fremden während sieben Ver-
sen kommentiert hat,13 damit an, Fragen zu stellen.Mit demEröffnungsmarker
πρῶτον μέν am Anfang des Verses 460 weist er klar darauf hin, dass er nun mit
dem Gespräch beginnt; mit dem Imperativ μοι λέξον gleich danach befiehlt er
seinem Gesprächspartner, zu antworten. Auf diese erste Frage und ihre Ant-
wort, welche die erstenWorte des Fremden darstellt,14 folgen siebenundvierzig
Verse, welche die erste Dialogstelle bilden.
2.2 Zweiter Teil (Eur. Bacch. 645–656)
In der dritten Szene tritt Pentheus aufgeregt aus dem Palast: Der Fremde befin-
det sich nicht mehr im Gefängnis, wohin er nach der ersten Dialogstelle ge-
11 Die Standarddefinition der Stichomythiewurde vonGross (1905: 9) formuliert. Siehe auch
Seidensticker (1971: 183–184); Collard (1980); Schuren (2015: 1–4).
12 Eur. Bacch. 233 λέγουσι.
13 Eur. Bacch. 453–459.
14 Seine ersten Worte als Fremder, da der Gott Dionysos schon den ganzen Prolog gespro-
chen hat.
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bracht wurde. Da dieser ruhig vor dem Palast steht und auf den König warten
scheint, nimmt Pentheus’ Aufregung zu. Wie schon im ersten Gespräch ver-
sucht Pentheus, die unklare Situation mit deutlichen Fragen zu klären.
So beginnt dieser Abschnitt mit zwei von Pentheus nacheinander gestellten
Fragen über die erstaunliche Befreiung des Fremden (645–646 τί τάδε;πῶς προ-
νώπιοςφαίνηι; „Was ist das?Wie erscheinst duamEingang?“).Da sie sodichtund
ohne bestimmtes Bindewort hintereinandergestellt sind, weisen sie auf Pen-
theus’ Aufregung hin. Sie dienen zum Teil gleichzeitig der Aufforderung zum
Sprecherwechsel: Die erste Frage stellt sich Pentheus selbst; die Verbform in
der zweiten Person am Anfang des folgenden Verses zeigt deutlich, dass die
zweite Frage an den Fremden gerichtet ist. Dieser wird auch gleich danach das
Wort ergreifen. Nach elf Versen unterbricht aber das Eintreten eines Boten den
Dialog.15
2.3 Dritter Teil (Eur. Bacch. 787–846)
NachderRededesBoten setzenPentheus undder Fremde ihrGespräch fort. Im
Unterschied zu den vorigenDialogstellen ist Pentheus’Wut nichtmehr auf den
Fremden gerichtet. Ab diesem Moment ist er auf die in Wahnsinn versetzten
Thebanerinnen konzentriert, nachdem der Bote ihre erstaunlichen und gewal-
tigen Taten beschrieben hat.
In dieser dritten Dialogstelle wird der Fremde aktiver als zuvor. Er über-
nimmt dieGesprächsleitung, indemer zumBeispiel anfängt zu sprechen, ohne
vorher befragt worden zu sein (self-selection).16 πείθηι μὲν οὐδέν „du bist keines-
wegs überzeugt“, sagt er am Anfang dieses Dialogteils (787) und weist, nach-
dem Pentheus den Boten angesprochen hat,17 mit μέν darauf hin, dass er einen
neuen Sprechakt plant und das Wort für eine Weile (fünf Verse) ergreift.18
Danach versucht er während 58 Versen, Pentheus zu überzeugen, nicht auf
die Frauen zuzumarschieren. Seine Strategie basiert auf zwei Vorschlägen. Der
erste – dass er die Frauen allein und unbewaffnet zurückbringt – ist angesichts
von Pentheus’ königlichem Status selbstverständlich ungeeignet. Der Fremde
scheint ihn auch nur als Trick zu äußern, damit Pentheus den zweiten Vor-
schlag annimmt. Denn nachdem Pentheus den ersten Vorschlag mit einem
Schweigebefehl (809 σὺ δὲ παῦσαι λέγων „du aber hör auf zu reden“) abgelehnt
15 Die Länge dieser Stichomythie ist wahrscheinlich der Grund, warum sie nicht zu den von
Schwinge (1968) bearbeiteten Stellen gehört. Als vierten Dialog analysiert er denjenigen
zwischen Kadmos und Agaue, der für das Thema dieses Aufsatzes nicht relevant ist.
16 Vgl. zu diesem Phänomen Sacks u.a. (1974: 704).
17 Eur. Bacch. 778–786.
18 Bonifazi u.a. (2016: III.4 §28).
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hat – ein Befehl, der sich mit der ausdrücklichen Erwähnung von σύ eindeu-
tig an den Fremden richtet, von diesem aber einfach ignoriert wird –, lockt der
Fremde ihn mit der Äußerung seines innigsten Wunsches: die Frauen in den
Bergen zu sehen.19 Diese Idee nimmt Pentheus nicht direkt an: Er muss sich
vorher die Reise in allen Einzelheiten genau vorstellen können und stellt dafür
wieder Fragen.
2.4 Vierter Teil (Eur. Bacch. 918–972)
Die vierteDialogstelle erstreckt sichüber 54Verse inder vierten Szene:Der vom
Fremden überzeugte Pentheus hat sich während des dritten Stasimons verklei-
det. Als er neu gekleidet die Bühne wieder betritt, ist er bereit, dem Fremden
zu folgen, um in die Berge zu den Frauen zu gehen.
Das Gespräch enthält keine Überredungsversuche oder -ziele mehr. Pen-
theus stellt zwar einige Fragen; sie dienen ihm aber alle dazu, zu versichern,
dass seine Ausrüstung für eine Reise in die Berge angemessen ist, dass er gut
und richtig aussieht. Von dieser Reise wird Pentheus aber nicht zurückkom-
men. Nachdem die erste Dialogstelle das erste Wort des Fremden dargestellt
hat, bringt das Ende dieser vierten Stelle Pentheus’ letzte Worte:20 fünf Verse
in ἀντιλαβήwelche das fehlendeVerständnis zwischen denGesprächspartnern
augenfällig machen und so das Scheitern des Dialogs ankündigen.21
3 Pentheus’ Sprachgebrauch
WennPentheus spricht, tut er dies logischerweise nach seinerArt. Er stützt sich
auf seine Kenntnisse, seine Einstellungen, kurz gesagt: auf seine Denkweise
undWeltanschauung. Wichtig ist für ihn die Klarheit: was man deutlich sieht,
in Kategorien einordnet, klar versteht, worauf man sich tatsächlich stützt. Im
Dialog mit dem Fremden verwendet er wiederholt Vokabular der Klarheit und
des Sehens: Er spricht vomklaren Sehen (477 ὁρᾶν σαφῶς) undWissen (816 σάφ’
ἴσθι); er gebraucht den Ausdruck „was meinen Augen sichtbar ist“ (501 φανερὸς
ὄμμασιν ἐμοῖς) oder das Adverb „offensichtlich“ (818 ἐμφανῶς); er wird ferner
19 Eur. Bacch. 810 βούληι σφ’ ἐν ὄρεσι συγκαθημένας ἰδεῖν; „Willst du sie in den Bergen zusam-
mensitzen sehen?“ Der Fremde schlägt ganz genau Pentheus vor, heimlich und verkleidet
in die Berge zu gehen, um die Frauen unbemerkt zu beobachten und so entscheiden zu
können, ob sie wirklich schändlich handeln, bevor er mit ihnen schließlich nach Theben
zurückkehrt.
20 Pentheus’ letzte direkte Worte: Einige werden noch vom Boten (Eur. Bacch. 1059–1062,
1118–1121) und von Kadmos (1320–1322) wiedergegeben.
21 Siehe noch unter Abschnitt 6.
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als „eifriger Zuschauer“ (829 θεατὴς πρόθυμος) und „schlauer Beobachter“ (956
δόλιον κατάσκοπον) charakterisiert. Dazu stellt Pentheus Fragen, die klar und
deutlich eingeleitet und gebildet werden. Sein Ziel ist, das Wer, Was, Wie und
Warum zu bestimmen, um das für ihn Wichtige zu erfassen und einzuschät-
zen, zwischen den Möglichkeiten zu entscheiden und diese klassifizieren zu
können.
In der ersten Dialogstelle gibt es zehn solche Fragen:22
[1] Euripides Bakchen 460, 465, 467, 469, 471, 473, 477, 481, 485, 501
460 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μοι λέξον ὅστις εἶ γένος.
465 πόθεν δὲ τελετὰς τάσδ’ ἄγεις ἐς Ἑλλάδα;
467 Ζεὺς δ’ ἔστ’ ἐκεῖ τις ὃς νέους τίκτει θεούς;
469 πότερα δὲ νύκτωρ σ’ ἢ κατ’ ὄμμ’ ἠνάγκασεν;
471 τὰ δ’ ὄργι’ ἐστὶ τίν’ ἰδέαν ἔχοντά σοι;
473 ἔχει δ’ ὄνησιν τοῖσι θύουσιν τίνα;
477 τὸν θεὸν23 ὁρᾶν γὰρ φὴις σαφῶς, ποῖός τις ἦν;
481 ἦλθες δὲ πρῶτα δεῦρ’ ἄγων τὸν δαίμονα;
485 τὰ δ’ ἱερὰ νύκτωρ ἢ μεθ’ ἡμέραν τελεῖς;
501 καὶ ποῦ ’στιν; […]
460 Sag mir also zuerst, welches Stamms du bist.
465 Woher bringst du diese Feiern nach Griechenland?
467 Ist dort ein Zeus, der neue Götter zeugt?
469 Hat er dich bei Nacht oder vor den Augen gezwungen?
471 Die Zeremonien, welches Äußere haben sie für dich?
473 Welchen Nutzen gibt es für die Opfernden?
477 Der Gott – du sagst nämlich, du siehst ihn klar –, was für einer war
er?
481 Bist du zuerst hierher gekommen, die Gottheit bringend?
485 Die heiligen Dinge vollbringst du sie bei Tag oder bei Nacht?
501 Und wo ist er? […]
Sieben dieser Fragen sindmit einem Interrogativpronomen oder -adverb gebil-
det (460 ὅστις; 465πόθεν; 469πότερα ἤ; 471 τίν’; 473 τίνα; 477ποῖος; 501ποῦ). Nach
der ersten Frage, welche den Eröffnungsmarker πρῶτον μέν enthält, weisen
22 Pentheus stellt noch vier Fragen in der zweitenDialogstelle sowie zwölf in der dritten und
fünf in der vierten.
23 τὸν θεὸν LP : ὁ θεός Diggle.
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die fünf folgenden sowie noch zwei andere die Partikel δέ auf, die einen The-
mawechsel markiert.24 Diese dauernden Wechsel deuten auch auf Pentheus’
Führungsrolle hin: Sobald er eine Antwort bekommt, setzt er das Verhör mit
einer anderen Frage über ein anderes Thema fort.25 In Vers 501 hingegen mar-
kiert καί die Fortsetzung des vorigen Themas. Dasselbe in Vers 477, der sich auf
die eben ausgesprochenen Worte des Fremden bezieht: Pentheus strebt nach
Genauigkeit, indem er das letzteWort des vorigen Verses (476 θεοῦ) wiederholt
(τὸν θεόν…) und präzisiert (477… ποῖός τις ἦν). Kurz gesagt: Aus Pentheus’ Sicht
gibt es keinen Grund, dass ein so gut gegliederter Dialog die problematische
Situation nicht klärt.
Pentheus’ Sprachgebrauch zeigt, wer er ist: Der geschickte König, der die
Vollmacht hat. Seinem Gefangenen gegenüber ist er der mächtigere (505 κυρι-
ώτερος σέθεν). Diese Selbstsicherheit ist in seinem Gebrauch der Verbformen
sichtbar: Die Verben, die seine Taten ausdrücken, stehen im Futur:26 Als König
weiß er genau, was er will. Er äußert auch zahlreiche Befehle im Impera-
tiv,27 welche der Fremde oder seine Untertanen befolgen müssen. Im Allge-
meinen zeigt er deutlich, dass er die Gesprächsthemen beherrscht. Obwohl
er das spezifische Vokabular, das mit dem neuen Gott verbunden ist, nicht
wirklich kennt, verwendet er es: Er hat von den τελεταί gehört und gebraucht
das Wort richtig.28 Wenn der Fremde von den ὄργια spricht, die er von sei-
nemGott bekommenhat (470), nutzt Pentheus sofort die Gelegenheit, um sich
über diesen neuen Begriff zu informieren (471 τὰ δ’ ὄργι’ ἐστὶ τίν’ ἰδέαν ἔχοντά
σοι;).29
Die königliche Selbstsicherheit zeigt sich auch in Pentheus’ Reaktion, nach-
dem der Fremde gesprochen hat: Seine Redebeiträge sind selten responsiv.30
24 Bonifazi u.a. (2016: III.4 §35).
25 Der Reihe nach: das γένος des Fremden; die Herkunft der τελεταί; Zeus’ Nachkommen-
schaft; die Zeit der göttlichen Erscheinung; die Art und Form der ὄργια; der Nutzen der
Opfer; wie der Gott ist; die Reise des Fremden; der Ablauf der ἱερά; wo der Gott steht.
26 Eur. Bacch. 493, 497, 792, 793, 796, 840, 843, 845, 846, 942, 954. Und außerhalb der Dialog-
stellen: 228, 232, 239, 240, 351, 512, 514.
27 Eur. Bacch. 460, 495, 503, 809, 816, 820, 934, 960. Und außerhalb der Dialogstellen: 346,
350, 352, 509, 511, 672, 780, 781.
28 Eur. Bacch. 238 und 260, 465.
29 Diese Information, mit ἰδέα gebildet, gehört gewissermaßen auch zum Wortschatz des
Sehens.
30 Bei Redebeiträgen (bzw., in seiner Terminologie, Gesprächsschritten) unterscheidet
Mroczynski (2014: 76–78) zwischen iniitierenden (entsprechend in etwa dem englischen
first pair-parts), respondierenden (second pair-parts) und reaktivierenden. Mit der frühe-
ren Literatur klassifiziert er die respondierenden in responsive, nonresponsive und teilre-
sponsive Gesprächsschritte.
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Sobald eine Frage seiner Meinung nach geklärt ist, verweigert er die Fortset-
zung des bisherigen Themas und führt ein neues ein.
Die Stelle, in der Dionysos’ Herkunft diskutiert wird, ist ein gutes Beispiel:
[2] Euripides Bakchen 466–469
Δι. Διόνυσος αὐτός μ’ εἰσέβησ’, ὁ τοῦ Διός.
Πε. Ζεὺς δ’ ἔστ’ ἐκεῖ τις ὃς νέους τίκτει θεούς;
Δι. οὔκ, ἀλλ’ ὁ Σεμέλην ἐνθάδε ζεύξας γάμοις.
Πε. πότερα δὲ νύκτωρ σ’ ἢ κατ’ ὄμμ’ ἠνάγκασεν;
Di. Dionysos selbst hat mich eingeführt, der von Zeus.
Pe. Ist dort ein Zeus, der neue Götter zeugt?
Di. Nein, aber er hat sich hier mit Semele in Ehe vereint.
Pe. Hat er dich bei Nacht oder vor den Augen gezwungen?
Wenn der Fremde von Dionysos als Sohn des Zeus spricht, antwortet Pen-
theus ironisch mit einem reaktivierenden Gesprächsschritt, indem er gleich-
zeitig Zeus’ Namen wiederholt (respondierte Komponente), mit δέ einen The-
mawechsel markiert und eine neue Frage stellt (initiierende Komponente).
Wenn der Fremde aber bestätigt, dass der Dionysos, von dem er spricht, in
Theben (ἐνθάδε) von Semele, Kadmos’ Tochter und Pentheus’ Tante, geboren
worden ist, wechselt Pentheus ganz und gar das Thema: seine neue Frage –mit
dem Interrogativmarker πότερα ἤ gebildet undmit δέ eingeleitet – betrifft eine
ganz neue Idee, die mit noch nicht verwendetenWörtern geäußert wird. Denn
die Frage nach Dionysos’ Herkunft ist von da an für ihn geklärt. Da er schon
vor seiner Begegnung mit dem Fremden gehört hat, dass dieser Dionysos für
Zeus’ göttlichen Sohn hält,31 und da der Seher Teiresias ihm auch die ganze
Geschichte von Dionysos’ Geburt erzählt hat,32 braucht er nichts mehr darü-
ber zu wissen.
Pentheus’ respondierte Gesprächsschritte sind oft nonresponsiv:33 Er igno-
riert die Antworten des Fremden, als ob sie nicht geäußert worden wären, und
weist damit die implizite Aufforderung zurück. Pentheus’ dreiteilige Antwort
auf die Frage des Fremden zu seiner Bestrafung könnte zum Beispiel sehr gut
als ein ununterbrochener Redebeitrag geäußert werden:
31 Eur. Bacch. 242–243.
32 Eur. Bacch. 286–297.
33 Zur Terminologie s.o. Anm. 30.
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[3] Euripides Bakchen 493–499
Πε. πρῶτον μὲν ἁβρὸν βόστρυχον τεμῶ σέθεν.
Δι. ἱερὸς ὁ πλόκαμος· τῶι θεῶι δ’ αὐτὸν τρέφω.
Πε. ἔπειτα θύρσον τόνδε παράδος ἐκ χεροῖν.
Δι. αὐτός μ’ ἀφαιροῦ· τόνδε Διονύσου34 φορῶ.
Πε. εἱρκταῖσί τ’ ἔνδον σῶμα σὸν φυλάξομεν.
Δι. λύσει μ’ ὁ δαίμων αὐτός, ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω.
Πε. ὅταν γε καλέσηις αὐτὸν ἐν βάκχαις σταθείς.
Pe. Zuerst werde ich deine zarten Locken schneiden.
Di. Mein Haar ist heilig; ich lasse es für den Gott wachsen.
Pe. Dann übergib mir diesen Thyrsos aus deinen Händen.
Di. Nimm ihn selbst weg; als den des Dionysos trage ich diesen.
Pe. Und wir werden deinen Körper im Gefängnis bewachen.
Di. Die Gottheit selbst wird mich befreien, wann ich es will.
Pe. Na ja, wann du ihn rufen wirst, in der Mitte der Bakchen stehend.
Pentheus’ Erklärung ist gut gegliedert: Mit πρῶτον μέν, ἔπειτα und τε35 zeigt
er klar, dass die Bestrafung, die er sich für den Fremden ausgedacht hat, drei
Teile oder Momente hat. Pentheus’ Beiträge sind alle vollständig, so dass jedes
Mal ein unproblematischer Sprecherwechsel erfolgt. Sobald der Fremde fertig
ist, setzt Pentheus aber seine Rede fort, ohne sich um seinen Gesprächspart-
ner zu kümmern. Erst in Vers 499 zeigt er, dass er die Beiträge des Fremden –
oder zumindest den letzten – gehört hat: Er greift das zuletzt geäußerte Thema
auf, indem er die Konjunktion ὅτανwiederholt, und wandelt es spöttisch –mit
einem γε, das seinen Standpunkt markiert – um.36
Pentheus’ Sprachgebrauch ist klar: Aus seiner Sicht gibt es kein anderesmög-
liches Verhalten, keinen einzigen Grund, sich und seine Sprache infrage zu
stellen. Dank seinemSprachgebrauch bekommt er die Antworten, die er erwar-
tet hat, da sie Gerüchte über den Fremden bestätigen. Von diesem Sprachge-
brauch ist Pentheus überzeugt, auch wenn er an die Grenzen stößt, welche
34 διονύσου LP : Διονύσωι Diggle.
35 Nach Drummen (2017: 212 Anm. 37, 305 Anm. 113) wird ein solches initiierendes τε in der
Tragödie selten geäußert.
36 Bonifazi u.a. (2016: III.4 §63). Nach Drummen (2017: 306), ‚the addition of γε in resona-
ting utterances emphasizes the speaker’s hostile goal in echoing his opponent’s words,
and thereby implies anger or hate‘. In diesem spezifischen Fall erfordert aber der Kon-
text, die Partikel als spöttisch zu interpretieren, wie die Kommentare zu den Bakchen (die
Drummen in ihrer Anm. 114 auch zitiert) es betonen. Siehe auch Eur. Bacch. 796.
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der Fremde durch seine fehlendeAngst vor der sicheren, klar ausgesprochenen
Macht und durch seinen im Unterschied dazu mehrdeutigen Sprachgebrauch
darstellt.
4 Der Sprachgebrauch des Fremden
Als Gefangener kooperiert der Fremde gut: Er wird nie wütend, er weigert sich
nie, zu antworten. Ab und zu erlaubt er sich, den König zu korrigieren.37Wenn
diese Korrekturen einen nonresponsiven Gesprächsschritt darstellen, haben
sie aber keine negativen Folgen. Sie helfen eher der Dialogfortsetzung, da Pen-
theus nie in Verlegenheit gebracht wird und immer weiß, wie er zu reagieren
hat.
Im ersten Dialogteil ist der Fremde eher passiv: Er stellt mit dem Inter-
rogativpronomen τί eine einzige Frage, um zu erfahren,38 welche Bestrafung
Pentheus für ihn bereithält. Niemals ergreift er die Initiative, das Thema zu
wechseln. So enthalten seine erstenGesprächsschritte keine initiierendenMar-
ker. Dasselbe in der zweiten Dialogstelle und in der ersten Hälfte der drit-
ten: Die zwei Fragen des Fremden sind beide mit den kurz vorher geäußer-
ten Bemerkungen von Pentheus verbunden und fragen nach einer Präzisie-
rung.39
Ab dem Vers 810 (in der zweiten Hälfte der dritten Dialogstelle)40 wird
der Fremde aktiver: Er stellt mehr Fragen, verwendet mehr Partikeln, bringt
dadurch seinen Standpunkt aktiver ins Gespräch ein. Diese markieren meis-
tens keinen Themenwechsel, sondern helfen ihm, dem Gespräch die ge-
wünschte Richtung zu geben. Denn als folgsamer Gefangener eines machtvol-
lenKönigs äußert er seine Ideen undMeinungennie explizit. Als selbstbewuss-
ter Mensch,41 der vom Sprachgebrauch seines Gesprächspartners keineswegs
beeindruckt ist, bringt ermit kleinenHinweisen Pentheus aber dazu, seineVor-
schläge undMeinungen anzunehmen. ZumBeispiel kurz nach diesemWende-
punkt:
37 ZumBeispiel Eur. Bacch. 468 οὔκ, ἀλλ’ ὁ Σεμέλην ἐνθάδε ζεύξας γάμοις „Nein, aber er hat sich
hier mit Semele ehelich vereinigt“.
38 Eur. Bacch. 492 τί με τὸ δεινὸν ἐργάσηι; „Was wirst du mir Schreckliches antun?“
39 Eur. Bacch. 654 τί δ’; 806 ποῖόν τι; „Was für eine (List)?“
40 Der Ausruf ἆ in Vers 810 wird gewöhnlich (zum Beispiel Dodds 21960: 175; Roux 1972: 493;
Seaford 1996: 213; Susanetti 2010: 239) als Wendepunkt der Tragödie betrachtet, da der
Fremde ab diesemMoment die Oberhand über Pentheus gewinnt.
41 Wie schon gesagt, spielt es hier keine Rolle, dass der Fremde eigentlich ein Gott ist.
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[4] Euripides Bakchen 816–818
Πε. σάφ’ ἴσθι, σιγῆι δ’42 ὑπ’ ἐλάταις καθήμενος.
Δι. ἀλλ’ ἐξιχνεύσουσίν σε, κἂν ἔλθηις λάθραι.
Πε. ἀλλ’ ἐμφανῶς· καλῶς γὰρ ἐξεῖπας τάδε.
Pe. Wisse es klar, aber in Schweigen unter den Fichten sitzend.
Di. Sie werden dich aber aufspüren, auchwenn du unbemerkt kommst.
Pe. Dann sichtlich; denn du hast gut dazu gesprochen.
Mit σάφ’ ἴσθι bestätigt Pentheus, dass er die Frauen gerne sehen möchte, auch
wenn diese vom Wein berauscht sind. Er fügt aber eine zusätzliche Informa-
tion hinzu, die den vorigen mit einem adversativen δέ entgegengesetzt ist: Er
möchte nicht gesehenwerden.Da dies demPlan des Fremdennicht entspricht,
wählt dieser einen nonresponsiven Gesprächsschritt aus, den er mit ἀλλάmar-
kiert undderdieUnangemessenheit vonPentheus’ Idee zeigt. SowirdPentheus
dazu gebracht, seine erste Idee, wiederum mit ἀλλά, zu korrigieren: Er gibt die
Absicht auf, zu schweigen, sich zu verstecken, unbemerkt zu bleiben; er will
sich jetzt offen zeigen. Von dieser neuen Idee ist Pentheus ganz überzeugt; er
dankt dem Fremden auch dafür: Sein Sprachgebrauch war richtig!
Im Vergleich zu Pentheus benützt der Fremde eine weniger klare Sprache.
Er beantwortet zwar Pentheus’ Fragen und beteiligt sich am Gespräch, scheint
sich aber leicht daneben zu bewegen. Seine Antworten sindmeistens indirekt,
ungenau. Wenn Pentheus ihm im zweiten Dialogteil zum Beispiel fragt, wie
er sich befreit hat (648 πόθεν σὺ δεσμὰ διαφυγὼν ἔξω περᾶις; „Wie bist du den
Fesseln entkommen und trittst heraus?“), weist der Fremde auf die anschei-
nend schon erwähnte Hilfe eines unbestimmten τις hin (649 οὐκ εἶπον, ἢ οὐκ
ἤκουσας, ὅτι λύσει μέ τις; „Habe ich nicht gesagt, oder hast du nicht zugehört,
dass jemandmich befreienwird?“). Die zahlreichen Informationen, welche der
Fremde als Sequenzerweiterungen (expansions) äußert, verkomplizieren auch
die Struktur des Dialogs. Pentheus’ allererste Frage betrifft logischerweise das
γένος seines Gesprächspartners (460 ὅστις εἶ γένος „welches Stamms du bist“).
Die erwartete Antwort würde den Namen des Fremdenmit demjenigen seines
Vaters und/oder seiner Familie enthalten. Der Fremde wird aber nur von sei-
ner geographischen Herkunft sprechen (464 ἐντεῦθέν εἰμι, Λυδία δέ μοι πατρίς
„Von dort bin ich, Lydien ist meine Heimat“), und dies erst vier Verse spä-
ter. Dazwischen erweitert er die Gesprächssequenzmit einem reaktivierenden
42 δ’ P : γ’ Diggle.
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Gesprächsschritt,43 als ob sicherstellen möchte, dass Pentheus seine bevorste-
hende Antwort verstehen wird. Diese Erweiterung sowie die sofortige Antwort
von Pentheus auf seine indirekt gestellte Frage, die mit dem Indefinitprono-
men που gebildet ist,44 erlauben ihm aber, nicht mehr als seine geographische
Herkunft anzugeben und so ungenau zu bleiben.45
5 Missverständnisse und Scheitern
Dass der Fremde nur undeutlich antwortet und sogar ein Katz-und-Maus-Spiel
treibt, merkt Pentheus schnell. Als selbstsicherer König lässt er sich nicht ver-
unsichern. Aus seiner Sicht kann der Verantwortliche für die Unklarheiten in
ihrem Dialog nur der Fremde sein. Und als mächtiger König lässt Pentheus es
seinem Gesprächspartner auch wissen: Im ersten Dialogteil stellt er drei Mal
mit einem expliziten Beweis fest, dass er den Versuch des Fremden, ihn irrezu-
führen, bemerkt hat:
1. In Vers 473 möchte Pentheus wissen, welchen Nutzen – eine klare Frage
mit einem Interrogativpronomen, nach einem δέ als Themawechsel-
Marker – es für die Opfernden gibt (ἔχει δ’ ὄνησιν τοῖσι θύουσιν τίνα). Der
Fremde weigert sich zu antworten, indem er sich in einem nonrespon-
sivenGesprächsschritt hinter einem religiösenGrund versteckt: Die θέμις,
„das göttliche Gesetz“, verbietet Pentheus, es zu hören (474 οὐ θέμις ἀκοῦ-
σαί σ’). Dieser Grund entspricht einer sozialen Erwartung: Jeder weiß,
dass es unziemlich ist, gegen die θέμις zu handeln, dass man sonst eine
ὕβρις, eine „Freveltat“ begehenwürde. Der Fremde setzt das Versteckspiel
aber fort, indem er noch hinzufügt, dass es eigentlich wertvoll ist, es zu
wissen ([…] ἔστι δ’ ἄξι’ εἰδέναι). Das Thema hat er nicht gewechselt; Pen-
theus könnte noch darauf zurückgreifen. Als mächtiger König beschließt
er aber, sich seinem Gefangenen nicht zu unterwerfen, sondern ihm zu
zeigen, dass er seine Sprachspielerei bemerkt hat. Ohne sich zu ärgern,
43 Eur. Bacch. 461 οὐ κόμπος οὐδείς, ῥάιδιον δ’ εἰπεῖν τόδε. „Es gibt keine Prahlerei, dies ist ein-
fach zu sagen.“ (οὐ κόμπος LP : οὐκ ὄκνος Diggle).
44 Eur. Bacch. 462–463 Δι. τὸν ἀνθεμώδη Τμῶλον οἶσθά που κλύων. Πε. οἶδ’, ὃς τὸ Σάρδεων ἄστυ
περιβάλλει κύκλωι. „Di. Den blumigen Tmolos kennst du, du hast wahrscheinlich von ihm
gehört. Pe. Ich weiß, derjenige, der sich im Kreis um die Stadt Sardes legt.“ Die lydische
Herkunft des Fremden kennt Pentheus eigentlich schon. Sie gehört zu denGerüchten, die
ihm berichtet wurden (Eur. Bacch. 234 Λυδίας ἀπὸ χθονός).
45 Für die überblickenden Zuschauer ist die Antwort auf diese Frage selbstverständlich iro-
nisch, denn γένος spielt auch auf die doppelte Natur des Fremden als Gott und Mensch
an.
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setzt er das Spiel fort. Er antwortet auf die Bedeutung von ἄξιος als das,
was einen großenWert oder einen angemessenen Preis hat, mit demVerb
κιβδηλεύειν, das „eine Münze durch Zusatz von minderwertigem Metall
verfälschen“46 bedeutet: Der Fremde hat seine Argumente gut verfälscht,
damit Pentheus sie hörenwill (475 εὖ τοῦτ’ ἐκιβδήλευσας, ἵν’ ἀκοῦσαι θέλω).
Der König wird sich aber nicht dazu herablassen.
2. In der Fortsetzung des Dialogs interessiert sich Pentheus nicht mehr für
den Kult, sondern direkt für den Gott. Er möchte wissen, was für einer
dieser war (477 τὸν θεὸν ὁρᾶν γὰρ φὴις σαφῶς, ποῖός τις ἦν) – „war“, weil Pen-
theus an den Moment denkt, in dem der Fremde seinem Gott begegnet
ist, von ihmeingeweihtwurde, und der für Pentheus ganz klar zurVergan-
genheit gehört. Als Antwort auf das Interrogativpronomen ποῖος wählt
der Fremde das indefinite Interrogativpronomen ὁποῖος aus. So scheint
seine Antwort responsiv zu sein, während sie nonresponsiv ist: Der Gott
war,wer auch immer erwollte, ohnedass der Fremdeetwas zu sagenhatte
(478 ὁποῖος ἤθελ’· οὐκ ἐγὼ ’τασσον τόδε). Wiederum ist Pentheus sehr klug.
Er merkt selbstverständlich, dass sein Gesprächspartner seine Frage nur
ungenau beantwortet hat, und lässt es wiederum mit einem klaren Verb
wissen:Wie „dasWasser“, dasman „durch einenKanal umleitet“ (479 τοῦτ’
αὖ παρωχέτευσας),47 hat der Fremde Pentheus’ Fragemit der Veränderung
ins Indefinite abgelenkt.
3. Zehn Verse später äußert Pentheus wieder eine solche Bemerkung, mit
der er das Verhalten und die Worte des Fremden beschreibt. Diese Be-
schreibung zerfällt in zwei Teile: Zuerst wirft Pentheus dem Fremden vor,
schlechte σοφίσματα vorzubringen, wofür er bestraft werden muss (489
δίκην σε δοῦναι δεῖ σοφισμάτων κακῶν). Der Fremde hat gerade von der
Ehrwürdigkeit der Finsternis (486 σεμνότητ’ ἔχει σκότος) und vom schänd-
lichen Charakter des Tages (488 κἀν ἡμέραι τό γ’ αἰσχρὸν ἐξεύροι τις ἄν)
gesprochen. Zwei Charakterisierungen, die zu Pentheus’ Begierde nach
Klarheit und Deutlichkeit nicht passen. Deswegen kann σοφίσματα ein-
fachmit „Sophismen“übersetztwerden: Pentheuswirft demFremdenvor,
schlechte Argumente zu äußern, die scheinbar logisch sind, die aber zu
einem Fehlschluss führen. Und diejenigen des Fremden führen nicht nur
zu einem Fehlschluss, sondern sind einfach κακά, „schlecht“. Auch dafür
muss der Fremde bestraft werden.48 Der Fremde reagiert sofort, indem
46 Siehe noch Eur. Med. 516, El. 550, Hipp. 616.
47 Siehe auch Eur. Supp. 1111, Plat. Leg. 844a.
48 Diese Strafe liegt, nebenbei bemerkt, im Bereich der δίκη (und nicht der θέμις wie in Vers
474). Wenn δίκη zur Familie von dicere gehört (wie man es annimmt; siehe Benveniste
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er auf die Satzstruktur von Pentheus zurückgreift, aber ein neues Objekt
(mit δέ) hinzufügt: AuchPentheusmuss bestraftwerden.Nichtwegen sei-
ner guten oder schlechten Redekunst, sondern wegen seiner Unwissen-
heit und seiner Respektlosigkeit dem Gott gegenüber (490 σὲ δ’ ἀμαθίας
γε κἀσεβοῦντ’ ἐς τὸν θεόν). Pentheus wird von der Kritik des Fremden kei-
neswegs berührt. Er zeigt sich offen. Er anerkennt die Kühnheit49 und die
Redekunst seinesGesprächspartners (491ὡς θρασὺς ὁ βάκχος κοὐκ ἀγύμνα-
στος λόγων). Und noch einmal zeigt er sich auch geschickt: Indem er die
dritte Person braucht, verhindert er, dass der Fremde auf das scheinbare
Kompliment direkt reagieren kann.50 Dieser muss (auf seine Art, ohne
bestimmte Partikel) ein neues Thema einfügen und stellt so selbst eine
Frage.
Aus der Sicht des Fremden ist aber Pentheus verantwortlich. Denn er strebt
so sehr nach Klarheit, nach deutlichen Strukturen, dass er die mögliche Mehr-
deutigkeit, die in den Worten steckt – und insbesondere in denjenigen des
Fremden – nicht ernst nimmt. Dass ein Wort mehrere Bedeutungen besitzen
kann, ist Pentheus klar. Am Ende der zweiten Dialogstelle zum Beispiel geht es
um dieWeisheit des Fremden:
[5] Euripides Bakchen 655–656
Πε. σοφὸς σοφὸς σύ, πλὴν ἃ δεῖ σ’ εἶναι σοφόν.
Δι. ἃ δεῖ μάλιστα, ταῦτ’ ἔγωγ’ ἔφυν σοφός.
Pe. Weise, weise du, außer worin du weise sein musst.
Di. Worin es in ganz besonderemMaße sein muss, darin bin ich weise.
Pentheus nach ist der Fremde zwar weise, aber nicht in dem, worin er weise
sein muss. Und dies betont er, indem er das Adjektiv zwei Mal wiederholt, am
Anfang (noch mit dem Personalpronomen σύ)51 und am Ende des Verses. Im
Gegensatz dazu ist der Fremde überzeugt, genau darinweise zu sein. Und auch
1969: 107–110; Du Sablon 2014: 242), bedeutet das Wort eine „autoritative Aussage“, das
„Recht“, die „Gerechtigkeit“, die einKönig oder einRichter verkörpert, den „Rechtsspruch“,
den „Entschluss“ oderdas „Urteil“, diemanannehmenmuss. Pentheusbemerkt abernicht,
dass seine δίκηweniger mächtig ist als die θέμις, das „göttliche Gesetz“, das über die ganze
Welt herrscht und sie reguliert.
49 Nach Roux (1972: 340) wird im letzten Drittel des fünften Jahrhunderts der Rhetor, der
skrupellos eine falsche Rede halten kann, θρασύς genannt.
50 Di Benedetto (22010: 370).
51 Siehe auch Eur. Bacch. 186, Andr. 245.
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er zeigt es durchdie Syntax seinerAntwort:Wie in einemChiasmus greift er auf
den Relativsatz zurück, ändert aber gleichzeitig σε selbstverständlich zu ἔγωγε
sowie πλήν zu μάλιστα, und mit ἔφυν anstatt εἶναι betont er, inwiefern er Weis-
heit besitzt.52 Dass σοφός zweideutig ist, wissen sowohl der Fremde als auch
Pentheus: DieWahl derWortbedeutung hängt in diesem Fall von der Interpre-
tation undWeltanschauung jeder Figur ab.53
Ein Wort kann aber auch gleichzeitig mehrere Bedeutungen ausdrücken,
ohne dass es seine Kohärenz verliert. Ein gutes Beispiel dafür ist das Adjektiv
δεινός, das sowohl „furchtbar, schrecklich“ als auch „außerordentlich, erstaun-
lich“ bedeutet. Als Einleitung zum zweiten Dialogteil, wenn Pentheus aus dem
Palast kommt, spricht er von den δεινά, von denen er erfahren hat (642 πέπονθα
δεινά). Da sein Gefangener entflohen ist, drückt δεινά in diesem Fall sicher
„schreckliche Dinge“ aus. Es sind gleichzeitig aber auch „außerordentliche,
erstaunliche Dinge“, denn einen solchen Gefangenen hatte er noch nie.54
Deswegen ist Pentheus aus der Sicht des Fremden für das Scheitern ihres
Dialogs verantwortlich: Er versteht die subtilen Unterschiede nicht, die den
Sprachgebrauch des Fremden bilden und auf die Mehrdeutigkeit der Sprache
hinweisen. Er hat den Eindruck, dass der Fremde immer neueWörter beibringt
(650 τοὺς λόγους γὰρ ἐσφέρεις καινοὺς ἀεί), während eigentlich immer diesel-
ben gebraucht werden. Damit der Dialog zur Lösung einer problematischen
Situation wird, müssen die Gesprächspartner ein offenes Verhalten an den Tag
legen. Pentheus kann aber keinen Kompromiss schließen. Er ist nicht bereit,
den Sprachgebrauch und dieWeltanschauung des anderen zu verstehen, nicht
einmal zu akzeptieren. Zum Beispiel verwendet der Fremde, wenn er von sei-
ner Einweihung spricht, mit der Verbform δίδωσιν ein Präsens, auch wenn die
Handlung nicht zeitgleich zu seiner Äußerung stattfindet: Der Gott gibt dem
Fremden die ὄργια (470 καὶ δίδωσιν ὄργια). Dies bedeutet, dass der Gott sie ihm
gegeben hat (so versteht es Pentheus, da er inVers 477, wenn er gewissermaßen
zu diesem Thema zurückkehrt, das Verb im Imperfekt gebraucht), aber auch,
dass der Gott sie dem Fremden immer wieder gibt und immer wieder geben
wird, so dass er sie ihm schlicht und einfach gibt.55 Die klaren Zeitstrukturen
von Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft, die Pentheus’ Welt bilden, sind
52 Für diejenigen, die hinter dem Fremden den Gott hören, weist er so auch auf seine göttli-
che Natur, welche das Hauptziel seiner thebanischen Erscheinung ist, indirekt hin.
53 Dasselbemit εὖoderκακῶς λέγειν/φρονεῖν (vgl. Eur. Bacch. 196, 267–269, 332, 479–480, 483–
484, 1123).
54 Ein anderes Beispiel derMehrdeutigkeit von δεινός findet sich in derMitteilung des Boten
über die Taten der Thebanerinnen ausgedrückt (Eur. Bacch. 667, 716).
55 Rijksbaron (1991: 73) spricht von „a past state of affairswith present relevance“. DieseVerb-
form kann als Beispiel einer zyklischen Zeitvorstellung verstanden werden.
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für den Fremden nicht relevant. Ein anderes Beispiel: Der Gott kann anwesend
sein, ganz nah beim Fremden (500 πλησίον παρὼν ὁρᾶι; 502 παρ’ ἐμοί), so dass
dieser ihn sehen kann, auch wenn Pentheus ihn nicht sieht (501 καὶ ποῦ ’στιν;
οὐ γὰρ φανερὸς ὄμμασίν γ’ ἐμοῖς „Und wo ist er? Denn mindestens für meine
Augen ist er nicht sichtbar.“). Die Mehrdeutigkeit ist hier stark mit der dop-
pelten Natur des Fremden, der gleichzeitig auch der Gott ist, verbunden. Aber
nicht nur: Auch wenn der Fremde als reiner Mensch betrachtet wird, ist die
Mehrdeutigkeit verständlich. Dionysos’ Anwesenheit muss nicht faktisch, tat-
sächlich stattfinden: Er ist da und nicht da, einfach nicht wirklich oder klar
sichtbar.56
Pentheus bekommt jedes Mal die Möglichkeit, seine Ansicht und Einstel-
lung zu ändern. Zum Beispiel erklärt ihm der Fremde nach seinen zwei ersten
kritischen Bemerkungen, inwiefern seine Worte nicht „gefälscht“ oder „abge-
lenkt“ sind.57 Diese Erklärungen enthalten zwar keine bestimmten Partikeln
oder Marker. Wenn Pentheus auf die Worte hören würde, würde er aber mer-
ken, inwiefern sie kohärent sind und welche neue Information sie liefern. Ver-
geblich: Wie schon dargestellt, lehnt Pentheus in dieser Situation jede Art von
responsiven Gesprächsschritten ab. Er hört seinen Gesprächspartner nicht,
ignoriert ihn, stellt sofort eine neue Frage mit einem neuen Thema.
Dasselbe ganz am Ende der ersten Dialogstelle: Pentheus versteht nicht –
oder tut, als ob er nicht verstanden hätte –, dass der Fremde keine Frage mit
einem Interrogativpronomen, sondern eine bloße Feststellung über Pentheus
äußert (506 οὐκ οἶσθ’ ὅτι ζῆις οὔθ’ ὁρᾶις οὔθ’ ὅστις εἶ. „Duweißt nicht, dass du lebst,
noch was du siehst noch wer du bist.“)58. Sobald Pentheus ὅστις εἶ hört, nutzt
er die Chance, von sich selbst sprechen zu können, und antwortet ganz klar
und präzis (im Unterschied zu dem Fremden in Antwort auf die Frage ὅστις εἶ
γένος „welchen Stamms bist du“ in Vers 460): Er ist Pentheus, das Kind Agaues,
vom Vater Echion (507 Πενθεύς, Ἀγαυῆς παῖς, πατρὸς δ’ Ἐχίονος). Pentheus ist
stolz, seine erhabene Mutter Agaue und seinen Vater Echion nennen zu kön-
nen: Die erste verbindet ihn über den berühmten Kadmos mit der königlichen
Macht; der zweite verleiht ihm als einem sogenannten Spartos, der bewaffnet
aus der Erde erschienen ist, nachdem Kadmos den Drachen, der über das the-
banische Land herrschte, getötet und seine Zähne ausgesät hatte, die Stärke
der Erde, die kriegerische Kraft und die thebanische Legitimität.Was Pentheus
56 Dieselbe Interpretation gilt für die zwei Sonnen und die zwei Theben, die Pentheus nach
seiner Verkleidung sieht (Eur. Bacch. 918–919).
57 Eur. Bacch. 476, 480.
58 οὐκ οἶσθ’ ὅτι ζῆς οὐδ’ ὁρᾶς οὔθ’ ὅστις εἶ LP : ]θ’ ὁρᾶς οὔθ’ ὅστ[P.Ant. I 24: οὐκ οἶσθ’ †ὅτι ζῆς† οὐδ’
ὃ δρᾶις οὐδ’ ὅστις εἶ Diggle.
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aber nicht hört, ist diemögliche Bedeutung seines eigenenNamens. DennΠεν-
θεύς lässt πένθος anklingen, aus der Familie von πάσχειν, das den „Schmerz“
und besonders die „Trauer“ ausdrückt.59 Wie der Fremde es im darauffolgen-
denVers erklärt, ist Pentheus durch seinenNamenprädestiniert, ein schlechtes
Los zu erhalten (508 ἐνδυστυχῆσαι τοὔνομ’ ἐπιτήδειος εἶ. „Dir ist, was deinen
Namen betrifft, vorbestimmt, unglücklich zu sein.“). Das δυστυχεῖν, das Pen-
theus zum Unglück und zu einem furchtbaren Tod führen wird, könnte sich
aber in ein εὐτυχεῖν oder εὐδαιμονεῖν verwandeln,60 wenn Pentheus auf seinen
Gesprächspartner hören, seinen Sprachgebrauch akzeptieren und Dionysos’
göttliche Macht anerkennen würde. Darauf reagiert Pentheus natürlich nicht.
Im Gegenteil: In Vers 509 bekräftigt er seine königliche Position durch zwei
deutliche Imperativformen (χώρει und καθείρξατ’) und beendet das Gespräch.
6 Die Grenzen des klaren Dialogs
Die subtilen Unterschiede der Sprache versteht Pentheus also nicht. Wäh-
rend aller vier Dialogstellen bleibt er in seinem Sprachgebrauch der Gleiche
in seinem Streben nach Klarheit und Deutlichkeit. Auch nachdem Pentheus
den Vorschlag des Fremden angenommen hat, sich zu verkleiden, um in die
Berge zu gehen, ändert er sich nicht. Und dies obwohl Dionysos – der Fremde
ruft explizit den Gott darum an61 – eine „leichte Raserei“ über Pentheus kom-
men lässt (851 ἐνεὶς ἐλαφρὰν λύσσαν). Dasselbe geschieht, wenn er verkleidet
aus dem Palast tritt: Ab diesem Moment der Handlung sieht er, was er sehen
muss. Der Fremde sagt es ihm explizit (924 νῦν δ’ ὁρᾶις ἃ χρή σ’ ὁρᾶν „du siehst
nun, was du sehen musst“). Durch seine Verkleidung hat Pentheus ein neues
Sehvermögen erhalten. Es ändert aber nichts, denn er weiß dieses nicht zu
gebrauchen: es ist zu wenig eindeutig. Für Pentheus zählt seine eigene Sicht,
sein eigenes Aussehen.62 Und dies bis im kleinsten Detail wie eine Falte seines
peplos.63
Wichtig ist ihm auch sein erster Gedanke über die Unruhe in Theben: Er
bleibt bis zum Schluss überzeugt, dass die Frauen sich schändlichen Handlun-
59 Wie Teiresias es auch sagt (Eur. Bacch. 367 Πενθεὺς δ’ ὅπως μὴ πένθος εἰσοίσει δόμοις. „Dass
Pentheus aber keinen Schmerz in dein Haus hineinlasse!“). Eine Anspielung darauf findet
man noch in Vers 913 Πενθέα λέγω „ich meine Pentheus“.
60 Zum Beispiel Eur. Bacch. 73–74.
61 Eur. Bacch. 849 Διόνυσε, νῦν σὸν ἔργον „Dionysos, jetzt ist es deine Aufgabe“.
62 Eur. Bacch. 925 τί φαίνομαι δῆτ’; „Wie erscheine ich?“
63 Eur. Bacch. 937–938.
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gen hingeben.64 Seine Überzeugung ist so stark, dass er die Thebanerinnen nie
sieht, auch wenn er vor ihnen steht.65
Pentheus versteht so wenig von der Sprachmehrdeutigkeit, die der Fremde
beherrscht, er ist so selbstsicher, dass er am Ende der vierten Dialogstelle, in
den letzten Worten, die er auf der Bühne ausspricht, die Sätze des Fremden
unterbricht und sie auf seine Weise, nach seinem Sprachgebrauch und seiner
Weltanschauung, vervollständigt. Er merkt aber nicht, dass er so seinen eige-
nen Tod inszeniert.66
Mit Pentheus’ Tod ist das Problem, das sich in Theben abspielt, gelöst –
aber nicht dank einem klarenDialog. Dennmit Klarheit undDeutlichkeit ist es
unmöglich, einen solchen Gott wie Dionysos – der anwesend und abwesend,
sichtbar und unsichtbar ist, und der die klarenKategorien verschleiert und zer-
stört – zu erfassen und einzuordnen. Genereller gesagt ist es unmöglich, die
Mehrdeutigkeit mit klaren Worten und Strukturen zu erklären und darzustel-
len. So stößt der klare Dialog im Leben an seine Grenzen.
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Iphigenie und ihre Mutter: Pragmatische
Bemerkungen zur Iphigenie in Aulis
Giada Sorrentino
1 Einleitung: Interaktion und Charakterisierung in der Iphigenie in
Aulis
Die Iphigenie in Aulis zeichnet sich durch die besondere Bedeutung aus, die
im Plot den Schwierigkeiten und dem Scheitern der zwischenmenschlichen
Kommunikation beigemessen wird. Die Handlung entwickelt sich um die Auf-
rechterhaltung und Enthüllung eines von Agamemnon gegen seine Familie
und seine Tochter Iphigenie ersonnenen Trugs. Der Vater hat sie unter dem
Vorwand, sie solle Achill heiraten, nach Aulis, wo ermit der griechischen Flotte
nach Artemis’Willen festsitzt, kommen lassen. InWirklichkeit soll sie geopfert
werden, dadies die vonderGöttin gestellte Bedingung ist, damit die Expedition
beginnen kann. Der dauerndeWiderstand einiger Figuren gegen die Opferung
einerseits und andererseits dieMeinungsumschwünge anderer erschweren die
Entwicklung des Plots solange, bis das Mädchen durch seine Meinungsände-
rung selbst entscheidet, sich seinem Schicksal zu fügen.
In diesem dramatischen Gerüst liegt der Hauptgrundmeiner Untersuchung
des Dialogs in diesem Stück als Mittel zur Konstruktion und Gliederung des
Plots sowie zurCharakterisierungder Figurenund ihrerBeziehungen.DiePrag-
matik, die die Sprache als Form der Handlung betrachtet und sie mit den
spezifischen Eigenschaften ihres Gebrauchskontexts in Beziehung setzt, kann
einen grundlegenden Beitrag zu einer solchen Untersuchung leisten. Die Kate-
gorien und Erklärungsmodelle, durch die sie den Gebrauch der Sprache in den
kommunikativen Prozessen analysiert, haben sich seit langem auch als geeig-
nete Instrumente erwiesen, um den aktionalen, interaktionalen und sozia-
len Aspekt der dramatischen Sprache zu erfassen.1 Daher verwende ich diese
Instrumente – von der Sprechakttheorie über die Gesprächsanalyse bis zu
den politeness-Studien – neben den traditionellen auf die Literatur angewand-
ten Untersuchungsmethoden, um deutlicher hervorzuheben, wie die Figuren
1 Zur Anwendbarkeit der Pragmatik auf den Dialog des Dramas und zu ihren heuristischen
Vorteilen vgl. u.a. Elam (22002: 142–167) und Hess-Lüttich (1980: 5–22, 2001: 1640–1655); van
Emde Boas (2017) verwendet die verschiedenen Bereiche der Pragmatik in seiner Studie zur
sprachlichen Charakterisierung der Figuren in Euripides’Elektra.
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durch ihr Interagieren die Handlung fortführen und gleichzeitig ihre dramati-
schen Rollen sowie ihre Beziehungen gestalten.
In diesem Beitrag beschränke ich mich darauf, einige Resultate meiner
Untersuchung vorzustellen, die besonders die Charakterisierung der Figuren
von Iphigenie und Klytaimestra im Dialog betreffen. Ich werde zeigen, wie die
beiden Frauen im ganzen Stück hinsichtlich einiger grundlegender Aspekte
ihres interaktionalenVerhaltens einander entgegengestelltwerdenundwie der
Meinungsumschwung Iphigenies gegenüber der Opferung (ab Vers 1368) ihren
Gegensatz nicht beendet, sondern unter umgekehrten Vorzeichen weiterführt
und die Beziehung Mutter-Tochter im Schlussteil der Tragödie beeinflusst.2
2 Selbstsichere Ehefrau, Mutter und Königin: die Charakterisierung
Klytaimestras
In den Gesprächen, an denen Klytaimestra beteiligt ist, zeigt sie interaktionale
Verhaltensweisen, die trotz der Verschiedenheit der einzelnen Situationen bis
zu IphigeniesWandel konstant bleiben.
Ein erstes Kennzeichen betrifft die Art und Weise, wie sie das Wort ergreift
bzw. übergibt. In der Mehrheit der Fälle wählt sie sich selbst als Sprecherin
autonom aus, vor allem um Paarsequenzen zu eröffnen, also um Handlungen
(wie z.B. Fragen) zu verwirklichen, die von den Gesprächspartnern bestimmte
Reaktionen erwarten.3 Auf diese Weise gelingt es ihr, das Verhalten der Ge-
sprächspartner zu beeinflussen und die Interaktion leicht in die von ihr ge-
wünschte Richtung zu lenken.
Dies bemerktmanvon ihremersten (685–740)bis zu ihrem letztenGespräch
vor dem Wandel Iphigenies (1345–1368). Im ersten folgen etwa 30 Verse lang
2 Der Text der Iphigenie in Aulis hat zahlreiche philologische Kontroversen ausgelöst, von
denen viele immer noch offen sind: es lässt sich nämlich nicht bestreiten, dass das euripidei-
scheGrundgerüst verschiedenartigeÄnderungen erfahrenhat, die es unmöglichmachen, das
ursprünglicheWerk von den Zusätzen zu unterscheiden. Ich folge der von Collard und Mor-
wood (2017) besorgten Edition, welche die neueste ist und die meisten textkritischen bisher
erschienenen Studien berücksichtigt. In den Anmerkungen werde ich nur auf die Fälle hin-
weisen, in denen ich von ihrem Text abweiche oder in denen sie selbst unsicher sind. Vgl. zu
den wichtigsten Textproblemen außer Collard und Morwood (2017: 50–62) wenigstens die
ausführlichen Darlegungen von Stockert (1992: 63–87).
3 Eine Paarsequenz (adjacency pair) ist die Abfolge von zwei Aussagen, die von verschiede-
nenGesprächspartnern geäußert werden und so strukturiert sind, dass ein bestimmter erster
Teil einen dazu passenden zweiten verlangt, z.B. Frage/Antwort, Gruß/Gegengruß usw. Vgl.
Schegloff (2007: 13–21). Die deutscheTerminologie folgt grundsätzlich Eberle (1997) undMei-
bauer (22001).
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Fragen der Königin an Agamemnon über von ihr gewählte Themen aufein-
ander, im zweiten wählt sie sich ständig selbst als Sprecherin aus, um ihren
Gesprächspartner Achill zum Erzählen zu bringen, dessen Absichten zu erfah-
ren und mit ihm zusammen den letzten Versuch zu unternehmen, Iphigenie
zu retten.
Klytaimestras interaktionale Fähigkeit gewinnt im zweiten Dialog mit Aga-
memnon (1106–1145) an dramatischer Relevanz. Darin gelingt es der Königin,
die inzwischen die wahren Absichten Agamemnons erfahren hat, in wenigen
Zügen die Führungsrolle im Gespräch zu übernehmen und den Trug des Ehe-
manns zu entlarven. Der Dialog beginnt zwar auf Agamemnons Initiative, aber
es ist Klytaimestra, die die verbale Auseinandersetzung gesucht hat, wie sie
selbst in einem kurzen vorausgehenden Monolog (1098–1105) offenbart. Am
Anfang zeigt sie sich fügsamund reagiert auf die Sprechhandlungen ihresMan-
nes, ohne zu zeigen, dass sie umseinenPlanweiß.4Nachdemsie seinemBefehl,
Iphigenie aus dem Zelt herausgehen zu lassen, gehorcht hat, zeigt sie ihre Fer-
tigkeit, die aktive Rolle im Wortwechsel zu übernehmen. Zunächst erklärt sie
sich zur einzigen Gesprächspartnerin des Ehemannes, indem sie sagt, dass sie
für sich und für ihre Tochter sprechen wird (1121). Die von Agamemnon an das
Mädchen gerichteten Fragen über die Gründe für seinen ausweichenden Blick
und seine betrübte Miene rufen die folgenden Redebeiträge (turns) hervor:
[1] Euripides Iphigenie in Aulis 1124–1131
Κλ. φεῦ·
τίν’ ἂν λάβοιμι τῶν ἐμῶν ἀρχὴν κακῶν;
ἅπασι γὰρ πρώτοισι χρήσασθαι πάρα
κἀν ὑστάτοισι κἀν μέσοισι πανταχοῦ.
Αγ. τί δ’ ἔστιν; ὥς μοι πάντες εἰς ἓν ἥκετε,
σύγχυσιν ἔχοντες καὶ ταραγμὸν ὀμμάτων.
Κλ. εἴφ’ ἃν ἐρωτήσω σε γενναίως, πόσι.
Αγ. οὐδὲν κελευσμοῦ δεῖ σ’· ἐρωτᾶσθαι θέλω.
Κλ. τὴν παῖδα τὴν σὴν τήν τ’ ἐμὴν μέλλεις κτανεῖν;
4 Der einzige Hinweis auf ihr Wissen, den Klytaimestra in dieser Passage des Dialogs gibt, ist
die Bemerkung in Vers 1115–1116 τοῖς ὀνόμασιν μὲν εὖ λέγεις, τὰ δ’ ἔργα σου οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως χρή μ’
ὀνομάσασαν εὖ λέγειν („MitWorten sprichst du gut, doch wie ich deine Taten bezeichnen und
gut reden soll, dasweiß ich nicht.“). Diesewird aber durch dasWortspielmit demAusdruck εὖ
λέγειν, der sowohl ‚gut (wohl) reden‘ als auch ‚das Richtige treffen‘ bedeutet, für Agamemnon
zweideutig gemacht; vgl. Stockert (1992: 516).
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Kl. Ach, welchen Anfang meines Leidens soll ich wählen? Ein jedes
kann ich ja als erstes nehmen, als letztes odermittleres: Leid ist übe-
rall.
Ag. Was ist?Wie ihr beide doch einander gleicht: bedrückt erscheint ihr
und mit verstörtem Blick.
Kl. Antworte ehrlich auf meine Frage, mein Gemahl.
Ag. Dazu brauchst du mich nicht aufzufordern: frage nur!
Kl. Hast du die Absicht, dein Kind und meines zu töten?5
Die Königin gibt zunächst eine allgemeine Antwort, in der sie über schwer zu
beschreibende Übel spricht. Dies veranlasst Agamemnon, die Frage erneut zu
stellen. Aber nicht einmal jetzt liefert sie eine klare Antwort, sondern fügt in
die von Agamemnon eröffnete Frage-Antwort-Sequenz ein weiteres adjacency
pair ein. Gemäß der Gesprächsanalyse eröffnet sie eine Einschubsequenz.6 In
einer Aufforderung kündigt sie eine Frage ihrerseits an ihren Mann an. Diese
Einschubsequenz bereitet also eine neue Paarsequenz vor, die nach Agamem-
nons Zustimmung von Klytaimestra eröffnet wird (1131 „Hast du die Absicht,
dein Kind undmeines zu töten?“).7 Durch diese konversationellen Züge gelingt
es ihr, ihrem Mann die Rolle des Fragenden und damit die Zügel der Inter-
aktion zu entreißen. Sie will, dass Agamemnon selbst auf seine Anfangsfrage
antwortet und dabei seinen Plan offenbart. Ihre Anklage erscheint in Form
einer Ja/Nein-Frage, die zwar schroff, aber weniger aggressiv als eine Anklage
in assertiver Form ist.8DemGesprächspartnerwürde eine einfacheVerneinung
genügen, um sie zurückzuweisen.Wegen seiner Unfähigkeit, eine solche zu lie-
fern, wird ihn jedoch die Königin in den folgenden Versen (1132–1145) in die
Enge treiben. Auf die Redebeiträge, mit denen der König versuchen wird, der
Anklage auszuweichen, wird Klytaimestra mit ebenso vielen, in denen sie auf
der Frage beharrt und das Fehlen einer Antwort immer signifikanter macht,
reagieren. Von der so erreichten überlegenen Position aus wird sie schließlich
explizit Agamemnons Spiel entlarven.
5 Die Übersetzung stammt, wo nicht anders angegeben, aus Blume (2014).
6 Einschubsequenzen (insertion sequences) sind Folgen von Redebeiträgen (etwa Paarsequen-
zen), die zwischendemerstenunddemzweitenTeil einer umrahmendenPaarsequenz einge-
fügt werden und deren Vervollständigung derjenigen dieser vorausgeht. Vgl. Schegloff (2007:
97–114).
7 Die Paarsequenzen, die wie diese das Vorkommen einer folgenden vorankündigen, werden
in der Gesprächsanalyse als Präsequenzen (pre-sequences) bezeichnet, vgl. dazu Schegloff
(2007: 28–57).
8 Die Form der Frage kann die illokutionäre Kraft eines Sprechakts abmildern (Brown und
Levinson 21987: 132–133).
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Die Sprechakte, welche Klytaimestra im Dialog verwirklicht, und ihre relative
Frequenz in den verschiedenen Kontexten, in denen sie interagiert, bilden im
Stück ebenfalls ein wirksames Instrument zu ihrer Charakterisierung.9
In dieser Hinsicht ist die erste Replik, die Klytaimestra bei der gemeinsamen
Ankunft mit Iphigenie und dem kleinen Orest in Aulis ausspricht (607–630),
besonders interessant. Sie beginnt mit einem Dank an die Frauen des Chors,
welche die königliche Familie willkommen geheißen haben, und entwickelt
sich als lange Abfolge von direktiven Sprechakten (hauptsächlich Befehlen)10
an alle erreichbaren Anwesenden: begleitende Diener, die Frauen des Chors,
Iphigenie und Orest. Die Zahl der Direktiva und ihrer Adressaten, ihre direkte
Form (sie werden immer in Imperativsätzen geäußert), die unterschiedlichen
Bereiche, die sie betreffen – vom Aussteigen der Sprecherin und ihrer Kinder
aus dem Wagen über den Transport von Iphigenies Mitgift bis zur Versorgung
der Pferde –, zeigen bereits bei Klytaimestras erstemBühnenauftritt die Sicher-
heit, mit der sie die von ihren sozialen Rollen herrührende Autorität ausübt,
und die Sorgfalt, mit der sie ihre Aufgaben erledigt. Diese werden sich in der
Folge als die wichtigsten Merkmale ihres Charakters erweisen.11
Die in dieser Passage dominierenden Sprechakte nehmen auch sonst in Kly-
taimestras Sprechen bis zum Wandel Iphigenies eine wichtige Rolle ein. Die
Königin macht reichlich von Direktiva Gebrauch, die sie an all ihre Gesprächs-
partner richtet, um ihre sozialen Rollen auszuüben und ihre Beziehungen zu
gestalten. AnKinder undUntergebene richtet sie vor allemBefehle undAuffor-
derungen, die zu einerMutter undHausherrinpassen.GegenüberAchill äußert
sie anfangs – schon in der Rolle der künftigen Schwiegermutter – Sprechakte
des Vorschlags und der Aufforderung, nach der Entdeckung des unmittelbar
bevorstehenden Opfers der Tochter dagegen eindringliche Bitten um Hilfe.12
9 Ich folge in der Regel der Einteilung der Sprechakte von Searle (1976). Die Fälle, in denen
ich mich auf jüngere Studien stütze, die Searles Kategorien auf der theoretischen Ebene
oder hinsichtlich der Anwendung auf reale bzw. literarische Interaktionen präzisiert oder
korrigiert haben, werden jeweils in Anmerkung angegeben.
10 GemäßSearle (1976: 11) könnendie direktiven Sprechakte als „attempts (of varyingdegrees
[…]) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something“ definiert werden. Auf Risselada
(1993: besonders 32–49) aufbauend, verfeinert und korrigiert teilweise Denizot (2011: 23–
24) Searles Kriterien der Einteilung. Sie liefert somit eine m.E. befriedigendere Klassifi-
zierung der Unterarten der Direktiva, die den Akt der Frage ausschließt und Befehl/Auf-
forderung (injonction), Forderung/Bitte (requête), Flehen (prière), Vorschlag (proposition),
Ratschlag (conseil), Anweisung (instruction) usw. klarer zu unterscheiden vermag.
11 Diesen von vielen für unecht oder suspekt gehaltenen, aber von anderen verteidigten
Redebeitrag haltenCollard undMorwood in ihrer AusgabemitVorbehalt. Vgl. Collard und
Morwood (2017: 401–402) und Stockert (1992: 380–381).
12 An Iphigenie richtet Klytaimestra Aufforderungen (1117–1119, 1343–1344), ebenso an den
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Interessant ist, wie sich ihrVerhaltenAgamemnon gegenüber ändert: IhrMann
ist von Direktiva für eine bestimmte Dauer fast ganz ausgenommen, und zwar
solange, bis Klytaimestra sich entschließt, seinen Plan zu entlarven. Von da an
wendet sie sich an ihn immer häufiger mit diesen Sprechakten, die anzeigen,
dass sie die Autorität des Gatten infrage stellt.13
Eine umfassende Untersuchung der von Klytaimestra verwirklichten Sprech-
akte zeigt ihre Vorliebe für Direktheit. Das gilt auch bezüglich der Sprech-
akte, welche einige politeness-Modelle als FTAs ( face threateningacts) bezeich-
nen,14 da sie das Bedürfnis nach Bestätigung sowie das Bedürfnis nach Frei-
heit, die das soziale Selbstbild ( face) eines Individuums darstellen, verlet-
zen.15
Unter den politeness-Strategien, durch dieKlytaimestra ihre FTAs abmildert,
ist die Indirektheit selten und immer nur formal, da die FTAs aus dem Kon-
text und dem Kotext unmittelbar deutlich werden.16 Ein interessantes Beispiel
begegnet vor der Entdeckung des Trugs und betrifft ihren FTA der Weigerung,
dem Befehl Agamemnons, vor der Hochzeit Iphigenies nach Hause zu gehen,
zu gehorchen:
[2] Euripides Iphigenie in Aulis 733–740
Αγ. ἐγὼ παρέξω φῶς ὃ νυμφίοις πρέπει.
Κλ. οὐχ ὁ νόμος οὗτος οὐδὲ φαῦλ’ ἡγητέα.
Αγ. οὐ καλὸν ἐν ὄχλωι σ’ ἐξομιλεῖσθαι στρατοῦ.
Κλ. καλὸν τεκοῦσαν τἀμά μ’ ἐκδοῦναι τέκνα.
Αγ. καὶ τάς γ’ ἐν οἴκωι μὴ μόνας εἶναι κόρας.
Κλ. ὀχυροῖσι παρθενῶσι φρουροῦνται καλῶς.
alten Diener (867, 872). Vor der Entdeckung des Truges wendet sie sich an Achill mit einer
Aufforderung und einemVorschlag (831–832), danach fleht sie ihn an (900–916, 985–989)
und richtet wieder eine Bitte an ihn (995–996).
13 Die vonKlytaimestra anAgamemnon gerichtetenDirektiva sind eineAufforderung (1129),
die mehrmals wiederholt wird (1133 und 1135), ein Befehl in Form eines Rates (1143) und
eine Bittrede (1146–1208). Der direktive Sprechakt in Vers 740 ist inWirklichkeit Teil eines
kommissiven Sprechakts der Ablehnung.
14 Das Modell, auf das ich mich hauptsächlich beziehe, ist das von Brown und Levinson
(21987).
15 Vgl. Brown und Levinson (21987: 62–68) und Sektion B dieses Bandes.
16 Zur Tatsache, dass die Indirektheit (off-recordness) eines FTA nur formal ist, wenn der
extralinguistische Kontext, der Kotext (d.h. die umgebenden Redebeiträge), sowie para-
linguistische und nonverbale Hinweise nur eine einzige Interpretation dieses erlauben,
vgl. Brown und Levinson (21987: 211–213).
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Αγ. πιθοῦ. Κλ. μὰ τὴν ἄνασσαν Ἀργείαν θεάν.
ἐλθὼν δὲ τἄξω πρᾶσσε, τἀν δόμοις δ’ ἐγώ.
Ag. Ich werde das Licht scheinen lassen, das dem Brautpaar gebührt.
Kl. Das ist nicht der Brauch! Man darf dergleichen nicht geringschät-
zen.
Ag. Es ziemt sich nicht, dass du dich in der Masse des Heeres aufhältst.
Kl. Es ziemt sich aber, dass ich als Mutter mein Kind vermähle.
Ag. Aber auch, dass die Töchter zu Hause nicht allein bleiben.
Kl. In festen Mädchenzimmern leben sie wohlbehütet.
Ag. Gehorche!
Kl. Nein, bei der Göttin, die in Argos herrscht! Geh du und besorge die
Dinge draußen; die im Haus besorge ich.
Agamemnon hat soeben Klytaimestra versichert, dass er auch die für die Feier
von der Mutter zu verrichtenden Aufgaben erfüllen wird. Sie wendet ein, dass
dieses Verhalten vom νόμος (734) abweiche, der nicht unterschätzt werden
dürfe.17 Ihr Sprechakt ist zwar formal indirekt, wird aber in der kommunikati-
ven Situation, in der er vorkommt, deutlich und löst einen Schlagabtausch über
die Angemessenheit des Befehls aus. Auf die Bemerkung des Mannes, dass es
nicht angebracht sei, dass Klytaimestra sich unter das Heer mische, antwor-
tet sie in Vers 736, indem sie die Schicklichkeit der Anwesenheit der Mutter an
der Hochzeit betont. Unmittelbar darauf (738) neutralisiert sie den Einwand
des Gatten, dass das Verbleiben ihrer Töchter allein zu Hause unschicklich sei,
durch die Versicherung, dass diese in Argos wohlbehütet sind. Trotz der forma-
len Indirektheit wird in diesen letzten Redebeiträgen ihre Ablehnung durch
eine zweifache Wiederholung sogar verstärkt. Dient die exakte Wiederholung
(736) des von ihrem Mann ausgesprochenen καλόν dazu, Klytaimestras Stand-
punkt demjenigen des Gatten deutlich entgegenzusetzen, schafft die variierte
Selbstwiederholung mit καλῶς (738) eine Verbindung zum letzten eigenen
Redebeitrag und verstärkt den darin verwirklichten Sprechakt.18
17 Zur politeness-Strategie des „give hints“, die im ersten Satz ihres Redebeitrags verwendet
wird, um indirekt (off-record) einen FTA zu begehen, vgl. Brown und Levinson (21987: 213–
215). Der zweite Satz, der die Aufforderung, den νόμος nicht zu unterschätzen, enthält,
macht den Sprechakt durch die passive Konstruktion mit dem Verbaladjektiv ohne die
Erwähnung des Agens unpersönlich. Zu dieser Strategie vgl. Brown und Levinson (21987:
194–197).
18 Zur Wiederholung vonWörtern des Gesprächspartners (Fremdwiederholung), um Unei-
nigkeit auszudrücken, und zur Selbstwiederholung, um den eigenen Standpunkt zu ver-
stärken, vgl. Bazzanella (1992: 438–439) und Locher (2004: 137–142). Zu den Formen und
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Diese Ausdrucksmodalitäten verdecken die illokutionäre Kraft des FTA der
Weigerungnicht, sondernwerden vonKlytaimestra so lange verwendet, wie sie
es für möglich hält, ihren Gatten durch die Begründung der Ablehnung seines
Befehls umzustimmen. Zunächst erinnert sie Agamemnon an die Bedeutung
des νόμος, in der nachfolgenden Diskussion fordert sie gleiches Recht wie ihr
Ehemann bei der Festsetzung dessen ein, was für sie und ihre Familie mora-
lisch καλόν ist. Damit verteidigt Klytaimestra ihre Rolle als Mutter und Haus-
herrin. Sobald sie begreift (739), dass es für den Meinungsaustausch keinen
Raum mehr gibt, erwidert sie mit einer deutlichen Ablehnung, die durch die
Schwurformel noch verstärkt wird,19 steckt dabei die Kompetenzsphären bei
der Führung des oikos explizit ab und beendet autonom das Gespräch.
Klytaimestra mildert oft ihre FTAs durch die Erwähnung der Gründe, aus
denen sie verwirklicht werden, ab.20 Diese werden in der Regel von ihr in
den sozialen Rollen (gesellschaftliche Stellung, Geschlecht usw.), die sie oder
ihre Gesprächspartner bekleiden, und in den Verhaltensweisen, die jeweils für
sie vorgeschrieben sind, identifiziert. Außer den angeführten Beispielen sind
diesbezüglich die Verse 903–908 besonders eindrücklich. Darin begründet die
Königin ihre Bitte an Achill, das Leben Iphigenies zu retten, mit den Pflichten
des Ehegatten, selbst wenn Achill, wie sie zugibt, nur zum Schein und ohne
seinWissen mit dieser Rolle bekleidet worden ist.21
Bevor sie merkt, dass sie betrogen worden ist (847), findet man hingegen
sogar in den expressiven Sprechakten,22 die bisweilen kalt und formal erschei-
nen, kaum Hinweise auf ihre eigenen Gefühle.23 Bedeutsam ist der Gruß, den
sie bei ihrer Ankunft an Agamemnon richtet:
Funktionen derWiederaufnahmeder vorhergehendenRedebeiträge im tragischenDialog
vgl. die Literaturangaben bei Bonifazi u.a. (2016: III.3.1.3).
19 Zu μάmit Akkusativ als negative Erwiderung auf einen Imperativ (z.B. Ar.Thesm. 748) vgl.
LSJ s.v. III.1.b (1070).
20 Zur Angabe der Gründe für einen FTA, um ihn abzumildern, vgl. Brown und Levinson
(21987: 128).
21 Ein weiteres Beispiel begegnet in Vers 992–996: Bevor die Königin Achill explizit darum
bittet, Iphigenies Leben zu retten, ohne dass das Mädchen das Zelt verlasse und ihn per-
sönlich anflehe, unterstreicht sie (993), dass dasVerhalten,welches sie ihrerTochter erspa-
ren will, sich für ein Mädchen nicht zieme. Zur Beachtung dessen, was angemessen ist,
durch Klytaimestra vgl. Chong-Gossard (2008: 231–237).
22 Gemäß Searle (1976: 12) offenbaren die expressiven Sprechakte psychische Zustände, Ein-
stellungen und persönliche Gefühle. Vgl. Risselada (1993: 40–41) zur Schwierigkeit, diese
und ihre Unterarten (z.B. Gruß, Glückwunsch, Dank, Entschuldigung, Beileid, je nach
Kontext aber auchWunsch, Ausruf usw.) zu definieren.
23 Die einzigen Hinweise darauf kommen in Vers 609, 691–692 und 844 vor.
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[3] Euripides Iphigenie in Aulis 633–634
ὦ σέβας ἐμοὶ μέγιστον, Ἀγαμέμνων ἄναξ,
ἥκομεν ἐφετμαῖς οὐκ ἀπιστοῦσαι σέθεν.
O höchste Majestät, Agamemnon, Herrscher! Nicht ungehorsam gegenü-
ber deinen Befehlen sind wir gekommen.24
Die Königinwendet sich an ihrenGatten, den sie nach einiger Zeit wiedersieht,
mit einer feierlich und kalt klingenden Hochachtung: Zuerst spricht sie ihn
mit der ehrfürchtigen Anrede σέβας an, die in der Tragödie fast ausschließlich
an Gottheiten gerichtet wird;25 die zweite Anrede mit dem Nominativ Ἀγαμέ-
μνων ἄναξ unterstreicht die Autorität des Ehemanns, aber nicht die Gefühle,
die sie an ihren Gatten binden, was sonst in der Tragödie oft geschieht, wenn
sichdie Eheleutewiederbegegnen.26 ZudenbeidenAnredenpasst die folgende
Aussage gut, durch die Klytaimestra signalisiert, dass sie sich als gehorsame
Ehefrau benommen hat.
Die beschriebenen interaktionalen Verhaltensweisen scheinen auf kohä-
rente Weise dazu beizutragen, das Bild einer selbstsicheren und entschlosse-
nen Figur zu entwerfen, die sich stark mit ihren gesellschaftlichen Rollen als
Königin, Mutter und Ehefrau identifiziert. In ihrem Handeln spielen die sozia-
len Normen und Konventionen (im Gegensatz zu den Gefühlen) eine grund-
legende Rolle. Diese Charakterisierung schafft einen scharfen Gegensatz zwi-
schen Klytaimestra und Agamemnon, der sich vom Anfang an in jeder seiner
24 Übersetzung von mir.
25 Aesch. Cho. 157 ist der einzige sichere Passus einer Tragödie, in dem die Anrede an einen
Menschen gerichtet wird, und zwar noch einmal an Agamemnon: In diesem Fall wendet
man sich jedoch während eines Rituals an den Geist des toten Königs. Das Verb σέβω zum
Ausdruck der Achtung innerhalb einer Ehe wird z.B. in Aesch. Ag. 925, Soph. OT 700 ver-
wendet.
26 In der Tragödie richten Ehegatten Vokative und Ausdrücke der Zuneigung nicht nur bei
unerwarteten Wiedererkennungen und Wiedervereinigungen aneinander – wie diejeni-
gen in Eur. HF 531, in dem Megara Herakles mit dem Vokativ ὦ φίλτατ’ ἀνδρῶν „o liebster
unter denMännern“ (531) grüßt, undHel. 625 und636, in denendie beidenGatten, die sich
endlich wiedererkannt haben, ähnliche Anreden aneinander richten –, sondern manch-
mal auch bei alltäglichen Treffen: so spricht z.B. in Eur. El. 345 die Protagonistin ihren
Gatten mit dem Vokativ ὦ φίλτατ’(ε) „o liebster“, an. Im Agamemnon wendet sich die ais-
chyleische Klytaimestra, die nach dem Troianischen Krieg ihren Mann wiedersieht, mit
demVokativ φίλον κάρα, wörtlich „liebes Haupt“, an ihn (905), bevor sie mit ὦναξ „o Herr“
(907) den Ausdruck der Zuneigung mit demjenigen der Ehrerbietung verbindet.
- 978-90-04-44026-5
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com10/12/2020 08:49:24PM
via free access
iphigenie und ihre mutter 169
Rollen als inadäquat entpuppt.27 Im folgenden werde ich zeigen, wie das kom-
munikative Verhalten der Königin auch in starkem Gegensatz zu demjenigen
Iphigenies steht.
3 Gefühle ausdrücken und austauschen: Iphigenies Kommunikation
vor demWandel
Einen ersten Einblick in die Unterschiede zwischen Tochter undMutter geben
schon die beiden über weite Strecken stichomythischen Dialoge, in denen
zuerst Iphigenie (640–685) und dann Klytaimestra mit Agamemnon sprechen
(685–740).
Der Dialog zwischen Iphigenie und Agamemnon ist der erste lange Wort-
wechsel, an dem das Mädchen teilnimmt. Dieser beginnt mit dem Austausch
von Grüßen (640–643), fährt mit der Verwunderung Iphigenies über das Wei-
nen des Vaters fort, das sie zu beenden versucht (644–650), entfaltet sich in
der Folge um die Ankündigung Agamemnons einer Iphigenie bevorstehenden
Reise (651–671), wird durch Hinweise des Königs über Opfer verlängert, die sei-
ner Abreise von Aulis vorangehen werden (673–677), und endet damit, dass er
der Tochter befiehlt, in sein Zelt zu gehen, und sich von ihr weinend verab-
schiedet (678–685).
Die Unterschiede zwischen demVerhalten Iphigenies und demjenigen Aga-
memnons in diesemDialog hängen vor allem von ihremWissensgefälle bezüg-
lich der Fakten ab. Iphigenie, die noch nichts über ihr künftiges Schicksal weiß,
nimmt aktiv am Gespräch teil. Sie eröffnet es und führt es fort, indem sie fast
immer autonom das Wort ergreift. Ihre Sprechakte sind immer explizit und
klar und ihre nonverbale Kommunikation stimmt vollständig mit ihren Wor-
ten überein.28 Dagegen verhält sich Agamemnon eher reaktiv und nicht immer
kollaborativ. Er begnügt sich in der Mehrzahl seiner Redebeiträge damit, der
Tochter zu antworten, und erwidert auf ihre Fragen, die manchmal von ihm
selbst eingeführte Themen betreffen, oft mit wenig klaren Antworten oder mit
der Weigerung, eine Antwort zu geben.29 Seine Gesten stehen mehrmals mit
27 Zur Unzulänglichkeit Agamemnons in den verschiedenen Rollen, die er innehat, vgl. z.B.
Michelakis (2006: 33–35) und die von ihm zitierte Sekundärliteratur.
28 Durch die vor dem Beginn des Dialogs (631–632) angekündigte Geste, dem Vater entge-
genzulaufen und ihn zu umarmen, äußert Iphigenie ihren Enthusiasmus, ihn zu sehen,
den sie darauf verbal ausdrücken wird (640–642).
29 Dieses Verhalten rührt davon, dass Agamemnon, der die ganze Wahrheit kennt, „ständig
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seinen Worten offenkundig in Widerstreit, so etwa, wenn er sagt, er sei glück-
lich, seine Tochter wiederzusehen, aber nicht aufhört zu weinen (645–646,
648–650).
Andere konversationelle Verhaltensweisen Iphigenies verraten ihre Unreife
in ihrem interaktionellen Gebrauch der Sprache. So bemerkt man etwa, dass
sie nicht immer von ihrem Gesprächspartner Klarheit verlangt, was sonst in
der Interaktion gewöhnlich geschieht. Manchmal geht sie nicht genauer auf
den Sinn seiner dunklen Aussagen ein:
[4] Euripides Iphigenie in Aulis 658–660
Ιφ. ὄλοιντο λόγχαι καὶ τὰ Μενέλεω κακά.
Αγ. ἄλλους ὀλεῖ πρόσθ’ ἁμὲ διολέσαντ’ ἔχει.
Ιφ. ὡς πολὺν ἀπῆσθα χρόνον ἐν Αὐλίδος μυχοῖς.
Iph. Verflucht seien dieWaffen und das Unrecht an Menelaos!
Ag. Andere wird erst noch vernichten, was mich schon ganz vernichtet
hat.
Iph. Wie lange schon bist du fort in der Bucht von Aulis!
Nachdem Iphigenie den Krieg und Menelaos’ Übel verflucht hat, deutet Aga-
memnon ihr das traurige Schicksal an, das sie, die allgemein mit ἄλλους
bezeichnet wird, erwartet. Eine Frage Iphigenies würde genügen, damit die
Wahrheit ans Tageslicht käme, aber sie stellt keine Forderung an den König,
das Gesagte zu klären. Stattdessen knüpft sie an ihren letzten Redebeitrag an,
um sich über die Länge seines Aufenthalts in Aulis zu wundern.30 In anderen
Fällen akzeptiert sie seineWeigerung, auf ihre Fragen zu antworten.31 Dagegen
vertieft sie mit weiteren Fragen alles, was der Vater über seine Gefühle und die
sie beide betreffenden Angelegenheiten sagt.32
DemMädchen kommt es nicht darauf an, alles, was der Vater sagt, genau zu
begreifen. Es beschränkt sich vielmehr darauf, über die Themen zu kommuni-
zieren, in die es persönlich involviert ist, während es die Probleme übergeht,
hin- und herschwankt zwischen demWunsch zu sprechen und demUnvermögen, diesen
Wunsch zu realisieren“ (Schwinge 1968: 189).
30 Zu Vers 659 sagt Schwinge (1968: 188): „Nur eine darauf bezogene Frage, und Agamem-
non sähe sich durch Iphigenie selbst dazu aufgefordert, die Wahrheit auszusprechen.
Doch Iphigenie überhört diesenHinweis“. DasselbeVerhalten registriertman einigeVerse
danach (661–662).
31 Das geschieht nach Vers 671 und 677–685.
32 Das passiert in Vers 644, 648–650, 668–670, 675–676.
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mit denen er sich als König und Feldherr beschäftigt.33 Iphigenie selbst bestä-
tigt in diesem Dialog mit einem expliziten Hinweis auf die Verwendung der
Sprache ihre Vorstellung von der Kommunikation. Nachdem ihr Vater gesagt
hat, dass ihre klugen (συνετά) Worte ihn immer mehr zum Weinen bringen,
erwidert sie in Vers 654, dass sie unvernünftig (ἀσύνετα) reden will, wenn ihm
dies Freude bereiten (εὐφρανῶ) kann. Die Behauptung ist eine klare Äußerung
der Zuneigung zumVater. Zugleich zeigt Iphigenies geringe Beachtung rationa-
lerArgumente, dass sie die verbaleKommunikation vorwiegendals Instrument
auffasst, um Gefühle auszudrücken und hervorzurufen.
Die hohe emotionale Spannung ihrer Kommunikation wird von der hohen
Zahl expressiver Sprechakte, die sie im gesamten Verlauf des Dialogs verwirk-
licht, bezeugt.
[5] Euripides Iphigenie in Aulis 640, 642, 644, 664, 666, 674
640 ὦ πάτερ, ἐσεῖδόν σ’ ἀσμένη πολλῶι χρόνωι.
642 χαῖρ’· εὖ δέ μ’ ἀγαγὼν πρὸς σ’ ἐποίησας, πάτερ.
644 ἔα·
ὡς οὐ βλέπεις εὔκηλον ἄσμενός μ’ ἰδών.
664 μακρὰν ἀπαίρεις, ὦ πάτερ, λιπὼν ἐμέ.
666 φεῦ·
εἴθ’ ἦν καλόν †μοι σοί τ’ ἄγειν σύμπλουν ἐμέ†.
674 ἀλλὰ ξὺν ἱεροῖς χρὴ τό γ’ εὐσεβὲς σκοπεῖν.
640 Vater, ich sehe dich mit Freuden nach langer Zeit.
642 Sei gegrüßt, wie gut, dass du mich herbeigerufen hast, Vater.
644 Ach, du blickst unruhig, und hast mich doch froh gegrüßt.
664 Auf eine weite Fahrt begibst du dich und lässt mich zurück.
666 Ach! Dürftest †du mich doch mitnehmen auf der Fahrt†.34
674 Ja, mit Hilfe heiliger Riten muss man auf Frömmigkeit achten.
Wie die zitierten Verse zeigen, gehören die von Iphigenie ausgedrückten ex-
pressiven Sprechakte den verschiedensten Untergattungen an: Gruß, Dank,
33 Iphigenies Verhaltensweisen zeigen, wie von Mellert-Hoffmann (1969: 68) beobachtet,
„ihre Liebe zum Vater“, aber auch „ihre rührende Kindheit“, die sie dazu verleiten, die
Dinge „nur von der persönlichen Seite, insofern diese Auswirkungen auf ihr Verhältnis
zum Vater haben“, zu sehen.
34 Die cruces sind entsprechend dem gewählten griechischen Text von mir in die Überset-
zung eingefügt worden.
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Ausdruck des Staunens, des Leidens, der Sehnsucht und der Zustimmung. In
der vorangehenden Passage [4] kommen auch eine Verfluchung und ein weite-
rer Ausdruck der Sehnsucht vor.
Sowohl die angeführten als auch die übrigen Sprechakte Iphigenies sind auf
der formalen Ebene voll von Zeichen des Affekts: Zahlreiche werden als Aus-
rufe ausgedrückt,35 bisweilen gehen ihnen verstärkende Interjektionen voraus
(ἔα, φεῦ),36 die Häufigkeit des Vokativs (ὦ) πάτερ bekräftigt den Kontakt zum
Gesprächspartner, ebenso kommen gehäuft Personalpronomina der 1. und 2.
Person vor, oft begegnen Gefühlswörter (ἄσμενος, εὔκηλος, εὐφραίνω) und wer-
tende Begriffe (εὖ, καλός).37
Ein nicht besonders reifes kommunikatives Verhalten, da in höchstemMaß auf
den Ausdruck und Austausch von Emotionen und Gefühlen innerhalb einer
Beziehung ausgerichtet, wird Iphigenie bis zu ihremWandel charakterisieren.
Dieses unterscheidet Iphigenie nicht nur und nicht so sehr von Agamemnon,
der in der Interaktion auf den Ausdruck seiner Gefühle nicht verzichtet, son-
dern auch und vielmehr von Klytaimestra.
Der Kontrast zwischen dem kommunikativen Verhalten der Tochter und
demjenigen der Mutter zeichnet sich deutlich in der unmittelbaren Fortset-
zung des Epeisodion mit dem schon erwähnten Dialog zwischen Klytaimestra
und Agamemnon (691–740) ab.38 Darin treten die Konkretheit und die Ratio-
nalität Klytaimestras, die sich schon in ihrer ersten Replik (607–630) gezeigt
haben, schärfer zutage, da sie nur sachliche Themen wählt, und resultieren
in einem Verhalten von Kälte gegenüber dem Gesprächspartner, an den nach
dem Gruß (siehe [3]) nicht einmal eine Anrede gerichtet wird. Dazu kommen
die umsichtige und gewissenhafte Aufmerksamkeit Klytaimestras in ihren Fra-
gen und ihre Selbständigkeit in der Gesprächsführung (siehe [2]), die in klarem
Gegensatz zur Naivität und Nachgiebigkeit der Tochter stehen.
35 GemäßRisselada (1993: 41) nehmen die Ausrufe eineMittelposition zwischen expressiven
und assertiven Sprechakten ein, da sie „involve the expression of an emotion about a state
of affairs whose existence is presupposed“ und zugleich „describe this state of affairs“.
36 Zur Funktion von ἔα in Vers 644 und von φεῦ in 666 vgl. Biraud (2010: 47 bzw. 110).
37 Der Vokativ kommt in acht der 18 von Iphigenie geäußerten Repliken vor (640, 642, 662,
664, 656, 670, 672, 676).GemäßBiraud (2010: 98) verstärkt in diesemStückdas häufigeVor-
kommen vonὦ vor demVokativ die Nähe zumGesprächspartner. Die Personalpronomina
fehlen in sieben Repliken Iphigenies (648, 658, 660, 662, 668, 674, 676). ἄσμενος kommt in
Vers 640 und 644, εὔκηλος in 644, εὐφραίνω in 654 vor, εὖ begegnet in Vers 642 und 672,
καλός in Vers 666. Caffi (2001: 116–123) zählt die sprachlichen Zeichen der emotionalen
Beteiligung in der realen Kommunikation auf.
38 S. Abschnitt 2.
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Nach diesen beiden Stichomythien unterstreichen zwei ebenfalls nebenein-
andergestellte rheseis im vierten Epeisodion die kommunikative Besonderheit
Iphigenies und damit den Gegensatz zu Klytaimestra. Jede der beiden Frauen
wendet sich an Agamemnon, um ihn zu bitten, auf die Opferung zu verzich-
ten. Der Gegensatz zeichnet sich noch deutlicher ab, da beide Reden einen
direktiven Sprechakt mit demselben perlokutionären Ziel verwirklichen und
an denselben Adressaten innerhalb des gleichen Kontextes gerichtet sind.39
Eine komplexe Analyse der ganzen Reden nicht nur aus der pragmatischen,
sondern auch aus der stilistischen und rhetorischen Perspektive, wäre wichtig,
umalle Aspekte angemessen zu bewerten.40 Ich beschränkemichhingegen auf
einige Bemerkungen, um das hervorzuheben, was am meisten die Kommuni-
kation Iphigenies von derjenigen ihrer Mutter unterscheidet.
Dieses Mal spricht Klytaimestra als erste (1146–1208). Wie gewohnt behan-
delt sie der Reihe nach die Argumente, die sie für nützlich hält, um ihrenMann
zu überreden, und offenbart dabei großes rhetorisches Geschick.41 Der Stil
ihrer Rede ist oft emotionserregend, ohne dass sie selbst jemals ihrenGefühlen
nachgibt. Von den rhetorischen Fragen über die sarkastischen Ausrufe bis zur
Verwendung der oratio recta in imaginierten Situationen und zur Anrufung der
Götter dient jedes Mittel dazu, das Unrecht und die Sinnlosigkeit der Tötung
der Tochter zu belegen.42
WenigeVerse später beginnt IphigeniesRede (1211–1252): Sie kündigt an, dass
sie sich denTränen als ihrer einzigenFertigkeit anvertrauenwird.43VonAnfang
an thematisiert sie die eigene Unerfahrenheit im persuasiven Gebrauch des
Wortes.
39 Beide Reden sind an Agamemnon gerichtete Bitten, auf das Opfer zu verzichten. Sie
können also als direktive Makrosprechakte bezeichnet werden. Unter Makrosprechakt
versteht man einen Text, der zwar aus mehreren Sprechakten bestehen kann, dessen
kommunikative Hauptfunktion aber ein bestimmter Sprechakt bildet. Das Konzept von
Makrosprechakt wurde von van Dijk (1977: 238–247) entwickelt.
40 Zur Bedeutung einer komplexen linguistischen und rhetorischen Methode zur Untersu-
chungder tragischen rheseis vgl. vanEmdeBoas (2017: 47–50). Eine integrierte Perspektive
zu deren Untersuchung ist indessen noch nicht vollständig entwickelt worden.
41 Aretz (1999: 165–169) liefert eine vertiefte rhetorische Analyse der Rede. Vgl. auch Gibert
(2005: 230).
42 Rhetorische Fragen begegnen in Vers 1167, 1171–1178, 1185, 1186, 1187, 1188, 1191, 1192–1193,
1194–1195. Ein sarkastischer Ausruf erscheint in Vers 1168–1169. Die Verwendung der oratio
recta in fingierten Situationen kommt in Vers 1177–1178 und 1197–1198 vor. Die Anrufung
der Götter, die auf emphatisches μὴ δῆτα („nein“, vgl. Denniston 21954: 276 und Bonifazi
u.a. 2016: III.3 §49) folgt, erscheint in Vers 1183–1184.
43 Zum rhetorischen Gebrauch der Tränen in der antiken Literatur vgl. etwa Hagen (2016)
und die von ihr angegebene Bibliographie sowie Calabrese in diesem Band.
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Tatsächlich entwickelt Iphigenie keine durchgehende Argumentation. Sie
beschränkt sich auf die Bemerkung, dass es besser ist, (selbst unehrenhaft) zu
leben, als zu sterben (1218–1219 und 1249–1250); außerdem stellt sie weinend
nur einige erschrockene Fragen, was Helenas und Alexandros’ Liebesaffäremit
ihr zu tun hat (1236–1237), und fleht Agamemnon im Namen seiner Vorfahren
und ihrer Mutter Klytaimestra an. Sie bevorzugt die ihr vertrauten kommuni-
kativen Modalitäten, wie der Kern ihrer Rede verdeutlicht:
[6] Euripides Iphigenie in Aulis 1220–1230
πρώτη σ’ ἐκάλεσα πατέρα καὶ σὺ παῖδ’ ἐμέ·
πρώτη δὲ γόνασι σοῖσι σῶμα δοῦσ’ ἐμὸν
φίλας χάριτας ἔδωκα κἀντεδεξάμην.
λόγος δ’ ὁ μὲν σὸς ἦν ὅδ’· Ἆρά σ’, ὦ τέκνον,
εὐδαίμον’ ἀνδρὸς ἐν δόμοισιν ὄψομαι,
ζῶσάν τε καὶ θάλλουσαν ἀξίως ἐμοῦ;
οὑμὸς δ’ ὅδ’ ἦν αὖ περὶ σὸν ἐξαρτωμένης
γένειον, οὗ νῦν ἀντιλάζυμαι χερί·
Τί δ’ ἆρ’ ἐγὼ σέ; πρέσβυν ἆρ’ ἐσδέξομαι
ἐμῶν φίλαισιν ὑποδοχαῖς δόμων, πάτερ,
πόνων τιθηνοὺς ἀποδιδοῦσά σοι τροφάς;
Als erste rief ich dich ‚Vater‘, und du mich ‚Kind‘, als erste setzte ich mich
auf deine Knie und streichelte und küsste dich und liess mich küssen.
Da sprachst du so: „Werde ich dich, mein Kind, glücklich im Hause dei-
nes Ehemannes sehen, lebensfroh undblühend,meinerwürdig?“ Und ich
erwiderte, während ich deinen Bart gefasst hielt, nach dem ich auch jetzt
greife mit meiner Hand: „Und werde ich dich also, wenn du alt bist, auf-
nehmen und liebevoll inmeinemHaus beherbergen, Vater, als Entgelt für
die Mühen, dass du mich aufgezogen hast?“
Iphigenie versucht, ihre Bitte wirksam zu machen, indem sie dem Vater die
gegenseitige Zuneigung, die sie seit jeher verbindet, in Erinnerung ruft.44 Sie
beschränkt sich nicht darauf, die verbalen und nicht-verbalen Handlungen,
44 Die Erwähnung der Zuneigung, die Vater und Tochter seit jeher verbunden hat, ist ein
Mittel, um die Reziprozität in den Gefühlen und die Gemeinsamkeit der Ziele auch in
der Gegenwart zu verlangen. Zum Verlangen von Gegenseitigkeit und Kooperation als
politeness-Strategie bei Forderungen und anderen FTAs vgl. Brown und Levinson (21987:
125–129).
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die sie mit dem Vater auszutauschen pflegte, erneut zu erwähnen, sondern
vergleicht sie mit denjenigen, die sie in diesem Augenblick verwirklicht: Die
emotionsgeladenen Anreden an den Vater, die Gesten, ihren Körper zumVater
hin zubewegenund seineKnie und seinKinn zuberühren– alles Elemente, die
zumRitual des Flehens (Hikesie) gehören – sind zumgroßenTeil dieselben, die
sie in der Vergangenheit nur in der Absicht, ihre Zuneigung zum Vater zu zei-
gen, eingesetzt hat. Anders formuliert: Die üblichenWorte und Gesten, die sie
an den Vater richtete und die plötzlich in die Vergangenheit gerutscht waren,
leben jetzt wieder auf und füllen sichmit neuer illokutionärer Kraft auf. Hand-
lungen, die vorher nur expressiv waren (Ausdrücke der Zuneigung), werden
zu einem integrierenden Bestandteil des aktuellen, ritualisierten direktiven
Sprechakts. Sind diese in der Vergangenheit vom Vater auf angemessene Art
angenommen und erwidert worden, so erfordern sie auch jetzt, dass der Vater
sie annimmt und auf die von der Tochter gewünschteWeise darauf reagiert.
Dies könnte einenWeg darstellen, umden rechtenTon gegenüber demVater
zu treffen.45 Indessen wird die Sprecherin bald von ihren Gefühlen überwäl-
tigt. Die andauernde Unbeweglichkeit des Vaters, der sogar den Blick von ihr
abwendet, veranlasst sie einige Verse später, vorübergehend das perlokutio-
näre Ziel der Rede aus den Augen zu verlieren und folgende Bitte zu formu-
lieren:
[7] Euripides Iphigenie in Aulis 1238–1240
βλέψον πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὄμμα δὸς φίλημά τε,
ἵν’ ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κατθανοῦσ’ ἔχω σέθεν
μνημεῖον, ἢν μὴ τοῖς ἐμοῖς πεισθῆις λόγοις.
Schau mich an, schenk mir deinen Blick und einen Kuss, damit ich ster-
bend wenigstens dies als Erinnerung an dich behalte, wenn du dich nicht
durch meineWorte bewegen lässt.
Durch Iphigenies Bitte an den Vater, sie anzublicken und ihr einen Kuss zu
geben, selbst wenn er sich nicht durch ihre Worte umstimmen lasse, scheitert
45 Die Gegenseitigkeit des vergangenen verbalen und nicht-verbalen Verhaltens wird von
IphigeniewirksamdurchdasNebeneinanderstellen vonVerbendesGebensundErhaltens
(1222), durch den Chiasmus und den Parallelismus in der syntaktischen Struktur einiger
Sätze (wie z.B. 1220) und durch das Zitieren der expressiven Sprechakte, die sie und ihr
Vater austauschten, in oratio recta (1223–1225 bzw. 1228–1230) ausgedrückt. Vgl. dazuAretz
(1999: 169–173).
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der strategische Gebrauch der affektiven Kommunikation. Er weicht der Sehn-
sucht, diese wie in der Vergangenheit als Ausdruck gegenseitiger Zuneigung
wieder zu erleben, und schwächt schließlich den Sprechakt des Flehens (ἱκε-
τεύειν) ab, anstatt ihn wirksamer zu machen.
Die Einbeziehung des kleinen Bruders Orest in die Bitte stellt Iphigenies
letzten Versuch dar, die affektive Kommunikation zu verwenden, um der Rede
Wirksamkeit zu verleihen: Sie bedient sich eines stummen Bittstellers als
Gehilfen, den sie bittet, gemeinsam mit ihr zu weinen. Doch geschieht dies
nicht, da er ihreWorte nicht versteht (1241–1248).
Die tiefgreifenden Unterschiede zwischen Iphigenie und der Mutter erschei-
nen vor allem in der Kommunikation mit Dritten (insbesondere mit Aga-
memnon). Die direkte Kommunikation zwischen den beiden Frauen auf der
Bühne beschränkt sich bis zu Iphigenies Wandel auf kurze Wortwechsel, in
denen Iphigenie ständig eine unterwürfige Position gegenüber ihrer Mutter
einnimmt: Sie sucht Klytaimestras Zustimmung bezüglich des Verhaltens, das
sie annehmen will (so in Vers 631–632, wenn sie zum Vater laufen will, um ihn
zu umarmen), gehorcht ihren Anweisungen (so nach Vers 1343–1344, wenn sie
auf die Aufforderung der Mutter vor Agamemnons Zelt bleibt), oder schließt
sich einfach den Handlungen der Mutter an (so etwa, wenn sie in Vers 1279–
1282 auf die Klage derMuttermit einer Klage antwortet, die bezüglich derTöne,
des Vokabulars und des Rhythmus jener ähnlich ist).46
Der Wandel Iphigenies hinsichtlich ihres Schicksals (ab Vers 1368) zeigt
sich auch anhand einer tiefgreifenden und ebenso plötzlichen Änderung ihrer
kommunikativen Modalitäten, der ein symmetrischer und entgegengesetzter
Wandel bei Klytaimestra entspricht. Dadurchwird auch die BeziehungMutter-
Tochter vor ihrer endgültigen Trennung beeinflusst.
4 Iphigenies und Klytaimestras kommunikativerWandel
In der Rede in Vers 1368–1401 sind die wichtigsten Änderungen des kommu-
nikativen Verhaltens Iphigenies sofort sichtbar. Darin verknüpfen sich eine ihr
bisher unbekannte argumentative Fähigkeit, ein ebenso neuesVertrauen in die
Wirksamkeit ihrer Worte und wichtige Änderungen auf der konversationel-
len und illokutionären Ebene derart miteinander, dass dadurch die Form und
Struktur der Rede bestimmt werden.
46 Die Echtheit derVerse 1276–1282 ist sehr umstritten, vgl. Collard undMorwood (2017: 556).
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Hatte Iphigenie sich kurz zuvor einer Rhetorik der Tränen und Gefühle
anvertraut undwarOpfer derselbengeworden, erscheint sie jetzt unverkrampft
und entschlossen imGebrauch desWortes. Dies zeigt schon die Art undWeise,
auf die Iphigenie das Wort ergreift, deren unerwarteter Charakter während
einer Interaktion, an der sie nicht beteiligt war, von der ἀντιλαβή unterstrichen
wird.47 Im Laufe der Rede entwickelt sie verschiedene Argumente zuguns-
ten ihrer plötzlichen Entscheidung, den Tod zu erleiden. Sie hält eine geord-
nete und gut gegliederte Rede, deren grundlegendeMomente (den Beginn, die
Ankündigungder eigenenEntscheidung, denAnfangdes argumentativenTeils,
den Übergang zu einem neuen Argument) sie durch explizite Hinweise auf die
Worte, die sie ausspricht, unterteilt. Diese Hinweise haben meistens die Form
von Aufforderungen an die Gesprächspartner (insbesondere an die Mutter),
auf ihre Rede zu hören und deren Richtigkeit zu beachten.48 Ihre Funktion
besteht darin, die in der Rede enthaltenen Sprechakte zu verstärken. Dabei
dominiert die kommissive Illokution,49 da die Verpflichtung, den eigenen Kör-
per zur Rettung Griechenlands herzugeben, im Mittelpunkt der Rede steht
(z.B. 1383). Zahlreich sinddie dazu komplementärendirektiven Sprechakte, die
nicht nur an ihre Mutter (1371–1373),50 sondern an ganz Griechenland (1398)
und in dritter Person an Achill (1392–1393) gerichtet werden. Das Mädchen,
welches sich kurz zuvor von der Mutter leiten ließ und in der Kommunikation
expressive Sprechakte bevorzugte, lässt Illokutionen dominieren, die den Spre-
cher bzw. den Adressaten verpflichten, den Status der Dinge zu verändern.51
Im letzten Wortwechsel zwischen Iphigenie und Klytaimestra nach Achills
Abgang von der Bühne (1433–1466) – der ersten und einzigen langen verbalen
Auseinandersetzung zwischen den beiden in dieser Tragödie –wird eine totale
Umkehrung der von ihnen in der Vergangenheit geführten kommunikativen
47 Der Beginn einer rhesis durch die Unterbrechung eines laufenden Dialogs mitten im Vers
ist besonders signifikant, da er in der Tragödie selten und auf spezielle Situationen wie
auf den unerwarteten Bühnenauftritt des neuen Sprechers beschränkt ist (so etwa in Vers
414 dieser Tragödie). Vgl. dazu Collard und Morwood (2017: 584–585), Aretz (1999: 190).
48 Diese Hinweise findet man in Vers 1368–1369 (Redebeginn), 1374 (Ankündigung der Ent-
scheidung), 1377 (Beginndes argumentativenTeils), 1392 (Übergang zueinemneuenArgu-
ment).
49 Searle (1976: 11) folgend, bezeichne ich diejenigen Sprechakte als Kommissiva, die den
Sprecher auf die Ausführung einer zukünftigen Handlung verpflichten, wie z.B. das Ver-
sprechen oder die Drohung.
50 Im übrigen verschont Iphigenie ihre Mutter nicht mit Kritik (1369–1370).
51 Kommissiven und direktiven Sprechakten ist nach Searle (1976: 11–12) die Beziehung von
Wort undWelt, die sie bewirken, gemeinsam:mit beidenTypologien von Sprechakten ver-
sucht man, dieWelt an die eigenenWorte anzupassen und nicht umgekehrt.
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Verhaltensweisen offenbart. Schon die ersten Verse zeigen einen deutlichen
Wandel in der Interaktion zwischen Mutter und Tochter:
[8] Euripides Iphigenie in Aulis 1433–1436
Ιφ. μῆτερ, τί σιγῆι δακρύοις τέγγεις κόρας;
Κλ. ἔχω τάλαινα πρόφασιν ὥστ’ ἀλγεῖν φρένα.
Ιφ. παῦσαί με μὴ κάκιζε· τάδε δέ μοι πιθοῦ.
Κλ. λέγ’· ὡς παρ’ ἡμῶν οὐδὲν ἀδικήσηι, τέκνον.
Iph. Mutter, warum bist du still und füllst deine Augen mit Tränen?
Kl. Ich Arme habe Grund, von Herzen betrübt zu sein.
Iph. Halt ein! Mach nicht weich und gewähre mir dies eine.
Kl. Nun, was? Von mir erfährst du kein Unrecht, Kind.
Der Anstoß, die Interaktion wiederaufzunehmen, geht vom Mädchen aus, das
sich darüber wundert, dass die Mutter nach seiner Rede nicht mehr zu Wort
gekommen ist, sondern schweigend weint. Nachdem Klytaimestra ihren Zu-
stand mit einer Klage begründet, antwortet Iphigenie auf unerwartete Weise:
Mit drei aufeinanderfolgenden Imperativen fordert sie von der Mutter explizit
und ohne jegliche Abmilderung, mit ihremVerhalten, das sie feige macht, auf-
zuhören, und befiehlt ihr, auf das zu achten, was sie sagenwird. DieMutter gibt
ihr Einverständnis und überlässt ihr dasWort.52
Iphigenie dominiert das Gespräch vom Beginn bis zum Ende. Auch wenn
sie die Mutter nicht daran hindert, autonom das Wort zu ergreifen, führt sie
das erste Thema ein, bestimmt den Augenblick der Beendigung des Gesprächs
(1458–1466) und zögert in seinemVerlauf nicht, die Regeln der Konversation zu
verletzen, sooft die Mutter den Dingen einen anderen Lauf zu geben versucht
(etwa durch die Unterbrechung des Redebeitrags der Mutter in Vers 1459 oder
durch die Unterlassung des Abschiedsgrußes in 1464–1466).
Auf der illokutionärenEbene stelltmandie hoheZahl der direktiven Sprech-
akte in Iphigenies Sprechen fest. Auf das Verbot an die Mutter, nach ihremTod
Trauerkleider zu tragen (1437–1438), folgen unter anderem Anordnungen, wie
man ihren Leichnam zu ehren habe (1442, 1444), Forderungen betreffend die
Familienmitglieder (1448, 1450, 1454) und Anweisungen, mit denen Iphigenie
ihren Abgang zum Ort des Opfers organisiert (1459–1461, 1466).
52 In Klytaimestras Redebeitrag dient m.E. der Satz „von mir erfährst du kein Unrecht“ als
Beweis für die unerwartete Schroffheit von Iphigenies Befehlen.
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Die Direktiva werden direkt und explizit ausgedrückt (in den meisten Fäl-
len mit Imperativ oder μή und Imperativ Präsens bzw. Konjunktiv Aorist). Auf
diese folgt oft alsAbmilderungdieErklärung ihrerGründe, aber nicht unmittel-
bar, sondern in der Regel nach Einwänden der Mutter. Im Gegensatz zu früher
kommen die wertenden Begriffe (so etwa 1440 εὐκλεής „ruhmvoll“, 1446 εὐτυ-
χοῦσα „glücklich“, 1461 κάλλιον „schöner“), die Iphigenie benutzt, fast nur bei
der Begründung ihrer Direktiva vor.
Der BevorzugungderDirektiva entspricht eineAbneigung, verbale undnon-
verbale Gefühlsäußerungen zu verwirklichen. Diesbezüglich ist folgende Pas-
sage signifikant:
[9] Euripides Iphigenie in Aulis 1447–1452
Κλ. τί δὴ κασιγνήταισιν ἀγγείλω σέθεν;
Ιφ. μηδ’ ἀμφὶ κείναις μέλανας ἐξάψηις πέπλους.
Κλ. εἴπω δὲ παρὰ σοῦ φίλον ἔπος τι παρθένοις;
Ιφ. χαίρειν γ’· Ὀρέστην δ’ ἔκτρεφ’ ἄνδρα τόνδε μοι.
Κλ. προσέλκυσαί νιν ὕστατον θεωμένη.
Ιφ. ὦ φίλτατ’, ἐπεκούρησας ὅσον εἶχες φίλοις.
Kl. Was aber soll ich deinen Schwestern melden?
Iph. Auch sie kleide nicht in schwarze Gewänder.
Kl. Soll ich von dir ein liebesWort den Mädchen sagen?
Iph. Ein frohes Lebewohl. Und meinen Orest ziehe auf zumMann.
Kl. Umarme ihn, denn du siehst ihn zu letzten Mal.
Iph. Du mein Liebster, du hast uns geholfen, so gut du es vermochtest.
Die Mutter, die das Wort vor allem dazu ergreift, um Iphigenie die Erfüllung
einiger letzter Gefallen nach dem Tod anzubieten, fragt, was sie ihren Schwes-
tern von ihr ausrichten soll. Iphigenie antwortet mit einem Befehl, wobei sie
ein Verhalten annimmt, das ganz weit von demjenigen vor dem Wandel ent-
fernt ist. Die Mutter muss im folgenden Redebeitrag ausdrücklich nach einem
φίλον ἔπος (1449) für die Mädchen fragen, damit Iphigenie akzeptiert, ihnen
einen raschenGruß zu senden,worauf sogleichwieder einBefehl andieMutter
folgt. An den kleinen Orest richtet sie in Vers 1452 einen liebevollen Sprechakt
des Dankes, aber auch in diesem Fall auf Klytaimestras Bitte.53
53 Diewenigenvon Iphigenie gebrauchtenGefühlswörterwerden indenexpressivenSprech-
akten an die Geschwister (z.B. ὦ φίλτατε 1452) und in der Bitte an ihre Mutter, den Vater
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Ihr gegenüber zeigt das Mädchen einen wachsenden emotionalen Abstand.
Dieser zeigt sich durch zahlreiche kommunikative Zeichen. Zunächst ist
beachtenswert, dass Iphigenie nur zweimal – im Aufruf des bereits erwähnten
ersten Redebeitrags (1433) und kurz vor ihrem Abgang (1460) – ein farbloses
μῆτερ an die Mutter richtet, während diese den Vokativ (ὦ) τέκνον doppelt so
häufig (1436, 1439, 1445, 1464) gebraucht. Zum schon erwähnten Fehlen eines
Abschiedsgrußes gesellt sich dieTatsache, dass Iphigenie sichweigert, dasWei-
nen mit der Mutter zu teilen. Mit dem kalten und distanzierten Satz οὐκ ἐῶ
στάζειν δάκρυ („Ich erlaube nicht, Tränen zu vergießen“),54 der die Adressatin
nicht einmal erwähnt, spricht sie sogar ein Verbot zu weinen aus und beendet
damit das Gespräch (1466).55
Seitdem Iphigenie dieRolle der siegendenHeldin angenommenhat, bedient
sie sich eines radikal veränderten kommunikativenVerhaltens undnimmt eine
resolute, direkte und autoritäre Haltung ein. Sie ergreift entschlossen die Zügel
des Lebens, das ihr bleibt, und emanzipiert sich vomWillen und der Kontrolle
der Mutter. Von dieser verlangt sie die Annahme ihrer Entscheidungen sowie
ihrer neuen Definition und Festsetzung der moralischen Werte, die ihr Han-
deln motivieren.56
Ihrem Wachstum entspricht eine Schwächung Klytaimestras. Die Königin
erfährt denEntschluss Iphigenies als eineAushöhlung ihrer Rolle alsMutter, da
sie unfähig gewesen ist, ihre Tochter zu retten. Das Schweigen und dasWeinen
sind die kommunikativen Signale für ihren Gemütszustand. Sie kann nur noch
ihre affektive Bindung zur Tochter ausdrücken. Aber Iphigenie weiß ihrerseits,
dass sie auf ihre emotionalen Bindungen verzichten muss, um ihre Entschei-
nicht zu hassen (1454), ausgedrückt. Zu φίλτατε in der Tragödie vgl. Gregor (1957) sowie
van Emde Boas (2017: 99), in der Prosa vgl. Dickey (1996: 119–120, 135–138).
54 Übersetzung von mir. Das Fehlen des Akkusativs des Adressaten macht den Befehl allge-
meiner. Was sonst eine negative politeness-Strategie ist (vgl. Brown und Levinson 21987:
190), kann in einer so intimen und heiklen Interaktion wie dieser nur dazu dienen, die
Sprecherin von der Adressatin zu distanzieren (vgl. Brown und Levinson 21987: 93).
55 Nach Ende des Gesprächs wendet sich das Mädchen noch einmal während der Schluss-
monodie an seine Mutter, nur um zu bestätigen, dass es ihre Tränen nicht erwidern
wird (1487–1490). Das Fehlen des Abschiedsgrußes und des gemeinsamenWeinens sticht
besonders hervor, wennman diese mit anderen analogen Situationen der euripideischen
Tragödie vergleicht. Sowohl in Hec. 415–431 als auch in Heracl. 574–596 verzichten die
Mädchen, die zum Sterben gehen, nicht darauf, den Gesprächspartnern spontan einen
Abschiedsgruß zu geben und Grüße an ihre abwesenden Lieben auszurichten. In Hec.
433–434 steckt das Weinen der Protagonistin dasjenige ihrer Tochter und umgekehrt an.
Zum „contagio delle lacrime“ als Zeichen einer affektiven Bindung zwischen zwei Figuren
in der antiken Literatur vgl. Ricottilli (2000: 192–193).
56 Vgl. dazu Chong-Gossard (2008: 238–240).
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dung umsetzen zu können. Jemehr daher dieMutter versucht, sich der Tochter
zu nähern, desto mehr entfernt sich diese bis hin zur definitiven, kalten Tren-
nung.
Die Anwendung der Kategorien der Pragmatik auf den Dialog der Iphigenie in
Aulis hat m.E. ein tiefer greifendes Verständnis und eine wirksamere Beschrei-
bung des kommunikativen Verhaltens Iphigenies und Klytaimestras ermög-
licht. Insbesondere hat sie erlaubt, die Kohärenz aufzuzeigen, mit der dieMut-
ter und die Tochter hinsichtlich der Kommunikation sowohl vor als auch nach
demWandel Iphigenies einander entgegengestellt werden. IhrGegensatz dient
sicherlich dazu, die Einzigartigkeit der Reifung Iphigenies zu unterstreichen:
Das zuvor naive und emotionale Mädchen ist nicht nur plötzlich erwachsen
geworden, sondern hat sogar den Status einer Heldin erlangt, die imstande ist,
die Schranken einer starken, aber konventionellen Frau wie ihrer Mutter zu
überwinden.
Die Tatsache schließlich, dass die beiden Frauen sich zwar in vielen Ge-
sichtspunkten unterscheiden, aber am Ende der Tragödie als die stärksten und
entschlossensten Figuren hervorgehen, bildet einen weiteren Gegensatz zwi-
schen ihnen und den männlichen Helden dieses Stücks, welche von Anfang
an als wankelmütig und gleichzeitig starr, ehrgeizig und feige, gewalttätig und
dennoch unfähig dargestellt werden.57
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Oedipus and Tiresias: Im/politeness Theory and the
Interpretation of Sophocles’Oedipus Tyrannus
Luigi Battezzato
1 Theoretical Approaches: Politeness Theory, Theory of Mind, and
Possible-World Theory
The present paper analyses the dialogue betweenOedipus andTiresias inOedi-
pus theKing (297–462) fromthree angles: politeness theory, theoryof mind, and
theory of possible worlds. The paper will argue that the approaches are com-
patible froma theoretical point of view and complement each other. Politeness
theory helps us make sense of the dialogue at the micro-level; theory of mind
and theory of possibleworlds canbe fruitfully combinedwithpoliteness theory
to make sense of the whole dialogic sequence.
These approaches are crucial for understanding the two main interpret-
ive problems of the scene: Oedipus’ shift from politeness to impoliteness and
Tiresias’ (apparent?) incoherence. Oedipus is, at first, extremely polite to Tire-
sias but ends up having one of the most aggressive clashes known in Greek
tragedy. Tiresias, on arriving onstage, refuses to reveal what he knows about
the killer of Laius (316–333); he then reveals the truth (350–442); at the end, he
claims that he has said ‘what I came here for’ (447),1 thus suggesting in retro-
spect that his original intention was the opposite of what he said.2
Most pragmatic theories focus on short dialogic or textual sequences. Con-
versation Analysis and politeness theory developed from pioneering studies of
the 1970s, by Sacks as well as Brown and Levinson respectively, and developed
into a highly formalised subfield of linguistics.3 Brown and Levinson’s frame-
1 Unless indicated otherwise, all references in the paper are to Sophocles’ Oedipus the King;
the Greek text and the translation are taken from Finglass (2018). I thank the volume edit-
ors, Marco Catrambone, and Catherine Conybeare for useful comments and corrections. The
Università del Piemonte Orientale contributed to support this piece of research.
2 On this scene, see esp. Lattimore (1975), Reinhardt (1979: 104–110), Bain (1979), Heath (1987:
149–151), Ahl (1991: 67–102), Gianquinto (1994), Pfeiffer-Petersen (1996: 74–85), Edmunds
(2000), Dorati (2015: 205–209),Worman (2014), Manuwald (2012a), Condello (2016), and Fin-
glass (2018: ad 297–462) with further references.
3 On conversation analysis, see Sacks et al. (1974), Sidnell (2010); Sidnell and Stivers (2012); for
classics, see van Emde Boas (2017a), van Emde Boas (2017b). On politeness theory, see the
following note.
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work is nowwidely used, 4 in spite of criticism.5 Some of themore general con-
cepts introduced by Brown and Levinson are heuristically useful: ‘face redress’,
‘bald on record’, positive and negative face (respectively the ‘positive consistent
self-image’ and the wish that one’s action ‘be unimpeded by others’),6 and ‘off
record’.7 Of special importance for the present paper is the concept of being
‘off record’, which describes a ‘communicative act’ which ‘is done in such a way
that it is not possible to attribute only one clear communicative intention to the
act’.8 Applying this methodology to ancient texts involves special problems: for
instance, intonation is normally crucial for evaluating ironic or insulting pas-
sages, but the intonation of an ancient Greek is inaccessible for us. Moreover,
bald-on-record and off-record utterances are potentially ambiguous, since they
can be used in polite, ironic, or insulting ways. It is not simple to determine
these nuances and objective criteria are difficult to find. This is especially com-
plex in the case of the scene that is to be studied, which stages an angry quarrel
which includes many ironic statements.9
A second problematic area is the ambiguity of ‘politeness’ itself: does it refer
to the interpretation of speakers in the conversation (‘first-order politeness’ or
‘politeness1’) or is it simply a theoretical construct (‘second-order politeness’ or
‘politeness2’), or a label to describe a linguistic strategy which may be actually
impolite?10We will see that Oedipus and Tiresias use ‘polite’ strategies, such as
the ‘off-record’ strategy defined above, but that their clash is actually impolite.
Brown and Levinson based their approach on Grice’s theory of language,
in particular on his principle of co-operation.11 Grice, in turn, presupposes
‘rationality’ as a general principle of human behaviour and linguistic interac-
tion. Many scholars question whether this model is useful for all conversations
(human beings often act irrationally12 and fail or refuse to co-operate) and
4 Brown and Levinson (21987), Lloyd (2004), Brown (2006), Lloyd (2006), Lloyd (2009), Ferri
(2009), Hall (2009), Barrios-Lech (2016), Catrambone (2016), van Emde Boas (2017b), and
Catrambone (2019).
5 See e.g. Watts (2003).
6 See Brown and Levinson (21987: 61–62) and passim. Positive and negative politeness are
linguistic strategies that try to ‘redress’ or minimise the threats that a linguistic act poses
against the positive and negative face of the interlocutor.
7 For methodological discussions and definitions, see above, n. 4.
8 Brown and Levinson (21987: 211). For an extensive discussion of the phenomenon in
Sophocles, see Catrambone (2016).
9 See esp. 364, 432, 435–436, 440.
10 Watts (2003: 8–9); Culpeper (2011: 396–397).
11 Grice (1975: 45 = 1989: 26).
12 On irrationality in psychology, see e.g. Kahneman (2011); on the linguistic implications of
this, see Culpeper (2011: 32), with references.
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whether it can really account for non-polite conversations (in what way is an
angry argument a co-operative linguistic exchange?). As Culpeper points out:
Grice was aware of problematic cases such as quarrelling, which is why
his description of the Cooperative Principle refers not only to ‘a common
purpose or set of purposes’ but adds ‘or at least a mutually accepted dir-
ection’.13
These three main problematic areas relate to the fact that, in order to inter-
pret the dynamics of the conversation, we need to infer the ‘intentions’ of the
speakers.14 We can do that from the general drift of the dialogue and/or from
statements from the speakers, butwe should bear inmind that, asHaughpoints
out, intention is often a post-factum construct.15
This does not stop human beings from attributing intentions and states of
minds to other human beings, mostly on the basis of their actions and words.
This mental faculty is called Theory of Mind (ToM); it is an endowment pecu-
liar to the human species.16 Human beings use ToM in order to interpret both
real people and fictional characters. As Zunshine notes:
Works of fiction manage to ‘cheat’ these mechanisms [i.e. ToM cognitive
mechanisms] into ‘believe’ that they are in the in the presence of material
that theywere ‘designed’ toprocess, that is, that they are in thepresenceof
agents endowed with a potential for a rich array of intentional stances.17
A growing corpus of research focuses on ToM in ancient and modern fiction.18
ToM focuses on long narrative and dialogic sequences. Even larger sections
of narrative texts are discussed in ‘possible-world theories’, i.e. theories that
discuss narrative as a set of possible worlds. When a story is communicated
to an audience (of readers, spectators, etc.), the audience imagines possible
ways in which the story could evolve or reconstruct past events in the world
of fiction.19 These possible worlds are part of the mental image of the recipi-
13 Culpeper (2011: 158) referring to Grice (1989: 26). See also Culpeper (2011: 32).
14 On intentions in pragmatics, see Haugh (2008), Haugh and Jaszczolt (2012).
15 Haugh (2008: 101).
16 On ToM in general, see e.g. Apperly (2012), Epley (2014), Heyes (2018).
17 Zunshine (2006: 10).
18 On ToM and fiction, see Zunshine (2006), Herman (2013); see also the papers collected in
Zunshine (2015). On ToM and Greek texts, see Budelmann and Easterling (2010), Scodel
(2012), Battezzato (2019).
19 See e.g. the early approaches of Iser (1978).
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ents of a narrative. Ryan pointed out that readers imagine fictional worlds as
the closest possible to the ‘actual’ world, and they only make changes that are
mandated by the text. Ryan calls this interpretive rule ‘the principle of minimal
departure’.20 Applying our innate mind-reading abilities (or ToM) to literary
characters amounts to subjecting them to the principle of minimal departure.
ToM is thus crucial for these approaches (politeness theory, conversation ana-
lysis, possible-world theory), which are often applied one by one rather than
combined.
The possible-world theory is especially useful for interpreting texts in which
fate and prophecies play a part, such as Oedipus the King. Is the storyworld of
the play totally determined by fate? Or is it only partially determined? How
can knowledge of future events and freedom coexist? And what do characters
think about their own freedom of action? These questions will be explored in
section 3.
2 Oedipus and Tiresias
After many years in a department, a friend of mine moved to a different aca-
demic institution. This friend was unhappy: ‘I cannot quarrel well with my
new colleagues.’ Quarrels require linguistic collaboration: people need to con-
tinue to speak and, in order to do so, must understand each other at least in
part. In Greek tragedy, quarrels may end in walkouts and/or silence.21 Quarrels
normally entail impoliteness, and impoliteness, just like politeness, can be a
strategy to achieve a goal. Culpeper, in one of the most important contribu-
tions to this topic, distinguishes between affective, coercive, and entertaining
impoliteness.22 It is easy to find examples of affective andcoercive impoliteness
in Greek tragedy.23 Do these categories apply to the dialogue between Tiresias
20 See Ryan (1991, 2013). Dorati (2015) discusses these theories in relation to ancient Greek
texts.
21 See esp. Iurescia and Martin (2019). Many quarrels end when a character leaves whilst
making a final parting statement (see e.g. in Soph. Aj. 1159–1160, Phil. 1257–1258, OC 1036–
1037 and 1443–1446). On scenes of quarrel in Sophocles in general, see Pfeiffer-Petersen
(1996).
22 Culpeper (2011: 221–239).
23 According to Culpeper (2011: 59), affective impoliteness ‘is characterised by the fact that
it is emotionally driven’; see e.g. Soph. Phil. 991. According to Culpeper (2011: 226), ‘[c]oer-
cive impoliteness is impoliteness that seeks a realignment of values between the producer
and the target such that the producer benefits or has their current benefits reinforced
or protected […]. It involves coercive action that is not in the interest of the target.’ For
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and Oedipus in Oedipus the King? Bain considers this scene a ‘psychologically
convincing depiction of a quarrel between two angry men’24 but some diffi-
culties are evident. Oedipus and Tiresias, in their quarrel, accuse each other of
the gravest crimes but fail to understand each other. They act and speak in a
way that has been judged incongruous by many interpreters. Voltaire claimed
that the incongruity derives from Sophocles’ incompetence as a playwright:
So much ignorance in Oedipus and Jocasta is only a crude artifice of the
poet, who, to give his play a reasonable length, spins out into the fifth act
a realisation already made obvious in the second.25
Tycho vonWilamowitz-Moellendorff claimed that the scene between Tiresias
and Oedipus was ‘far removed from all psychological subtleties’.26 Reinhardt
considered Tiresias inherently incoherent: ‘indecisive and forgetful, coming
and yet anxious to go, concealing and yet revealing; he is half a capricious, irrit-
able oldman, half—in themidst of his anger—possessed of second sight; he is
a walking enigma’.27
The main inconsistency concerns Tiresias’ intentions. When he arrives
onstage, he refuses to reveal what he knows:
[1] Sophocles Oedipus the King 332–333
… τί ταῦτ’
ἄλλως ἐλέγχεις; οὐ γὰρ ἂν πύθοιό μου.
Why do you pointlessly carry out this investigation? For youwill not learn
anything fromme.
examples in tragedy, see [9] (Soph. OT 334–336) and Creon’s utterances in Soph. Ant. 280–
331. According to Culpeper (2011: 234), entertaining impoliteness is ‘designed as much for
the over-hearing audience as for the target addressee’ and aims at entertaining the audi-
ence. In fact, entertainment canbe a side effect of coercive impoliteness (I thankG.Martin
for pointing out this problem in Culpeper’s definition).
24 Bain (1979: 143).
25 Translation Hester (1993: 3) from Voltaire (1877: 24) (originally from 1719). The ‘second
act’, in Voltaire’s terminology, corresponds to the first episode, and includes the dialogue
between Tiresias and Oedipus.
26 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1917: 78): ‘sehr weit entfernt […] von allen psychologischen
Feinheiten’.
27 Reinhardt (1979: 104).
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The opening exchanges between Oedipus and Teiresias create an absurd-
ist atmosphere in which one of the characters has come at the bidding of
the other but then refuses to answer his questions.28
In the course of the scene, Tiresias repeats his refusal several times (328–329,
332–333, 343–344); he then, in fact, reveals what he knows (350–353, 362, 366–
367, 413–428). When he finally walks away, he says:
[2] Sophocles Oedipus the King 447–448
εἰπὼν ἄπειμ’ ὧν οὕνεκ’ ἦλθον, οὐ τὸ σὸν
δείσας πρόσωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ’ ὅπου μ’ ὀλεῖς.
I will go when I have said what I came here for, not fearing your face; for
there is no way that you can destroy me.
Does hemean that he camewith the purpose of telling what he refused to tell?
Or does he simply mean that he said what he was asked to come for? The first
interpretation is far more plausible, as he hints at fear of Oedipus as a possible
reason for not saying ‘what he came for’. The interpretive problem centres on
Tiresias’ intentions and states of minds.
Interpreters offer different explanations for the perceived incoherence;
these can be divided into four different general categories:
(a) there is an inconsistency at the level of characterisation; it has dramatic
purposes;29
(b) there is an inconsistency, but it is to be explained as an instance of char-
acterisation;30
(c) the inconsistency is apparent: Tiresias is manipulating Oedipus and only
feigns reticence;31
28 Edmunds (2000: 34–35).
29 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1917: 78); Finglass (2018: ad 447–448): ‘Formal inconsistency is
outweighed by dramatic gain’; Lloyd (2018: 339): ‘the play could not continue if Oedipus
had immediately accepted Tiresias’ statements of his true identity (OT 362 etc.), although
this does not rule out an additional explanation in terms of character.’
30 Reinhardt (1979: 104); Lattimore (1975: 108); Bain (1979: 143); Roisman (2003: 4–5).
31 Ahl (1991: 67–102).
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(d) there is an inconsistency, but it is not related to characterisation or dra-
matic gain; it is determined by the logically impossible coexistence of
freedom and fate within the storyworld of the play.32
A different explanation can be advanced:
(e) Tiresias is (apparently) incoherent because he faces a very difficult lin-
guistic task.
In fact, Tiresias must break strong linguistic taboos if he is to reveal the truth
(see the analyses in sections 5 and 6). Tiresias explains that he must overcome
the ‘fear’ for the ‘face’ of Oedipus (see [2]). He first resists disclosing what he
knowsandonlyunder strong verbal aggression fromOedipusdoeshe reveal the
truth. At the end of the scene, he attributes the intention of revealing the truth
to himself, either as a post-factum explanation or as a revelation of a strategy he
had in mind from the beginning. An analysis in terms of politeness strategies
helps make sense of the ‘incoherence’.
The four approaches listed above (a-d) will be analysed in inverted order.
Section 3 will use possible-world theory to discuss whether the incoherence is
logically inevitable or not (interpretation d). Section 4 will use ToM to discuss
whether Tiresias is manipulating Oedipus (interpretation c). Sections 5 and 6
will use politeness theory and ToM to discuss the linguistic hurdles faced by
Tiresias and to offer a linguistic analysis of the scene (interpretations a, b, and,
especially, e).
3 Freedom, Fate, and Linguistic Incoherence
Are incoherencies inevitable within the storyworld of the play? Dorati argues
that that is the case. He notes that, in a partially determined storyworld,
it is always possible to imagine normal anthropomorphic actions (Achil-
les kills Agamemnon […]) or different material circumstances (Oedipus
and Laius fail tomeet at the crossroad) that are in contrast with it [fate].33
However, Dorati argues that, at the beginning of the play, the audience does
not know whether the storyworld is determined or not.34 This is questionable:
32 Dorati (2015: 205–209). Manuwald (2012a: ad 316–318) also stresses that Tiresias could
not have revealed the truth in the past, since this would have made the plot impossible.
Manuwald (2012a:ad447–448) andManuwald (2012b) eliminates the incoherenceof 447–
448 by deleting the whole sequence 447–462, but see Finglass (2018: ad 447–462).
33 My translation from Dorati (2015: 39).
34 Dorati (2015: 39, 256–257).
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as Aristotle noted, some events in tragedy are fixed and inevitable as opposed
to what happens in comedy (Poetics 1453a17–22 and 39). At the beginning of
the play, characters presuppose that they can act freely: the verdict of Apollo
reported byCreon implies that the citizens of Thebes are free to act and termin-
ate the plague, and Oedipus’ edict, banning the killer of Laius and threatening
the accomplices, presupposes that people can choose their course of action.35
However,
[t]he entrance on stage of a mantis—a man that places himself on the
same level as the god for knowledge (284ff.)—reveals further internal
contradictions within the storyworld. Tiresias poses again and amplifies
at the human level the problem posed by Apollo at the divine level. […]
The question Oedipus will later ask Creon (568f.)—if Tiresias knows,
why does he not speak?—is symmetrical to that asked of Oedipus by the
chorus leader about the role of Apollo [278–281].36
The dialogue between Oedipus and Creon is especially telling:
[3] Sophocles Oedipus the King 568–569
Οι. πῶς οὖν τόθ’ οὗτος ὁ σοφὸς οὐκ ηὔδα τάδε;
Κρ. οὐκ οἶδ’· ἐφ’ οἷς γὰρ μὴ φρονῶ σιγᾶν φιλῶ.
Oe. Why then did this wise man not declare these things at the time?
Cr. I do not know; on matters where I do not understand, I like to be
silent.37
As Dorati points out:
Oedipus’ accusations highlight a crucial problem […]. If Tiresias is omni-
scient […] and decided not to speak for some reason, why did he come
onstage only to refuse to speak, and, at least according to his original
intentions, to go back right away without revealing what he knows?38
35 AlreadyAristotle (Eth.Nic. 1113b21–26) points out that punishments imposedby legislators
presuppose that actions depend on human beings and are voluntary.
36 My translation from Dorati (2015: 257).
37 Was this the source of Wittgenstein’s ‘Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss
man schweigen’?
38 My translation from Dorati (2015: 206).
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The problem is that the storyworld of the play combines amodicum of free-
dom with a large number of events determined by fate.
Prophetic abilities also pose a difficulty.Why does Tiresias not act to prevent
parricide and incest? Why did he not solve the riddle of the Sphinx (391–398;
see also 562–565)? Oedipus infers from this that Tiresias is not a true prophet
(390–394), but the audience knows that Tiresias does indeed possess proph-
etic knowledge, as Oedipus will later realise (747). According to Dorati, these
questions point to an impossibility in the storyworld of Oedipus the King: it is
impossible to avoid fate, but Sophoclesminimised the intervention of the gods
within the play.39
One could explain the events of the play on the hypothesis that the gods
intervene at the right moment in the story; for instance, we can infer that
Apollo does not let Tiresias know what would stop the course of action envis-
aged by Apollo himself.40 This would imply that the gods are malevolent. Dor-
ati rules this out,41 but there is internal42 and external evidence to the con-
trary.43
Moreover, the audience does not need to suppose that Tiresias is omni-
scient. Oedipus and the chorus presuppose that he ‘grasp[s] all things’ (300:
see [6]) and that he knows everything that Apollo knows (284–286: see [7]),
but these statements come from human, not divine, sources and are only part
of a politeness strategy.44 One can infer that Apollo did not reveal to Tiresias
how to solve the enigma of the Sphinx precisely because the god (377) ‘takes
an interest’ (377 μέλει) in bringing Oedipus to his downfall, as Tiresias himself
reveals:
39 Dorati (2015: 226).
40 See Kovacs (2009).
41 Dorati (2015: 175).
42 See [4] discussed below; Dodds (1966: 44–46 = 1973: 73–74); Cairns (2013: 127–138, 159, and
passim); Kovacs (2019: 108–109), discussing [4], and lines 720–722, 1329–1333.
43 Soph. Trach. 1278, which is the final line of the play, states that ‘no element of this was not
Zeus’, κοὐδὲν τούτων ὅ τι μὴ Ζεύς: all of the unjust sufferings described in the play were the
action of Zeus.
44 See below, section 6. Note that in 305–309, Oedipus explains that he does not presup-
pose that Tiresias knows the response of the oracle reported by Creon; Oedipus sus-
pects that Tiresias heard the news but cannot be sure about it. As Finglass (2018: ad
305–309) notes, Oedipus’ statement ‘if indeed you have not heard this from the mes-
sengers’ (εἰ καὶ μὴ κλύεις τῶν ἀγγέλων) is a polite way to ensure ‘that Tiresias is apprised
of the situation, without implying that the all-knowing seer is ignorant’; the introduct-
ory words εἰ καί ‘if indeed’ can be used ‘in a protasis that the speaker suspects to be
false’.
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[4] Sophocles Oedipus the King 376–377
οὐ γάρ σε μοῖρα πρός γ’ ἐμοῦ πεσεῖν, ἐπεὶ
ἱκανὸς Ἀπόλλων, ὧι τάδ’ ἐκπρᾶξαι μέλει.
Indeed, since it is not fated that you should fall by my hand, since Apollo
is sufficient, who takes an interest in bringing that to its conclusion.45
Tiresias does not reply to Oedipus’ accusation at 390–394 about his failure to
solve the riddle of the Sphinx because he does not want to damage his own
‘positive face’ by admitting partial ignorance in a confrontation that focuses
on the reliability of his own prophetic skills. The prophet only knows what
Apollo reveals to him when Apollo sees fit.46 This does not imply that Tiresias
knew everything from the beginning. In fact, we only know that Tiresias knows
the truth about Oedipus at the moment when the play takes place; we are
never told that he knew Oedipus’ fate in the past. From 376–377 ([4]), we pos-
itively know that Apollo is a ‘malevolent’ god who is intent on causing the
fall of Oedipus. This explains why Tiresias’ prophetic abilities cannot prevent
fate.
4 Tiresias the Manipulator?
Another approach to the problem, a very extreme one, was suggested by Ahl.47
According to Ahl, there is no inconsistency in the scene: Tiresias always meant
to reveal his message; his message is false; he only pretends to have access to
divine revelations, but in fact he is part of a plot and wants to convince Oedi-
pus of his guilt. Extreme interpretations such as Ahl’s are fascinating because
they explore the limit of our ToM. Murnaghan, in response to Ahl, points out
45 Finglass (2018) ad loc. translates ‘whose business it is to bring that to its conclusion’.
46 On the role of Apollo in the play, see Cairns (2013: 127–138 and passim), Kovacs (2009),
(2019). As Gunther Martin points out to me (in a personal communication), ‘I believe we
do not know what a seer sees when’, nor could any non-seer in antiquity know what a
mythical seer saw. This of course ‘opens the doors for the poet to manipulate information
and plots’; ‘trying to construct a coherent view may be doomed to fail’. In any case, the
text, by posing the very interpretive problemswe are addressing, is asking the audience to
explore possible answers.
47 Ahl (1991). Goodhart (1978) already argued that Oedipus was innocent and Tiresias
untrustworthy.
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that this kind of reading presupposes treating characters in literature as if they
were part of real life.48 As Dodds put it:
There is only one branch of literature where we are entitled to ask such
questions about τὰ ἐκτὸς τοῦ δράματος, namely the modern detective
story.49
This means that extreme interpretations use ToM in a way that seems illegit-
imate. However, we cannot completely abandon ToMwhen we interpret texts.
Characters that act without motives and in a way that is unintelligible are not
characteristic of Greek tragedy but of very different modern genres.50
In fact, ToM is crucial to the play. It is used by Oedipus in the first part of
the play, when he, on the basis of his (false) belief in his own innocence, infers
that Tiresias and Creon must have some other reasons for accusing him. Oed-
ipus concludes that they are plotting against him in order to rob him of his
kingdom (380–403). He bases his confidence on his ability to ‘read the mind’
of the Sphinx when he solved the riddle. Even the chorus leader claims he
reads the mind of Oedipus and Tiresias, namely when he ‘conjectures’ that the
words of the two interlocutors were ‘spoken in rage’ (403–404 ἡμῖν μὲν εἰκά-
ζουσι […] ὀργῆι λελέχθαι).51 Therefore, ToM, being a central aspect of the scene
under discussion, cannot be completely dismissed as a tool for interpreting the
play.
5 The Linguistic Problems of Tiresias
If we approach the scene from the politeness point of view of Tiresias andOed-
ipus, we find that they both have very difficult linguistic tasks.
The dynamics of power between the two interlocutors are unbalanced. Oed-
ipus has supreme political power but Tiresias has a special connectionwith the
gods. There is no established hierarchy between these two powerful people.
Tiresias himself points out the ambiguity in ranking:
48 Murnaghan (1993: 164). For a brief but persuasive criticism of Ahl (1991), see Bain (1993).
49 Dodds (1966: 40–41 = 1973: 68).
50 See Easterling (1973): a classic paper on the ‘human intelligibility’ of tragic characters. On
characterisation in antiquity, see now De Temmerman and van Emde Boas (2018) with
further references.
51 On anger in the play, see below, p. 199 n. 57.
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[5] Sophocles Oedipus the King 408–411
εἰ καὶ τυραννεῖς, ἐξισωτέον τὸ γοῦν
ἴσ’ ἀντιλέξαι· τοῦδε γὰρ κἀγὼ κρατῶ·
οὐ γάρ τι σοὶ ζῶ δοῦλος, ἀλλὰ Λοξίαι,
ὥστ’ οὐ Κρέοντος προστάτου γεγράψομαι.
Even if you are a monarch, the right of equal reply must be equalised, at
least; for of that I too am master. For my life is enslaved not at all to you,
but to Loxias; so I will not be inscribed as having Creon as my patron.
Tiresias does not claim to be superior to Oedipus but equal. Ranking of power
is a crucial sociolinguistic variable and of prime importance for im/politeness
mechanisms.52 The lack of a precise ranking between the two speakers leads to
frank and explicit verbal exchanges andmakes the situation potentially explos-
ive from a linguistic and social point of view, as the two interlocutors vie for
linguistic and political supremacy.
Clashes between prophet and king are common in Greek epic and tragedy
as well as in other genres and literatures.53 One could ask whether a prophet
feels the need to be perceived as polite by his interlocutors (politeness1: in this
section ‘politeness’ and ‘polite’ will be used in this meaning): a prophet is after
all protected by the gods and reveals the messages or even the very worlds he
receives from the gods.54 However, from the very beginning of Homer’s Iliad,
we learn that priests and prophets need to speak with caution in front of a king
for fear of retaliation (1.17–32, 62–115). This implies the need for facework from
the prophet.
Moreover, Oedipus has access to special intellectual abilities which make
him think he is, in some respects, more authoritative than the prophet; these
abilities push him to extremes in attributing intentions to other agents, using
ToM to an unprecedented level. Finally, Tiresias and Oedipus are speaking in
front of a chorus of Theban citizens, andTiresiasmust avoid using taboowords
or expressions.
Oedipus, at the beginning of the scene, asks Tiresias to tell the truth. Tiresias
faces three politeness problems. First of all, if he accepts to do what Oedipus
52 Brown and Levinson (21987: 29–33, 74–83, and passim); Culpeper (2011: 186–193 and
passim).
53 See e.g. Bremmer (1993). On the roles of prophet and king in this scene, seeWorman (2014:
sections 6–7).
54 I thank M. Lloyd for this observation.
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asks him to do, he must threaten the negative face of Oedipus. Tiresias has
to tell Oedipus that he must leave town (as a consequence of his own edict).
Secondly, Tiresias must also make admissions that threaten his own negative
face: he is asked by Oedipus to admit his inability to help now and in the past.
Thirdly, and more importantly, if the prophet is to reveal what happened, he
must attack the ‘positive’ face of Oedipus and break several linguistic taboos.
He must tell Oedipus that
(a) he is a murderer;
(b) he is the murderer of Laius, i.e. he is the person that he himself banned
from the city;
(c) he committed parricide since Laius is his father;
(d) he committed incest since Jocasta, his wife, is in fact his mother.
These are all extreme aggressions to the positive face of Oedipus. In fact, ‘par-
ricide’ was one of the ‘unspeakable words’ (ἀπόρρητα) under Athenian law. It
was, from a legal point of view, a taboo word. The person making a (false)
accusation of parricide could be brought to trial.55 Within the drama, incest is
perceived as being linguistically even more problematic than parricide. At the
end of the play, the messenger pronounces the word ‘parricide’ (1288 πατρο-
κτόνον) but cannot bring himself to repeat the terms Oedipus used to describe
the nature of his relation to his mother (note the harsh aposiopesis at 1289: τὸν
μητρός—, ‘his mother’s—’). In the dialogue with Oedipus, Tiresias avoids or
delays revealing explicitly what Oedipus did. This linguistic approach can be
interpreted both as a politeness strategy (‘off record’) and as a social strategy
(avoiding words that are unacceptable in some social contexts: euphemism).56
These two possibilities are not in principle mutually exclusive, but in this case,
politeness can be ruled out: Tiresias repeatedly clarifies that it is only anger
that makes him reveal the facts (412 [13]),57 and he is reluctant to explain what
happen explicitly. His euphemistic statements are therefore not a politeness
strategy directed to Oedipus.
55 See Lys. 10.6 with Todd (2007: ad loc.); Clay (1982).
56 On euphemism in ancient Greece, see Sommerstein and De Martino (1999), Pellucchi
(2013), Caroli (2017), with further bibliography.
57 Oedipus repeatedly mentions that Tiresias made him angry (335, 339, 345), and Tiresias
comments on Oedipus’ anger (337–338, 344). Anger is often seen as causing bad delib-
erations: see Thuc. 3.42.1 and, in the context of impolite accusations to an interlocutor,
Eur. Med. 446–447, 615. See Battezzato (2017: 169). On anger in this scene, see Worman
(2014: section 6). On conceptions of anger in antiquity, seeHarris (2001), Braund andMost
(2003).
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6 The Dialogue between Oedipus and Tiresias
A general overview of the scene shows that, after an initial positive politeness
act from Oedipus (300–315) and an off-record reply from Tiresias (317–319),
both interlocutors speak ‘bald on record’ with occasional attempts at negative
politeness from Oedipus (‘give reasons’: 303, 305–314) and frequent off-record
and ironic utterances from Tiresias. Tiresias’ off-record utterances include a
general maxim (spoken in order to avoid answering a request [317–319]), indir-
ect revelations about Oedipus’ fate (350–353, 366–367, 372–373, 379, 413–428,
438, 442), and ironic utterances (364, 432, 435–436, an ironic indirect accusa-
tion, 440). The difficulties of Tiresias’ linguistic taskwill emerge fromadetailed
analysis of the scene.
Oedipus starts the dialogue by failing to understand the gravity of the lin-
guistic problems of his interlocutor; he nonetheless appreciates that his
request is a threat to the negative face of Tiresias. For this reason, Oedipus
tries to mitigate the face threat with standard positive politeness techniques.
He welcomes the seer expressing exaggerated praise:
[6] Sophocles Oedipus the King 300–301
ὦ πάντα νωμῶν Τειρεσία, διδακτά τε
ἄρρητά τ’ οὐράνιά τε καὶ χθονοστιβῆ
Tiresias, youwho grasp all things, what can be taught andwhat cannot be
spoken, the things of heaven and the things that tread the earth
As Finglass observes: ‘Tiresias attempts to leave words unspoken that Oedipus
wishes to be said.’58 More than that: by mentioning the need to speak ‘what
cannot be spoken’ (ἄρρητα), Oedipus unknowingly alludes to the ‘unspeakable
words’ (ἀπόρρητα), i.e. to the accusation of parricide.
In his positive facework, Oedipus echoes a similar statement made earlier
by the chorus:
[7] Sophocles Oedipus the King 284–286
ἄνακτ’ ἄνακτι ταὔθ’ ὁρῶντ’ ἐπίσταμαι
μάλιστα Φοίβῳ Τειρεσίαν, παρ’ οὗ τις ἂν
σκοπῶν τάδ’, ὦναξ, ἐκμάθοι σαφέστατα.
58 Finglass (2018: ad 300–301).
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I know that lord Tiresias sees the same things as does lord Phoebus, and
from him, my lord, one might learn these things most truly in the course
of investigation.
The words of Oedipus and the chorus leader do not imply that Tiresias is in
fact omniscient, as Dorati and others concluded.59 The chorus leader praises
Tiresias’ prophetic ability as part of his attempt tomitigate the face threat he is
making in telling Oedipus what he should do (see already the tentative ques-
tion of the chorus leader at 282). Oedipus’ words can simply be interpreted as
an instance of positive politeness: they introduce the request (made at 310–315)
that the prophet use all his prophetic arts to help discover the identity of the
murderer of Laius.
At the beginning of the dialogue, Oedipus thus mitigates the face threats by
using positive politeness, namely by praising Tiresias’ prophetic abilities (300–
301, 304) and negative politeness (‘give reasons’) when he orders him to speak
(303, 305–314). The city is in danger: therefore, Tiresias must speak (310–315).
This request puts him in a difficult situation. He reacts with—what conversa-
tion analysis calls—a ‘pre-expansion’, in which he gives reasons for the refusal
that he will make explicit at 328–329:
[8] Sophocles Oedipus the King 316–318
φεῦ φεῦ, φρονεῖν ὡς δεινὸν ἔνθα μὴ τέλη
λύηι φρονοῦντι. ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς ἐγὼ
εἰδὼς διώλεσ’· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δεῦρ’ ἱκόμην.
Pheu pheu, how terrible is wisdomwhen being wise brings no advantage!
I knew this well but forgot it; for otherwise I would not have come.
The interjection pheu pheu and the (exact) wording of these remarks allow
the interlocutors to draw an inference about Tiresias’ state of mind: he is
‘emotionally upset’ (Bain 1979: 134). His language is peculiar: he says he ‘des-
troyed’ (διώλεσα) his knowledge, a verb that many interpreters consider as
equivalent to ‘forgetting’.60 Other scholars suggest that Tiresias is saying that
59 Dorati (2015: 205).
60 Finglass (2018: ad loc.): ‘For διώλεσα “I forgot” cf.Ter. Phor. 386nomenperdidi, and alsoσῴζω
“I remember” at Eur.Hel. 266 (and LSJ9 s.v. σῴζω i 4 [the second 4 under i] for σῴζομαιwith
this sense); perhaps the unusual term somehow emphasises Tiresias’ personal agency in
- 978-90-04-44026-5
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com10/12/2020 08:49:24PM
via free access
202 battezzato
‘Teiresias, for his part, did not “forget” this conventional wisdom […] but delib-
erately put it out his mind, in order to comply with Oedipus’ summons’
(Edmunds 2000: 37).61 This ambiguous statement amounts to an off-record
response.
The dialogue rapidly escalates into an angry argument. Oedipus immedi-
ately attacks Tiresias’ face with a bald on record statement, accusing him of
‘breaking the law’ and acting as an enemy of the city that reared him (322–
333). Tiresias tries to explain that Oedipus’ request is inopportune (324–325),
a typical positive polite strategy (‘give reasons’).62 Oedipus supplicates the
prophet, thus applying the strongest religious pressure he can (326–327).63
Tiresias utters his first direct (‘bald-on-record’) statement, claiming that Oedi-
pus and the citizens of Thebes lack understanding (328). He categorically
refuses to reveal what he knows (329), a stance that Oedipus considers tan-
tamount to treason (330–331). Tiresias states, once again, his refusal (332–333),
which makes Oedipus break into open coercive impoliteness:
[9] Sophocles Oedipus the King 334–336
οὐκ, ὦ κακῶν κάκιστε—καὶ γὰρ ἂν πέτρου
φύσιν σύ γ’ ὀργάνειας—ἐξερεῖς ποτέ,
ἀλλ’ ὧδ’ ἄτεγκτος κἀτελεύτητος φανῆι;
You utter wretch—for you would enrage a very stone—will you never
speak out?Will you appear thus intransigent and inconclusive?
Oedipus points out that Tiresias’ behaviour is provocative: the prophet’s words
cause anger in him.64 But is Tiresias being intentionally provocative? Or is this
just a consequence of his intention to avoid threatening Oedipus’ ‘face’? The
exchange that follows focuses onOedipus’ anger (337–343) and concludeswith
another bald-on-record refusal from Tiresias, who defiantly challenges Oedi-
pus to rage as much as he likes (344–345). Oedipus takes up the challenge and
reveals what he had been thinking already for a while:
suppressing the thought more than e.g. διελαθόμην would.’ The lack of Greek parallels is
striking.
61 For a discussion of the interpretations, see Dorati (2015: 206 n. 205, 207 n. 201 and 203).
62 Brown and Levinson (21987: 128–129).
63 On supplication, see Gould (1973), Naiden (2006).
64 See above n. 57.
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[10] Sophocles Oedipus the King 345–346
καὶ μὴν παρήσω γ’ οὐδέν, ὡς ὀργῆς ἔχω,
ἅπερ ξυνίημ’.
Well, I will leave out nothing—such is my anger—of what I understand.
This utterancemarks a turning point in the scene: Oedipus, saying that he ‘will
leave out nothing’, reveals his previous and future linguistic strategies.65 Until
this moment he has ‘left out’ something, i.e. he has not completely revealed
his thoughts. It is his present state of anger, which he has just reached (‘such is
my anger’), that allows him to say what he thinks. Anger allows him to express
the face-threatening utterances that he had repressed so far. Oedipus goes on
to accuse Tiresias of being an accomplice in the murder of Laius (346–349), a
grave accusation, which entails exile or death. These violent attacks to Tiresias’
face take the conversation away from all politeness strategies, which in turn
allows Tiresias to speak the truth. Tiresias crosses the first linguistic bound-
ary, explicitly accusing Oedipus of being the murderer of Laius (above, section
5, p. 199: points [a] and [b]). However, he only indirectly accuses Oedipus of
being themurderer of Laius; he states that the king is the ‘unholy polluter of the
land’ (353 γῆς τῆσδ’ ἀνοσίωι μιάστορι). Oedipus had ruled that the murderer of
Laius, because of his impure status, should be excluded from any conversation
with the citizens of Thebes (238), andTiresias states that any conversationwith
Oedipus should stop now (350–353). The prophet stresses that it was Oedipus
who forced him to speak:
[11] Sophocles Oedipus the King 358
σὺ γάρ μ’ ἄκοντα προὐτρέψω λέγειν.
For you made me speak although I was unwilling.
Tiresias’ revelation becomes explicit (362) at Oedipus’ request (361). After this,
Oedipus crosses another boundary and resorts to physical threats (363). This
menaced aggression makes Tiresias in turn cross another linguistic boundary
(above, section 5, p. 199, [e]): the prophet finally hints at Oedipus’ incest:
65 On some such strategies, see van Emde Boas in this volume.
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[12] Sophocles Oedipus the King 364–367
Tε. εἴπω τι δῆτα κἄλλ’, ἵν’ ὀργίζηι πλέον;
Oι. ὅσον γε χρήιζεις· ὡς μάτην εἰρήσεται.
Tε. λεληθέναι σέ φημι σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις
αἴσχισθ’ ὁμιλοῦντ’, οὐδ’ ὁρᾶν ἵν’ εἶ κακοῦ.
Ti. Shall I say anything else, then, so that you can get angrier?
Oe. As much as you like, as it will be spoken in vain.
Ti. I say that you are unknowingly associating most shamefully with
those closest to you, and do not see in what a disaster you are.
Tiresias sarcastically asks Oedipus for permission, noting that he will make
the king even angrier. In this way, no one can blame Tiresias for ‘destroying’
or ‘forgetting’ (318: [8]) what wise people know. Tiresias makes, as Catram-
bone notes, ‘sarcastic use of the deliberative subjunctive’ (364 ‘shall I say’),
to which Oedipus replies ‘with equally sarcastic positively-polite exaggera-
tion’ at 365.66 Tiresias stresses that he intends to stir Oedipus’ anger (364 ‘so
that you can get angrier’); he is able to control Oedipus’ emotions, reactions,
and language. Oedipus gives permission (365), erroneously thinking that he
is in control, but must immediately resort to uttering further physical threats
(368, repeating the threat of 363), and, finally, expressing disbelief (370–371,
374–375). Oedipus’ disbelief culminates in a long speech where he denies that
Tiresias has any sound knowledge of the past and the future, thus taking back
what he said at the beginning of the episode ([6] = 300–301; 304); Oedipus
questions Tiresias’ prophetic ability and suggests that greed and lust for power
motivate his words (380–403). Tiresias answers with a symmetrical speech
(408–428), where he specifies that he is speaking because Oedipus insulted
him:
[13] Sophocles Oedipus the King 412
λέγω δ’, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τυφλόν μ’ ὠνείδισας·
I speak, because you even insulted me as blind.
66 Catrambone (2019: 258 n. 408). For a similar request in a polite contest, see Eur. Supp. 293
εἴπω τι, τέκνον, σοί τε καὶ πόλει καλόν; ‘shall I say something honourable for you and the city,
my son?’
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Tiresias thus states that he causedOedipus’ anger,which in turn causedOed-
ipus’ insults, which allowed Tiresias to speak the truth. Tiresias’ control of the
dialogue is complete. His metalinguistic observation stresses anger again as a
motivation for linguistic acts in continuity with similar previous observations
by both speakers and the chorus leader (335, 337–338, 339–340, 364 [12], 404–
405). Tiresias restates, in allusive and indirect language, that Oedipus ‘does not
see’ (413) his situation and does not understand what he did to his father and
mother. Tiresias finally resorts to direct attacks to the face of Oedipus, prophes-
ising that hewill be ‘rubbed out’ (428 ἐκτριβήσεται)more than any other human
being.67
Oedipus rejects Tiresias’ words as absurd insults and utters new threats
against the prophet (429–431, 433–434). Tiresias replies by pointing out that
it was Oedipus who asked him to come and speak (432) and claims that he
will be considered ‘wise’ (436 ἔμφρονες) by Oedipus’ parents. Oedipus asks who
his parents are, and Tiresias answers that ‘this day will be your parent’. This is
an off-record reply, shifting the focus from the biological to the metaphorical
level:
[14] Sophocles Oedipus the King 438–439
Τε. ἥδ’ ἡμέρα φύσει σε καὶ διαφθερεῖ.
Οι. ὡς πάντ’ ἄγαν αἰνικτὰ κἀσαφῆ λέγεις.
Ti. This day will be your parent and your destroyer.
Oe. How everything you say is full of riddles and obscurity!
Oedipus reads Tiresias’ words as ‘full of riddles’, and this is consistent with
Tiresias’ role as a prophet. Oedipus, however, does not understand thatTiresias,
even at this point of their clash, is, in fact, being euphemistic, i.e. not polite or
prophetic.68 At 440, Tiresias sarcastically alludes toOedipus’ pride in his ability
to interpret riddles, in reference to 390–397, where Oedipus accusedTiresias of
being a useless prophet because hewas unable to solve the riddle of the Sphinx.
This is another direct attack to Oedipus’ face: Tiresias notes that Oedipus’ abil-
67 Tiresias uses prosaic terms: see esp. 427 προπηλάκιζε with Worman (2014: n. 12) and Fin-
glass (2018: ad 426–428).
68 Brown and Levinson (21987: 217, 223, 226) discuss euphemisms as an off-record polite-
ness strategy intended to minimise the face threat to the interlocutor. Here, Tiresias does
not intend to minimise the face threat to Oedipus but elicits further questions from him,
which will authorise Tiresias to use more explicit language.
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ity was in fact to his disadvantage (442) and implies that he is unable to use his
ability to his own advantage now.
At this point, Tiresias expresses his intention to accept Oedipus’ order and
walk out (444).69 He delivers a final speech (447–462), introduced by the pas-
sage quoted above (see [2]), where he states his intention to reveal what he
came for. Tiresias’ revelations about incest and parricide finally become direct
and explicit.
[15] Sophocles Oedipus the King 457–460
φανήσεται δὲ παισὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ ξυνὼν
ἀδελφὸς αὑτὸς καὶ πατήρ, κἀξ ἧς ἔφυ
γυναικὸς υἱὸς καὶ πόσις, καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς
ὁμόσπορός τε καὶ φονεύς.
He will be revealed as both brother and father of the children he is living
with, and the son and husband of the woman from whom he was born,
and the fellow-sower and killer of his father.
Tiresias avoids using the taboo word ‘parricide’, which was considered
extremely shocking; however, he resorts to a very explicit periphrasis (τοῦ
πατρὸς […] φονεύς ‘killer of the father’).70
This scene ends in a walkout, as many arguments do in real life.71 Tiresias
obeys Oedipus’ order to leave the stage72 but has the last word in the scene:
there is nothing that Oedipus can say at this point.
69 Oedipus orders Tiresias to leave at 430–431, stops him at 437 (μεῖνον ‘stop!’), and orders
him, oncemore, to leave at 445–446. Tiresias says he will leave at 444 but delivers his final
speech (447–462) before doing so.
70 Athenian law explicitly prohibited the slanderous use of the taboo word ‘parricide’. The
law was probably interpreted as prohibiting also the use of periphrases, as argued in Lys.
10: cf. above, section 5, p. 199 with n. 55. Oedipus, in any case, is a parricide (and there-
fore, one would assume, not covered by the law). He shockingly uses that very word
(πατροκτόνον ‘parricide’) in reference to himself at 1288, in an indirect speech reported
by the messenger. Plato Laws 944b–e, in discussing ‘shield-flinger’, another word con-
sidered ‘unspeakable’ under Athenian law, stresses that periphrases or less common turns
of phrases are felt to be less hurting and damning than the words covered by the law.
71 See the studies by Dersley andWootton (2000) and Dersley andWootton (2001).
72 See Finglass (2018: ad 447–462) for a review of staging and authenticity problems. See also
above, p. 193 n. 32.
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7 Conclusions
We have now returned to our original question about ToM: is Tiresias’ stated
intention a post-factum explanation or a revelation of his original intention? Is
Tiresias allowed to be ‘insincere’ in his refusal to speak? We find that a con-
temporary of Sophocles interpreted the Oedipus the King scene in this way.
In Euripides’ Phoenician Women, Creon summons Tiresias onstage, asking the
prophet to reveal what he knows about the future. The prophet again refuses
to speak:
[16] Euripides Phoenissae 891–895
ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ εἰπεῖν οὔτ’ ἐμοὶ τόδ’ ἀσφαλὲς
πικρόν τε τοῖσι τὴν τύχην κεκτημένοις
πόλει παρασχεῖν φάρμακον σωτηρίας,
ἄπειμι. χαίρεθ’· εἷς γὰρ ὢν πολλῶν μέτα
τὸ μέλλον, εἰ χρή, πείσομαι· τί γὰρ πάθω;
But it is unsafe for me to speak these words, and it will be galling to those
who are touched by this fate that I should give the city its life-savingmedi-
cine: I’m going away. Farewell! If I must I will suffer, as one man among
many, what is to come.What can I do?73
As Mastronarde and others noted, Euripides modelled this scene on that
betweenTiresias andOedipus inOedipus the King.74 In Euripides, Tiresias rein-
states his refusal after Creon’s repeated requests (896–897); however, when the
king points out the need to help the city in peril (898, 900), he rapidly accedes
to the king’s request. Tiresias repeatedly asks his interlocutor to confirmhiswill
to know the truth, especially in the presence of his son (901–910). Tiresias’ shift
from refusal (891–895) to compliance (910) occurs in the span of a very brief
dialogue (85 words in lines 891–909).75 This suggests that Tiresias only meant
to obtain preventive reassurances from Creon. For he was afraid he might face
Oedipus’ anger when confronting him with the possibility of negative con-
73 Translation from Kovacs (2002).
74 Mastronarde (1994: ad 865–895) and Medda (2006: 46–50, 219 n. 156), with further refer-
ences.
75 The dialogue might have been even shorter since lines 903–904 are suspected of being
unauthentic by some scholars: see, however, Mastronarde (1994) and Medda (2006: ad
loc.).
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sequences. The linguistic difficulties aremuchweaker here than inOedipus the
King: Tiresias is about to reveal that the king’s son needs to be sacrificed if the
city is to be saved, but no shameful secrets or accusations are involved, nor is
the king forced to act on the revelation because of a binding legal and religious
commitment he himself proclaimed in public, as in Oedipus the King.76
Of course, the king is expected to act on behalf of the city, but the threats to
the positive and negative face of the king are much weaker than in Sophocles.
In Euripides, Tiresias’ refusal is meant to show solidarity with, not hostility
against, the king; his words (see [16]) imply that he is willing to die rather than
make revelations that can lead to the death of the king’s son.
Euripides, in recreating the scene from Oedipus the King, simplifies the lin-
guistic challenges for the speakers and the interpretive problems for the audi-
ence: he creates a dialogue that clearly suggests that the prophet meant to
reveal what he knew if he received appropriate reassurance. Does this inter-
pretation work for the Oedipus the King scene as well? In Oedipus the King, we
are left without conclusive evidence on whether Tiresias attributes to himself
the intention of revealing the truth only post factum or whether this was his
intention all along.
Based on psychological parallels, interpreters may conclude in favour of the
post-factum explanation, which is compatible with the claim that the scene
contributes to the characterisation of the two interlocutors.
Alternatively, one can offer a weaker version of the insincerity interpret-
ation advanced by Ahl (1991): Tiresias meant to reveal his message from the
beginning, thus saving the city, but felt he could not do this because of the face
threats involved and the linguistic tabooshehad tobreak.Theprophet revealed
the truth only when compelled by Oedipus’ anger, which the prophet himself
caused.Thismay imply that he elicitedOedipus’ anger onpurpose. In this inter-
pretation, Tiresias in Oedipus the King is being insincere when he states that
he wants to leave without revealing the truth. A true prophet that is insincere
may sound paradoxical. But, as we saw in Euripides’PhoenicianWomen, it is not
unparalleled.
Prophets are proverbially obscure; audiences expect them to clash with
kings. The text of Sophocles weaves these typical strands of characterisation
into an unexpected tapestry: the obscurity is in fact not a divine challenge to
human fallibility, but a necessary choice under complex circumstances. Oedi-
pus fails to decipher Tiresias’ obscurity, just as he failed to decipher Apollo’s
76 The king, in fact, tries to avoid the death of his son, who eventually kills himself to save
the city: Eur. Phoen. 985–1012.
- 978-90-04-44026-5
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com10/12/2020 08:49:24PM
via free access
oedipus and tiresias 209
prophecy. Mistakenly overconfident in his ability to read the mind of the
prophet, he ironically breaks the linguistic barrier of respect and politeness,
thus allowing Tiresias to deliver the message he asked for—and again failing
to understand what Tiresias says in very plain words. The text thus exploits the
external constraints of the communicative situation bymaking Tiresias’ clarity
appear opaque to an Oedipus who is led astray by his own interpretive fury.
The storyworld of Oedipus the King is partially determined by fate and we
must assume that the gods intervene to avoid outcomes that do not conform
to fate or predictions. This helps to make sense of Tiresias’ initial statement
about the uselessness of advance knowledge. Tiresias’ linguistic difficulties
help understand why he is reticent about his failure to help in the past: admit-
ting the uselessness of his knowledgewould be a threat to his ownpositive face.
We see how the linguistic interpretation of this scene is strictly linked to
the themes of human freedom and fate, to the attribution of intent to human
agents, and to the dynamics of linguistic interaction. That Tiresias is insin-
cere is a possibility suggested but not made unambiguous by the text. Does
this interpretation push ToM too far, as Dodds would claim? Or is thinking
about language, fate, gods, and human freedom the whole point of Oedipus the
King?
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Politeness and Impoliteness in Aristophanes
Michael Lloyd
The difference between an interpretation of dramatic dialogue in terms of
pragmatics (what speakers do with words) and an interpretation in terms of
semantics (what words mean) can be illustrated by the following exchange:
[1] Aristophanes Knights 725–727
Πα. ὦ Δῆμε, δεῦρ’ ἔξελθε. Αλ. νὴ Δί’, ὦ πάτερ,
ἔξελθε δῆτ’. Πα. ὦ Δημίδιον ⟨ὦ⟩ φίλτατον,
ἔξελθ’, ἵν’ εἰδῆις οἷα περιυβρίζομαι.1
Pa. Demos, come out here!
Sa. Yes, father, come out by Zeus!
Pa. Little Demos, dearest, come out and see how outrageously I am
being treated!
Demos, a stupid and bad-tempered old man, represents the Athenian people.
He has bought a new slave called Paphlagon, representing the demagogue
Cleon, who flatters and indulges him. The play deals with Paphlagon being
usurped by an even more unscrupulous figure, the Sausage-Seller, a purely fic-
tional character who does not represent anyone in the real world of Athens.
The present passage comes just before Demos’ first appearance, as Paphlagon
and the Sausage-Seller call him out of his house to decide between them. The
Sausage-Seller addresses Demos asπάτερ (‘father’), a respectful termof address
to an older man who is not necessarily the speaker’s real father.2 Paphlagon
addresses him as φίλτατον (‘dearest’) and uses an affectionate diminutive of his
name.Alan Sommerstein sees only the locutionary forceof these expressions of
affection: ‘Paphlagon speaks thusbecausehe claims tobeDemos’ “lover” (732)’.3
Stephen Halliwell takes a similarly literal view of such terms in Plato, remark-
1 Aristophanes is cited from the Oxford Classical Text edited byWilson (2007). All translations
aremyownunless otherwise stated.The eleven survivingplays date from425BC (Acharnians)
to 388BC (Wealth).
2 Cf. Men. Dys. 107, 171; Dickey (1996: 78–81).
3 Sommerstein (1981: ad 726).
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ing that φίλε (‘friend’) ‘carries a normal presumption of affection, attachment
or some stronger feeling’.4
Sommerstein’s interpretation fits neither the portrayal of Paphlagon else-
where in the play nor Aristophanes’ use of diminutives in other plays. Paph-
lagondoes indeed explain toDemos that he is suffering onhis account ‘Because
I feel affection for you, Demos, and am your lover’ (732), but only a few lines
earlier he had boasted of his ability to control the old man (719–720). Another
slave, usually identified with the Athenian general Demosthenes, character-
ises Paphlagon’s treatment of Demos with the following three verbs, all mean-
ing ‘flatter’ or ‘fawn upon’: αἰκάλλω, θωπεύω, and κολακεύω (48).5 Paphlagon’s
expressions of affection are exaggerated and manipulative. There are other
examples in Aristophanes of diminutives and terms of affection being used in
requests or to get someone’s attention when there is no other evidence of the
speaker having any particular liking for the addressee, e.g. Dicaeopolis’ Εὐρι-
πίδη, Εὐριπίδιον, ὑπάκουσον (‘Euripides, little Euripides, answer me’, Ach. 404–
405), Strepsiades’ ὦ Σωκρατίδιον φίλτατον (‘Dearest little Socrates!’, Nub. 746),
Trygaeus’ μή νυν λακήσηις, λίσσομαί σ’, Ὧρμήιδιον (‘Don’t shout, I beg you, little
Hermes’, Pax 382), and the children’s prayer ἔξεχ’ ὦ φίλ’ ἥλιε (‘Come out, dear
sun’, fr. 404, from Islands).6
Paphlagon’s request to Demos can be interpreted in terms of politeness the-
ory. Themost influentialmodel for understanding politeness is the ‘face-threat’
theory of Brown and Levinson (21987), according to which every act of polite-
ness is oriented to a specific ‘face-threatening act’. They distinguish two kinds
of face, which are assumed to be universal. The first, termed positive face, is the
want to be approved of or admired. The second kind of face, termed negative
face, is thewantnot tobe imposeduponor impeded. BrownandLevinson’s the-
ory accordingly distinguishes two different types of politeness. Positive polite-
ness offers redress to positive face, by expressions of affection, compliments,
or limited agreement. Negative politeness is oriented to negative face, and thus
aims to leave an ‘out’ (i.e., scope for evading or ignoring the face-threatening
act) and to minimise the imposition.
4 Halliwell (1995: 91).
5 Cf. Unceta Gómez pp. 292–293 in this volume on expressions of flattering (e.g. ‘blandiri’, ‘adu-
lare’) as part of the Latin metalanguage of over-politeness.
6 For a contrastingmeteorological prayer, see the popular song ὗσον ὗσον,ὦφίλε Ζεῦ (‘Rain rain,
dear Zeus’, Carm. Pop. fr. 8 PMG). The ingratiating nature of this prayer means that it is at best
only indirectly relevant to the question whether the Greeks could ever be said to love Zeus:
Aristotle, MM 1208b30; Dodds (1951: 35); Lloyd-Jones (21983: 193 n. 34).
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Terms of affection and respect are often used in Aristophanes, as in other
Greek authors, to mitigate face-threatening acts.7 The most common in his
plays are φίλε (‘friend’), φίλτατε (‘dearest’), ἀγαθέ (‘good’), and δαιμόνιε (‘mar-
vellous’). The similarity of their illocutionary force is more significant than any
difference in lexical meaning.8 They are especially common in Aristophanes
with directives (Ach. 296, 305, 929, 1020; Eq. 240, 860; Nub. 38, 1138; Vesp. 962,
967, 1052, 1149, 1152; Av. 206, 846, 961, 1436, 1638; Lys. 95, 140, 762, 883, 945;Thesm.
64; Ran. 44, 175, 835, 997, 1227; Eccl. 564, 784; Plut. 360), but also occurwith other
face-threatening acts such as disagreement (Eq. 843), rebuke (Nub. 816; Vesp.
1145), and rejection (Pax 1238; Av. 1577; Eccl. 784).
The question then arises of howwe can distinguish between positive polite-
ness and straightforward expressions of affection where the locutionary force
of the friendship terms is to be taken at face value.9 Brown and Levinson
remark, ‘the linguistic realizations of positive politeness are in many respects
simply representative of the normal linguistic behaviour between intimates’;
compare, more concisely, ‘Positive-politeness utterances are used as a kind of
metaphorical extension of intimacy’.10 They argue that positive politeness is
distinguished by an element of exaggeration. It is not always easy to distin-
guish what is exaggerated from what is appropriate, but in cases like that of
Paphlagon we have other evidence for the speaker’s real attitude which sug-
gests that his expression of affection is indeed exaggerated. Another clue is the
proximity of a face-threatening act. RichardWatts quotes the (fictional) utter-
ance ‘Jim, you’re really good at solving computer problems’, which in itself is
merely face-enhancing, but can readily be analysed as polite when followed
by ‘I wonder if you could just help me with a little formatting problem I’ve
got’.11
Similar issues arise in a more developed form in the following passage:
7 Dickey (1996: 107–145, 274–283) calls these vocatives ‘friendship terms,’ which will be
followed here although some of them appear to be complimentary rather than friend-
ly.
8 Sommerstein (1977: 272) alleges that Aristophanes’ characters employ δαιμόνιε ‘in rebuk-
ing, admonishing, or pleading with a respected person, always with an element of defer-
ence’, but that is clearly not true of (e.g.) Ran. 175 where Dionysus is bargaining with a
corpse to act as a porter to the underworld.
9 Contrast Dickey (1996: 109): ‘polite or affectionate,’ treated as equivalent;Watts (2003: 12–
17); Willi (2003: 166).
10 Brown and Levinson (21987: 101, 102).
11 Watts (2003: 89).
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[2] Aristophanes Clouds 80–89
Στ. … Φειδιππίδη, Φειδιππίδιον. Φε. τί, ὦ πάτερ;
Στ. κύσον με καὶ τὴν χεῖρα δὸς τὴν δεξιάν.
Φε. ἰδού. τί ἐστιν; Στ. εἰπέ μοι, φιλεῖς ἐμέ;
Φε. νὴ τὸν Ποσειδῶ τουτονὶ τὸν ἵππιον.
Στ. μὴ ’μοιγε τοῦτον μηδαμῶς τὸν ἵππιον·
οὗτος γὰρ ὁ θεὸς αἴτιός μοι τῶν κακῶν.
ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἐκ τῆς καρδίας μ’ ὄντως φιλεῖς,
ὦ παῖ, πιθοῦ. Φε. τί οὖν πίθωμαι δῆτά σοι;
Στ. ἔκστρεψον ὡς τάχιστα τοὺς σαυτοῦ τρόπους,
καὶ μάνθαν’ ἐλθὼν ἃν ἐγὼ παραινέσω.
St. … Pheidippides, little Pheidippides!
Phei. What, father?
St. Kiss me and give me your right hand.
Phei. There. What is it?
St. Tell me, do you love me?
Phei. Yes, by Poseidon here, the god of horses.
St. Don’t mention the god of horses to me, for he is the cause of my
troubles. But, my son, if you really love me from your heart, obey
me.
Phei. How should I obey you then?
St. Change your ways at once, and go and learn what I recom-
mend.
Strepsiades wants to evade his debts by persuading his extravagant son Phei-
dippides, who despises intellectual pursuits, to give up horses and learn the
sophistic art of clever speaking. He has made clear in the immediately preced-
ing lines (75–77) that his affectionate behaviour has a specific purpose, and it
leads up to a significant face-threatening act in the last two lines of this pas-
sage. The scene ends with threats and insults when Pheidippides refuses to
co-operate (121–123). Unusually sensitive requests have polite pre-expansion
elsewhere in Aristophanes, for example ἐθελήσεις τί μοι οὖν, ὦ πάτερ, ἤν σού
τι δεηθῶ; (‘Would you be willing to give me something, father, if I ask you?’,
Vesp. 291–292) or ὦ δαιμόνιε, πρόσελθε· δέομαι γάρ τί σου (‘Come here, my good
man, I have something to ask you’, Ran. 44). Strepsiades’ positive-politeness
gambit ‘if you really love me from your heart’ (86) is used elsewhere in Aris-
tophanes: ἀλλ’ εἴ τι κήδει Δερκέτου Φυλασίου (‘But if you care for Dercetes of
Phyle …’, Ach. 1028) and ἀλλ’ εἴ τι χαίρεις ἀνδρὸς εὐόργου τρόποις, ἐμοὶ φρά-
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σον (‘But if you rejoice in the character of a good-tempered man, tell me’,
Plut. 61–62).12
The lowP(S) impliedby Strepsiades’ politeness strategy expresses thehumil-
ity of his approach to Pheidippides.13 Aristophanes’ heroes are ordinary people
faced with challenges which require them to approach important or intimid-
ating individuals who might assist their plans, and their manner in doing so
is accordingly deferential. Their use of supplicatory language is particularly
marked.Thus Peisetaerus addressesTereus: ἱκέται […] ἀφίγμεθα […] εἴ τινα πόλιν
φράσειας ἡμῖν … (‘We have come as suppliants, if you might tell us of a city …’,
Av. 120–122). Euripides approaches Agathon in a similar fashion: ἐγὼ δὲ καινῆι
ξυμφορᾶι πεπληγμένος ἱκέτης ἀφῖγμαι πρὸς σέ (‘I havebeen struckby anunexpec-
ted disaster, and have come to you as a suppliant’, Thesm. 179–180). Agathon’s
initial response is favourable, but his attitude soon changes when he hears the
actual request.14
Passage [2] seems to be an example not just of politeness but of over-
politeness. Strepsiades has made clear that his affectionate tone is manipu-
lative (75–77), and he introduces it with the metapragmatic comment that
he wants to treat Pheidippides ‘most pleasantly’ (ἥδιστα, 79). An extended
sequence of pre-expansions is appropriate only to an extremely face-threat-
ening request (e.g. Eur. Tro. 48–58), and in terms of Greek cultural norms it is
difficult to imagine any normal situation in which Strepsiades’ level of polite-
ness would be appropriate for a father addressing his son. Over-politeness
might be expected to attract adverse comment from third parties or from the
hearer, but in this case no-one else is present and it is part of the joke that
the arrogant Pheidippides is not surprised by his father addressing him in
this extraordinary way. Compare Hermes’ ἆρ’ ὠφελήσαις ἄν τι τὸν σαυτοῦ φίλον;
(‘Would you help your friend?’, Plut. 1134), where the joke is that his request is
incongruously ingratiating for a god addressing a slave. Brown and Levinson’s
theory focuses on generating politeness, but using it for literary interpreta-
tion requires reverse-engineering in order to determine the implications of the
12 εὐόργου (‘good-tempered’) is Schaefer’s conjecture for codd. εὐόρκου (‘keeping his
oath’).
13 P(S) = the relative power of the speaker, P(H) = the relative power of the hearer, D = the
social distance between them, and R = the absolute ranking of an imposition in a particu-
lar culture. For these abbreviations, and the sociological variables to which they refer, see
Brown and Levinson (21987: 15–17, 74–84).
14 On the polite ‘nouniness’ of Agathon’s reply τίς οὖν παρ’ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ὠφέλειά σοι; (lit-
erally, ‘What assistance is there from us for you?’, Thesm. 183), see Lloyd (2009: 188–
189).
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politeness strategy in a particular text. In this case, we can deduce fromStrepsi-
ades’ over-politeness that he is humbling himself, as Aristophanes’ heroes often
do early in a play. This shows the unusual balance of power in their relationship
which is due to the habits and attitudes which Pheidippides has derived from
his aristocratic mother.
Brown and Levinson themselves include over-politeness under the heading
‘Trying to re-rankR, P, orD’, in particular the use of a non-expectable strategy to
insult: ‘if S is too [original emphasis] polite (overestimatingWx) hemay insultH
(or simply wound his feelings) by implying that D or P(H) is greater than it is’.15
Their example is of a man switching from the T pronoun to the more formal
V when challenging a former comrade to a duel. Vimala Herman (1995: 241)
cites a similar strategy in Oscar Wilde’s The Importance of Being Earnest: ‘ini-
tial friendliness is displayed in the change of address forms, mutually agreed
upon, from the formal “Miss Cardew”, “Miss Fairfax” to “Cecily” and “Gwen-
dolen”. When antagonism owing to misunderstanding occurs between them,
the change in address forms to formality signals distance, while the highly
indirect “polite” methods of disagreement used regarding which of them is
actually engaged to Ernest constructs not comity, but an acute frostiness in
their relations’. It is not common in Aristophanes for over-politeness to be
perceived as inappropriate or sarcastic, although the Sausage-Seller wrongly
interprets Demosthenes’ effusive approach in these terms: τί […] καταγελᾶις;
(‘Why are youmaking fun of me?’, Eq. 160–161).16 One possible interpretation of
the over-politeness of the shopkeeper described by Dickey (2016: 202–203), ‘So
sorry to trouble you, but do you suppose you could possibly pay twelve pounds
and forty-five pence for that, please?’, rather than (e.g.) ‘That’ll be twelve pound
forty-five, then’, is that that the customer was delaying unreasonably in paying,
or even making to leave the shop without paying at all. The shopkeeper sar-
castically adjusts the politeness of the request to an exaggerated assessment
of R.
The most elaborate example of politeness in Aristophanes is the scene in
Acharnians in which Dicaeopolis tries to obtain from Euripides the costume
and props of a suitably pathetic character in order to make a speech to the bel-
licose Acharnians justifying his private peace with Sparta (Ach. 414–479). He
begins as follows:
15 Brown and Levinson (21987: 229–230). Wx = the ‘weightiness’ of the face-threatening
act x.
16 For modern examples, see Culpeper (2008: 24–27, 2011: 100–103, 178–180).
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[3] Aristophanes Acharnians 414–417
ἀλλ’, ἀντιβολῶ πρὸς τῶν γονάτων σ’, Εὐριπίδη,
δός μοι ῥακιόν τι τοῦ παλαιοῦ δράματος.
δεῖ γάρ με λέξαι τῶι χορῶι ῥῆσιν μακράν·
αὕτη δὲ θάνατον, ἢν κακῶς λέξω, φέρει.
I beg you by your knees, Euripides, give me a bit of rag from that old play.
I need to make a long speech to the chorus, and it means death if I speak
badly.
Dicaeopolis is thinking of Telephus, but cannot remember his name and rejects
four suggestions by Euripides before he hits on the right character. There is a
series of insert expansions before he finally specifies Telephus in his request
(430–431). A further negative politeness technique here is to describe the over-
whelming reasons for the imposition; compare Euripides’ approach to Aga-
thon (Thesm. 179–180, quoted above).17 Supplicatory language is common in
Aristophanes in polite requests, notably ἀντιβολέω (‘supplicate’, ‘pray’, Eq. 1202;
Nub. 155, 224, 314; Vesp. 1388; Pax 87, 376–377, 400; Av. 207; Plut. 103, 444), ἱκε-
τεύω (‘supplicate’, ‘pray’, Ran. 167, 299; Eccl. 970), and πρὸς τῶν θεῶν (‘by the
gods’: Vesp. 760; Plut. 1176). The literal meaning of these words is stronger in
some cases than in others, but sometimes they mean little more than ‘plea-
se’.18
Dicaeopolis then requests a further item of Telephus’ costume:
[4] Aristophanes Acharnians 437–439
Εὐριπίδη, ’πειδήπερ ἐχαρίσω ταδί,
κἀκεῖνά μοι δὸς τἀκόλουθα τῶν ῥακῶν,
τὸ πιλίδιον περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν τὸ Μύσιον.
Euripides, since youhavedoneme this favour, givemealsowhat goeswith
the rags, the little Mysian felt cap for my head.
Euripides is happy to oblige with this too, and his favourable response indic-
ates that Dicaeopolis is still being acceptably polite. The da-quia-dedisti (‘give
17 Cf. Brown and Levinson (21987: 189).
18 Cf. Willi (2003: 25); Lloyd (2006: 243).
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because you have given’) formula, familiar in prayers, is a positive politeness
gambit, establishing common ground and good will.19
In the rest of the scene, Dicaeopolis combines politeness with increas-
ingly intrusive demands. He gives a metapragmatic signal of his more face-
threatening approach by exhorting himself to be γλίσχρος (‘tenacious’, ‘impor-
tunate’, 452). Euripides asks him why he needs a little basket, and he replies
χρέος μὲν οὐδέν, βούλομαι δ’ ὅμως λαβεῖν (‘There is no need, but I still want it’,
455), which is in notable contrast with the overwhelming need he had politely
expressed earlier (417). The climax comes with the following lines:
[5] Aristophanes Acharnians 475–478
Εὐριπίδιον, ὦ γλυκύτατον καὶ φίλτατον,
κάκιστ’ ἀπολοίμην, εἴ τί σ’ αἰτήσαιμ’ ἔτι,
πλὴν ἓν μόνον, τουτὶ μόνον, τουτὶ μόνον·
σκάνδικά μοι δὸς μητρόθεν δεδεγμένος.
My sweetest and dearest little Euripides, may I perish most wretchedly if
I ask you for anything else, except one thing alone, this alone, this alone:
give me some chervil from your mother.
The endearments in line 475 are a positive politeness feature, more exagger-
ated than those in 404 and 467, but his politeness is mostly negative. For min-
imising the imposition (458, 462–463, 477), compare Strepsiades’ ὦ δέσποιναι,
δέομαι τοίνυν ὑμῶν τουτὶ πάνυ μικρόν (‘Ladies, I ask of you this very small thing’,
Nub. 429) and Lysistrata’s πρὶν λέγειν δ’, ὑμᾶς τοδὶ ἐπερήσομαι τὸ μικρόν (‘Before I
speak, I shall ask you this small question’, Lys. 97–98).20 Dicaeopolis’ exagger-
ated politeness is itself face-threatening, even without the concluding allusion
to Euripides’ mother’s alleged trade as greengrocer. Euripides responds with
increasing impatience, andDicaeopolis is characterised as λυπηρός (‘annoying’,
456) and ὀχληρός (‘vexatious’, 460, 472).21 Euripides’ concluding verdict is ἁνὴρ
ὑβρίζει (‘The man is insulting me’, 479).
19 Pulleyn (1997: 32) discusses the same strategy in line 405. Contrast the da-quia-dedi (‘give
because I have given’) strategy at Pax 384–388.
20 The diminutive in Wealth’s description of someone ‘asking to borrow a small sum of
money’ (αἰτῶν λαβεῖν τι μικρὸν ἀργυρίδιον, Plut. 240) clearly reflects the actual language
of the request.
21 Olson (2002: ad 460) suggests that ὀχληρός (‘vexatious’) is paratragic, comparing Eur. Alc.
540, Hel. 452.
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It is obvious from halfway through this passage (line 447) that, for all his use
of polite expressions, Dicaeopolis is increasingly impolite. Discursive theorists
like Richard Watts argue that ‘no linguistic structures are inherently polite’.22
This is sometimes presented as an objection to Brown and Levinson’s theory,
although they do in fact take account of such situations, e.g. ‘our system “over-
generates” and needs to be complemented with a set of “filters” that check that
a chosen utterance form has no impolite implicatures for other reasons’.23 In
this case, a filtermight be that utteranceswhichare formally polite can threaten
negative face if they are disproportionately extended. This would apply to the
example given by Dickey (2016: 202): ‘a child who wants an ice-cream cone
might say “Please, please, please, Mummy, please gimme ice cream, please,
please!”; in this request “please” makes it harder, not easier, for the mother to
refuse the child’s demands’. Geoffrey Leech offers a qualified defence of his
much-criticised notion of absolute politeness, which he now terms ‘pragma-
linguistic’ as opposed to ‘sociopragmatic’ politeness, although he only commits
himself to recognising relative degrees of politeness in the absence of context,
e.g. ‘Thank you very much’ is invariably more polite than ‘Thank you’.24 The
Acharnians passage discussed above seems to show that there is not necessar-
ily a contradiction between individual expressions being polite in themselves
while being used as part of an overall strategy which is not polite, and indeed
the comic effect here depends on the ostensible politeness of Dicaeopolis’
approach.
This passage resembles others inAristophanes inwhich thehero approaches
someone to help him, often an expert in the field in question. The hero is usu-
ally very polite, as noted above. There is however more at stake in Dicaeopolis’
approach to Euripides. This hero is uniquely close to Aristophanes himself, and
the politeness strategy in the scene reflects the dramatist’s own complex rela-
tionshipwithEuripides.25Dicaeopolis’ negative politeness expresses deference
to a distinguished playwright, and in particular serves to establish D and P(H).
The positive politeness is also respectful, but implies a greater degree of intim-
acy. The overt face threat, and in particular Dicaeopolis’ irrepressible persist-
ence, conveys that aspect of Aristophanes’ relationship with Euripides which
22 Watts (2003: 168).
23 Brown and Levinson (21987: 11); cf. 22: ‘politeness is implicated [original emphasis] by the
semantic structure of the whole utterance, not communicated by “markers” or “mitigat-
ors” in a simple signalling fashion which can be quantified’.
24 Leech (2014: 15–17); he reasonably observes that ironic politeness is a second-order phe-
nomenon which is not covered by this principle (2014: 232–238).
25 See (e.g.) Foley (1988).
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is not respectful at all, but rather focuses on mundane and disreputable fea-
tures of his plays such as heroes dressed in rags. Dicaeopolis’ politeness strategy
combines elements which could hardly be found together in any normal social
interaction, but which vividly express the complexity of Aristophanes’ attitude
to Euripides.
Politeness implies P(S) or P(H) in ways which Aristophanes can exploit for
comic incongruity. Both are at stake at the end of Birds, when the gods are
obliged to send a delegation to seek terms with the now all-powerful Peis-
etaerus. Poseidon greets him as follows: τὸν ἄνδρα χαίρειν οἱ θεοὶ κελεύομεν (‘We
gods bid you greeting’, Av. 1581). This doubtless reflects the formal language of
diplomacy, in which there is face vulnerability on both sides, and it is amusing
that such an important god needs to be so polite to a mortal. Socrates’ 3rd-
person greeting Στρεψιάδην ἀσπάζομαι (‘I greet Strepsiades’, Nub. 1145; cf. Eur.
Tro. 48–50) has a similar effect. Strepsiades had earlier incurred Socrates’ con-
tempt for his stupidity (Nub. 789–790), but nowwehear the dignified tones of a
teacher addressing the father of a student at the end of an expensive course of
study. Strepsiades responds in a similarly gracious style (1146–1147). The formal
greeting of the chorus to the Spartan delegates ἄνδρες Λάκωνες, πρῶτα μέν μοι
χαίρετε εἶτ’ εἴπαθ’ ἡμῖν πῶς ἔχοντες ἥκετε (‘Men of Laconia, first of all my greet-
ings, and secondly tell us what brings you here’, Lys. 1074–1075) is incongruous
with their comically distressed state.
A rather different kind of incongruity may be seen in the following pas-
sage:
[6] Aristophanes Birds 1010–1011
Πε. …Μέτων— Με. τί ἐστιν; Πε. ἴσθ’ ὁτιὴ φιλῶ σ’ ἐγώ,
κἀμοὶ πιθόμενος ὑπαποκίνει τῆς ὁδοῦ.
Pe. … Meton—
Me. What is it?
Pe. Please understand that I like you: take my advice, and get out of the
way.
The geometerMeton is one of the unwelcomevisitorswhomPeisetaerus expels
from his new city. The introductory expression of affection is a positive-polite-
ness gambit: compare εὔνους γὰρ ὤν σοι πυνθάνομαι πάνυ σφόδρα (‘I deserve an
answer to my question because I am extremely well-disposed to you’, Plut. 25).
In passage [6], κἀμοὶ πιθόμενος (‘takemy advice’)would naturally be interpreted
as the introduction to a friendly and constructive suggestion (cf. Ar. Vesp. 760;
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Pl. Grg. 486c). What follows is a bluntly face-threatening order. Meton contin-
ues to speak as though he is receiving friendly advice, until he is threatened
and then physically attacked before he manages to escape. He is identified as
an ἀλαζών (‘charlatan’, 1016–1017),26 and his failure to recognise Peisetaerus’
strategy exposes his lack of self-awareness. Jonathan Culpeper has discussed
‘verbal formula mismatches’ of this kind, and suggested that the ostensible
politeness exacerbates the face threat.27 This is plausible, although there seems
to be additional significance in Peisetaerus’ use of this gambit. He affects rather
a grand air in this part of the play, and polite forms of expression are an
aspect of that. Compare ἀσπαζόμεσθα φιλύρινον Κινησίαν (‘We welcome lime-
wood Cinesias’, 1377), where the respectful greeting is combined with what
seems to be an uncomplimentary reference to the poet’s unhealthy appear-
ance.28
Peisetaerus’ dismissal of Meton in Birds is typical of the way the comic hero
treats unwelcome visitors after his triumph, and these passages are the most
interesting examples of impoliteness in Aristophanes. As we have seen, the
hero is often polite or even ingratiating in the earlier part of a play, and this
expresses the low P(S) of an ordinary man trying to deal with overwhelming
problems. The situation is reversed at the end of a play, where the hero is now
in control and treats other people impolitely. This implies high P(S), demon-
strating that he no longer needs to mitigate threats to the face of the hearer
and that he is indeed in a position to aggravate them.29 This can involve actual
or threatenedphysical violence, aswhenStrepsiades prods the SecondCreditor
with a goad as if he were a horse (Nub. 1298) or Peisetaerus threatens to rape
Iris (Av. 1253–1256). More frequently, the hero subjects his victims to jokes and
taunts, as when Trygaeus makes a series of insulting suggestions about uses to
which the Arms-Dealer’s wares could be put (Pax 1228, 1242–1244, 1262–1263),
or Dicaeopolis contrasts his tasty peacetime food with Lamachus’ frugal cam-
paign diet (Ach. 1115–1116).
The ‘discursive turn’ in politeness theory stresses the wider context of any
given interaction, and inparticular its ongoing evaluationby theparticipants.30
26 On the meaning of ἀλαζών, see Dunbar (1995: ad 825).
27 Culpeper (2011: 174–178, 193). Leech (2014: 238) observes that the polite element tends to
precede the impolite element in such cases.
28 See Dunbar (1995: ad 1378) for discussion of the meaning of φιλύρινον. Cf. 916, 1025–1026
for further examples of Peisetaerus’ combination of politeness and abuse.
29 Cf. BrownandLevinson (21987: 69, 97).On impoliteness andpower generally, seeBousfield
and Locher (2008).
30 Locher and Watts (2005) is fundamental; cf. Kádár and Haugh (2013: 36, with references
to earlier discussions).
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A response by the addressee can give some indication of what should be
regarded as polite or impolite, but is in itself only a personal opinion which
does not necessarily reflect accepted social norms. Further illumination may
come from the wider context, with third parties expressing their views and
commenting on the interaction, but this rarely happens in Aristophanes.
Another clue is if consistent terminology is used in similar situations. One
word which is especially common as a description of the heroes’ impolite-
ness is ὕβρις.31 This and cognate words are used of Dicaeopolis (Ach. 479, 1117),
Strepsiades (Nub. 1299), Philocleon (Vesp. 1303, 1319, 1441), Trygaeus (Pax 1229,
1264), and Peisetaerus (Av. 1259). The victims in these situations often also say
‘you are mocking me’ (καταγελᾶις), sometimes as a question (‘are you mock-
ing me?’) or directive (‘stop mocking me!’). This word is used of Dicaeopolis
(Ach. 1081, 1107; cf. 1126), Strepsiades (Nub. 1238), Philocleon (Vesp. 1406), Try-
gaeus (Pax 1245), and Peisetaerus (Av. 1407). σκώπτω has a similar meaning,
and is used of Strepsiades (Nub. 1267) and Philocleon (Vesp. 1320).32 Some
of the victims respond with threats of their own, especially summoning wit-
nesses with a view to legal action (e.g. Ach. 926; Nub. 1297; Vesp. 1406–1408,
1417–1418, 1436; Pax 1119; Av. 1031, 1259; Plut. 932, 944–950). Brown and Levin-
son (21987: 69) write of cases ‘where S is vastly superior in power to H, or can
enlist audience support to destroy H’s face without losing his own’. In the par-
ticular context of Aristophanic comedy, there is no effective internal audience
and it is the implied audience in the theatre which endorses the heroes’ beha-
viour.
Conversely, Aristophanes confirms Brown and Levinson’s theory that bald-
on-record directives can be polite in certain contexts. Invitations are in the
interests of the hearer, and thus do not need mitigation, e.g. ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ταχὺ
βάδιζε (‘Come quickly to dinner’, Ach. 1085–1086; cf. 1094; Pax 1207–1208; Av.
640–642; Ran. 503, 507, 512, 517, 669; Eccl. 695). Other examples of unredressed
imperatives to the hearer’s advantage include Nub. 189 (‘Don’t worry about
that!’) and Vesp. 248 (‘Be careful!’). Bald-on-record imperatives are also not
impolite in task orientation (e.g. Pax 1–2), emergencies (e.g. Vesp. 829), and
commands to slaves (e.g. Vesp. 138, 529). There is no evidence in any of these
cases that the hearers regarded the bald-on-record directives as impolite.
31 Olson (2002:ad479)defines ὕβρις as ‘outrageouslyhostile behaviourdesignednot somuch
to injure as to humiliate its victim’, with references to other discussions. Cf. ‘Insults’ in
Baron (2020).
32 Cf. μὴ σκῶπτέ με, (‘Do not mock me!’) at Ran. 96; Eccl. 1005, 1074.
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Wealth ends, as do Acharnians, Peace, and Birds, with a series of scenes
involving characterswhose circumstanceshave changed for better orworse as a
result of the newdispensation brought about by the hero. Chremylus has cured
the god Wealth of his blindness, so that he is now able to bestow his favours
with more discrimination. The first character to appear in this sequence is a
just man who has regained the prosperity which he had lost through help-
ing his friends. A sycophant then complains that he has fallen into poverty,
and is driven off with insults and blows.33 In describing what is being done
to him, he uses what we have seen to be the three key terms for impolite
behaviour by the hero at the end of a play, although in this case Chremylus
himself is not the actual perpetrator: ὕβρις (886; cf. ὑβρίζειν, 899), καταγελάω
(880), and σκώπτω (886).34 Insulting language culminates in violence (928–
943), and the Sycophant threatens retaliatory legal action as he departs (944–
950).
The third character to appear is an old woman, who addresses the chorus as
follows:
[7] AristophanesWealth 959–961
ἆρ’, ὦ φίλοι γέροντες, ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν
ἀφίγμεθ’ ὄντως τοῦ νέου τούτου θεοῦ,
ἢ τῆς ὁδοῦ τὸ παράπαν ἡμαρτήκαμεν;
Dear oldmen, have we really arrived at the house of this new god, or have
we completely missed the way?
The Old Woman is characterised by her polite manner of speaking. She uses
positive politeness by addressing the old men as φίλοι (‘dear’), and uses the
vocative of φίλος (‘dear’) and φίλτατος (‘dearest’) on three other occasions (967,
1025, 1034). She also uses negative politeness by framing her question in such a
way that the preferred answer ‘yes’ can truthfully be givenwhether or not this is
in fact the right house. Compare the words of the chorus to Cassandra (Aesch.
33 The word ‘sycophant’ is not used here in its usual English sense, but as an equivalent of
the Greek word συκοφάντης: ‘a term of abuse for a bringer of what the speaker considers
unjustified charges from discreditablemotives’ (Dunbar 1995: ad 674, with discussion and
references).
34 Olson (1989: 197 n. 15) gives the leading role in the assault on the Sycophant to the
Just Man, while Sommerstein (2001: ad 926–934) hesitantly prefers Carion (cf. 2001: ad
824).
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Ag. 1049): πείθοι’ ἄν, εἰ πείθοι’· ἀπειθοίης δ’ ἴσως (‘Obey please if you are going to
obey, but perhaps youwill disobey’); alsoHom. Il. 14.190–192, 15.201–204. Poten-
tial optatives are also used in these introductory questions, sometimes in the
third person: τίς ἂν φράσειε ποῦ ’στὶ Χρεμύλος μοι σαφῶς; (‘Who would tell me
reliably where Chremylus is?’, Plut. 1171); τίς ἂν φράσειε ποῦ ’στιν ἡ Λυσιστράτη;
(‘Who would tell us where Lysistrata is?’, Lys. 1086); ἔχοιτ’ ἂν οὖν φράσαι νῶιν
Πλούτων’ ὅπου ’νθάδ’ οἰκεῖ; ξένω γάρ ἐσμεν ἀρτίως ἀφιγμένω (‘Would you be able
to tell uswhere aroundhere Pluto lives?We are strangerswhohave just arrived’,
Ran. 431–433).35
The chorus-leader’s response is not so easy to assess:
[8] AristophanesWealth 962–963
ἀλλ’ ἴσθ’ ἐπ’ αὐτὰς τὰς θύρας ἀφιγμένη,
ὦ μειρακίσκη· πυνθάνει γὰρ ὡρικῶς.
You have come right to his door, young woman—for you ask youth-
fully.
The first line here is a formulaic polite response.36 The chorus-leader’s ironic
comment on the OldWoman’s ‘youthfulness’ must relate to her appearance or
intonation rather than to the actual content of what she says,which is polite but
not otherwise remarkable, unless he is provoked by her addressing the chorus
as ‘dear old men’. The chorus-leader’s reply seems to be another example of
verbal formula mismatch, as it can hardly be polite to allude to her attempt
to look younger than she really is. Compare Nub. 358–363, where disrespectful
remarks take the place of the expected compliments after the Clouds’ initially
polite greeting to Socrates. The chorus-leader’s impoliteness here foreshadows
the way the OldWoman is treated in the rest of the scene.
Her complaint is that a young man to whom she has been giving frequent
and substantial gifts rejects her now that he is rich. Chremylus initially assumes
that she resents the new dispensation because she has behaved unjustly (Plut.
970–972). This appears not to be the case, as she denies the offences which he
suggests shemight have committed, and does not seem otherwise to be partic-
35 Another polite expression by the Old Woman may be οὐχ ὑγιαίνειν μοι δοκεῖς (1060, 1066;
lit. ‘you do not seem tome to be healthy’, i.e. ‘in your right mind’; cf. the ladylike Iris at Av.
1214).
36 Cf. Ran. 436. On the similar exchange at Soph. El. 660–662, see Lloyd (2006: 233).
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ularly bad.37 In any case, she does not complain about having lost her wealth,
and thus does not resemble the Sycophant in being a bad person who is now
deservedly poor. On the other hand, the Young Man does not seem to deserve
his new wealth. The previous scene suggested that the result of Wealth regain-
ing his sight is that good men become rich while bad men lose their ill-gotten
gains, and it has often been suggested that this scene implies a different plot in
which everyone becomes rich.38
MacDowell sees no redeeming features in the Young Man: ‘He was mak-
ing money by disgraceful means, and now that he no longer needs to do so
he is drunken and boorish’.39 Sommerstein defends him, but does not distin-
guish between his behaviour before and after becoming rich: ‘With nomarket-
able asset except his good looks, he has been forced into a life that he finds
repugnant, and his reaction when able to escape is natural’.40 The OldWoman,
however, stresses the change in his behaviour (994), as does Chremylus (1003–
1005, 1047–1048), although he takes a different view of it. Chremylus criti-
cises his treatment of the Old Woman and insists that he should continue his
relationship with her (1071–1087, 1201).41 On the other hand, there is no par-
ticular reason to find fault with his behaviour in the past. The Old Woman
gives a favourable account of his character (975–979), and his language as she
describes it is impressively eloquent.Wealth himself notes that people become
bad when they become rich (107–109, 567–570), and the Young Man seems to
be an example.
He is often described as a gigolo, and some scholars take rather a narrow
view of this profession, e.g. ‘it becomes clear that he is a gigolo who has been
giving her sexual satisfaction in return for payment’.42 The Oxford English Dic-
tionary offers a less specific definition: ‘a young man supported financially by
an older woman in return for his attentions’. This gives amore accurate impres-
sion of the relationship as this woman describes it. The following passage is an
excerpt from her conversation with Chremylus:
37 Halliwell (1998: 208) reasonably remarks ‘the woman is not a convincingly moral target’.
MacDowell (1995: 341) is more censorious.
38 On the ‘double plot’ in Wealth, see e.g. Flashar (1967: 161 = 1996: 318); Konstan and Dillon
(1981); Olson (1990: 223–224).
39 MacDowell (1995: 341); cf. Flashar (1967: 170 = 1996: 324–325).
40 Sommerstein (1984: 324–325 = 1996: 267–268).
41 Chremylus twice expresses approval of the Young Man’s behaviour (1003–1005, 1023–
1024), but only in the context of a cynical interpretation of it which has the rhetorical
purpose of undercutting the OldWoman’s romantic view.
42 MacDowell (1995: 340); cf. Halliwell (1998: 207).
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Γρ. καὶ τάς γε χεῖρας παγκάλας ἔχειν μ’ ἔφη.
Χρ. ὁπότε προτείνοιέν γε δραχμὰς εἴκοσιν.
Γρ. ὄζειν τε τῆς χροιᾶς ἔφασκεν ἡδύ μου.
Χρ. εἰ Θάσιον ἐνέχεις, εἰκότως γε νὴ Δία.
Γρ. τὸ βλέμμα θ’ ὡς ἔχοιμι μαλακὸν καὶ καλόν.
Χρ. οὐ σκαιὸς ἦν ἅνθρωπος, ἀλλ’ ἠπίστατο
γραὸς καπρώσης τἀφόδια κατεσθίειν.
OldWom. He used to say that I had the most beautiful hands.
Chr. At any rate when they were holding out twenty drachmas.
OldWom. And he would say that my skin smelled sweet.
Chr. Very likely, by Zeus, if you were pouring out Thasian wine.
OldWom. And that I had a gentle and beautiful expression.
Chr. The man was not stupid: he knew how to eat up the wealth
of an old sow on heat.
The Old Woman seems to take pleasure in being flattered and describes what
she does for the Young Man in terms of gifts rather than payment. Chremylus,
by contrast, believes that everything good depends on money (144–146), and
relentlessly reduces the relationship to a transaction in which fine words are
mere camouflage for the purchase of sex.43 Sommerstein further suggests that
the scene contains a number of sexual euphemisms. The Old Woman intro-
duces her account of the relationship as follows:
[10] AristophanesWealth 975–978
ἦν μοί τι μειράκιον φίλον,
πενιχρὸν μέν, ἄλλως δ’ εὐπρόσωπον καὶ καλὸν
καὶ χρηστόν· εἰ γάρ του δεηθείην ἐγώ,
ἅπαντ’ ἐποίει κοσμίως μοι καὶ καλῶς.
I hada young friend, poorbut good-looking andhonourable anddecent: if
I wanted something, he would do everything for me dutifully and nicely.
Sommerstein detects three euphemisms in these lines:
43 On the importance of money in the play, see Olson (1990: 227–228).
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(1) ‘φίλος “friend”, i.e. “sexual partner” ’;
(2) ‘τι “something” denotes sexual intercourse […] for there was nothing else
which the impoverished young man was capable of supplying to the eld-
erly woman on whom he was sponging’;
(3) ‘ποιεῖν ἅπαντα “do everything” means “copulate” ’.44
He finds two further sexual euphemisms in the scene. The Old Woman sug-
gests that Wealth should force the Young Man to ‘treat her well in return’ for
what she has done for him (1029), and he explains this as follows: ‘εὖ ποιεῖν
“do good to” means “copulate with” ’.45 The most plausible of these supposed
euphemisms is the one spoken by the Young Man, when he asks if she would
like to ‘playwith’ him (1055); Sommerstein glossesπρός με παῖσαι as ‘have sexual
intercourse with’.46 The Old Woman stresses her pleasure in the Young Man’s
flattering words, so it seems incorrect to say that he has nothing else to con-
tribute, and Sommerstein’s view of the relationship is unnecessarily reductive.
Aristophanes was well able to portray sexual coercion in explicit terms, as we
can see from Epigenes’ interaction with the old women at Eccl. 877–1111. The
decree which compels him reads in part: ἢν ἀνὴρ νέος νέας ἐπιθυμῆι, μὴ σποδεῖν
αὐτὴν πρὶν ἂν τὴν γραῦν προκρούσηι πρῶτον (‘if a young man desires a young
woman, he shall not bonk her until he screws an older woman first’, 1015–
1017).
James Davidson begins a subtle discussion of the important if sometimes
elusive distinction between commodity exchange and the exchange of gifts
with a quotation fromWealth:
[11] AristophanesWealth 149–159
Χρ. καὶ τάς γ’ ἑταίρας φασὶ τὰς Κορινθίας,
ὅταν μὲν αὐτάς τις πένης πειρῶν τύχηι,
οὐδὲ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ἐὰν δὲ πλούσιος,
τὸν πρωκτὸν αὐτὰς εὐθὺς ὡς τοῦτον τρέπειν.
Κα. καὶ τούς γε παῖδάς φασι ταὐτὸ τοῦτο δρᾶν,
οὐ τῶν ἐραστῶν ἀλλὰ τἀργυρίου χάριν.
Χρ. οὐ τούς γε χρηστούς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πόρνους· ἐπεὶ
αἰτοῦσιν οὐκ ἀργύριον οἱ χρηστοί. Κα. τί δαί;
Χρ. ὁ μὲν ἵππον ἀγαθόν, ὁ δὲ κύνας θηρευτικούς.
44 Sommerstein (2009: 93, 92, and 91); cf. Sommerstein (2001: ad 977–978).
45 Sommerstein (2009: 87).
46 Sommerstein (2009: 92, 101). Contrast Dunbar (1995: ad 1098–1101), observing more cau-
tiously ‘(συμ-) παίζειν sometimes has erotic overtones’.
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Κα. αἰσχυνόμενοι γὰρ ἀργύριον αἰτεῖν ἴσως
ὀνόματι περιπέττουσι τὴν μοχθηρίαν.
Chr. They do say those Corinthian hetaeras pay no attention whatso-
ever when a man without means tries to seduce them but if a rich
man comes along they bend over and present themselves in no
time at all.
Ca. Yes and they do say that boys do the same, not for the sake of their
lovers, but for money.
Chr. Only the whores among them, not the decent ones; decent boys
never ask for money.
Ca. And what do they ask for, then?
Chr. Well, one might ask for a thoroughbred, another might ask for a
pack of hunting dogs.
Ca. That’s just euphemism. They are ashamed to ask for money and
gloss over their vice with words.47
Aristophanes presents the effect of the new dispensation on financially asym-
metrical relationships and it would be interesting to consider a play in which
the gender roles were reversed, as they doubtless were much more frequently
in real life. Davidson (1997: 124)writes: ‘Misrecognition, beating about the bush,
the avoidance of specifics, the uncertainty of favours in return, are all strategies
designed to keep “friendship” out of the market-place’. One may add that they
can all be interpreted in terms of politeness, and many members of the audi-
ence may well have preferred such transactions not to be too crudely bald-on-
record.
This chapter has focused on the politeness or over-politeness of Aristo-
phanes’ heroes in the earlier part of a play, which expresses the need of ordin-
ary individuals to ingratiate themselves with those who are more powerful in
order to gain their ends. Impoliteness conversely demonstrates their power
after they have succeeded, an aspect of the comic fantasy of having no need
to respect the face of others. The means by which Chremylus gains good for-
tune inWealth do not require him to be ingratiating, but he takes full advantage
of the freedom to be impolite at the end of the play, as does his slave Carion.
The usual reversal from politeness to impoliteness is shown more clearly by
the Young Man. Universal wealth does away with the need to earn money in
potentially disagreeable ways, but also allows people to say whatever they like
47 Davidson (1997: 109), his translation.
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without having toworry about the consequences of being offensive. It could be
argued that this is not an altogether good thing, and thatWealth, like others of
Aristophanes’ plays, is open to an ‘ironic’ interpretation which brings out the
darker side of the hero’s success.48 It is notable that the Old Woman is one of
the most polite characters in Aristophanes, and gives the impression that it is
gracious speech which she found most desirable in her lover. Chremylus may
show little or no interest in politeness, and is indeed extremely offensive to her,
but he eventually agrees that the Young Man has treated her unjustly (1071–
1085), compels him to resume his relationship with her (1201), and includes
her in the final procession. There is no evidence that Chremylus himself has
experienced a conversion to the merits of polite speech in particular, but the
scenewith the OldWoman nevertheless explores with a subtlety that is unique
in Aristophanes the question whether there is more to politeness than hypo-
crisy.
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Developments in Politeness from Aristophanes to
Menander and Beyond
Peter Barrios-Lech
1 Introduction: Developments in Politeness from the Fifth to the
Third Centuries BCE
My aim is to describe developments in the polite language of late fifth century
BCE Athens, when Aristophanes wrote, to the time when Menander was act-
ive (early third century BCE). By ‘polite language,’ I mean those expressions,
routines, and scripts by which a speaker expresses consideration for the other.
They are an ubiquitous part of our own daily language use. Polite expressions
(in English, ‘please’; ‘can you + verb’); routines (for instance, facilitating closure
to a conversation); and scripts (enabling predictable structure to even themost
informal talk); these provide quarry for students of politeness because they
demonstrate howpeople express, negotiate andmanage the sometimes unpre-
dictable terrain of face-to-face interaction. And this polite language, so defined,
changes over time, just as the language’s phonology, morphology, or syntax.
Now, Aristophanes wrote when Athenian democracy was in full bloom.
In fifth-century Athens, every citizen enjoyed the right to speak his mind in
assembly and he benefitted from legal protections. The reforms of Cleisthenes
had succeeded to some extent in eliminating distinctions of wealth or family
background as a meaningful basis of political involvement. Any violence—
verbal or physical—done to a free Athenian citizen was ὕβρις, an actionable
offense.Menander wrote when democracy was effectively dead, aMacedonian
garrison ensuring order in the polis. Is it possible that the death of democracy
produced changes in the polite language of Classical Athens?
Answering such a question might, at first sight, seem challenging. We can-
not eavesdrop on the gossip of the fishmonger with his client in the agora of
fifth-century Athens; nor hear two Athenians wrangling about the quality of
Sophocles’ recent production; still less can we question them, like modern-day
linguists, about any polite usages peppering their speech. Spontaneous conver-
sation andquestionnaires, however, are precisely the forms of evidence usedby
sociolinguists of modern languages. What evidence do Classicists have avail-
able?
Wehave access to text-genres that capture living voices in conversation (dia-
logue, drama, epistles). We also have the ancients’ comments—often casual,
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obiter dicta—on ‘pragmatic’ characteristics of certain expressions; for instance,
whether the imperative was indeed felt to be rude. Parallels from modern lan-
guages are helpful, as long as we do not equate these parallelisms with the
ancient phenomena. In doing so we risk ‘familiarising’ the politeness of the
ancients, and so effacing how alien to us that politeness may be.
In fact, we, as students of ancient politeness, are not that badly off compared
to our peers who study modern languages. As Michael Lloyd (2004: 75) points
out:
Literary dialogue has the advantage of being completely transparent in
terms of context. All relevant factors are in principle available for any-
one to test. Experimental data, by contrast, are inevitably incomplete and
opaque, as well as being subject to distortion by the prejudices of the
investigator or the artificial nature of the experiment.
Here we think of the ‘Observer’s Paradox’: that is, we want spontaneously pro-
duced speech, but the presence of the observer inevitably elicits the oppos-
ite. Labov famously found this when researching how members from various
social classes produced a certain phonological variable. He found that mem-
bers from the working class, when questioned by him, would assume a higher
register of speech (Labov 1972: 61, 209). Questionnaires and role-plays are also
problematic each in their own way. For instance, the questionnaire-prompt,
including description of the real-world context, might influence the respond-
ent’s answer; and his or her written response might be more formal than a
spoken one (Márquez-Reiter 2000: 73).1
So we have texts that imitate dialogue, dialogue which, however artificial
compared to spontaneous conversation, allows the observer to isolate all relev-
ant variables: speaker and addressee status, context, both global (genre), and
local (specific topic; the surrounding ‘co-text’); and the social and historical
matrix giving rise to the text. Besides, students of ancientGreek politeness have
plenty of data at their disposal: the corpus of Classical Greek—and beyond.
We can take a snapshot, say, a synchronic study of ancient Greek politeness
in the fifth century BCE, relying mainly on dramatic texts, or we can view the
whole froma bird’s eye perspective, aswewill try to do: taking in developments
1 An example of a questionnaire prompt from Márquez-Reiter (2000: 73) illustrates this: ‘You
missed a lecture yesterday and would like to borrow the notes from a class mate/ You: … ……
… … … … … … … … … … … … /Classmate: Sure, but please let me have them back before
the lecture next week.’ Note also that the Classmate’s answer—unknowable in an actual
conversation—might also condition the response.
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over the course of a century and a half, from the late fifth to the early third
centuries BCE in Athens.
In this contribution to the study of ancient Greek ‘language of politeness’, I
focus on one particular category of data, the directive (essentially, commands
and requests), drawn from the plays of Aristophanes, Menander, Hellenistic
Mime, and one Platonic dialogue (theCratylus). These authors—Aristophanes,
Menander, Herodas (contemporary with Theocritus and mime-writer) and
Plato—did not have the same goals that we do, and this is an advantage for us.
While theirs was to entertain and edify audiences and readers, they routinely
overlook the kinds of linguistic detail that we are interested in: perfunctory
salutations, conversation closings andpre-closings, dialogue transitiondevices,
and, of importance for us, routine requests and commands.
Now it is true that some authors—like Menander and Xenophon—were
happy to repeat the same formulae over and over again. The repetition of con-
versational formulae and colloquial expressions is also an advantage for the
researcher attempting to recover the polite language of the Athenians. But
other authors, like Plato andHomer, aim to vary such expressions.2 So our data,
it must be said, come from authors disparate in style and in their relation to the
spoken idiom.
Can we turn this difference in authorial style to our advantage? To anticip-
ate thedescriptionof our corpus,most of our datawill come fromAristophanes
and Menander. There could not exist two more different playwrights. Plutarch
famously wrote on those differences, simultaneously expressing his distaste, if
not contempt for Aristophanes. To take an example, Menander suits his lan-
guage to context; Aristophanes does not, according to Plutarch:
[1] Plutarch Comparison of Aristophanes andMenander 853b5–8
λέγω δὲ τὰ ἀντίθετα καὶ ὁμοιόπτωτα καὶ παρωνυμίας. τούτοις γὰρ ὁ μὲν μετὰ
τοῦ προσήκοντος λόγου καὶ ὀλιγάκις χρῆται ἐπιμελείας αὐτὰ ἀξιῶν, ὁ δὲ καὶ
πολλάκις καὶ οὐκ εὐκαίρως καὶ ψυχρῶς.
I’m talking about antitheses and successive words with the similar end-
ings; puns. Menander, deeming their usage worth careful attention,
employs them in suitable contexts, and infrequently. But Aristophanes
uses them frequently, not at the right moment, and insipidly.
2 Dickey (2016a: 247–248).
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And Plutarch distinguishes the comic poets in other ways.3 Although Plut-
arch is, of course, biased, no-one will dispute that these two authors have
divergent styles. Each wrote at a different historical moment, under a differ-
ent regime, and in a different genre. Suppose, then, a pattern shows up in
Aristophanes and recurs in Menander; for instance, that the proportion of all
imperatives softened in each author is the same. Menander was hardly likely
to imitate Aristophanes in this subtle particular. We could argue, instead, that
both authors reproduce a speech pattern which had remained stable for over
a century. In fact, the statistics calculated from our congeries of Attic authors
writing in different genres and at different historical moments suggests a sur-
prising stability in the polite language of the ancient Greek polis, specifically
Athens, despite regime changes.
Indeed, Dickey, writing on the Greek imperative, says ‘[i]n literature there
appears tobeno change in theway requests aremade at anyperiodof antiquity,
just as there appears to be no change in Greek grammar or spelling’ (Dickey
2016a: 244). This claim is based on the survey of an ample corpus of directives,
with particular attention to how requests are framed.4 Any continuity in the
politeness system of these texts, then, may be due to the conservatism of the
authors—with regard to grammar, spelling, and ‘pragmatic’ features of the lan-
guage.
Still, even Dickey (2016a: 247) concedes that colloquial language must sur-
face in our Attic texts, with certain authors (Aristophanes, Aeschylus, Plato)
avoiding conversational formulaewhile others (Menander, Xenophon) employ
them frequently. Following this line of reasoning, we can view the continuities
across these disparate authors as evidence for actual speech habits. Or, if one
prefers, the cross-genre regularities of languagewill beworth documenting, for
they canprovide comparanda for similar regularities as represented in the texts
of other languages, most obviously, Latin; or comparanda for texts in the same
language—Greek—but written at different places and times.
For instance, the mimes of Herodas—coeval of Callimachus, and perhaps
active in the intellectual circles of Ptolemy II—and the mimes from imper-
ial Rome present patterns strikingly different from those in our Attic corpus,
3 For further contrasts in Plutarch see esp. Plut. Comp. Ar. et Men. 853b5–8 (Menander charac-
terises on the linguistic level, Aristophanes does not);Menander has achieved the remarkable
feat of creating a languagewhich gives the impression of uniformitywhile in fact suiting itself
to characters of various kinds: Plut. Comp. Ar. et Men. 853d10–853e4.
4 Dickey (2016a) surveys Homer, Odyssey 1–4; Sophocles, Philoctetes, Antigone; Euripides, Hip-
polytus, Medea; Aristophanes, Acharnians, Knights; Menander, Dyscolus, Aspis, Epitrepontes;
Herodotus (all); Plato, Symposium.
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although the data culled from these mimes is, unfortunately, limited. Still, that
major shifts in the politeness system did happen from the Classical to the Hel-
lenistic period has been attested with the help of other evidence—Hellenistic-
era letters preserved on papyrus (Dickey 2016a: 247).
2 Description of Corpus
I have four sub-corpora, drawn from distinct points in the temporal flow: fifth-
century Old Comedy, represented by Aristophanes, whose language preserves
with more or less fidelity a colloquial Attic spoken in the fifth century BCE;
Plato, writing in the mid-fourth century BCE, whose language imitates the
more learned discourse of anAthenian élite; the early third centuryMenander,
whose plays similarly reflect an Attic, but an every-day idiom, spoken about a
century later, and onewhichwaswell on its way to becoming the Koine; finally,
Hellenistic Mime, whose language also comes close to the colloquial idiom.
This latter ‘Mime’ corpus should be subdivided into two: we have data from the
mimes of Herodas and from scriptedmimes presumably performed during the
Roman imperial period. All of this data is summarised in Table 1.5 (The figure
given under ‘Mime’ in Table 1 adds both the directives from Herodas and those
from imperial-era mime.)
All texts were read at least once, and the data collected by hand. itur in anti-
quam siluam: that is let us begin our journey into this silua, or ὕλη, the stuff or
material of our directive database.
5 Wilson (2007) for Aristophanes, Arnott (1979–2000) for Menander, Cunningham (2004) for
Mime, and Burnet (1905) for Plato.
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3 The Greek Imperative and Its Softeners
Appendix 1 lists the types of directive that occur in this corpus. A glance
at this Appendix hints at the rich variation in the ancient Greek directive
system.6 As mentioned, we investigate in this essay that most prototypical
of the Greek directive, the imperative. There are several reasons for doing
so.
First, of all directives, the imperative is the most frequently attested. It con-
stitutes 64.0% of the directives in Aristophanes, 70.3% in Menander, 41.7%
in Plato, and 75.2% in the mime. It’s worth noting, incidentally, that those
authors who represent every-day conversation—Aristophanes,Menander, and
the mime-writers—yield the highest proportion of imperatives. The propor-
tion is remarkably lower in the Platonic dialogue, perhaps because it conveys
the cultured conversation of educated Athenians. Second, if we are to gen-
eralise based on a sample of data, we should like our sample to be as large
as possible—and our sample of Greek imperatives is sufficiently large. Third,
in many languages, the imperative attracts mitigators to itself, like our Eng-
lish ‘please’; and ‘if you wouldn’t mind’; the equivalent Greek mitigators being
perhaps ‘entreaty’ words like πρὸς θεῶν (‘[I entreat you] by the gods’) and ἱκε-
τεύω (‘I beseech you’), in addition to conditional phrases like εἰ δοκεῖ (‘if it’s ok
with you’), among others. As we will see, these are rare, and their very rare-
ness indicates that, in these words, we do not have softeners per se, but polite
‘boosters’—expressions usedwhen the routineway of requesting is not enough
(Dickey 2016a: 241).
One may object that my scope—imperatives only—is arbitrary. There are
other ways of expressing requests that are not imperatives, which, however,
convey similar speech act force(s). For instance, while the present imperat-
ive (ποίει) exists in negated form (μὴ ποίει); there exists no similar comple-
ment for the aorist imperative, that is, we have ποίησαι or ποίησον but not *μὴ
ποίησον.7 If we include μὴ ποίει among the imperatives, shouldn’t its counter-
part, μὴ ποιήσηις, also be included? Indeed, Denizot (2011: 192–393) classifies
her data in this way: verb morphology that directly conveys commands or
requests is identified as ‘injunctive’. And while there is an aspectual difference
between forms like μὴ ποίει and those like μὴ ποιήσηις—with the former gen-
erally expressing inhibitives (‘stop doing’), and the latter prohibitives (‘don’t
6 Denizot (2011) is an excellent overviewof the semantic andpragmatic characteristics of many
of these forms.
7 Schwyzer and Debrunner (1966: 343) note that phenomena like μὴ ποίησον are ‘vereinzelt’,
isolated.
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do’)—there does not seem to be any difference in politeness.8 But I leave out
the latter, forms like μὴ ποιήσηις, for this study. For even if we assume that the
type μὴ ποιήσηις and μὴ ποίει—different aspectually—are otherwise equival-
ent, the former type are few in number, constituting between 1.0% to 4.0% of
the total directives, depending on the author.9 Including themwould probably
not change our results.
The Greek imperative is the chameleon of the directive system, assuming its
particular tone from the speech situation and contextwithinwhich it is embed-
ded. Consider the following examples.10
[2] Herodotus 1.155.3 (Croesus advises Cyrus)
ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν οἰκότα εἴρηκας, σὺ μέντοι μὴ πάντα θυμῶι χρέο μηδὲ πόλιν
ἀρχαίην ἐξαναστήσηις.
O King, you’ve spoken what’s fitting, but don’t vent your anger and des-
troy an ancient city.
Croesus, given the role of advisor to the Persian king, accordingly advises the
king on what not to do, using an imperative form.
[3]MenanderDyscolus 375 (the SlaveDaos responds to Sostratos, whohas
expressed his desire to work in the country)
τὴν παρ’ ἐμοῦ λαβὼν ἴθι.
Take this [mattock] fromme and go.
Sostratos, the youngman in love of the play, wants amattock in order to depart
to Knemon’s farm. His slave offers him his own and tells him to go ahead to
the farm. (Similarly, a parent would offer an ice cream cone to a child who
wants ice-cream, saying ‘take it’.) Thus the imperative in passage [2] gives the
8 Schwyzer and Debrunner (1966: 343, section 3) on possible differences; but see now espe-
cially Denizot (2011: 287–290).
9 Herodas and imperialmime, 11 of the total 278 directives (4.0%);Menander, 18 of the total
830 (2.2%); in Plato these are less than 1%of the total directives (1 of the 139 total); in Aris-
tophanes, the type constitutes 61 of the total 3223 directives, or 1.9%.
10 I use the same examples presented by Dickey (2016a: 239–240), who, however, employs
them to a different purpose.
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‘green light’ to an addressee, allowing the hearer to do whatever desire he or
she had previously made manifest. Thus, the imperative constitutes a permis-
sion.
In this passage, Pan, rustic god, with a shrine in the deme of Phyle, addresses
the audience viewing Menander’s Dyscolus.
[4] Menander Dyscolus 1–3, 45–46
τῆς Ἀττικῆς νομίζετ’ εἶναι τὸν τόπον,
Φυλήν, τὸ νυμφαῖον δ’ ὅθεν προέρχομαι
Φυλασίων
[…]
ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὰ κεφάλαια, τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα δὲ
[ὄψεσθ’] ἐὰν βούλησθε—βουλήθητε δέ.
Take this place to be in Attica, Phyle, to be precise; and the Nymphaeum
whence I came as belonging to the Phylasians
[…]
These are the chief points; but as for the particulars, you will see them
if you want. Do want!
Here Pan tells the audience howhewants them to view the stage; he then com-
mands them, with an aorist imperative, to ‘want’ to view the drama.
In assigning the illocutionary point (whether advice, permission or com-
mand) conveyed by the imperative, I have used my own judgment. Different
researchers may see the same imperative differently: alii aliis modis. Thus, a
reader might plausibly understand [2] as a command.
But all scholars agree that the imperative can convey one of a variety of dir-
ective speech acts: advice, permission, commands, and more. Denizot notes
that we find imperatives addressed to a god just as we find the imperative used
in insulting language, and she concludes that ‘the palette of the effects of the
sense linked to the imperative is […] great’ (2011: 488). Considered in isolation,
wrested from any context, the imperative appears to be neutral with respect to
politeness. It must be so, for speakers to employ it in a wide variety of speech
situations, and to convey all kinds of illocutions (commands, requests, permis-
sions, advice).11
11 To this extent, then, I do agree with Denizot (2011: 488) when she says ‘that we must cer-
tainly admit that this form […] is itself neutral from the point of view of politeness.’
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But the imperative always appears in a context, and in some contexts, the
imperative alone won’t do. Some added politeness is called for, specifically
when the imperative represents an imposition on the hearer, when that hearer
is of equal or greater status than the speaker (as in passage [2], above) or when
the addressee is not known to the speaker (passages [7] and [9], below).
Yet for Greek authors, the imperative was the paradigmatic form for com-
manding, reflected in its name, τὸ προστακτικόν. Consider first what Protagoras
says about the imperative. Aristotle quotes Protagoras’ statement in the Poet-
ics. The philosopher of Stagira has been discussing style, and says that the parts
of speech—what we would call the various illocutionary forces an utterance
could take—fall under the head of style, or λέξις, that is,
[5] Aristotle Poetics 1456b11–19
οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρι-
σις καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς
τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπολά-
βοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾶι, ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν
‘μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά’; τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησίν, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς ἐστιν. διὸ
παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὂν θεώρημα.
what sort of thing a command is, a prayer, a statement, a threat, a ques-
tion, an answer, and so on. For as to knowledge or ignorance of these
things, no censure worth the effort is imputed to Poetry.What would any-
one suppose to have beendonewrong inwhat Protagoras criticises? Since
Homer, intending to pray, instead commands, when he says, ‘Of the Rage,
Sing, Goddess.’ ‘For ordering someone to do something or not,’ he says,
‘is a command.’ Being an investigation more appropriate to another field
than that of poetry, let this be left to the side.
Aristotle chooses to forgo discussing the precise speech-act value of the imper-
ative, ἄειδε, but we should not. Invocations at the beginning of hexameter
poetry often contain the imperative (Homer Od. 1.1; Hes. Op. 1–2). Incidentally,
particularly aorist imperatives are typical in prayers to a divinity.12 Finally, the
vocative, θεά or the like, must be considered in conjunction with the imperat-
ive, since it frames the entire interaction as one taking place between a human
worshiper and a god. In such a speech situation, there is no question of com-
manding.
12 Bakker (1966: 12).
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Some five centuries later, Apollonius Dyscolus, the late second century CE
grammarian from Alexandria, concurs with Protagoras, in his work On Syntax
(Apollonius had been talking about whether there exists a first-person com-
mand, and presents an argument against):
[6] Apollonius Dyscolus De constructione 3.105.2–5 Lallot
καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι ἑαυτόν τινα προσκαλούμενον διὰ τὸ ἀχώριστον τοῦ
προσώπου, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἑαυτῶι προστάσσοντα διὰ τὸ ἀχώριστον τοῦ προσώπου·
πᾶν γὰρ προστακτικὸν ἐκ προσώπου ἐπικρατοῦντος συνέστηκεν ὡς πρὸς ἐπι-
κρατούμενον.
And as it is not possible to imagine a person addressing himself on
account of the indivisibility of the person, so it is not possible to imagine
a person commanding (προστάσσοντα) himself for the same reason. For
every command arises from a dominant person (ἐκ προσώπου ἐπικρατοῦν-
τος) with power to one who is dominated (πρὸς ἐπικρατούμενον).
Apollonius had been discussing the distinction between first- and second-
person imperative; andhehadhad just given as examples of the latter the forms
φεῦγε, λέγε, and γράφε (3.104.9). But Apollonius considers only one speech
situation in which τὸ προστακτικόν could appear, specifically, an address by a
superior to an inferior. In such situations, when superiors command inferiors,
we might indeed expect imperatives with little to no mitigation.
In other words, the bare imperative is expected in such situations; while
more elaboration is necessary when a power difference exists between the
interlocutors, as a first century BCE writer on style indicates (Demetr. Eloc. 7
Radermacher): ‘orders are concise and brief and every master is curt towards
his slave. Supplication and lamentation, on the other hand, are lengthy’ (καὶ
τὸ μὲν ἐπιτάσσειν σύντομον καὶ βραχύ, καὶ πᾶς δεσπότης δούλωι μονοσύλλαβος, τὸ
δὲ ἱκετεύειν μακρὸν καὶ τὸ ὀδύρεσθαι). Accordingly, the bare minimum—even
a verbless imperative like δεῦρο (‘[come] hither!’)—suits addresses by super-
iors to inferiors; conversely, more elaboration—using vocatives and ‘polite
boosters’—are necessary when inferiors address superiors or when the impos-
ition is great.
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4 Characterising the Data in Broad Strokes
4.1 Proportion of Imperatives in the Greek Directive Database
Of course, this is not the first synoptic treatment of the Greek imperative. Here
I want to focus on two important, and recent, claims. First, Dickey shows us
that the Greeks of the Classical Period very rarely used softeners.13 To put this
in perspective, compare the proportion of softened imperatives in two very
similar authors, the Latin comic poet Terence and the Greek comic poet Men-
ander, both of whom give the impression, if not an actual reflection, of ‘real’
speech. As I have shown elsewhere, 11.2% of all imperatives in Menander are
softened; while 15.4% in Terence are. The difference between the proportions
is statistically significant.14 Terence mimics Menander—he is called by Julius
Caesar a dimidiatus Menander (Suet. de poetis 11.103 Reifferscheid)—but not
with respect to the softened imperative. The Latin poet probably does not
imitateMenander with regard to conversational patterns, preferring instead to
model these on what his Roman audience will have heard in their own spoken
interactions. This result is tentative—after all, we do not havemuchMenander
or Terence—but it does underscore Dickey’s claim, that the Greeks did not
incline to softening imperatives.
The second important claim in recent literature is that the bareGreek imper-
ative was used in preference to almost any other form of directive, 65% of
all directives in an ample corpus spanning from Homer to Plato.15 Overall, as
Denizot says, ‘imperatives represent between 75%and 90%of the occurrences
of verbal types typical of orders’ (Denizot 2011: 192).16 Based on the numerical
13 Dickey (2016a: 239–240). Perhaps, however, we need to broaden our definition of what
counts as a directive softener. For instance, it is possible that vocatives and particles like
δήdoplay a role inmitigating the directive; on the former, see Barrios-Lech (forthcoming);
on the latter, see Denizot (forthcoming).
14 Barrios-Lech (forthcoming); I use the z-test to calculate the probability of significant dif-
ference.Using the z-test,we candecidewhether proportions calculated from twodifferent
populations are more likely to originate from two different populations or represent the
same population; in other words, whether the difference between the two proportions,
calculated from two independent samples, is statistically significant. For further informa-
tion on this statistical test, see Butler (1985: 92–95).
15 Dickey (2016a: 239), specifically Table A, where the bare imperative represents 65% of the
total directives in her corpus.
16 ‘[L]es impératifs représentent entre 75% et 90% des occurrences de formes verbales
typiques de l’ injonction.’ Her corpus contains Archaic and Classical Greek: Iliad,Odyssey,
the extant tragedies of Aeschylus; Herodotus, Aristophanes, Lysias and the early dialogues
of Plato (Denizot 2011: 191–192). According to her, Hesiod is the only outlier, in whose texts
imperative forms make up only 28.2% of the texts.
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table 2 Imperatives as a percentage of directives in the Greek dir-
ective database
Total directives Imperatives as % of total
Aristophanes 3223 64.0% (2063)
Plato 139 41.7% (58)
Menander 830 70.6% (586)
Mime 278 75.2% (209)
Total 4470 65.2% (2916)
prevalence of the bare imperative in her Classical Greek corpus, Dickey (2016a)
has argued that the present imperative was the ‘unmarked’ way of ‘doing’ a
request in Classical Greek, much as the ‘can you’ request is an unmarked way
of carrying out a request in English.
In our Aristophanes corpus, we find 3223 directives; of these 2063 (64.0%)
are imperatives. Now, in a corpus representing a later stage of Greek, our Men-
ander corpus, there are 830 directives (less 52 dubious instances). Of these,
there are 219 aorist imperatives, and 292 present imperatives, totalling 511.
When we add to this total 28 perfect imperatives (forms like ἴσθι ‘know ye’),
47 tokens like μὴ φέρε, (‘don’t bring,’ that is, μή + present imperative), we arrive
at an overall total of 586 imperatives in our Menander corpus, which repres-
ents 70.3% of all directives inMenander. This proportion (70.3%) comes close
to that calculated byDenizot, 75–90% (depending on the author). So, too, does
the proportion calculated from ourHellenistic-eramime corpus: of the 278 dir-
ectives there, 209, or 75.2%, are imperatives. Finally, 41.7% of the directives in
Plato’s Cratylus are imperatives, so 58 imperatives of 139 directives total. Thus,
apart from the Aristophanes and Plato sub-corpora, our figures accord with
those of Denizot. And in sum, of the total directives in our corpus, 65.2% (2916
out of 4470) constitute imperatives. Table 2 presents the data in summary form.
In other work, I have shown that, as a whole, the proportion claimed by
imperatives in the Greek database differs significantly from that in my Roman
Comedy database, the latter corpus representing all the directives in extant
Roman comedies: Plautus and Terence. From this Roman comedy corpus
imperatives claim 58.4% of the total directives.17 Note the difference, between
this proportion (58.4%) and that for the Greek corpus, 65.2%: it is statistic-
17 Barrios-Lech (forthcoming).
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ally significant. Also notice we are not comparing only comedy with comedy,
that is Plautus and Terence on the one hand (of all directives 58.4% are imper-
atives) with Greek comedy and mime on the other (66.0%). If we did, the
difference between the resulting proportions would be even less likely to be
owing to chance.
We have corroboration for Dickey’s claim: compared to Roman speakers,
Greek speakers appear to have been significantly more inclined to employ
the imperative whenever they needed to command, request, instruct, permit,
advise, and suggest. Of course, the question naturally arises: what accounts for
this difference?
The type of social structure which organised relations between members of
a communitymayhavemuch to dowith this difference. In a typicalGreekpolis,
élites ormembers of the ‘in-group’ lived together as equals, whether thesewere
citizens of fifth-century Athens or the ὁμοῖοι of Sparta. The absence of hier-
archical relations between individuals means that the imperative, when used,
lacks a context thatwould give it the value of ‘order’.18 By contrast, élite Romans
were hyper-aware of factors like auctoritas—roughly the social influence of a
person—and dignitas—the esteem to which his standing in society, his family,
and accomplishments entitled him. Differences in the dignitas and auctoritas
between speaker and hearer needed to be taken into account by the speaker.
The resulting wariness about the other’s status relative to one’s own, and the
heightened fear of potentially injuring the other with an untoward remark,
might result in the relatively lower proportion of imperatives we see in our
Roman texts.19
4.2 HowOften Did the Ancient Greeks Soften Their Imperatives?
4.2.1 Positively and Negatively Polite Softeners; or ‘Polite Boosters’ and
‘Polite Down-Toners’
To anticipate a little, the Greeks in our period seemed disinclined to use what
we would consider the most obvious candidates for ‘please’, again, words like
ἀντιβολῶ σε, πρὸς θεῶν, ἱκετεύω. Dickey demonstrates not only that these are
rarely used, but that they did not go down the path of grammaticalisation over
time (Dickey 2016a: 242–243, 245–246). Nevertheless, let us try to characterise
the Greek ‘words for please.’ On the one hand, ‘polite boosters’, entreaty-words,
simultaneously make the request urgent and ingratiate the speaker with the
18 Dickey (2016a: 249) and (2016b).
19 Barrios-Lech (forthcoming) on the Roman disinclination to the present imperative com-
pared to the Greek; on social factors, see Unceta-Gómez (2009: 43) and Kaster (2005: 28):
the relevant social emotion is uerecundia.
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addressee. Vocatives, for instance γλυκεῖα ‘honey’ or φίλτατε ‘dearest’, appeal
to the hearer’s close connection with the speaker, or instantly forge such a
close connection (much like the British-English address-term ‘love’). In Greek,
we also have ‘polite down-toners’, words that minimise (μόνον, ‘just’ do this)
or βραχύ (‘just a bit’); and phrases that make the imposition optional for the
hearer, like εἰ δοκεῖ. A listing of what I consider polite words may be found in
Appendix 2.
Two concepts familiar in politeness theory can help us to organise this data:
negative and positive politeness.20 Positive politeness emphasises a connec-
tion with the addressee (‘hey brother, can you spare a dime?’; or ‘be a dear and
hand me my scarf, will you?’), while negative politeness maintains respectful
distance from the addressee (‘I was wondering if you wouldn’t mind covering
my shift this Wednesday’ or ‘Sir, may I offer you some advice?’). These terms
form part of a theory of Politeness meant to describe modern politeness cul-
tures, but they have proven useful in studies of the language of ancient Greek
and Latin.21
Positively polite, then, is Habrotonon’s—the good courtesan in Menander’s
Epitrepontes—request of a youngwoman.Habrotonon, aware that her address-
ee may in fact be the mother of an abandoned child, asks a key question:
[7] Menander Epitrepontes 862–863
λέγε μοι, γλυκεῖα, πέρυσιν ἦ[λθ]ες ἐπὶ θ[έαν
τοῖς Ταυροπολίοις ε[
Tell me, honey, did you go last year to the Tauropolia?
The vocative γλυκεῖα, here, expresses the courtesan’s affection for the young
woman; similar is φίλτατε (or φιλτάτη), ‘one of the most common friendship
terms and expresses very strong and genuine affection’ (Dickey 1996: 358). This,
too, can express positive politeness. The nurse in Menander’s Dyscolus makes
a positively polite request of her addressee, to go down a well to rescue the
misanthrope—in addition to a mattock—that have fallen in. Certainly, this is
not a routine request, nor is she in the position to bemaking requests—she is a
servant—so shemust frame it politely: φίλτατε, κατάβα. (Dys. 632). It bears not-
20 The seminal text is that of Brown and Levinson (1978), reprinted with new introduction
in 1987.
21 A full bibliography is not possible here: for a good starting point in Greek, see Denizot
(2011); for Latin, see now Unceta-Gómez (2018).
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ing that her addressee, the cook Sikon, is also of low-status. In fact, the cookhad
made a similar request of the old woman, to ‘finish the work’ by throwing rocks
on top of the unlikeable old man in order to murder him. The cook softens the
urgent—and joking—appealwith the similarὦφιλτάτη γραῦ (‘It’s your jobnow,
love, to take a mortar or a stone and thrown it down on him’: ὦ φιλτάτη γραῦ,
νῦν σὸν ἔργον ἐστί […] ὅλμον τιν’ ἢ λίθον τιν’ ἢ τοιοῦτό τι ἄνωθεν ἔνσεισον λαβοῦσα.
Men. Dys. 630–632).
I havementioned that entreaty-words like ἀντιβολῶ σε and ἱκετεύω ingratiate
the speaker with the hearer. They would appear to be tokens of positive polite-
ness, but prove, in practice, more difficult to classify. Consider the following
passage, in which Dicaeopolis asks Euripides for some rags so he can dress up
like Telephus and take a charcoal basket hostage (just as Telephus had taken
the baby Orestes hostage in the lost Euripides play).
[8] Aristophanes Acharnians 431
τούτου δὸς ἀντιβολῶ σέ μοι τὰ σπάργανα.
Give me, I beg you, the rags of this man.
ἀντιβολῶ may count as an instance of positive politeness, since with it the
speaker pays the addressee the compliment of elevating his or her status, while
humbling himself. But this move, self-humbling, distances self from other. So
ἀντιβολῶ and the like may function as a negative politeness particle—this is
how Sorrentino (2013: 191–192) sees it, for example. In either case, such entreat-
ies leave the addressee very little option to refuse fulfilling the request. When
we consider what other words appear alongside the recurrent ἀντιβολῶ σε and
ἱκετεύω, we find both positively polite addresses like ὦ φίλτατ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί
(Ar. Nub. 110), but also the negatively polite ὦ δέσποτα (Ar. Eq. 960). Most fre-
quent alongside ἀντιβολῶ are strengtheners like ἴθι and ἄγε. Similarly, when ἱκε-
τεύω appearswith othermodifiers, we find bothpositively andnegatively polite
modifiers. In my data, however, ἱκετεύω never co-occurs with strengtheners, so
that there is a case to bemade either that, of the two, it was the less-urgent form
of entreaty.22
These ‘entreaty’ words originate from the language of prayers. In prayers
words like ἱκετεύω convey the relationship between god and the worshiper,
22 Of course, one could make the opposite argument: that it was already urgent enough so
that no added strengtheners were felt necessary.
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at once distant and intimate, so that, appearing with ‘entreaty’ words we find
intimate addresses like the diminutive Ὦρμήιδιον ‘dear little Hermes’ (μή νυν
λακήσηις, λίσσομαί σ’, Ὦρμήιδιον, Ar. Pax 382), as well as distancing addresses
like Θεσμοφόρω πολυποτνία, ‘O Almighty Goddesses of the Thesmophoria’, ad-
dressed to Persephone and Demeter (ἀντόμεθ’, ὦ Θεσμοφόρω πολυποτνία, Ar.
Thesm. 1155).
Dickey (2016a: 243) also acknowledges that these entreatywords are difficult
to categorise. She prefers to see them as ‘markedly’ polite, since they deviate
from the otherwise unmarked ways of carrying out requests. It makes sense,
then, to count them as a different kind of strategy altogether.
Let us consider the following passage which illustrates another kind of neg-
ative politeness, that is, ‘minimising’ requests with phrases like, βραχ[ύ τί:
[9] Menander Dyscolus 299–300 (Sostratos, the city youth, replies to the
rustic youth, Gorgias)
μειράκιον, οὕτως εὐτυχοίης, βραχ[ύ τί μου
ἄκουσον.
Young man, may you be fortunate, listen for just a little while.
We first consider the context. Gorgias had accused the rich young man Sostra-
tos of abusing his privilege by taking advantage of a poor youngwoman (in fact,
Gorgias’ sister). Sostratos, innocent of the charge, will clear himself, but first he
needs to secure Gorgias’ attention and good will. It is a crucial moment.23
Dickey (1996: 74) notes that in Menander, the address-term μειράκιον
‘appears to be a neutral one, and the usage from one youth to another, as in
Lucian, is more polite than otherwise.’ The vocative is typical in addresses from
one youth to another, so that we may take μειράκιον ‘young man’ as unmarked;
that is, it is expected in this kind of interaction.24 βραχ[ύ τί (‘some little bit’),
however, is clearly needed as some form of ‘extra’ politeness: the unmarked
request form will not do, after all. Gorgias is not known to Sostratos, nor can
Sostratos be sure that Gorgias wants to listen. So the rich youth promises
that the imposition will be a small one, thus indicating respect for Gorgias,
23 Sorrentino (2013: 259–260, 272) notes the difference in their approaches, with Sostratos
inclining to positive politeness; Gorgias by contrast prefers off-record strategies and neg-
ative politeness.
24 The address-term varies according to context: for analysis of usage in Menander, see Sor-
rentino (2013: 257 n. 46).
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as someone who does not deserve or want to be imposed upon at all. He fur-
thermore adds a positively-polite device, wishing Gorgias’ success in the future
(οὕτως εὐτυχοίης), a recurrent, if infrequent ‘polite booster’.
The particular polite value of vocatives—a favoured means of softening
directives—depends on the context. When the chorus in Acharnians tell the
Theban guest to take a sycophant with him, they make the request polite by
adding the address term ὦ ξένων βέλτιστε: ‘ “reap” him too, in your harvest,
and add him to your cargo, bringing him wherever you want, an informer for
all occasions.’ (ἀλλ’, ὦ ξένων βέλτιστε, συνθέριζε καὶ πρόσβαλλ’ ὅποι βούλει φέρων
πρὸς πάντα συκοφάντην, Ar. Ach. 948–949). Dickey (1996: 139) classifies this as
a friendship term, but notes its usages vary depending on the author. Outside
of Plato ‘authors do not make a […] distinction between βέλτιστε and other
friendship terms.’ She adds (1996: 139), however, that in Menander, the term is
‘polite and respectful’ but it can be used in moments where the speaker claims
superiority over the addressee. I have, in general, classified all friendship terms
as positively polite. I acknowledge here that, since other readers may classify
a given vocative differently, the classification that I rely on for this essay must
remain provisional.
4.2.2 Analysing the Data—Polite Boosters and Down-Toners in the
Greek Directive Database
Scrutiny of the 2063 imperatives in Aristophanes reveals 239 softeners; this
means that in Aristophanes, imperatives are softened 11.6% of the time. In
Menander, 11.2% of all the imperatives are softened (66 out of 586), and in
Plato’s Cratylus, 11.8% of the imperatives are modified (6 out of 51). The relev-
ant statistical test shows no significant difference amongst these proportions.25
In other words, we see a surprising continuity across genres and time-periods
in this respect—at least for the Athens-centred authors.
In Herodas’ Mimes, however, 8.5% of the imperatives are softened (11 out
of 129), and the proportion does differ significantly from that given for our
Athenian corpus. Herodas, a coeval of Callimachus, probably had connections
with the court of Ptolemy II (Cunningham 1971: 2–3), and his mimes convey
scenes from the everyday life of individuals inhabiting the lower strata of soci-
ety. Consider some representative situations: in the first mime, a maid advises
a courtesan; in the second, a pimp delivers a courtroom speech; in the fifth, a
woman accuses a slave she has been sleeping with of infidelity; in the sixth
and seventh, women discuss and shop for βαυβῶνες. As for the mimes from
25 According to the z-test; see above n. 14.
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the Roman imperial period (collected and edited in Cunningham 2004), these
show 9.0%, or 7 softeners out of 78 imperatives, similar to the figure that we
find in Herodas. The figures for Herodas and imperial mime do not differ signi-
ficantly, but we have very little data, making statistical tests unreliable.
The Athenian corpus—consisting of different authors writing in different
genres and at different times—shows a surprising stability in the percentage of
imperatives softened. That continuity is put into striking relief when we com-
pare texts written outside of Athens—the mimes of Herodas—or those texts
written during the Roman imperial era.
If we compare data from Roman texts, we can better appreciate the sta-
bility of the politeness system across the various Attic texts. In the plays of
Plautus and Terence, 9.8% and 15.4% respectively of the total imperatives
in each author are softened. If we compare, again, two authors quite similar
in their approach to the genre, Menander (11.2% of all the imperatives are
softened) and Terence (15.4% softened), the difference is significant. Further
let us compare two similar texts, the Cratylus of Plato and the de Oratore of
Cicero, a dialogue on the place of oratory within the traditional ‘academic’ dis-
ciplines. In Plato’s dialogue, we found that 11.8% of imperatives are softened (6
out of 51); while in Cicero’s 17% of the present imperatives are softened (7 of
41).
4.3 What Kind of Politeness Did the Greeks Incline To?
We saw that about 11–12% of the imperatives are softened in our Attic Greek
corpus.When we comparedMenander with Terence and Platonic with Cicero-
nian dialogue, we appreciated the Greek disinclination to soften imperatives
compared to Latin authors. This difference may point to an underlying reality
in language use.
The distinction noted between negative and positive politeness can help us
to characterise our data in another, general, way. And one may ask, of the two,
which kind did theGreeks incline to? Before beginning, Imust admit tomisgiv-
ings.We have already seen that entreaties performboth positive and negatively
polite functions, so that I have found it impossible to categorise the entreaty as
one or the other.
As we saw above, entreaty performs both negatively and positively polite
functions at once, so that I thought it best to consider it a separate category. In
general, we see a preference for positively polite softeners in Aristophanes (see
Table 3).
When we compare the Menandrian and Aristophanic corpora (see Tables 3
and 4), we find that are no significant differences in the proportions for Aristo-
phanes and those calculated for Menander. That is, as far as softened imper-
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table 3 Percentage of softeners that are negative, positively
polite in Aristophanes
Softeners NP PP Entreaty
Total softeners 239 71 126 42
Percent of total 100% 29.7% 52.7% 17.6%
table 4 Percentage of softeners that are negative, positively
polite in Menander
Softeners NP PP Entreaty
Total softeners 66 23 26 17
Percent of total 100% 34.8% 39.4% 25.8%
atives go, the sets of data—negative, positive, and entreaty-type imperative
softeners—come from the same population, and that population can be char-
acterised as either (1.) the language of Athenian comedy; or (2.) the colloquial
idiom of Athens.
Let us turn to the Platonic subcorpus. Here, we find 10 imperative softeners.
Of these imperative softeners in Cratylus, 6 are negatively polite (60%) and 4
are positively polite (40%); one entreaty-form is used, representing 10% of the
total softeners. The relevant statistical test indicates no significant difference
between our Platonic subcorpus and either the Aristophanic or Menandrian.
But we would need more data to be certain of this result; for with the data we
have the test is not reliable.
Let us tentatively conclude from this agreement across our three Attic
genres—OldComedy, NewComedy, and Platonic dialogue—that the language
of Greekpoliteness across theperiodweare considering showsa stability that is
perhaps surprising. While we can interpret the continuities we have observed,
with Dickey, as owing to the conservativism of authors using an established
literary idiom, I personally am inclined to think that those regularities across
different authors point to actual and pervasive habits of speech. To character-
ise the politeness culture, however, will take a more ample study than can be
attempted here: we need to take into account more relevant data from Plato’s
and Xenophon’s dialogues and to consider other kinds of im/politeness phe-
nomena.
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table 5 Percentage of softeners that are negative, positively
polite in Herodas
Softeners NP PP Entreaty
Total softeners 11 3 7 1
Percent of total 100% 27.3% 63.6% 9.1%
Let us now consider the Mime subcorpora, both the mimes written by
Herodas and those dating from the Roman imperial era. These give us an
indication—although no firm proof—that the polite language—specifically
the softeners—of the Attic authors stands apart.
Under a third of the softeners are negatively polite; nearly two-thirds are
positively polite. There are very few data, and even fewer from the imperial-
era mime, where all of the strategies consist of respectful vocatives like κυρία
and δέσποινα. For our data (culled from imperial-era mime), the use of these
vocatives appears to be a negatively polite strategy (although I grant that such
characterisations retain an element of subjectivity).
In particular, and again, for the imperial period, the addresses κύριε and
κυρίαderived fromaGreek translation for the Latindomine. Their use increased
in the second century CE; the forms could be directed equally to superiors
as to friends, relatives, and equals. In the same century, δέσποτα and δέσποινα
weremost often used toward superiors.26The evidence fromourRoman imper-
ial mime database shows the forms being directed in all cases to superiors.27
Indeed, there are too few data to perform a reliable statistical test. Future work
will need to look at texts imitating spontaneous speech from the later periods.
Probablymost illuminatingwill be to consider thewealthof data available from
the second sophistic, and particularly the dialogues of Lucian; and compare
these with the conclusions given here, for Athens.
26 Dickey (2001: 3–5; and 8–9) for analysis of δέσποτα and κύριε, respectively, in the imperial
period. All examples of the vocative κυρία in my mime database come from the papyrus
P.Oxy. 413 (accessible both in the Cunningham volume and also in the Loeb edition, Page
[1941: no. 76]), dated to the Roman Imperial period, second century CE.
27 In P.Oxy. 413, at lines 27, 42, 107, 123, 135, a (presumably) lower-status character addresses
a superior (I say ‘presumably’ because the state of the papyrus permits only guesses at
speaker-identity for some verses). In the same papyrus at line 106, Charition prays to a
goddess, addressing her with δέσποινα.
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table 6 The top 4 styles of politeness used in Aristophanes
Type of softener Totals
vocatives, Positive Politeness (e.g. φίλτατε) 79
ἀντιβολῶ type (words of entreaty) 42
vocatives, Negative Politeness (e.g. ὦ πότνια) 41
minimise (e.g βραχύ τι) 9
table 7 The top 4 politeness
styles used in Menander





4.4 What Kinds of Polite Expression Are Used?
Tables 6 and 7 show the fourmost recurrent Politeness strategies in our comed-
ies. Other kinds of Politeness are used, of course, but these are by far the most
prevalent. Appendix 2 lists other kinds of politeness that we find in the Aris-
tophanes corpus, in addition to the types mentioned above. What do we find
in Menander, writing about a century later, in a different genre, and under a
different regime?
Again, we find continuities. Even though entreaty words like ἀντιβολῶ and
ἱκετεύω never did go down the path of grammaticalisation, and even though
the Greeks, compared to the Romans, were disinclined to soften their imperat-
ives, when they did, words of entreaty were often used, as were vocatives. Here,
again, there is a stark difference from the material we find in the Latin data,
where vocatives were significantly less often used.28
28 Barrios-Lech (forthcoming); on entreaty-words in the Greek data, see Dickey (2016a:
246).
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table 8 Politeness styles used in
Herodas’ Mimes
Type of softener Totals
vocatives PP 3






The data fromHerodas can be considered, even though there are too few items
for reliable conclusions to be drawn.
Here, vocatives again stand out as a recurrent means for softening imperat-
ives. The expression of a wish in the addressee’s benefit, that is, variations on
‘may you be blessed’ οὕ]τως ὄναιο (Men. Pk. 400), recurs as a politeness phrase
throughout our corpus, and appears twice in Herodas. It may have been a col-
loquial feature.29 Herodas diverges from what we have seen in the types of
expression used, particularly the use of hedges like εἰ φιλεῖς με and formulas
like οὕτως ὄναιο. The latter do appear in Aristophanes andMenander but claim
only a small percentage of the total softeners (though it should be noted that
expressions like οὕτως ὄναιο are used fifth-most-often in Menander).
The figures from the mimes presented in Cunningham’s Teubner volume
also diverge from the corpus of Greek comedy: there, all seven imperative
softeners are negatively polite. Six of the total seven are vocatives, which, as
we have seen, is a characteristically Greek way to soften imperatives. We also
find one minimiser (μόνον, ‘just’ do). These latter texts date mainly to Rome’s
imperial period.
Thus, it looks like theAttic subcorpus, consistingof all theplays of Menander
and Aristophanes, as well as Plato show stability in the percentage of imperat-
ives softened and the kinds of politeness used. The mime corpus stands apart,
but that divergence may be only an illusion, since our mime subcorpus yields
29 Ferri (2015: 503–504) collects some examples of this and related expressions. It was prob-
ably a polite formula, with elegant variations possible.
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few data to work with. To appreciate the uniqueness of the politeness system
in the Attic subcorpus, we will need more ample data from a different place or
time; a suitable candidate will be the Greek of the second sophistic, when the
Hellenistic world will have felt the impact of Romanisation.30
Appendix 1: Types of Directives, Aristophanes (Items in Bold Are
Polite)31
– 1st plural hortatory subjunctive (ex. Ach. 627 the chorus has been convinced
by Dicaeopolis. They exhort each other to take off their garments and begin
the anapests): ἀλλ’ ἀποδύντες τοῖς ἀναπαίστοις ἐπίωμεν.32
– Questions
– 2nd person future indicative in a question (ex. Ach. 55, the divine Amphi-
theos, under arrest by Skythian archers, calls upon the gods for help): ὦ
Τριπτόλεμε καὶ Κελεέ, περιόψεσθέ με; negative with μή: Eccl. 1145; negative
with οὐ μὴ (ex. Nub. 367, Strepsiades asks whether Zeus isn’t a god, and
Socrates replies): ποῖος Ζεύς; οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις· οὐδ’ ἔστι Ζεύς.33
– 1st person plural future indicative in a question (ex. Lys. 356).
– οὐκ + 2nd person future indicative in a question (ex. Ach. 822, see below for
context): οὐκ ἀφήσεις τὸν σάκον;34
– 2nd person present or perfect indicative in a question (ex. Ach. 483–484,
Dicaeopolis encourages his spirit to go forward and debate with the
Acharnian charcoalmakers): πρόβαινε νῦν,ὦ θυμέ γραμμὴ δ’ αὑτηί. ἕστηκας;
οὐκ εἶ, καταπιὼν Εὐριπίδην; negativewith οὐ: see e.g. Eccl. 46–47 (Praxagora
calling attention to a woman approaching): τὴν Σμικυθίωνος δ’ οὐχ ὁρᾶις
Μελιστίχην σπεύδουσαν ἐν ταῖς ἐμβάσιν;
– βούλει μή + infinitive in a question (ex. Ach. 1112, Dicaeopolis to the general
Lamachus): ὦνθρωπε, βούλει μὴ βλέπειν εἰς τὰς κίχλας;35
30 For one step in this direction, see Dickey (2009).
31 The items marked as polite are requests documented as polite in the secondary literat-
ure; if the item is not in bold, it is either not polite; its politeness is context-dependent;
or I have not been able yet to ascertain its politeness. I refer throughout in the notes for
further reading to Denizot (2011), an up to date and comprehensive account of the Greek
directive.
32 Polite: Denizot (2011: 268).
33 On the difficulty of identifying the former as true questions, see Denizot (2011: 457): on
the latter, with οὐ μή, see Denizot (2011: 476–483): not polite.
34 Impolite: Denizot (2011: 469–473).
35 Polite; but can be used to convey ironic politeness: Denizot (2011: 458–459).
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– τί (οὐ) + present or perfect (ex. Ach. 410, Euripides tells Dicaeopolis to keep
quiet): τί λέλακας;
– Tag questions (ex. Ran. 522 and 526, Xanthias in the latter asks Dionysus
not to take the Heracles costume from him): τί δ’ ἐστίν; οὔ τί πού μ’ ἀφελέ-
σθαι διανοεῖ ἅδωκας αὐτός;
– ‘Whynot’-questions (ex. Ran. 635–636, whereDionysus suggests that since
Xanthias is a god, he should get beaten too): τί δῆτ’, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ φὴις εἶναι
θεός, οὐ καὶ σὺ τύπτει τὰς ἴσας πληγὰς ἐμοί;
– Statements
– 2nd person future indicative in a statement with κλάων: (ex. Ach. 822, the
informer tries to seize contraband from a Megarian): κλάων μεγαριεῖς,
‘you’ll be sorry if you side with the Megarians’.36
– 1st person future indicative in a statement (ex. Lys. 1230).
– οὐ μή + 2nd person present indicative in a statement (ex. Ach. 165–166, the
ambassador tells Dicaeopolis not to approach the Thracian mercenaries,
as they are primed to fight like cocks): ὦ μόχθηρε σύ οὐ μὴ πρόσει τούτοισιν
ἐσκοροδισμένοις.37
– 1st person plural aorist indicative (ex. Lys. 181–182, the title character
recommends thewomen swear an oath): τί δῆτα ταῦτ’ οὐχὡς τάχιστα,Λαμ-






– Aorist Infinitive (ex. Ach. 130–131, Dicaeopolis asks Amphitheos to go
secure a peace treaty): ἐμοὶ σὺ ταυτασὶ λαβὼν ὀκτὼ δραχμὰς σπονδὰς ποι-
ῆσαι πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους μόνωι.
– Present Infinitive (ex. Ach. 172, the herald tells the Thracians to come the
next day): τοὺς Θρᾶικας ἀπιέναι, παρεῖναι δ’ εἰς ἕνην.39
36 Speech act value and politeness of the 2nd person future indicative in statements are
highly context-dependent; when used alone like this they tend to be impolite: see Denizot
(2011: 431–433).
37 A strong prohibition: see further Olson (2002: ad loc.).
38 Here we might be tempted to see an example of what Lloyd (1999: 33–35, esp. 33) calls
‘[t]he distancing effect of the tragic aorist’ which ‘is often used tomake a verbmore polite
than it would have been in the present’. But these types of question with τί and the aorist
do also convey urgent commands: see Denizot (2011: 460).
39 On the infinitive, a neutral form, most like the imperative in its morphology, see Denizot
(2011: 336–339).
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– SpeechActVerb (ex. Ach. 169, Dicaeopolis does not want to have an assembly
called about the matter of wages for the Thracian mercenaries): ἀλλ’ ἀπαγο-
ρεύω μὴ ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν τοῖς Θραιξὶ περὶ μισθοῦ.40
– Impersonals41
– δοκεῖ + infinitive (ex. Ran. 687–688, the chorus makes a suggestion to the
audience): πρῶτον οὖν ἡμῖν δοκεῖ ἐξισῶσαι τοὺς πολίτας κἀφελεῖν τὰ δεί-
ματα
– χρή + infinitive
– δεῖ + infinitive (ex. Ach. 233, the chorus looks for the person who has con-
cluded a separate peace with Sparta): ἀλλὰ δεῖ ζητεῖν τὸν ἄνδρα
– ἔστι + infinitive (ex. Pl. 576–577, Dicaeopolis allows Peloponnesians to
trade with him): σκέψασθαι δ’ ἔστι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τῶν παίδων, ‘it’s possible to
see this especially using the example of children’ (= ‘consider the example
of children’).42
– ὥρα ’στίν + infinitive (ex. Ach. 393, Dicaeopolis steels himself to go visit
Euripides): ὥρα ’στὶν ἁρμοῖ καρτερὰν ψυχὴν λαβεῖν·
– Verbal Adjective in -τός, -τέος (ex. Ach. 221, Chorus looking for Dicaeopolis):
οἴχεται. διωκτέος δέ; I find only two directives with the verbal adjectives
with -τός and these are questionable; see perhaps Ar. Ach. 618: ὦ δημοκρα-
τία ταῦτα δῆτ’ ἀνασχετά; and Ar. Lys. 656 ἆρα γρυκτόν ἐστιν ὑμῖν; ‘can you
possibly grumble?’
– εἰκός + copula + infinitive (ex. Eccl. 493–494, the chorus of women does
not want to wait): ὥστ’ εἰκὸς ἡμᾶς μὴ βραδύνειν ἔστ’ ἐπαναμενούσας πώγω-
νας ἐξηρτημένας
– σὸν ἔργον + infinitive (ex. Eccl. 514, where the chorus asks Praxagora to tell
them what the next task is): σὸν δ’ ἔργον τἄλλα διδάσκειν
– Conditional Clause
– εἰ + 2nd person present indicative, 2nd person future indicative (ex. Nub.
413–414, the chorus of Clouds addresses Strepsiades): ὡς εὐδαίμων ἐν Ἀθη-
ναίοις καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι γενήσει, εἰ μνήμων εἶ; negative with μή.
– εἰ + 2nd future indicative (usually in threats, ex. Ach. 564–565, οὗτος σύ, ποῖ
θεῖς; οὐ μενεῖς; ὡς εἰ θενεῖς τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, αὐτὸς ἀρθήσει τάχα)
40 The politeness value will, of course, very much depend on the speech-act verb. Here ἀπα-
γορεύω presents a strong prohibition.
41 On the deontic impersonals, see Denizot (2011: 400–409): since these propose the action
as something that ‘should or ought’ to be done, they can be used to express polite direct-
ives.
42 These can have a directive function in the right context; admittedly interpretation is dif-
ficult, and opinions will vary on whether a given example counts as a directive.
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– ἤν + present or aorist subjunctive, future indicative (usually in threats, ex.
Ach. 968; but also advice, ex. Nub. 1009): ἢν δ’ ἀπολιγαίνηι (‘bluster’), τοὺς
ἀγορανόμους καλῶ
– εἰ μή + future indicative, οὐ(κ) ἄν + aorist optative (ex. Eccl. 162–163, Praxa-
gora insists the women get things right before they proceed in disguise to
the all-male assembly): ἐκκλησιάσουσ’ οὐκ ἂν προβαίην τὸν πόδα τὸν ἕτερον,
εἰ μὴ ταῦτ’ ἀκριβωθήσεται
– (ὅρα) ὅπως + 2nd person future indicative (ex. Ach. 253–254, Dicaeopolis asks
his daughter to lead a procession in honor of Dionysus): ἄγ’, ὦ θύγατερ, ὅπως
τὸ κανοῦν καλὴ καλῶς οἴσεις; for variant with ὅρα, see Eccl. 300.
– Prohibitives
– μή+2nd /3rdpersonaorist subjunctive (ex. Ach. 334, the chorus tries to pre-
vent Dicaeopolis from murdering a charcoal basket, à la Telephus): ἀλλὰ
μὴ δράσηις ὃ μέλλεις, μηδαμῶς, ὢ μηδαμῶς
– μή + 2nd /3rd person present imperative (ex. Ach. 334, the chorus does not
want to hearDicaeopolis’ request): οὐκ ἀνασχήσομαι· μηδὲ λέγε μοι σὺ λόγον
– μή + 2nd person present subjunctive (ex. Eccl. 437):
– Optative
– οὐ(κ) + 1st person aorist plural optative + ἄν (ex. Lys. 309; the chorus
of old men exhort each other to kindle the fire and charge the gates):
οὔκουν ἄν, εἰ τὼ μὲν ξύλω θείμεσθα πρῶτον αὐτοῦ, τῆς ἀμπέλου δ’ εἰς τὴν
χύτραν τὸν φανὸν ἐγκαθέντες ἅψαντες εἶτ’ εἰς τὴν θύραν κριηδὸν ἐμπέσοι-
μεν.
– 2nd person present optative + ἄν (ex. Eccl. 132, Praxagora tells someone to
speak in the mock-assembly): λέγοις ἄν (but see Ran. 436, Dionysus to his
slave: αἴροι’ ἂν αὖθις, ὦ παῖ.)43
– εἴθε + 2nd person aorist optative in awish-like construction (ex. Eq. 618–619,
where the Knights ask the sausage-seller to relate what happened in the
council chamber): εἴθ’ ἐπέλθοις ἅπαντά μοι σαφῶς.
– 2nd person aorist optative, (ex.Men. Pk. 720–721) ἃ δὲ λέγεις δείξαις ἀληθῶς
ὄντ’, also ἔχουσα δέ μοι μόλοις εἰρήνην φιλέορτον (Ar. Thesm. 1146–1147, in a
prayer to Athena; cf. Thesm. 368–371; and 1229–1231).44
43 See Schwyzer and Debrunner (1966: 329) on the use of the potential optative as a polite
form ‘einer Willensäußerung, Bitte, Aufforderung’. But the expression may not be polite
per se; context will be important in determining whether it is polite or not. For, as in the
the example from Aristophanes’ Frogs, cited above, the 2nd person present optative + ἄν
can also be used to express peremptory commands; see also, from a tragedy, Soph. El. 1491
(Orestes to Aegisthus): χωροῖς ἂν εἴσω σὺν τάχει. We might have here instances of ‘ironic
politeness’ where politeness is employed to express its opposite.
44 On this kind of optative, where the speaker dissociates himself from the ‘situation d’énon-
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– οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις + participle: (ex. Eccl. 118, Praxagora exhorts a woman to put
her beard on): οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις τὸ γένειον ἂν περιδουμένη.45
– Verbless Imperatives (ex. Ach. 864, Dicaeopolis speaking to the Theban and
his daughters who have come to his door): οἱ σφῆκες οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν θυρῶν;
Appendix 2: Types of Politeness Used in Greek Comedy
Type of softener / Politeness type Example phrase
ἀντιβολῶ type: entreat the Speaker (S).
Positive and Negative Politeness.46
τούτου δὸς ἀντιβολῶ σέ μοι τὰ σπάργανα
(Ar. Ach. 431)
Point out a previous favour the Addressee
(A) had done. Positive Politeness.47
Εὐριπίδη, ’πειδήπερ ἐχαρίσω ταδί, κἀκεῖνά
μοι δὸς τἀκόλουθα τῶν ῥακῶν (Ar. Ach. 438)
Point out that requested act is typical;
one that A has done before, often. Positive
Politeness.48
Εὐριπίδη, Εὐριπίδιον, ὑπάκουσον, εἴπερ
τώποτ’ ἀνθρώπων τινί (Ar. Ach. 405)
Minimise. Negative Politeness.49 μόνον
Don’t assume A is willing. Negative Polite-
ness.50
αἰ λῆις (Ar. Ach. 772)
Don’t assume A has time. Negative Polite-
ness.51
σὺ δ’ ἢν σχολάσηις, πάσηι τέχνηι πρὸς ἑσπέ-
ραν ἐλθὼν ἐκείνηι τὴν βάλανον ἐνάρμοσον’
(Ar. Lys. 411–412)
ciation’, expressing a desire, and leaving it up to others to carry out the implicit request,
see Denizot (2011: 445–455).
45 On this as a prevalently polite act, see Denizot (2011: 468).
46 Brown and Levinson (21987): positive politeness strategy 2 (pp. 106–108): ‘Exaggerate
(interest, approval, sympathy with H)’ and negative politeness strategies 5 (178–187) ‘Give
deference’, see esp. Brown and Levinson [21987: 178]) and 6 ‘Admit the impingement’ (188–
189). From now on, strategies identified and page ranges will come from Brown and Lev-
inson (21987). ‘S’ refers to speaker; ‘H’ to hearer.
47 Positive politeness strategy 14 ‘Assume or assert reciprocity’ (129).
48 Positive politeness strategies 7 ‘Presuppose, raise, assert common ground’ (117–124) and 14
‘Assume or assert reciprocity’ (129). Ar. Nub. 357.
49 Negative politeness strategy 4 ‘Minimize the imposition’ (176–178).
50 Ar. Lys. 1188. Negative politeness strategy 2 ‘Don’t assume H is willing/able’ (145–172,
esp. 162–163).
51 Negative politeness strategy 2 ‘Don’t assume H is willing/able’ (145–172, esp. 162–163).
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(cont.)
Type of softener / Politeness type Example phrase
Out of respect or love for god, standards,
parents, etc. Negative Politeness.52
ἀλλ’ εἴ τι κήδει Δερκέτου Φυλασίου, ὑπά-
λειψον εἰρήνηι με τὠφθαλμὼ ταχύ (Ar. Ach.
1028–1029)
Express wish of some benefit for A. Posit-
ive Politeness.53
σεαυτῆς οὕτως κατόναι’ (Ar. Eccl. 915)
Show that you take the A into consid-
eration in some way. Positive Polite-
ness.54
ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ μάχιμος εἶ, ἐς τἀπὶ Θράικης ἀπο-
πέτου κἀκεῖ μάχου (Ar. Av. 1368–1369)
Promise something to A. Positive Polite-
ness.55
ὦ φίλ’Ἑρμῆ ξύλλαβε ἡμῖν προθύμως τήνδε
καὶ ξυνέλκυσον.
καί σοι τὰ μεγάλ’ ἡμεῖς Παναθήναι’ ἄξο-
μεν (Ar. Pax 416–418)
Vocatives PP Εὐριπίδιον, ὦ γλυκύτατον καὶ φίλτατον (Ar.
Ach. 478)
Vocatives NP ἰὼ Λάμαχ’, ὦ βλέπων ἀστραπάς (Ar. Ach.
568)
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The present chapter examines several pragmatic aspects of giving advice in
Roman comedy, a speech act particularly concerned with the speakers’ self-
representation and their social bonds during critical moments of the plot.
While orders and threats are mechanisms of exerting power and dominance,
good advice in comedy serves to portray father-son and amical relations on
stage (Raccanelli 1998: 190). On the other hand, seeking, giving, and receiving
advice—planned over many utterances—comprises entire scenes, in which
interlocutors manage rapport, while the pragmatic meaning emerges from
the on-going interaction. Accordingly, the studies on advice describe multiple
possibilities of expressing advice and acknowledge ‘a certain fuzziness of the
concept itself ’ (Locher 2012: 7), which is also recognised in Latin scholarship
(e.g. Unceta Gómez 2009: 33–34; Barrios-Lech 2016: 274). The following pages
set out to address the complexity of the phenomenon of advising in Plautus
and Terence, its discursive realisation and its contribution to the Latin system
of politeness, as represented in the comedy texts. To this end, I will need to
combine various pragmatic perspectives. The speech-act theoretical descrip-
tion of advising (Section 2) will be followed by its analysis in light of the
research on im/politeness (Section 3–4). In doing so, I ammost indebted to two
studies on Latin directives and their im/politeness value: Risselada (1993) and
Barrios-Lech (2016).1 The existing accounts, arguably, can be further developed
by a data-driven analysis of Latin conceptualisations of advising and its con-
sequences for the management of social relations.
In addition, the formulation of speech acts will be investigated in relation to
their position within an interaction (Section 5) as described by Conversational
1 Cabrillana (2016) combines pragmatics with a sociolinguistic approach to all directive sub-
types in one comedy. For studies on Latin requests, see Dickey (2012, 2016). According to
UncetaGómez (2018: 13), the directive speech acts are a quintessence of face-threatening acts
(see Section 3) and, hence, they are a core issue for the im/politeness studies also in Classical
languages.
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table 1 Giving advice in twelve comedies by Plau-
tus and Terence
Plautus Terence Total
advisory episodes 41 53 94
turns of advising 60 73 133
advisory acts 75 79 154
Analysis.2 I am also interested in how the act of advising is carried out, start-
ing from the beginning of the adviser’s turn. Thus, I shall make a distinction
between advisory acts, which are linguistic expressions of a particular piece of
advice, and turns of advising, i.e. stretches of talk, carried out by one speaker,
which host the advisory act(s). The whole situation of giving advice in one
interaction, moreover, will be treated as an episode—this can take the form
of a single act (in one turn) or an entire sequence of advising, planned across
one or many turns. In order to obtain a more balanced corpus of both authors,
to the six plays by Terence I have added six of Plautus’ comedies from which I
intend to retrieve my data.3
AsTable 1 shows, the overall number of acts in both authors’ corpus are fairly
similar, while the selected Plautine comedies seem to contain fewer advisory
episodes. On the basis of this limited corpus, I will attempt to establish what
types of advisory situation show the highest degree of imposition and how the
interpersonal tensions influence both the linguistic expression of the acts and
their conversational sequencing.
2 Advising as a Directive Sub-type
According to most typologies, advising belongs to a wider group of directives,
i.e. speech acts by which the speaker attempts to change the hearer’s actions.4
2 Hoffmann (1983) first adapted the tools of Conversational Analysis to Roman comedy dia-
logues,whereasMüller (1997) offered the first systematic account for thedialogues inTerence.
See Schegloff (2007) for a comprehensive introduction to the methodology.
3 The two authors, in fact, differ in their storylines and their pursuit of comic effect, as is also
visible in their favourite set of stock-characters. For Plautus, I have selected Casina, Curculio,
Epidicus, Menaechmi, Stichus, and Trinummus. If it seems profitable, I will sporadically recur
to examples from the rest of the plays.
4 Austin (21975: 155–157) mentions the act of advising as pertaining to his group of exercitives,
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The persuasion may take various forms and degrees. Searle (1969: 67) con-
structs his rule-based definition of advice out of two elements: by advising
some future act, the adviser must have some reason to believe that the recip-
ient (from here on: the advisee) will benefit from carrying it out, whereas it
is not obvious for either of them that the advisee would carry it out in the
normal course of events (i.e. without the advice being given). On the other
hand, advice differs from ‘stronger’ directives such as requests or orders since,
as Searle points out, ‘[a]dvising is more like telling you what is best for you’.5
From this follows that there is a connection between advice and opinions,
assessments, or judgments. Bach andHarnish (1979: 49), for instance, point out
that ‘what the speaker expresses is not the desire that [the hearer] do a cer-
tain action but the belief that doing it is a good idea, that it is in [the hearer’s]
interest’.
The ambiguous status of advisory illocutions will be better explained if, fol-
lowing Risselada (1993: 33), one opts for a prototype classification of speech
acts. In her view, advising is a less prototypical member of the directive group;
some scholars place it halfway towards assertives, i.e. acts which describe the
state of affairs. Accordingly, the uptake of advice, apart from signals of compli-
ance (see tuo consilio faciam in [3]), often includes elements of appreciation
and evaluation (see bene mones in [1]), the latter being also a typical reaction
to opinions and statements.
The directive sub-type of advising may be further characterised by applying
Risselada’s (1993: 46–47) criteria of (i) benefit and (ii) bindingness. Accordingly,
the future action contained in advice (i) serves the interest of the addressee
and (ii) is more optional than orders but more binding than suggestions. Both
parameters, however, are not to be understood as fixed in advance or static.
In example [1], the old citizen, Periplectomenus, manages to convince the
slave, Sceledrus, that his previous accusations towards his neighbour’s girl-
friend are false. After the servant has apologised, his interlocutor advises him
rather insistently to be more discreet from now on. Sceledrus believes in the
senex’s good intentions, so he takes his words for good advice (benememones).
The spectators know, however, that Periplectomenus, by persuading the ser-
vant to keep his mouth shut, is solely serving his own interest, i.e. he wants to
stop the slave from exposing the girl.
which were later included, along with some behabitives, in Searle’s (1976: 11) directives. In
the typology proposed by Risselada (1993: 36–37), directives may be classified as speech acts
about action oriented towards the addressee.
5 Searle (1969: 67).
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[1] Plautus Miles gloriosus 570–573
Per. … ignoscam tibi istuc. Sce. at tibi di faciant bene!
Per. ne tu hercle, si te di ament, linguam comprimes,
posthac, etiam illud quod scies nesciueris
nec uideris quod uideris. Sce. benememones.6
Per. … I’ll forgive you for this.
Sce. May the gods bless you!
Per. Seriously, if the gods love you, you’ll keep your mouth in check.
From now on don’t know even what you do know and don’t see
what you do see.
Sce. You’re giving me good advice.
In another excerpt, the parasite Peniculus, after having been asked for advice
by a high-status Roman matrona, modifies the level of bindingness during the
progression of his turn. He formulates a directive act in the subjunctive and
then adds a hedge sic censeo ‘that’s what I think’, as if he wanted to reformulate
the utterance as an assertive act. Thus, by stressing the subjectivity, Peniculus
manages to lower the peremptoriness of his own advice.
[2] Plautus Menaechmi 568–569
Mat. quid ego nunc cum illoc agam?
Pen. idem quod semper: male habeas; sic censeo.
Mat. What should I do with him now?
Pen. The same as always: give him a hard time. That’s what I think.
Examples like this show that the optionality and the benefit of the action con-
veyed in directive sub-types depend on the perception of the participants (see
[1]). During the ongoing interaction, that perception may be subject to read-
justment (see [2]) and negotiation. In order to grasp this phenomenon, we
need to be awarewhen adopting the prototype approach that there is a ‘gradual
transition fromone speech act [sub-]type to another’ (Risselada 1993: 34). Bach
6 Plautus’ text and its English translation follow the editionbydeMelo (2011–2013). ForTerence,
I have used Barsby (2001). I will not modify the translations, even though in many occasions
the translator’s interpretation of the illocutionary force (and the tone of the whole interac-
tion) is different from this presented in the main argument.
- 978-90-04-44026-5
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com10/12/2020 08:49:24PM
via free access
268 berger
figure 1 Advisory acts in the classification of directives
modified from Risselada (1993: 48)
and Harnish (1979: 49), for instance, propose a general group of ‘advisories’
in which they include admonishing, counselling, recommending, urging, and
warning. In this paper, I will focus on a similar chain of advisory acts that are
differentiated according to the degree of compliance they demand (see Fig-
ure 1).7
In spite of using theEnglish speech-act denominations, Iwill seek,whenever
it is possible, to apply a native speaker’s taxonomy, retrieved in a bottom-up
analysis of the corpus.8 Therefore, in order to distinguish particular illocutions,
I will take as a starting point the participants’ pragmatic metalanguage, i.e.
how the interlocutors denominate or describe their own speech activity. Other
indications will be provided by further linguistic (e.g. verbal surrounding) and
contextual (e.g. type of the interlocutors’ relation) cues.9
Firstly, Risselada (1993: 48) is right in placing advice ‘on the binding side of
the scale’, but—as will be demonstrated in the following section—this feature
depends on other contextual factors such as the authority and the expertise
of the adviser, either presupposed or emerging during the interaction. I will
start with the speech act covered by the Latin consilium; this type of advice
concerns a more symmetrical relation among interlocutors, who, in a trouble-
some situation, consult one another in search of a solution. This would be the
case of the slave Trachalio (see [3]), who accepts the advice (consilium) from
another low-status character, even if he himself had a different idea initially.
It seems important, nonetheless, that consilium is usually presented as a new
7 Barrios-Lech (2016: 274) chooses to use a wider definition of advice, pointing out that the
distinction with suggestions ‘proved difficult to make’. My advisory acts, however, will also
include instructions and warnings.
8 Using only lay categories, recognised and used by the non-expert participants in conversa-
tions, is one of the main premises of the ethnomethodologists and, later on, conversation
analysts (see Levinson 1983: 294–296 for a short overview).
9 Compare the methods described by Barrios-Lech (2016: 30–31).
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plan that is yet to be discovered (see reperiamus in [4]). Accordingly, this type
of act is connected to the adviser’s sphere of expertise (see tuo consilio faciam in
[3]), which is understood in relative terms as a level of competence in offering
advice claimed for oneself or attributed by others.10Moreover, in a peer-to-peer
interaction, this type of advisory episode often entails some further negoti-
ations (see [3] and the continuation of [4]).
[3] Plautus Rudens 960–962
Tra. … quid inde aequom est dari mihi? dimidium
uolo ut dicas. Grip. immo hercle etiam amplius,
nam nisi dat, domino dicundum
censeo. Tra. tuo consilio faciam.11
Tra. … What is a fair part I should be given from it? I want you to say
half.
Gr. No, even more: if he doesn’t give it to you, I think the owner has to
be told.
Tra. I’ll follow your advice.
[4] Plautus Epidicus 255–256
Per. quid ego faciam? nunc consilium a te expetesso, Apoecides.
Ap. reperiamus aliquid calidi, conducibilis consili.
Per. What should I do? Now I’m seeking your advice, Apoecides.
Ap. Let’s find some fresh, expedient plan.
As for monere—another frequent lay denomination of advisory acts—it has a
different semantic content. Given its etymological connection with ‘memory’
(memoria) and ‘remembering’ (meminisse), this speech act sub-type frequently
10 Thus, it would correspond to Heritage’s (2012: 7) relative epistemic status defined ‘as a con-
sensual and thus effectively “real” state of affairs, based upon the participants’ valuation of
one another’s epistemic access and rights to specific domains of knowledge and informa-
tion.’
11 It seems important to add that in this passage the low-status characters do not know
each other (cf. Plaut. Rud. 938–958). Trachalio asks Gripus for advice—supposedly—in
an unrelated matter which, as it turns out, concerns his interlocutor (962a–963). Hence
the (relative) expertise in advising is attributed by Trachalio to his addressee in order to
be used, later on, against Gripus’ own benefit.
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appears when advisers indicate the solution by simply reminding their inter-
locutors of the correctway of acting.12 Thus, depending on the situation, the act
canbeunderstoodas anunnecessary admonishment (see [5]) or as goodadvice
(see [6]). On the other hand, monere also encompasses warnings, where ‘the
speaker presumes the presence of some likely source of danger or trouble for
[the hearer]’ (Bach and Harnish 1979: 49)—Periplectomenus in [1] may serve
as an example.
[5] Plautus Miles gloriosus 354
Pal. praecepta facito ut memineris. Phil. totiensmoneremirum est.
Pal. Make sure you remember my instructions.
Phil. I’m surprised that you remind me so often
[6] Plautus Menaechmi 344–345
Mes. … nunc in istoc portu est nauis praedatoria,
aps qua cauendum nobis sane censeo.
Sos. mones quidem hercle recte.
Mes. … Now in that harbor there’s a pirate ship which I think we need
to be on our guard against.
Sos. You’re giving me proper advice.
Finally, if the adviser’s authority and/or expertise aremarkedly higher than the
advisee’s, as in the case of the cunning slave Palaestrio [7], the advisory acts are
referred to as praecepta (‘instructions’). In this example, the bindingness of the
directive illocution is confirmed by the uptake of the hearer, who will obed-
iently follow (parere) the described course of action. Pyrgopolinices conveys
the idea that the source of knowledge is clearly his adviser, whose competence
and expertise is foregrounded.
12 Latin monere derives from PIE *mon-eie̯- ‘to make think of, remind’ which is a causative
suffixed formof the stem *men- ‘to think’ present inmens ‘mind’ andmeminisse ‘to remem-
ber’ (see de Vaan 2008: 387). For the connection between reminding and admonishing
being transparent for the interlocutors, see Plaut. Capt. 191: Erg. … numquid uis? Heg.
uenias temperi. Erg.memoremmones. (‘Erg. … Is there anything youwant? Heg. Come
early. Erg. You’re reminding someone who remembers.’).
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[7] Plautus Miles gloriosus 1034–1036
Pyrg. iube adire. Pal. at scin quid tu facias? facito fastidi plenum,
quasi non lubeat; me inclamato, quia [sic] tam te uolgo uol-
gem.
Pyrg. memini et praeceptis parebo.
Pyrg. Have her come here.
Pal. But do you know what you should do? Be full of disdain, as if
youweren’t interested. Shout atme because I publicize you to the
public like this.
Pyrg. I remember it and I’ll obey your instructions.
On the opposite end of the bindingness scale, I have found lay denominations
of opinions and judgments, like sententia. Accordingly, this highly optional
variant of advising is introduced by performative verbs used in assertions, such
as censeo in [8]. Moreover, the advisee’s autonomy of action, which is salient
in this sub-type, will be related to particular (negative-)politeness strategies
(see Section 4). Indirectness and minimal bindingness of the act of censere,
however, may be perceived as vagueness and a sign of adviser’s low personal
commitment, as the reaction of the disappointed Demipho confirms below:
[8] Terence Phormio 452–459
Dem. dic nunc, Hegio.
Heg. ego sedulo hunc dixisse credo. uerum itast:
quot homines tot sententiae: suos quoique mos.
mihi non uidetur quod sit factum legibus
rescindi posse; et turpe inceptust. Dem. dic, Crito.
Cri. ego amplius deliberandum censeo:
res magnast. Heg. numquid nos uis? Dem. fecistis probe:
incertior summulto quam dudum.
Dem. Now you. Hegio.
Heg. I’m sure that he (pointing to Cratinus) has given you excellent
advice. But the truth is, there are as many opinions as there are
people; everyone has his own way of looking at things. My own
view is that what has been done in accordance with the law can-
not be rescinded, and it is dishonorable to try.
Dem. Now you, Crito.
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Cri. I suggest that this needs further deliberation. It’s a weighty mat-
ter.
Heg. (to Demipho) Is that all?
Dem. (ironically) You’ve been very helpful. (aside) I’m evenmore uncer-
tain than I was before.
At this point, it seems important to stress that the illocutionary force of advis-
ory acts does not depend strictly on the linguistic tokens used by the adviser
but, as Locher (2012: 4) reminds us, ‘the embeddedness of the speech act in the
wider speech event is crucial for its interpretation’. It follows that the expect-
ations of the advisee also play a role in how the advice needs to be framed. In
the next example [9], the young boy Chaerea is engaging in a ‘trouble-telling
sequence’ with his slave Parmeno. After the servant has jokingly described
some audacious course of action, his words are taken up in earnest by Chaerea,
who calls the idea a great consilium.13
[9] Terence Eunuchus 376–378
Chae. dixisti pulchre: numquam uidi melius consilium dari.
[…]
Par. quid agis? iocabar equidem.
Chae. It’s a brilliant idea. I’ve never known better advice.
[…]
Par. What are you thinking of? I was only joking.
The advisory acts discussed above can be further categorised by source of com-
petence, i.e. by distinguishing whose expertise and knowledge is salient in
designing the future course of action (see Figure 2).14 The acts of praecipere,
consulere, and censere are anchored within the adviser’s competence (with dif-
ferent degrees of bindingness). The monere-type of advice, by contrast, argu-
ably implies that the advisee already knows the solution and only needs to be
induced in order to implement the correct action.
13 Thus, Terence seems to be playfully remodelling a typical scene of a slave explaining the
deceit to the adulescens who is in love—already Donatus was impressed by this tech-
nique (Don. ad Eun. 292, 356, 370). The contrast between planned and accidental action
in Eunuchuswas studied by Saylor (1975).
14 Accordingly, the competence management would be similar to what Riccioni et al. (2014:
53–54), drawing on Heritage (2012), call epistemic negotiations. The scholars use this
framework to analyse face mitigation in Italian conversations.
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bindingness:
binding optional
source of competence: adviser praecipere consulere censere
advisee monere
figure 2 Classification of advisories in Roman comedy
The modifications of claimed and perceived source of competence, more-
over, seem to run parallel to the negotiations of authority in the on-going advis-
ory episode. The relationship between the interlocutors changes according to
whether the advisee agrees to follow theproposed course of action (e.g. tuo con-
silio faciam) or is willing to admittedly rectify their behaviour out of their own
intellectual resources (bene mones, etc.). Interestingly enough, this distinction
is humorously exploited by Plautus in the following excerpt.
[10] Plautus Stichus 577–578
Epi. … atque eccum tibi lupum in sermone: praesens esuriens adest.
Pam. ludificemur hominem. Epi. capti consili memoremmones.
Epi. … And look, here you have the wolf in the fable: he’s present
hungry.
Pam. Let’s make fun of him.
Epi. You’re reminding someone who remembers the plan that has
been made.
The two brothers, Epignomus and Pamphilippus, see a somewhat tedious
hanger-on approaching them on the stage. Pamphilippus makes a proposal to
his brother to tease him, but Epignomus, in a turn of a typically Plautine styl-
istic colouring, responds that there is no need for proposals since his mind has
already beenmade up and the consilium accepted, as if he himself had created
the plan. Accordingly, he claims to be the source of the idea along with the
competence and authority implied in launching the proposal.
3 Face-Threat of Giving Advice
The intricacies of the directive speech act system will prove relevant in the
management of social relations. Brown and Levinson (21987), who formulated
theuniversalmodel of politeness,were interested in the consequences that cer-
tain illocutions have on the speakers’ self-presentation and how it affects their
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relationship. According to Goffman (1955: 213), the participants of an interac-
tion claim a ‘face’ for themselves, i.e. a public image they construct (in close
interrelation with each other) out of positive social values. Brown and Levin-
son (21987: 62) choose to reinterpret face as ‘basic wants, which every member
knows every othermember desires, andwhich in general it is in the interests of
every member to partially satisfy’. These face needs, in turn, can be subsumed
into two categories: ‘the desire to be ratified, understood, approved of, liked
or admired’ (positive-face wants) and the desire that one’s own ‘action is not
impeded’ (negative-face wants). In this politeness model, most of the speech
acts interfere implicitly with either or both types of face wants and are called
face-threatening acts.
According to Brown and Levinson (21987: 65), giving advice, just as other dir-
ectives, primarily threatens the addressee’s negative-facewant by indicating (in
its worst possible interpretation) that the speaker is attempting to impede the
hearer’s freedom of action. The imposition on the advisee’s autonomy strongly
correlates with the degree of bindingness conveyed by the directive (sub-)type.
On the other hand, performing an act whose felicity conditions include the
hearer’s benefit must also enhance their positive-face wants. The correct man-
agement of face depends on the estimation of interactional risk and possible
face damage corresponding to a given advising situation.
Brown and Levinson (21987: 74) proposed to calculate the level of face-threat
on the basis of—broadly defined—factors of social distance (D) between the
interlocutors, their relation of power (P), as well as the ranking (R) of impos-
ition ascribed to the act. The last variable can be further elaborated on by the
findings of Goldsmith andMacGeorge (2000: 256),who concluded that theper-
ception of face-threat also depends on the types of goals attributed to advice
givers and receivers, the types of problems (forwhich thedegree of P andDmay
be relevant), as well as the content and the sequencing of an advice message.
As for the ranking of the imposition of advising in Roman culture, accord-
ing to Burton (2004: 224), ‘provision of candid advice’ is essential for a healthy
friendship among free-born of equal status (amicitia), being one of the recip-
rocal amical favours they perform.15 From this set of mutual obligations and
expectations, it follows that advisory acts between intimate characters are not
very imposing—in fact, they may serve to enhance the social relation by flat-
tering the positive face of both the adviser and the advisee.16 Thus, the young
15 See Plaut. Epid. 112–113 and Ter. Heaut. 416–419 on young and oldmen’s in-group solidarity
and mutual support.
16 In the case of the contemporary Spanish speaking community, Hernández-Flores (1999)
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citizen Charinus in [11] may freely and openly ask his friend for advice at the
very beginning of the interaction, right after the greeting.
[11] Terence Andria 318–320
Pam. Charinum uideo. salue. Cha. o salue, Pamphile.
ad te aduenio spem, salutem, auxilium, consilium expetens.
Pam. neque pol consili locum habeo neque ad auxilium copiam.
Pam. It’s Charinus. Good day.
Cha. Oh. good day Pamphilus. I am coming to you in need of hope, sal-
vation, help, advice.
Pam. Heaven knows I’m in no position to advise and I’ve no means to
help.
Still, the face threat in friendly advice can be considerably high, depending on
the goals attributed to the advisers. The Plautine adulescens Lysiteles insists
on marrying his friend’s sister without a dowry as a way of helping him out
in his financial troubles. The other youth, Lesbonicus, does not agree with
this generous concession since he does not believe that his friend has his best
interest at heart (male consulis17) (see [12]). From Lesbonicus’ point of view,
not giving a dowry will humiliate him and put his sister in a shameful mar-
riage.
[12] Plautus Trinummus 633–636
Les. … [qui] bene quom simulas facere mihi te, male facis, male con-
sulis.
Lys. egone? Lesb. Tune. Lys. quid male facio? Lesb. quod ego
nolo, id quom facis.
Lys. tuae rei bene consulere cupio. Lesb. tu [mihi] es melior quam
egomet mihi?
sat sapio, satis in rem quae sint meam ego conspicio mihi.
indicates that candid advice is a responsibility of relations and does not need to be bal-
anced against a need to symbolically recognise the other’s autonomy.
17 Note that the verb consulere means ‘to reflect on something’, ‘to ask for advice’ as well as
‘to have in mind the best interest of somebody’. It captures both facets of the advisory
episode: reflecting on the problem and seeking to use someone else’s expertise. Serving
the benefit of the other party during the process is also implied.
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Les. … While pretending to do me a good turn, you do me a bad one
and treat me badly.
Lys. I?
Lesb. Yes, you.
Lys. In what respect am I doing you a bad turn?
Lesb. In doing what I don’t want.
Lys. I wish to act in your best interest.
Lesb. Are you better to me than I ammyself? I am intelligent enough, I
can see well enough for myself what’s in my best interest.
Reluctant to see good intentions in his interlocutor’s act, Lesbonicus stresses
his autonomy of decision and self-sufficiency (sat sapio ‘I am intelligent
enough’). Further on in the dialogue, Lysiteles does not hesitate to remind his
friend that his impoverished conditions are related to his own indulgent life-
style while urging him to change his mind. Harsh criticism is interwoven with
a more insistent tone in this passage, and the friendly consilium turns into a
strong admonishment (674 te moneo hoc etiam atque etiam ‘I urge you again
and again’). Lesbonicus, however, cannot appreciate his friend’s concern and
feels rebuked (680 tu obiurgans me ‘while you’re chiding me’).
Furthermore, one could identify a direct relation between the role of expert-
ise and the source of competence with the management of the participants’
positive and negative faces in this scene. By considering the act of consulere
unhelpful, the advisee implicitly questions the adviser’s expertise, threatening
his positive face.18 Hence, Lysiteles implies by his intensified use of moneo that
the hearer should already know and appreciate the proposed course of action.
On the other hand, Lesbonicus’ competence first seemeddamaged by Lysiteles’
advice presented as a consilium—now the adviser is implying his resistance to
admonishment.19
In conclusion, in this short episode we have identified some Roman (emic)
correlates of Brown and Levinson’s (21987: 76) social factors. In order to cal-
18 See also the criticism which the old man Chremes directs towards another senex in Ter.
Heaut. 922–923: Chr. … nonne id flagitiumst te aliis consilium dare, foris sapere, tibi non
posse te auxiliarier? (‘Chr. … Isn’t it a disgrace that you should give advice to others, be so
wise to outsiders and be unable to help yourself?’).
19 In the context of this admonitory dialogue, Burton (2004: 224) states that candour (liber-
tas) is ‘a potential minefield of misunderstanding and wounded feelings’ due to which
friends ‘need to walk a fine line of admonition’. On the connection between frankness
and monere in friendship, see also Cic. Amic. 44, briefly discussed in Hall (2009: 127–
128).
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culate the imposition of the act, the participants of the advisory episode in
comedy have shown to be taking their intimacy, assumed authority (under-
stood as expertise or experience), perceived interactional goals, and contents of
the types of action contained in the advisory message into account, especially
if the advice entailed elements of criticism. Advice, finally, proved to be face-
threatening for all parties involved due to the fact that it changes the relation
of power and distribution of competence among the interlocutors.20 Hence
the ‘riskiest’ configurations in the social reality depicted by Plautus and Ter-
ence are: (i) peer-to-peer advice of free-born characters and (ii) low characters
advising a non-intimate superior.
4 Speech-Act Formulation and Im/politeness
According to the classical theory of im/politeness, in case of any face-threaten-
ing acts, the facewants are addressed by specific formulation types (strategies).
After reading through my corpus, I grouped the linguistic tokens of different
advisory acts according to Brown and Levinson’s (21987: 68–70) classification.
They organised the strategies into a hierarchy (I–IV) based on their level of
imposition, where the lowest risk of face threat corresponds with the first
major formulation type (I) and, respectively, the highest risk leads to the last
strategy (IV) or to renouncing from doing the act altogether (which would be
V).
Thus, giving advice baldly on-record (I) ‘involves doing it in the most dir-
ect, clear, unambiguous and concise way possible’. I have listed all the forms
which express the propositional content of telling others what, in a given situ-
ation, is right (decet,aequomst, etc.), what is better for them (melius est) orwhat
they should do (opus est, oportet, and periphrastic gerundival construction). I
included all of the imperative sentence types (present and future imperative
forms, subjunctive) as well as the directive use of future indicative into this
scheme. Even though these formsmay convey different advisory acts in specific
contexts, they nevertheless tend to imply a higher level of bindingness and are
typically used as praecepta—see, for instance, the instructions in future imper-
ative directed by Philto to his son in [13].
20 Similarly, in the context of giving advice, Hall (2009: 118) states that the interaction of
Roman aristocrats in the times of Cicero can ‘be viewed as an arena for competition rather
than cooperation.’
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[13] Plautus Trinummus 297–298
Phil. … meo modo et moribus uiuito antiquis,
quae ego tibi praecipio, ea facito.
Phil. … Live my way and by the old standards, do what I teach you.
Next, formulations can contain some redressive action ‘that attempts to coun-
teract the potential face damage’ of the advisory act by a series of modific-
ations and additions which are designed to address either the positive- or
the negative-face wants (Brown and Levinson 21987: 69–70). The negative-
politeness strategies (III) entail, for instance, stressing the adviser’s subjective
point of view or the option of non-compliance by using the metalanguage of
advice (Berger 2017: 270–271). Non-agentive advisory expressions seem to pro-
duce a similar redressive action (Brown and Levinson 21987: 191–194). As for
positive-politeness mitigation (II), among the identified strategies, one could
mention evoking a close bondwith the advisee, searching for common ground,
or including oneself in the realisation of the action.21 These are the strategies
used by the senex Demea, who has recently experienced a self-induced trans-
formation and is now trying out being extremely polite and considerate with
others (see [14]). Interestingly enough, the change of his habitual speech pat-
tern is achievedmainly through positive politeness while elsewhere in comedy
old men are depicted as mostly concerned with negative-face wants (Barrios-
Lech 2016: 56–57; Berger 2017: 271).
[14] Terence Adelphoe 948–955
Dem. … bene nos aliquid facere illi decet.
Mic. quid facere? Dem. agellist hic sub urbe paullum quod locitas
foras.
huic demus qui fruatur. Mic. paulum id autemst? Dem. si
multumst, tamen
faciundumst: pro patre huic est, bonus est, noster est, recte
datur,
postremo nunc meum illud uerbum facio quod tu, Micio,
bene et sapienter dixti dudum: ‘uitium commune omniumst,
21 See Brown and Levinson (21987: 127–128) for the strategy of including both the speaker
and the hearer in the activity.
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quod nimium ad rem in senecta attenti sumus’? hanc maculam
nos decet
affugere. et dictumst uere et re ipsa fieri oportet.
Dem. …We should do something for him.
Mic. Do what?
Dem. There’s that small plot of land just outside the townwhich you let
out. Let’s give him the enjoyment of that.
Mic. That’s a little plot?
Dem. Even if it’s a large one, we should do it. He’s like a father to the
girl, he’s a good man, he’s one of us. It’s a gift well given. When
all’s said and done, can’t I adopt for myself the remark which you
made just now, Micio, so wisely and so well? ‘It’s a common fault
of all of us that in old age we are too worried about money.’ We
should avoid that reproach. It’s sound advice andwe should carry
it out in practice.
While Demea formulates his advice to his brother, he repeatedly states that the
decision is to be made together (nos decet; demus). The old man also addresses
his interlocutor directly in order to demonstrate that the compliance would
simply be following the advisee’s own rules of conduct. This searching for
common ground and indicating shared values serves, at the same time, to
include face-enhancing praise (bene et sapienter dixti; dictumst uere).22 Still,
one cannot overlook that these tokens of positive politeness are interwoven
with mitigation that attends to negative-face wants, e.g. syntactical deletion of
the addressee through non-agentive directive expressions ( faciundumst; fieri
oportet). Moreover, the advice is supplied by argumentation and justification
by which the described course of action does not seem arbitrary nor peremp-
tory. Accordingly, the redressive action in advisory acts proves to be a complex,
sometimesmulti-turn, procedurewhich,moreover, combines the positive- and
the negative-politeness strategies in the same formulation.23
The last way of giving advice (IV) is doing it off-record, i.e. in such a way
that ‘it is not possible to attribute only one clear communicative intention
22 On compliments in Plautus and their contribution to linguistic politeness, see Unceta
Gómez (2019). Here the act of praising seems to be ambiguous. Evoking Micio’s own
words and his rules of behaviour is also important for the plot: through his transforma-
tion, Demea seems to be trying to ridicule Micio’s generosity and gentle spirit.
23 See also Hall (2009: 118–127), who discusses extensively the politeness strategies of giving
advice through letters between Cicero and his peers.
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to the act’ (Brown and Levinson 21987: 211). Thus, the speaker avoids taking
full responsibility for the illocution, leaving the interpretation of the utterance
to the addressee. The off-record formulation, therefore, should be associated
with the least binding advisory acts such as the act of censere or giving sug-
gestions and hints, whose directive illocutionary force is derived inferentially
from the context. The question launched by the banker Lyco in [15] violates the
Griceanmaximof relevance (he does not contributewith any new information
responding to Cappadox’ inquiry) and of sincerity (he does not expect to be
given an actual answer).24 By making a correct inference, Cappadox interprets
the turn as a helpful admonishment (monere).
[15] Plautus Curculio 457–460
Lyco argentum accipias, cum illo mittas uirginem.
Cap. quid quod iuratus sum? Lyco quid id refert tua,
dum argentum accipias? Cap. qui monet quasi adiuuat.
Lyco Take your money and send the girl off with that man.
Cap. What about the oath I gave?
Lyco What does that matter to you so long as you receive yourmoney?
Cap. He who advises helps, so to speak.
On the other hand, if the off-record strategy comes after an explicit request
for advice, the comprehension process is more straightforward. For example,
the young citizen Antipho is hinting to his slave Geta that he should steal the
money from the youth’s own father. The boy is expressing the advisory act by
means of a declarative sentence type.
[16] Terence Phormio 540–542
Get. quid faciam? Ant. inuenias argentum. Get. cupio; sed id unde
edoce.
Ant. pater adest hic. Get. scio. sed quid tum? Ant. ah! dictum sapi-
enti sat est.
Get. itane? Ant. ita. Get. sane hercle pulchre suades.
24 For rhetorical questions as a frequent off-record strategy, see Brown and Levinson (21987:
223–225). In describing the process of interpreting the off-record politeness strategy, the
scholars refer to Grice’s (1975) conversationalmaxims (Brown and Levinson 21987: 211–212,
with a brief discussion).
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Get. By doing what?
Ant. Finding the money.
Get. I’d like to. But explain where?
Ant. My father’s back home.
Get. I know, but what follows?
Ant. Oh! Can’t you take a hint?
Get. Really?
Ant. Really.
Get. That is fine advice, for god’s sake!
This category (IV) includes rhetorical questions (see [15]) or opinions and state-
ments in declarative sentence types (see [16]).
The final calculation based on 154 advisory acts extracted from twelve com-
edies byPlautus andTerence are presented inTable 2.Theproportions between
illocutions formulated baldly on record (49.4%) and with some kind of mitig-
ation (42.9%) are very similar. It is, however, worth keeping in mind that for
these statistics I have only counted the elements of redressive action that are
contained in the host advisory turn, although we have already seen that some
face-work can be achieved in wider conversational surroundings.
Itmight be surprising that features of positivepoliteness aremore frequently
used than negative-face mitigation but the proportions are somehow tainted
by certain formulations that seem to be combining both formulation strategies
(grouped under ‘mixed strategies’).25 This also makes the attempt to search for
preferences in the distribution of a given strategy among the character types
problematic—at least in a limited corpus such as this.
It may be useful to see if the contexts with a high imposition do indeed lead
to ‘polite’ strategies of act realisation, especially in the first turn, where the con-
cern for face is at its highest (see Section 3).
For the next quantitative analysis (seeTable 3), I selected only the ‘risky’ con-
figurations of advising: (i) peer-to-peer interactions of free-born characters and
(ii) episodes of low-status character advising a superior. Even if face manage-
ment plays an important role in (i), there is still a surprisingly high proportion
of the least ‘polite’ formulation, baldly on-record (38.9%); it is even higher in
contexts in (ii) (63%).
25 The study of Goldsmith and MacGeorge (2000) tested the perception of the face-threat
of giving advice in English. Similarly to the findings in this chapter, their sample advice
messages were not seen by the language users as very threatening for the negative face,
while the concern for the positive face was almost as important.
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table 2 Formulation of advisory acts in the corpus distributed according to politeness
strategies
Speech-act expression N° Politeness strategy Total




periphrastic gerundival construction 3
oportet / opus est “You should” 8
decet / licet / aequom est “It’s (only) right” 3
satiust /meliust / potiust “It’s better” 6
+ seeking for common ground and val-





combination of (II) and (III) 11 (II–III) mixed strategies 11 (7.1%)
+ stressing the subjectivity and option-





rhetorical questions 6 (IV) off-record 12 (7.8%)
non-modal assertives 6
total 154
The predictive inaccuracies that Brown and Levinson’s (21987) classicmodel
exhibits were addressed by later methodological proposals. One of the reser-
vations of the so-called discursive approach to im/politeness was that polite-
ness should be viewed as a dynamic, participant-oriented concept that exceeds
boundaries of a single utterance (see van der Bom andMills 2015: 181–184, with
further references). Thus, in the following section, I will test the potential value
of ‘polite’ act formulation against its position in the dialogical sequence.
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total 43 (52.4%) 33 (40.2%) 6 (7.3%) 82
5 Turn Sequencing of Advisory Episodes
In order to identify the conversational pattern of the advisory episode, one
should first make a distinction between advice that is on-demand and advice
that is not-sought-for. In case one, the interlocutor is searching for advice and
the prototypical sequence of talk consists of at least three turns: (i) request
for advice, (ii) granting of the advisory act, and (iii) evaluation and/or prom-
ise of compliance. In terms of CA, the first pair of turns is an adjacency pair,
which, moreover, tends to beminimally expanded by a third, sequence-closing
element or evaluation turnwhich ‘is designednot to project any furtherwithin-
sequence talk beyond itself ’ (Schegloff 2007: 118). This prototypical three-turn
sequence appears throughout the entire chapter but is presented—for
clarity—in the following excerpt [17]: a conversation between two old men,
Laches and Phidippus.
[17] Terence Hecyra 715–719
Lach. quid ergo agam, Phidippe? quid das consili? (i)
Phi. quid agas?meretricem hanc primum adeundam censeo. (ii)
oremus, accusemus, grauius denique.
minitemur si cum illo habuerit rem postea.
Lach. faciam ut mones. (iii)
Lach. What shall I do, Phidippus?What’s your advice?
Phi. What should you do? I suggest that we approach this mistress of
his first. Let’s appeal to her, put the accusation in front of her, and
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finally threaten some firm action if she has anything to do with
him in the future.
Lach. I’ll do as you suggest.
Interestingly, here, the request for advice includes two elements: the expres-
sion of doubt as to what course of action to take (quid ergo agam?) and an
actual demand for a consilium. As far as distribution of competence is con-
cerned, Laches is willing to confer the authority to his interlocutor and thus
enhance his positive-facewants. Phidippus, however, by his turn-opening rhet-
orical question (quid agas?) seems to be implying that the right course of
action is quite obvious. In reaction, Laches tries to save his own positive face
by anchoring the idea within his own expertise: he reinterprets the act not
as an adviser-oriented consilium but as a kind of admonishment ( faciam ut
mones). The act of compliance—perhaps significantly—does not contain any
element of praising (e.g. bene/recte/pulchre mones), which normally enhances
the adviser’s positive-face. Despite these tensions in the distribution of author-
ity, the adviser still addresses the face-needs of his interlocutor: he combines
the deletion of the hearer in the first act (negative politeness) with the inclu-
sion of himself in the realisation of the action (positive politeness) in the
following formulations (oremus, accusemus, minitemur).26 Finally, it is worth
noting that the advisory acts are ordered from more (periphrastic gerundival
construction with censeo) to slightly less (subjunctive) ‘polite’ formulations—
both, however, with redressive action. Thus, the arrangement of the elements
inside the turn proves to be relevant also for the calculation of interactional
risk.
Another available option in the sequencing of the act is giving advice that is
not requested explicitly and, hence, potentially unwanted. Menaechmus talks
to the slave Messenio, thanking him for his help in a violent incident on the
street. Since the servant mistakesMenaechmus for his ownmaster, he uses the
opportunity to suggest that, in exchange, he himself deserves to be liberated.
This type of self-offered advicemight be analysed not as a reaction to a request
but as (i) an initiatory action (offering advice) paired with (ii) the following
evaluation:
26 While Phidippus could have also meant that they should go meet the courtesan together,
in the following scene, she is only approached by Laches (Ter. Hec. 731)—Phidippus never
gets to talk to the woman. The polite extension of the reference in the directive is also
confirmed by its first-person uptake ( faciam).
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[18] Plautus Menaechmi 1021–1024
Men. at tibi di semper, adulescens, quisquis es, faciant bene.
nam apsque te esset, hodie numquam ad solem occasum uiue-
rem.
Mes. ergo edepol, si recte facias, ere, med emittas manu. (i)
Men. liberem ego te? (ii)
Men. May the gods always bless you, young man, whoever you are: if it
hadn’t been for you, I’d never have lived till sunset today.
Mes. Then if you were to do the right thing, master, you’d set me
free.
Men. I should free you?
Risselada (1993: 57) remarks that compliance to directives on demand (i.e. in a
second-pair-part position) is partially ‘guaranteed’ by the initiating turn. She
concludes that the act in a first-pair-part position is more likely to contain
tokens of politeness. Analogously, it follows from the discussion on face-threat
in section 3 that this variant of sequence includes a higher level of imposition.
All the constraints mentioned until now that shape the predictions on polite-
ness seem to be at work in Messenio’s formulation. The servant, while giving
unsolicited advice on a serious matter (his manumission) to a person he takes
for hismaster, chooses the positive-politeness strategy.Messenio addresses the
master directly (ere) and he appeals to values (recte facere) he presumes his
interlocutor shares.27
This rule may also be verified in a single interaction. In [19], the slave Stas-
imus is called after by his master, but—unwilling to look back—he cannot
recognise him. The first unsolicited advisory act launched by the servant is for-
mulated baldly on-record with a moral-evaluative expression (meliust + inf.).
The next act, however, which comes after an explicit request (quid ago?), con-
tains a more binding token: an unmitigated imperative. The socially defined
imposition should not have changed significantly over one turn of talk; there-
fore, much the same value of politeness may be conveyed through different
linguistic tokens, depending on different conversational contexts.
27 For the positive-politeness strategy of presuming that the hearer has the same values as
the speaker, see Brown and Levinson (21987: 123–124).
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[19] Plautus Trinummus 1060–1063
Char. aha nimium, Stasime, saeuiter!
Stas. emeremeliust quoi imperes. Char. pol ego emi atque argentum
dedi; sed si non dicto audiens est, quid ago? Stas. da magnum
malum.
Char. bene mones, ita facere certum est.
Char. Ah, Stasimus, you’re behaving too violently!
Stas. It’s better to buy someone to order around.
Char. I did buy someone and paid money; but if he doesn’t obey me,
what am I to do?
Stas. Give him a big thrashing.
Char. You’re giving me good advice, I’m resolved to act accordingly.
Still, if during a face-sensitive social interaction the character launches unso-
licited and unmitigated advisory turns, there should, as an alternative to mit-
igation, be some face-managing mechanisms. One such politeness-motivated
phenomenon may be localised in the act’s verbal embedding and, more spe-
cifically, in the design of its turn-host.
Firstly, I argue that postponing the advisory act within the turn might have
a redressive function. This effect is most visible if the adviser reverses the
order of advice and its justification or explanation, which—as I have poin-
ted out before—avoids the peremptoriness of the directive (see Section 3).
In the trouble-telling sequence [20], the slave Byrria uses a bald on-record
formulation (subjunctive uelis) but arguably mitigates the imposition by first
presenting the reasons for offering this particular piece of advice. The post-
poned advisory act of a slave talking to his youngmastermaybe comparedwith
the next example [21], where the old father fronts his urgent advice (directed
to his daughter in danger) in a turn-initial position. Here, the content of the
act and its early placement inside a turn is more important than any politeness
feature.
[20] Terence Andria 305–306
quaeso edepol, Charine, quoniam non potest id fieri quod uis,
id uelis quod possis.
Please, Charinus, for god’s sake, since you can’t have what you want, want
what you can have.
- 978-90-04-44026-5
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com10/12/2020 08:49:24PM
via free access
advice-giving in roman comedy 287
[21] Plautus Menaechmi 850–851
fuge domum, quantum potest,
ne hic te optundat.
Run off home as fast as possible so that he doesn’t beat you.
Moving on to more face-sensitive contexts, in [22] the speaker introduces the
act by means of a mitigating preface that prepares the ground for a baldly on-
record performed directive: the advice given by the doctor. The introductory
part is even separated from the rest of the speaker’s utterance by a verse-final
pause. This mechanism allows the adviser to create a fictitious scenario in
which his advice is actually a reactive action—towards his own words.
[22] Plautus Menaechmi 946
scin quid facias optimum est?
ad me face uti deferatur.
Do you know what you’d better do? Have him taken to my place.
[23] Plautus Menaechmi 1023
ergo edepol, si recte facias, ere, med emittas manu.
Then if you were to do the right thing, master, you’d set me free.
The imposition that self-selection in advisory acts constitutes can also be par-
tially compensated through cohesive linguistic elements. Messenio (see [23]
and [18] above), for instance, conveys that the advice is a logical consequence
(ergo) of the advisee’s previous talk.
Consequently, the positioning of advisory acts in the conversation might
also be relevant for the politeness prediction and the actual interpersonal
impact of certain types of formulation. Apart from high-imposition social con-
figurations for speech activity, one should also look into ‘risky’ conversational
contexts. The examples presented in this section suggest that the highest face-
threat should be ascribed to unsolicited advice, fronted in turn-initial position,
first in a series of acts (if there is any) and without perceivable connection to
the previous conversational material.
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table 4 Correlation between parameters of advisory
acts and politeness strategy
(orders)
praecipere (I) baldly on-record






This chapter proposes a wider pragmatic approach to advising in Roman com-
edy in order to better grasp its theoretical elusiveness as a protean illocution
type with multiple expressive means. First, the phenomenon was analysed
as a chain of directive sub-types (advisory acts), differentiated according to
the factor of bindingness and distribution of the competence. Arguably the
latter distinction—between the acts attributed only to adviser’s intellectual
resources (praeceptum, consilium, and sententiae) and the knowledge already
stored in the advisee’s mind (monere)—is more important than, for instance,
the (English) one between advice and warning.
Further, I have tentatively connected the formulation of the advisory acts
with Brown and Levinson’s (21987) politeness strategies. Certain ways of com-
pensating the face-threat tend to correspond with particular types of illoc-
ution identified in the corpus (see Table 4) since a more direct (i.e., baldly
on-record) formulation normally conveys more binding speech acts, while the
off-record strategy sometimes results in assertive-like expressions of the advis-
ory act.
Despite the correlations, it was often necessary to stress that the illocution
type, just like the politeness value, was a result of a rather complex interac-
tion between social (power relation, distance, ranking of imposition) and con-
textual (verbal surrounding) constraints. Regarding the latter, I hope to have
demonstrated some correlations between the act formulation, its evaluation in
terms of politeness, and its position in a wider discursive environment: inside
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a sequence, in an adjacency pair, and inside a turn. Such discourse-oriented
analysis might arguably be a more nuanced approach to investigate the ways
of doing politeness and, from a wider perspective, of doing things with words
in dramatic dialogues.
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The Politics of Manipulation: Politeness and
Insincerity in the Language of Parasites and
Courtesans in Plautus’ Comedies
Luis Unceta Gómez
1 Introduction: In/sincerity and Politeness
In recent years, significant advances have been made in our understanding of
linguistic politeness phenomena in Classical languages, especially in Latin.1
The analysis of impoliteness has also been addressed, although to a lesser
degree.2 However, the concept of over-politeness—that is inappropriate,
excessive, and/or insistent use of politeness strategies—along with the prob-
lem of sincerity in politeness practices, has not been sufficiently explored in
Latin, with the exception of Hall’s notable approach to latent hypocrisy in cer-
tain polite fictions in Cicero’s letters.3 This study seeks to further explore this
issue by examining the comedies of Plautus, specifically, two stock characters
from his works, namely the courtesan and the parasite, who make use of cer-
tain politeness strategies for manipulative purposes, aiming to control others
for their own benefit. In both cases, these characters are known for their disin-
genuousness in the ‘working’ sphere, to the extent that their very sustenance
might be said to depend on hypocrisy and feigned amiability.4
If politeness is understood as a ‘social lubricant’, sincerity may tend to take
second priority (in order) to maintain good social relations,5 something that
was already noted by Goffman (1959). There is a variety of motives for express-
ing oneself insincerely, and not all lies are antisocial. This is especially observ-
able in compliments, where certain insincere affirmations fulfil a clearly proso-
1 See Unceta Gómez (2018).
2 Iurescia (2019a) offers a complete analysis of the expression of impoliteness in Latin comedy
and novel. See also Roesch (2019).
3 Hall (2009: 78–106). See alsoUncetaGómez (2019a), on the in/sincerity of certain expressions
of happiness as a positive politeness strategy in comedy.
4 I cannot embark here on the complex definition of the concept of ‘insincerity’; see Stokke
(2014, 2018: esp. 171–198) for a complete analysis.
5 See, for instance, Davidson (2004: 1). According to this author’s claims, in 18th century Bri-
tain, the concept of hypocrisy was identified with good manners and politeness, becoming
an exclusive privilege of the elite, and thus beyond the reach of the servant class.
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cial function.6 But there are also certain other insincere statements where the
speaker seeks to obtain a benefit at the expense of someone else. The latter will
be the focus of my interest here.
Schulze (1984) put forward the manipulative potential of politeness, and
Sorlin (2017) has analysed it in detail. The latter questions the altruistic ori-
entation of classical politeness models, such as those by Brown and Levinson
(21987) and Leech (2014), and suggests the need to consider the speaker’s per-
sonal motives and goals as well as the perlocutionary effects of his/her speech
acts, in order to understandhowmanipulative discourse can ‘parasitise’ certain
politeness strategies.7
At any rate, within a communicative exchange, it is not always easy to draw
the line between sincerity and insincerity. From the viewpoint of politeness
research, the degree of sinceritymay be judgedwith regard to the propositional
content of a specific utterance, or with regard to interest in maintaining good
social relations, whereby the prosocial value of certain insincere utterances is
justified.8
Things are more complicated in the case of ancient languages, where quite
a number of fundamental parameters for correctly interpreting im/politeness
phenomena are not accessible to us. For example, it is quite likely that insin-
cerity in Latin could be perceived in suprasegmental or non-linguistic features,
such as voice pitch or facial expressions:9 data that lies outside our reach. We
may be sure, however, that these types of perception were possible for Latin
speakers, as is confirmed by the lexicalisation of ideas such as ‘manipulative
amiability’, ‘adulation’ and ‘insincere flattery’ in verbs like blandiri10 ‘to behave
6 Talwar et al. (2007). Along these lines, the etymological connection between Spanish
semblante (from Catalan semblant) ‘facial expression, face, aspect’, and Latin simulare ‘to
put up, pretend, simulate’ (derivative of similis ‘similar’) is also instructive. On compli-
ments in Plautus’ comedies, see Unceta Gómez (2019b).
7 Sorlin (2017) defines the limits of the concept of ‘manipulation’ as follows: ‘manipula-
tion could be conceived on a spectrum between persuasion on the one hand and coer-
cion on the other, bearing in mind that manipulation leaning on the side of persuasion
would tend to be more belief-based than it is in coercive manipulation. In the latter case,
the manipulator would seek to coerce the victims into acting in a certain way (through
linguistic/pragmatic—not physical—means) rather than coercing them into adopting
the Speaker’s beliefs’ (Sorlin 2017: 135). On manipulative uses of impoliteness in Plautus,
see Iurescia (2016).
8 See, for instance, Pinto (2011: 231).
9 On English, see Fish et al. (2017).
10 According to Barrios-Lech (2016: 120), blanditia should not necessarily be considered
a form of manipulation: ‘women use the characteristic features of blanditia—amabo
and mi + vocative—even when they are not attempting to flatter. […] blanditia could
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or speak ingratiatingly, flatter’, adulare11 ‘to flatter in a servile manner, fawn
upon’, assentari ‘to flatter by agreeing’, or palpari ‘to act in a soothing or cajoling
manner’, and their corresponding lexical families.
Beyond these linguistic considerations, a few metapragmatic comments
offer first-hand information about the in/sincerity of certain obsequious beha-
vioural patterns. The greedy Euclio [1], for instance, thinks he sees a change
of attitude in his neighbours after he has found a treasure, though he keeps it
hidden:12
[1] Plautus Aulularia 182–185
Meg. saluos atque fortunatus, Euclio, semper sies.
Euc. di te ament, Megadore. Meg. quid tu? recten atque ut uis uales?
Euc. non temerarium est ubi diues blande appellat pauperem.
iam illic homo aurum scit me habere, eo me salutat blandius.
Meg. (loudly) May you always be well and blessed, Euclio.
Euc. May the gods love you, Megadorus.
Meg. Well then? Are you in good health, just as you wish?
Euc. (aside) It’s not by chance when a rich man addresses a poor one
in such an ingratiating way. Now he knows I have the gold, that’s
why he’s greeting memore politely.13
But, before going on to address this type of behaviour, certain general concepts
about the principles that govern politeness in Latin must be presented.
simply describe a polite way of speaking typically ascribed to women. […] The word
blandus and its cognates have at least two main connotations, “flattering/manipulative”
or simply “polite” ’. Nevertheless, as Hall (2009: 80) points out, ‘Cicero regularly uses the
term blandus and its cognates to refer to language that seems overly effusive and manip-
ulative’.
11 On the etymology of adulare, see Clackson (2017), who, after rejecting the previous pro-
posals, considers it to be a parasynthetic formation originating froma syntagma ad culum,
so that, starting from the canine custom of smelling the anus, it would have passed meta-
phorically to the meaning ‘to flatter’ (a similar movement is found in English expressions
such as arse-licking and brown-nosing).
12 See also Plaut. Aul. 113–117. Pseud. 448–452 offers a reflection on the usefulness of amiab-
ility (blandis uerbis). And Most. 181 presents an explicit rejection of insincere praise.
13 Texts and translations are borrowed from the Loeb edition by Wolfgang de Melo (2011–
2013).
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2 Latin Politeness System
Politeness in Latin includes awhole constellationof different ideaswhose com-
mon thread is theneed to acknowledgeoneself, andbe acknowledgedbyothers
as well, in one’s proper social position. Consequently, the linguistic behaviour
of each individual in societymust follow this pattern. Although social relations
are subverted on many occasions in Plautus’ comedies—or, perhaps, precisely
because of that possibility—these worksmay be considered a faithful, comical
reflection of a very rigid social structure, where a well-established upper class
interacts with characters belonging to the lower class, whether they be slaves
or free. In harmony with the Roman sense of uerecundia14 (‘restraint, mod-
esty, deference, respect’) the latter must show deference to the former, thereby
ensuring and strengthening the status quo. On some occasions, nonetheless,
certain underprivileged characters can make use of other linguistic mechan-
isms to meet their self-serving objectives, on which their livelihood depends.
Within the theoretical framework that I amcurrently developing for the ana-
lysis of politeness phenomena in Latin,15 I make use of the difference between
politic behaviour16 and polite behaviour.17 Similarly, following Arundale
(2006), I propose substituting the positive/negative politeness dichotomy by
another more generic, less ethnocentric opposition, articulated in terms of the
concept of connectedness/separateness.18 To complete the panorama, along
with further studies about impoliteness, consideration must also be given to
over-polite behaviour, anegativelymarked linguistic behaviour,which is under-
explored to date.19 In this paper, I will consider ‘over-politeness’ not only to be
an excessive or inappropriate showof politeness but also an insincere,manipu-
lative use of certain strategies. Aswewill see,with regard to the linguistic habits
of the chosen characters, these strategies are primarily mechanisms aiming to
14 Kaster (2005: 13–27).
15 See Unceta Gómez (2019c).
16 I.e. ‘linguistic behaviour which is perceived to be appropriate to the social constraints of
the ongoing interaction, i.e. as non-salient’ (Watts 2003: 19).
17 I.e. ‘behaviour beyond what is perceived to be appropriate to the ongoing social interac-
tion, which says nothing about howmembers evaluate it’ (Watts 2003: 21).
18 I’ll comeback to thismodel in Section 4. Even if reconceptualised in the light of Arundale’s
(2006) proposal, for the sake of clarity, throughout this paper I use the terms ‘positive/neg-
ative politeness’ and ‘positive/negative face’.
19 See in Culpeper (2011: 100–103) a metapragmatic analysis of over-politeness. Paternoster
(2012: 317–321) offers an interesting approach to over-politeness in literary texts. Regard-
ing Latin, Iurescia (2019b) presents some reflections on over-politeness as a response to
impoliteness; and Konstan (2018) briefly deals with flattery in epic.
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shorten social distance,20 not in an effort to avoid conflict or manage social
relations, but solely and exclusively in pursuit of one’s personal benefit.
3 Selfish Use of Politeness
In Plautine comedy, there are two character types, the courtesan and the para-
site, that share certain traits, such as their limited resources, their lack of social
importance and their low hierarchical level. In other words, they share a situ-
ation of weakness which makes them dependent and limits their choices and,
possibly, a pronounced sexual dimension.21 Another very apparent common
trait is their linguistic behaviour, characterised by their self-serving use of cer-
tain politeness strategies. In the following sections, I will examine how their
use of certain manifestations of linguistic politeness becomes a mechanism
for trying to manipulate the interlocutor and gain some benefit from him (the
characters targeted by this procedure are always men).
3.1 Parasites
The parasite appears in eight of Plautus’ twenty-one comedies that have sur-
vived to our day,22 although not all of them adopt this expected prototypical
behaviour.23 Being a freeman, this character typemakes use of his wit as a form
of livelihood;24 by means of his obsequious behaviour, he tries to be invited to
20 According to Brown and Levinson (21987: 76–77), ‘D [distance] is a symmetric social
dimension of similarity/difference within which S [speaker] & H [hearer] stand for the
purposes of this act. In many cases (but not all), it is based on an assessment of the fre-
quency of interaction and the kinds of material or non-material goods (including face)
exchanged between S & H (or parties representing S or H, or for whom S and H are rep-
resentatives). An important part of the assessment of D will usually bemeasures of social
distance based on stable social attributes. The reflex of social closeness is, generally, the
reciprocal giving and receiving of positive face’.
21 I.e. if Fontaine (2010: 202, 221–241) is right in his assertion about the Plautine parasite;
according to his interpretation, this character is the subject of veiled but substantive jokes
that insinuate ongoing paedophiliac relations with their patrons.
22 Damon (1997: 37). On the features of this character and his language, see also Guastella
(1988, 2002); Petrone (1989); Maltby (2000); Filoche (2014).
23 For instance, Diabolus in Asinaria or Curculio (Damon 1997: 44). By contrast, slaves, such
as Palaestrio in Miles gloriosus (1037–1093, in the context of a trick), can take on certain
linguistic habits of a parasite. On the similitudes and differences between Plautus’ para-
sites and those of Greek New Comedy, see Crampon (1988) and Lowe (1989).
24 This characterisation is well developed in their respective monologues (see Maltby 2000;
Guastella 2002): Capt. 69–90, 133–137; Men. 96–103; Persa 53–60; Stich. 155–195.
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meals in the home of his patron, so as to quiet his proverbial appetite while
never being fully satisfied. His insincere nature is well reflected in certain lines
from the lost Plautine comedy Colax (‘the flatterer’), a Greek loan which this
character is known by:25
[2] Plautus Colax fr. 2
… qui data fide firmata fidentem fefellerint,
subdoli supsentatores, regi26 qui sunt proxumi,
qui aliter regi dictis dicunt, aliter in animo habent.
Who have deceived the man who trusted them, after giving him their
word and vouching for it, the tricky flatterers, who are closest to the king,
and who speak words to the king in one sense, but have different inten-
tions on their minds.
A paradigmatic example of this contradiction between the ideas and words of
parasites is Artotrogus in Miles gloriosus. He uses a good number of positive
politeness strategies in his conversation with his patronus Pyrgopolynices, but,
on several occasions, he immediately places these strategies in doubt through
asides. We thus find, for example, hyperbolic praise [3],27 obvious attempts to
avoid conflict through a co-operative attitude and reiterated agreement [4]—
an example that includes an illustrative aside28—or attention to the needs of
the interlocutor, and asserted knowledge of the hearer’s needs and concern for
them [5]:29
25 The colax is a stock character—similar but different from the parasite in Greek litera-
ture—which Plautus inherits from Greek New Comedy and seems to gradually do away
with, characterising him as a seruus callidus. Fontaine (2010: 13) suggests that, in addition
to reproducing the Greek κόλαξ, colax might be understood, in the Latin speaker’s mind,
as an -ax formation of the verb colere, which wouldmean ‘ “excessively fond of cultivating
friendship (with a superior)” and thus “fawning, adulatory, toadying, kowtowing, fulsome,
obsequious” ’.
26 On rex used by parasites as a designation for their patroni, see Crampon (1988: 518–520).
27 An additional example is Mil. 55–60.
28 See also Mil. 25–30, and a second aside in 33–35.
29 The obsequious treatment that the miles receives here is even more obvious, if we com-
pare it to how other characters treat him; see, among others, Mil. 947–990 and Poen.
470–503.
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[3] Plautus Miles gloriosus 9–12
Pyr. … sed ubi Artotrogus hic est? Art. stat propter uirum
fortem atque fortunatum et forma regia.
tum bellatoremMars haud ausit dicere
neque aequiperare suas uirtutes ad tuas.
Pyr. … But whereabouts is Artotrogus?
Art. He’s standing next to a real man, robust, rich and of royal beauty.
Mars wouldn’t dare to call himself such a warrior or compare his
exploits to yours.
[4] Plautus Miles gloriosus 16–24
Art. memini. nempe illum dicis cum armis aureis,
quoius tu legiones difflauisti spiritu,
quasi uentus folia aut peniculus tectorium.
Pyr. istuc quidem edepol nihil est. Art. nihil hercle hoc quidem est
praeut alia dicam … quae tu numquam feceris.
periuriorem hoc hominem si quis uiderit
aut gloriarum pleniorem quam illic est,
me sibi habeto, ei ego me mancupio dabo;
nisi unum, epityra estur insanum bene.
Art. I remember. You mean the one with golden armour of course,
whose legions you scattered with a breath as the wind does leaves
or a plasterer’s brush does plaster.
Pyr. That’s a mere nothing.
Art. Indeed, it’s a mere nothing compared with other things I might
mention … (aside)which you’ve never done. If anyone sees a man
perjuring himself more than this one or more boastful than he is,
he can have me for himself, I’ll sell myself to him; but there’s one
thing: his olive spread tastes awfully good.
[5] Plautus Miles gloriosus 38–41
Pyr. habes— Art. tabellas uis rogare. habeo, et stilum.
Pyr. facete aduortis tuom animum ad animummeum.
Art. nouisse mores tuos me meditate decet
curamque adhibere ut praeolat mihi quod tu uelis.
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Pyr. Do you have—
Art. (interrupting)Youwant to askme forwriting tablets. I do, and apen.
Pyr. You mind neatly what’s on my mind.
Art. I ought to know your ways studiously and take care that I get wind
of what you wish in advance.
This amiability, quite obviously excessive, contrasts with the attitude of these
characters when they are not assured of getting what they want,30 such as
in the first meeting between Peniculus and Menaechmus I, who has quar-
relled with his wife, thus limiting the possibilities for holding a banquet in his
home:
[6] Plautus Menaechmi 143–151
Men. dic mi, enumquam tu uidisti tabulam pictam in pariete
ubi aquila Catamitum raperet aut ubi Venus Adoneum?
Pen. saepe. sed quid istae picturae ad me attinent? Men. age me
aspice.
ecquid assimulo similiter? Pen. qui istic ornatust tuos?
Men. dic hominem lepidissimum esse me. Pen. ubi esuri sumus?
Men. dic modo hoc quod ego te iubeo. Pen. dico: homo lepidissume.
Men. ecquid audes de tuo istuc addere? Pen. atque hilarussime.
Men. perge, ⟨perge⟩. Pen. non pergo hercle nisi scio qua gratia.
litigium tibi est cum uxore, eo mi aps te caueo cautius.
Men. Tell me, have you ever seen a mural painting where an eagle car-
ries off Ganymede or Venus carries off Adonis?
Pen. Often. But what do those pictures have to do with me?
Men. Go on, look at me. Do I resemble them in a similar way?
Pen. (noticing the mantle) What are you dressed up for like that?
Men. Say that I’m a jolly good fellow.
Pen. Where are we going to eat?
Men. Just say what I’m telling you.
Pen. All right: jolly good fellow.
Men. Do you want to add something of your own to it?
Pen. And jolly charming fellow.
Men. Go on, go on!
30 See, for instance, the impoliteness of the parasite in Bacch. 577–583.
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Pen. I’m not going, unless I know what for. You’re having a quarrel
with your wife, that’s why I’m taking extra-careful care for myself
against trouble from you.
Significantly, Peniculus’ attitude changes immediately after Menaechmus I
communicates his intention to celebrate a banquet without his wife knowing
(Men. 162).
The self-serving nature of parasites is revealed even in the most delicate
moments, such as inCaptiui, whenErgasilus expresses his empathy toHegio on
the disappearance of his son [7]. The parasitemakes his appearance by sobbing
and expresses his condolences, in heartfelt fashion, winning Hegio’s approval
(laudo) even though the parasite explicitly expresses disagreement with him
(something that is justified by the context and which contributes to the polite
fiction). However, as is revealed immediately, it is all done in self-interest; the
true pain is what is brought on by his hunger:
[7] Plautus Captiui 139–141, 146–153
Heg. ne fle. Erg. egone illum non fleam? egon non defleam
talem adulescentem? Heg. semper sensi filio
meo te esse amicum et illum intellexi tibi.
[…]
Heg. alienus quom eius incommodum tam aegre feras,
quid me patrem par facere est, quoi ille est unicus?
Erg. alienus? ego alienus illi? aha, Hegio,
numquam istuc dixis neque animum induxis tuom;
tibi ille unicust, mi etiam unico magis unicus.
Heg. laudo, malum quom amici tuom ducis malum.
nunc habe bonum animum. Erg. eheu, huic illud dolet,
quia nunc remissus est edendi exercitus.
Heg. Stop crying.
Erg. Should I not cry for him? Should I not weep without restraint for
such a man?
Heg. I always felt that you were close to my son and I saw that he was
close to you. […]
Heg. Since you as an outsider find it so hard to bear hismisfortune, what
must I as his father do, for whom he is the only son?
Erg. Outsider? I an outsider to him? No, no, Hegio, never say that, and
never believe that. To you he’s the only one, but to me he’s even
more of an only one than an only one. (starts crying again)
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Heg. I praise you for considering a friend’s misfortune to be your own
misfortune. Now take heart.
Erg. Oh, oh, oh, this one (pointing to his stomach) is in pain about the
eating force having been dismissed now.
Expressions of commiseration, as well as congratulations, are required speech
acts in certain situations, thus absolute sincerity cannot be assumed in every
case.31 On this occasion, however, the speech acts seek a result that goes bey-
ond the mere expression of sympathy for the interlocutor’s problems or suf-
fering, and Ergasilus ends up by explicitly requesting an invitation to din-
ner.32
The parasite’s manipulative disposition is especially noticeable when his
strategies do not attain their desired objective. This happens with Gelasimus,
the parasite in Stichus. After a long journey abroad, his patron Epignomus
returns home with great wealth and an entourage of parasites who threaten
to displace him. When Gelasimus first encounters his patron [8], his greeting
conveys a highly exaggerated expression of happiness, quite conventionalised
in this speech act,33 as well as his good wishes. Despite the grandiose expres-
sion, Epignomus looks favourably upon the parasite’s words as is seen in his
metapragmatic comment, where he extends his appreciation:
[8] Plautus Stichus 465–469
Gel. … Epignome, ut ego nunc te conspicio lubens!
ut prae laetitia lacrumae prosiliunt mihi!
ualuistin usque? Epi. sustentatum est sedulo.
Gel. propino tibi salutem plenis … faucibus.
Epi. bene atque amice dicis. di dent quae uelis.
31 Leech (2014: 212). On congratulations in Roman comedy, see Unceta Gómez (2016).
32 Erg. quia mi est natalis dies; propterea ⟨a⟩ te uocari ad te ad cenam uolo (Capt. 174–175)
‘Erg. Because it’s my birthday. That’s why I want to be invited by you to a dinner at your
place’. Similarly, when he conveys to Hegio the good news of his son’s arrival, his main
objective is to be invited to a sumptuous dinner (Capt. 780). At the moment when he
shares the news, being fully assured of the reward it will bring him, he goes so far as to
make formulations that clearly threaten the addressee’s negative face, as in: Heg. Iuppiter
te dique perdant. Erg. te hercle … mi aequom est gratias agere ob nuntium (Capt. 868–869)
‘Heg. May Jupiter and the gods destroy you. Erg. No, you … should thank me for my mes-
sage’.
33 Berger (2016); Unceta Gómez (2019a).
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Gel. … (loudly) Epignomus, how happy I am to see you now! How my
tears are gushing forth out of joy! Have you been well throughout?
Epi. I’ve taken good care of myself.
Gel. I’m drinking to your healthwith a full … gullet.
Epi. It’s kind and friendly of you to say so. May the gods grant what you
wish.
The parasite’s next move is clearly an affiliative act (in Hall’s [2009] termino-
logy): the invitation to dine at his house [9] and the completely unbelievable
gesture, given the proverbial poverty of parasites. Epignomus politely rejects
the invitation, offering excuses,34 butGelasimus insists no less than eight times;
such insistence is clearly inappropriate and may even be considered impolite,
but Epignomus replies by presenting several reasons:
[9] Plautus Stichus 471–482
Epi. cenem illi apud te? Gel. quoniam saluos aduenis.
Epi. locata est opera nunc quidem; tam gratia est.
Gel. promitte. Epi. certum est. Gel. sic face inquam. Epi. certa
rest.
Gel. lubente me hercle facies. Epi. idem ego istuc scio.
quando usus ueniet, fiet. Gel. nunc ergo usus est.
Epi. non edepol possum. Gel. quid grauare? censeas.
nescioquid uero habeo in mundo. Epi. i modo,
alium conuiuam quaerito tibi in hunc diem.
Gel. quin tu promittis? Epi. non grauer si possiem.
Gel. unum quidem hercle certo promitto tibi:
lubens accipiam certo, si promiseris.
Epi. ualeas. Gel. certumne est? Epi. certum. cenabo domi.
Epi. I should dine there at your place?
Gel. Since you’ve arrived safely.




Gel. Do, I insist.
34 On this politeness strategy in Latin, see Ferri (2012: 133–134).
- 978-90-04-44026-5




Gel. You’ll really do me a pleasure.
Epi. That I know too.When the need arises, it’ll be done.
Gel. Then there’s need now.
Epi. I really can’t.
Gel. Why are you objecting? Reconsider it. Seriously, I have something
in store for you.
Epi. Just go, find yourself another table companion for today.
Gel. Why don’t you promise?
Epi. I wouldn’t object if I could.
Gel. One thing I promise for certain: I’ll acceptwith pleasure for certain,
if you promise.
Epi. Goodbye.
Gel. Are you resolved?
Epi. Yes, I am resolved. I’ll dine at home.
The objective, revealed immediately afterwards, is to get an invitation to dine.
Anexplicit request follows, towhichEpignomus replies againbygiving excuses,
and the parasite insists, while clearly threatening the negative face of his inter-
locutor (483–496).
According to Barrios-Lech,35 the parasite, along with the adulescens, are the
male character types who ‘speak most politely’; his quantitative data shows
that this character typically makes use of softening hedges (almost three times
as much as the senes, adulescentes and serui altogether);36 and of the prag-
matic marker obsecro (second only to the adulescentes).37 In both cases, these
mechanisms can contribute to the expression of negative politeness, where
parasites underscore their position as inferior and dependent on the favours
of others. More than these elements, however, the really unique aspect of their
language is the abundant use of positive politeness strategies, whereby they
show such familiarity toward their patrons that it may be considered excess-
ive. In this strategy, parasites clearly go beyond appropriate, politic behaviour;
their intensification of polite strategies is often judged negatively (whether by
the addressee, the bystanders, or the audience).
35 Barrios-Lech (2016: 48).
36 Barrios-Lech (2016: 150).
37 Barrios-Lech (2016: 124–125 and Table 9.3).
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3.2 Meretrices
The second character that interests us here, with an even greater presence
in the Plautine comedies, is the courtesan, who also uses politeness in self-
interest. Barrios-Lech’s distinction between meretrix and pseudo-meretrix—
the latter has freeborn status and ismore careful and ‘polite’ inher speech38—is
helpful in determining certain interesting deviations, but it will not be taken
into account in this analysis of over-polite strategies, which are used by both
character types.39
The self-serving character of themeretrices is evidenced on numerous occa-
sions, such as in the well-known passage that compares prostitution to the
occupation of fowlers:
[10] Plautus Asinaria 215–223
non tu scis? hic noster quaestus aucupi simillimust.
auceps quando concinnauit aream, offundit cibum;
[aues] assuescunt: necesse est facere sumptum qui quaerit lucrum;
saepe edunt: semel si captae sunt, rem soluont aucupi.
itidem hic apud nos: aedes nobis area est, auceps sum ego,
esca est meretrix, lectus illex est, amatores aues;
bene salutando consuescunt, compellando blanditer,
osculando, oratione uinnula, uenustula.
Don’t you know?This trade of ours is very similar to catching birds.When
a fowler prepares a clearing, he spreads food there; they get used to it.
He who seeks profit must make an investment. They eat often; but once
they’re caught they give the fowler his reward. It’s the same at our place
here: our house is our clearing, I’m the fowler, the prostitute is the bait, the
bed is the decoy, and the lovers are the birds. They get used to us through
nice greetings, sweet addresses, kissing, tender and delightful speech.
This amiability is used exclusively when there is some profit in sight,40 e.g. as
Diabolus reproaches Cleareta in Asinaria [11]:41
38 See Barrios-Lech (2016: 123, 150, 269).
39 Similarly, even in cases where we can determine that the courtesan is truly in love, they
make use of exaggerated expressiveness, as can be noted, for instance, with Lemniselene,
the courtesan in Persa (cf. e.g. 766).
40 When possibilities for obtaining such a profit disappear, courtesans can become curt or
even impolite, as, for instance, in Poen. 330–409.
41 Diniarchus in Truculentus (22–73) also complains about the behaviour of courtesans and
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[11] Plautus Asinaria 204–206, 208, 210–214
aliam nunc mi orationem despoliato praedicas,
longe aliam, inquam, ⟨iniqua⟩, praebes nunc atque olim quom dabam,
aliam atque olim quom illiciebasme ad te blande ac benedice.
[…]
me unice unum ex omnibus te atque illam amare aibas mihi:
[…]
meo de studio studia erant uostra omnia,
usque adhaerebatis: quod ego iusseram, quod uolueram
faciebatis, quod nolebam ac uotueram, de industria
fugiebatis, nec conari id facere audebatis prius.
nunc nec quid uelim nec nolim facitis magni, pessumae.
Now that you’ve robbed me you are using a different kind of rhetoric on
me; I say, now you give me a kind of rhetoric far different from when I
was providing for you, you criminal, different from the time when you
were enticing me to you with flattery and kind words. […] You used to
say tome that out of all people you and she lovedme andme only; […] all
your interests were in line with mine, you were clinging on to me all the
time. You did whatever I ordered and whatever I wished, you deliberately
avoided whatever I didn’t wish and forbade, and you didn’t dare try this
earlier. Now you don’t give a damn about what I like and what I dislike,
you crooks.
This obsequious behaviour, whereby themeretrices are distinguished from the
matrons,42 is usually directed toward lovers from whom there is hope of a
profit.43 This is seen, for example, in Menaechmi, where the courtesan Erot-
ium displays all of her charm (by the means of mechanisms such as the use
of mi + vocative, which is a term of affection,44 a form of affiliation, expres-
describes their manner in detail. See also his reproaches to Astaphium, servant of his
beloved Phronesium (Truc. 162–163).
42 Cleo. non matronarum officiumst, sed meretricium, uiris alienis, mi uir, subblandirier (Cas.
585–586) ‘Cleo. My dear husband, it’s not the job of wives, but of prostitutes, to charm
other men’.
43 Even so, use of these techniques is also confirmed outside the business exchange with
one’s client, as in Bacch. 39–100, where Bacchides, paradigm of the ‘bad meretrix’, man-
ages to win the favour of Pistoclerus and overcomes his efforts to resist (50 uiscus merus
uostra est blanditia; ‘Your flattery is pure birdlime’). See also Rud. 435–438.
44 Asin. 664–668 shows comical exploitation of the expressive use of terms of affec-
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sion of agreement, exaggerated sympathy and approval), in order to win her
client’s favour; this sharply contrasts with how she treats the slave of Menaech-
mus I, Peniculus, who makes a metapragmatic comment on the courtesan’s
attitude:
[12] Plautus Menaechmi 182–186, 190–193
Ero. animemi, Menaechme, salue. Pen. quid ego? Ero. extra num-
erum es mihi.
Pen. idem istuc aliis ascriptiuis fieri ad legionem solet.
Men. ego istic mihi hodie apparari iussi apud te proelium.
Ero. hodie id fiet. Men. in eo uterque proelio potabimus;
[…]
Pen. interim nequis quin eius aliquid indutus sies.
Ero. quid hoc est? Men. induuiae tuae atque uxoris exuuiae, rosa.
Ero. superas facile ut superior sis mihi quam quisquam qui impe-
trant.
Pen. meretrix tantisper blanditur, dum illud quod rapiat uidet.
Ero. My sweetheart, Menaechmus, hello.
Pen. What about me?
Ero. You don’t count to me.
Pen. That same thing is always said to happen to supernumeraries like
me in the army too.
Men. (to Erotium) I ordered that a battle should be prepared for myself
here at your place today.
Ero. It shall take place today.
Men. In this battle we shall both drink. […]
Pen. (aside) In themeantime you can’t helpwearing something of hers.
Ero. What is this? (points to the mantle)
Men. You are robed and my wife is robbed,my rose.
Ero. You easily gain the upper hand so that for me you are above any
of those who commandme.
Pen. A prostitute only flatters as long as she can see something she
can snatch.
tion for strengthening a petition. See also the comical imitation of this resource in Cas.
134–138.
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In this same scene [13], there are other typical procedures of positive polite-
ness: expression of agreement, attention to the interests and needs of the
hearer, and even anticipation of these:
[13] Plautus Menaechmi 207–209, 213–215
Men. scin quid45 uolo ego te accurare? Ero. scio, curabo quae uoles.
Men. iube igitur tribus nobis apud te prandium accurarier
atque aliquid scitamentorum de foro opsonarier,
[…]
atque actutum. Ero. licet ecastor. Men. nos prodimus ad
forum.
iam hic nos erimus: dum coquetur, interim potabimus.
Ero. quando uis ueni, parata res erit. Men. propera modo.
Men. (to Erotium) Do you knowwhat I want you to take care of?
Ero. I know, I’ll take care of what you want.
Men. Then have a lunch prepared at your place for the three of us,
and have some delicacies brought from the market […] and at
once.
Ero. Yes, of course.
Men. We’re off to the forum.We’ll be back soon.While it’s being cooked,
we’ll drink.
Ero. Comewhen you wish, it will be ready.
Men. Just hurry.
The intensification of familiarity produced by these expressive mechanisms
becomes entirely evident when they are used with a stranger, as occurs in the
comical recourse of twins in the same comedy:46
[14] Plautus Menaechmi 361–374
Ero. … animule mi, mi mira uidentur
45 As Barrios-Lech (2016: 215–218) has noted, the pattern scin quid …? allows courtesans to
anticipate the client’s wishes. The expression—which is not a real request for information
but has the communicative function of getting the interlocutor’s attention and leading up
to a request—is treated literally by the courtesans, thereby intensifying the impression of
interest toward their clients.
46 See also Men. 207–212, 677; Bacch. 1178–1179; Mil. 1161–1163.
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te hic stare foris, fores quoi pateant,
magis quam domus tua domus quom haec tua sit.
omne paratum est, ut iussisti
atque ut uoluisti, […].
prandium, ut iussisti, hic curatum est:
ubi lubet, ire licet accubitum.
Sos. quicum haec mulier loquitur? Ero. equidem tecum. Sos. quid
mecum tibi
fuit umquamautnunc est negoti? Ero. quia pol teunumexomni-
bus
Venus me uoluit magnuficare, neque id haud immerito tuo.
nam ecastor solus benefactis tuisme florentem facis.
Sos. certo haec mulier aut insana aut ebria est, Messenio,
quae hominem ignotum compellet me tam familiariter.
Ero. … My sweetheart, it seems strange to me that you’re standing
outside here: the door stands open for you, since this house is
more yours than your own house is. Everything is prepared, as
you ordered and as you wanted. […] The lunch has been seen
to, as you told me. We can go and recline at table as soon as you
wish.
Sos. (to Messenio) Who is this woman talking to?
Ero. To you of course.
Sos. What business have I ever had with you or have I now?
Ero. Because out of all men Venus wanted me to hold you alone in
esteem, and not undeservedly so: you alone let me flourish
through your generosity.
Sos. (again to Messenio) This woman is definitely either mad or drunk,
Messenio: she addresses me, a total stranger, so intimately.
The effect is quite comical, even ridiculous, since Sosicles does not know this
woman. Intensification of closeness (when the distance between two strangers
is great) is entirely improper despite Erotium emphasising her subsidiary pos-
ition using, for instance, the verb iussisti.
In the case of [15], however, Stephanium, the courtesan of Stichus, addresses
two fellow slaves. Even though the relationship is therefore different from the
previous ones, there is nevertheless a great similarity between Stephanium’s
expressive resources and those we have seen on other occasions, e.g. apo-
logies for lateness, interest in the hearer’s wishes and expressions of affec-
tion:
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[15] Plautus Stichus 742–744, 750–753
Ste. morigerabor,meae deliciae. nam ita me Venus amoena amet,
ut ego huc iam dudum simitu exissem uobiscum foras,
nisi me uobis exornarem. nam ita est ingeniummuliebre:
[…]
Ste. utrubi accumbo? Sang. utrubi tu uis? Ste. cum ambobus uolo,
nam ambos amo.
Sti. uapulat peculium, actum est. Sang. fugit hoc libertas caput.
Ste. date mi locum ubi accumbam, amabo, siquidem placeo. Sti. tun
mihi?
Ste. cupio cum utroque. Sti. ei mihi! bene dispereo.
Ste. I’ll humour you,my darlings: as truly as lovely Venus may love me,
I’d have come out here together with you long ago, if I hadn’t been
makingmyself pretty for you; yes, a woman’s nature is like this […]
In which place am I to recline?
Sang. In which do you want to?
Ste. I want to be with both, because I love you both.
Sti. My savings are getting a thrashing, I’m done for.
Sang. Freedom is running away fromme.
Ste. Please, give me a place to recline, you two, if you like me.
Sti. I like you?
Ste. I wish to do sowith each of you.
Sti. Dear me! I’m perishing in a good way.
In this case, we also see the use of a frequent form of blanditia and the prag-
maticmarker amabo, usedmostly in combinationwith requests or questions.47
A characteristic element of the female sociolect and strongly associated with
an erotic context,48 amabo is used mainly by courtesans49 and is also a trait
that strikingly differentiates their language from that of pseudo-courtesans;
according to the statistical data presented by Barrios-Lech, ‘courtesans direct
47 But it is not an exclusive function: on the uses of this pragmaticmarker, seeUncetaGómez
(2015) and Fedriani (2017).
48 In five of the seven examples in Plautus inwhich it is pronounced by aman, it is addressed
to a woman in an amorous context; the other two appear in a homoerotic context.
49 Courtesans use amabo almost five times more than matrons do, and, in Terence, only
courtesans use amabo (Barrios-Lech 2016: 121–123 and Table 9.2). The reason for this, as
Barrios-Lech (2016: 123) indicates, would have to be found in the ideology of the ‘good
wife’, ‘whose public conduct should be characterized by restraint’.
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two-thirds of all tokens of amabo put in theirmouths to lovers. But the pseudo-
courtesan directs to a lover only one-fifth of the total tokens of amabo assigned
to her’.50
Phronesium’s behaviour in Truculentus is also rather interesting. After deny-
ingher professional favours toDiniarchus, she becomes agreeable towards him,
be it in a strange type of relationship that might be considered as ‘friendship’
(see 434–440), although Phronesium continues to ask him for a gift (425–427).
In [16],we can identify: the pragmaticmarkeramabo, a joke, flattery, the offer of
a kiss, and an invitation to dine—in other words, an intensification of interest
in the boy:51
[16] Plautus Truculentus 352–353, 355–356, 358–363
Phro. num tibi nam, amabo, ianua est mordaxmea,
quo intro ire metuas,mea uoluptas?
[…]
Phro. quid tam inficetu’s Lemno adueniens qui tuae
non des amicae, Diniarche, sauium?
[…]
Din. salua sis, Phronesium.
Phro. salue. hicine hodie cenas, saluos quom aduenis?
Din. promisi. Phro. ubi cenabis? Din. ubi tu iusseris.
Phro. hic; me lubente facies. Din. edepol me magis.
nemp’ tu eris hodie mecum, mea Phronesium?
Phro. uelim, si fieri possit.
Phro. Please, my darling, you don’t think my door will bite you, do
you, so that you should be afraid to go in? […] Why are you so
unmannered that on your arrival from Lemnos you won’t give
your girlfriend a kiss, Diniarchus? […]
Din. My greetings, Phronesium.
Phro. Andmine to you.Won’t you have dinner here today, since you’ve
arrived safely?
Din. I have a prior engagement.
50 Barrios-Lech (2016: 123).
51 This behaviour sharply contrasts with how she treats the soldier Stratophanes (Truc. 499–
542), fromwhom she seeks to obtain a nice profit. And the attitude of Diniarchus himself
is also different than how he will act slightly later, when he wants to recover the child that
he has lent to Phronesium in order to pull off a trick on the soldier (Truc. 860–861).
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Phro. Where are you going to have dinner?
Din. Where you tell me to.
Phro. Here; you’ll do me a pleasure.
Din. Myself even more. You’ll be with me today, won’t you, my dear
Phronesium?
Phro. I’d love to, if it were possible.
Finally, the most expressive representation of this behaviour is found in Miles
gloriosus, where Acroteleutium makes use of a further resource: intensifying
the emotional element and simulating extreme lovesickness, including a ficti-
tious faint,52 trembling, and a suicide threat.53
By the means of the preceding examples, we can appreciate the richness of
manifestations of blanditia, the typical over-politeness of courtesans, as a form
of manipulation that is primarily, though not exclusively, female.54
4 Discussion and Conclusions
Although most of the linguistic resources that have, thus far, been recognised
as mechanisms of manipulation can also be found in the speech of other char-
acter types, it seems evident that both courtesans and parasites are the stock
characters that most often draw on a battery of procedures for giving posit-
ive face to the persons whom they depend on for their own livelihood. Among
the positive politeness strategies inventoried by Brown and Levinson,55 Table 1
presents those that are most easily recognised in the examples analysed in this
paper. This table does not contend on being exhaustive, but merely indicative.
However, one may note that certain passages are overloaded with this type of
strategies.
Furthermore, at the expressive level, we see some consistency in the fre-
quent use of flattery, and, in the case of courtesans, of affectionate terms,
52 The same stratagem is employed by the other courtesan in this comedy, Philocomasium
(Mil. 1330–1332).
53 See Mil. 1239–1241, 1260–1261, 1272–1273. On this stereotype of lovers, see Dutsch (2012).
54 Cf. supra, n. 10. As Dutsch (2008: 75–77) notes, the man can be influenced by the pros-
titute and become a blandus amator, a type of behaviour that is completely unsuitable
outside of the female sphere. ‘Plautus routinely casts the vir blandiens in the following
scenario: in order to satisfy his lust, the lover needs someone else’s help and, in order to
obtain it, adopts a woman’s persuasivemanner of speaking (blanditia)’ (Dutsch 2008: 77).
See Plaut., Trin. 245–247 and Cist. 449–460.
55 Brown and Levinson (21987: 101–129).
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table 1 Positive politeness strategies
Positive politeness strategy Parasites Courtesans
Notice, attend to H (interests, wants, needs,
goods)
[6] [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]
Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy
with H)
[3], [4], [7], [8] [12], [14], [15]
Seek agreement [4] [12], [13]
Avoid disagreement [4] [14], [15]
Presuppose/raise/assert common ground [7]
Joke [16]
Assert or presuppose S’s knowledge of and
concern for H’s wants
[5] [12], [13]
Offer, promise [9] [12], [13], [15], [16]
Give (or ask for) reasons [15]
Give gifts to H (goods, sympathy, under-
standing, co-operation)
[8] [16]
diminutives, the possessive mi + vocative, and the pragmatic marker amabo.
All these strategies seek to create a fiction on familiarity with the addressee.
Despite the occasional explicit expression of their position of dependence
and submission, the most frequent attitude in parasiti and meretrices is that
of attempting to reduce social distance with their addressee. It is to this end
that they apply all these strategies of connectedness.56 This sharply contrasts
with the acceptable politic behaviour for the lower classes (and even with the
polite behaviour that behoves them), that is, with adopting a humble attitude
and manifesting the social distance and hierarchical superiority of their inter-
locutor. The communicative style of these characters may, therefore, be con-
sidered unconventional, in that it is excessive and fails to follow the prevailing
norm in Latin, something that is not justifiable even by the acquaintance that
can be observed in most of the cases that were analysed. It can also be added
that, outside of Plautine comedy, the same overlap exists betweenmore or less
sincere affiliative techniques and expressions typical of contexts of familiarity,
as Hall has noted in Cicero’s letters.57
56 Brown and Levinson (21987: 103) consider positive politeness as a ‘social accelerator’.
57 ‘The language, then, of affiliative politeness and blanditiae overlapped to a considerable
degree. Both aimed at suggesting a sense of solidarity and familiarity with the addressee,
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Beyond that, these mechanisms are clearly conscious ones (not automated
or routinised) and insincere; their effectiveness lies in constituting a nonstand-
ard procedure to please the elite, an expectation that comedies discussed here
may seek to ridicule. Moreover, the procedure brings about interesting com-
ical effects, given that everyone (bystanders and audience) can see that such
dealings are over-polite—being excessive and insincere at once—except for
the addressees, who are fooled in most cases.58
Themanipulative intent and self-serving nature of these forms of politeness
are assured by the fact that the beneficiary of these strategies is always ulti-
mately the one who utters them, not their recipient, who usually falls prey to
the insincerity. Hall also reaches this conclusion and points to the difficulties
faced bymodern scholars in determining amanipulative intent in certain prac-
tices.59 In comedy, however, the plotlines allow us to determine the perlocu-
tionary effect of these acts. The contextual information provides an external
portrayal of the different characters’ conduct and communicative styles. This
is preciselywhy theatre constitutes anunsurpassed corpuswithwhich onemay
test theories about pragmatics and linguistic politeness.
The analysis of communities of practice,60 such as those of prostitutes
and parasites, with their characteristic linguistic behaviours, allows a glimpse
into some Roman conceptualisations regarding the need to uphold politeness
within reasonable limits and under a certain degree of control. The elite is—or
should at least be—alien to any expressive excesses. In this way, the four-sided
model proposed in Unceta Gómez (2019c) can be expanded with the inclusion
of the notion of over-politeness (Table 2).61
often through the use of compliments and overstatement. The more conventionalized
strategies, however, make these claims in a relatively restrained way that takes care to
show respect to the addressee. blanditiae, by contrast, seem to be characterized in part by
bolder assumptions of familiarity and intimacy, conveyed by the use of less formal idioms’
(Hall 2009: 82).
58 See, for instance, the words of Diniarchus, the adulescenswho is in love with Phronesium
in Truculentus and who acknowledges the gullibility of lovers (Truc. 190–192).
59 ‘Their language is often similar and both often involve fictions; the difference lies largely
inwho benefits. If these fictions help to save the addressee’s face and to promotemutually
beneficial social harmony, they are likely to be viewed favorably. But if the writer seems
to be angling for some advantage of his own, these civilities take on a rather more suspect
character’ (Hall 2009: 99).
60 That is, ‘a loosely defined group of people who are mutually engaged on a particular task’
(Mills 2003: 30).
61 Interestingly, the Handbook of Electioneering offers an indication that allows to inter-
pret blanditia as a distorted form of comitas: deinde id quod natura non habes induc in
animum ita simulandum esse ut natura facere uideare. nam comitas tibi non deest, ea quae
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In Greek tragedy, we often encounter characters being silent for an extended
period of time and, especially in Aeschylus’ works, as noted by Taplin (1972),1
these instances of silence convey a specific dramatic effect: they draw atten-
tion to the silent character.Whilst the significance of these extended stretches
of silence has been duly explored,2 shorter instances also play a role in tragic
discourse:
In the context of tragic persuasion and rhetoric, characters often fail to con-
vey their intent or proposition3—this has mostly to do with differing char-
acter opinions or dispositions. Sometimes, however, these characters are not
even able to establish communicative contact and their interlocutors stay or
fall silent. Frequently, then, speakers comment on this phenomenon by using
expressions such as τί σιγᾶις,4 σιγᾶις,5 or σιωπᾶις,6 sometimes in combination
with τί φήις.7 This suggests to today’s readers of tragedy that there must have
1 For Niobe und Achilles in Aesch. Myrmidones, see Taplin (1972: 58–76), also Montiglio (2000:
213–216).
2 Cf. e.g. Chong-Gossard (2008: 113–204). For an extensive survey of silences in tragedy, see
Montiglio (2000: 158–212).
3 For the case of Euripides, see Battezzato (2017).
4 Soph. Phil. 805 (τί φής; τί σιγᾶις;);OC 1271 (τί σιγᾶις; + aposiopesis); Aesch. EdonoiTrGF fr. 61.144
τί φήις; τί σιγᾶις; ἀλλὰ δῆτ’ ἐκ τοῦ μέλους ζητῶ σ’, ἐπειδή γ’ αὐτὸς οὐ βούλει φράσαι; Soph. Ichneutai
TrGF fr. 314.203 πά̣τερ, τί σιγ̣ᾶις; μῶν ἀληθ[ὲς εἴπομεν;], Eur.TrGF fr. 1008 τί σιγᾶις; μῶν φόνον τιν’
εἰργάσω;
5 Eur. Andromeda TrGF fr. 126/127/128 Ανδρ. σιγᾶις· σιωπὴ δ’ ἄπορος ἑρμηνεὺς λόγων. Περσ. ὦ
παρθέν’, οἰκτίρω σε κρεμαμένην ὁρῶν. Ανδρ. σὺ δ’ εἶ τίς ὅστις τοὐμὸν ὤικτιρας πάθος; Eur. Hypsi-
pyle TrGF fr. 757.839–841 Ὑψ. … οὕτω δοκ̣εῖ μ’ ὦ πότνι’̣, ἀποκτείνε[̣ιν] ὀργῆι πρὶν ὀρθῶς πρᾶγμ̣[α]
διαμαθ̣ε[̣ῖν τόδε;] σιγᾶις, ἀμείβηι δ’ οὐδέν; ὦ τάλαιν’ ἐγ̣[ώ.
6 Soph. Phil. 730–731 τί δή ποθ’ ὧδ’ ἐξ οὐδενὸς λόγου σιωπᾶις κἀπόπληκτος ὧδ’ ἔχηι. 951 τί φής;
σιωπᾶις. οὐδέν εἰμ’ ὁ δύσμορος.
7 For τί φήις as a request for more information and for a more specific explanation on what
was said in conversations without silence, see e.g. Soph. El. 675, 855; OT 330, 654, 957, 1233;
Ant. 248, 1289; Trach. 349; Phil. 1237, 1242. Only combination with τί φήις: Phil. 805. 951; Aesch.
Edonoi TrGF fr. 61.144.
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been a performed andmarked pause on stage: there is no communicative con-
tact at all despite the persuasive intention of the interlocutors.
2 Types of Silence and Their Linguistic Value
Before asking how these breaks in contact work andwhat they convey in tragic
discourse and on the tragic stage, an approach towards the causes8 of silence
in tragedy and its possiblemechanisms shall be taken by beginning with a look
at Aeschylus’ Agamemnon. Being probably the most famous silence scene in
tragedy,9 Clytaemestra’s appeal to Cassandra to enter the Argive palace offers
an instructive intradramatic reflection and relevant starting-point for our sur-
vey and may even be profitably paired with modern pragmatics in order to
explain other scenes:10
[1] Aeschylus Agamemnon 1035, 1039, 1050–1052, 1059–1065
Κλ. εἴσω κομίζου καὶ σύ, Κασσάνδραν λέγω·
[…]
ἔκβαιν’ ἀπήνης τῆσδε, μηδ’ ὑπερφρόνει.
[…]
Κλ. ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἐστὶ μὴ χελιδόνος δίκην
ἀγνῶτα φωνὴν βάρβαρον κεκτημένη,
ἔσω φρενῶν λέγουσα πείθω νιν λόγωι.
[…]
Κλ. σὺ δ’ εἴ τι δράσεις τῶνδε, μὴ σχολὴν τίθει.
εἰ δ’ ἀξυνήμων οὖσα μὴ δέχηι λόγον—
σὺ δ’ ἀντὶ φωνῆς φράζε καρβάνωι χερί.
Χο. ἑρμηνέως ἔοικεν ἡ ξένη τοροῦ
δεῖσθαι. τρόπος δὲ θηρὸς ὡς νεαιρέτου.
Κλ. ἦ μαίνεταί γε καὶ κακῶν κλύει φρενῶν
ἥτις λιποῦσα μὲν πόλιν νεαίρετον […].
Clyt. You come along inside too—I mean you, Cassandra.
[…]
8 Perceau (2014) offers ‘réticence’ and ‘cri’ as explanations.Thesebinary categories, however,
are, to my mind, inadequate, and I would like to search for more precise distinctions.
9 See Mastronarde (1979: 74).
10 Translations are taken from Sommerstein (2008).
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Come down from this carriage, don’t be so proud.
[…]
Clyt. Well, unless she has some unintelligible barbarian language, like
the swallows do, what I say should be getting inside her mind and
my words should persuade her.
[…]
Clyt. If youwant to take somepart in this, don’t hangaround. If youdon’t
understandmywords, and they’re not getting through to you, then
instead of speaking, express yourself with gestures in the way for-
eigners do.
Cho. The foreign woman seems to be in need of a clear interpreter. She
has the manner of a wild beast just trapped.
Clyt. She’s mad, that’s all, obeying the promptings of an unsoundmind.
And she doesn’t yet know how to bear the bridle, not till she’s
foamed out her rage in blood […].
It is striking how many unanswered imperatives11 are used by Clytaemestra
and the chorus; this clearly marks Cassandra’s silence as a behaviour out of the
ordinary. But even more curiously, by distinguishing scenarios,12 Clytaemestra
offers three possible explanations for Cassandra’s unusual silence:
1) a lack of understanding of Clytaemestra’s orders due to Cassandra’s bar-
baric language (1050–1051);
2) the lack of persuasion on her own behalf (1052); and finally, as a result of
her continued futile persuasive attempts,
3) Cassandra’s insanity (1064).13
How can we distinguish these explanations of silence? In terms of speech act
theory, the speaker’s illocutionary acts are always performed in an infelicitous
way when their interlocutor stays silent, meaning there is no uptake:
Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been
happily, successfully performed […]. It cannot be said to have warned
an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain
11 Cf. Clytaemestra’s lines 1035, 1039, 1059 and the chorus’ comments: πείθοι’ ἄν, εἰ πείθοι’
(1049) and ἕπου (1054).
12 The conditional in 1050 makes the alternative scenarios clear.
13 These interpretations givenwithin the text are not necessarily right. Here, as the audience
will have already knownand aswe can infer fromCassandra’s very first utterance toApollo
(1073 ὦπολλον ὦπολλον), Cassandra might be insane, but in the sense of a divine madness
induced by Apollo and the impact of her own prophecies. On the other hand, she might
also simply be unwilling to answer.
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sense. An effect must be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary
act is to be carried out […]. Generally the effect amounts to bringing
about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locu-
tion. So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of
uptake.14
But we can further specify these infelicitous speech acts—none of which
receives any uptake, but they are met with silence—and this is also roughly
outlined in Clytaemestra’s explanation:
1) locutionary ineffectiveness: the speaker’s utterance achieves neither a
locutionary nor an illocutionary effect. If one applies this to the example
of Cassandra, one would explain her silence as a consequence of insanity
or a failure to understand: Cassandra does not acoustically or mentally
understand Clytaemestra’s words (i.e. the locution), and therefore does
not grasp their illocutionary meaning either. She indicates this by staying
silent.
2) illocutionary ineffectiveness: the speaker’s illocutionary speech act has
been acknowledged but is wilfully ignored by the silent interlocutor, i.e.
has no illocutionary effect. This would refer to Clytaemestra’s plan to per-
suade Cassandra using words (ἔσω φρενῶν λέγουσα πείθω νιν λόγωι): in
this scenario, she assumes that Cassandra has understood the meaning
and the intention of her words, i.e. the illocution, perfectly, but refuses
to follow. In either case, there are no perlocutionary consequences as no
communicative contact is established.
Butwhat function does silence serve in discourse? In the framework of Conver-
sation Analysis,15 the categories of preferred and dispreferred response do not
apply to an interlocutor’s silence: it is neither the response usually expected16
by any speaker asking a question or making a request in their speech or turn
(agreement by talking) nor a dispreferred response (rejection by talking). Since
14 Austin (21975: 116–117). On the correct perception of the illocutionary act as basic pre-
requisite for communication, see also Searle (1965: 222).
15 ‘ “Preferred” and “dispreferred” […] refer to sequential properties of turn and sequence
construction, not participant desires ormotivations.’ Schegloff (1988: 445). See also Levin-
son (1983: 332–345).Whilst the preferred response would be agreeing by talking, rejection
(i.e. not agreeing) can be classed as dispreferred responses. See Schegloff (1988: 445) and
Pomerantz (1975, 1978).
16 Cf. the above-mentioned repeated imperatives towards Cassandra. Of course, not in every
adjacency pair the preferred response is agreement by talking, e.g. self-deprecations: cf.
Pomerantz (1984).
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it sometimes prefigures a dispreferred response to come17 but does not always
do so (Cassandra does not answer at all to Clytaemestra), I suggest defining
silence as a ‘non-response’.18
Other causes of silence can also be classified by this framework, e.g. sick-
ness or an unreceptive state of mind, as in similar scenes in Sophocles’Philoct-
etes and Euripides’ Hippolytus.19 These examples can be termed locutionary
ineffectiveness, because interlocutors were prevented from communicating by
external factors and did not even grasp the implications of the requestmade to
them.
Examples of illocutionary ineffectiveness—i.e. understanding the illocution
but not being able to give a preferred response and not acting upon the recog-
nised illocution—would be strong emotions on the interlocutor’s part: in Eur-
ipides’ Iphigeneia at Aulis (1238–1257), Agamemnon’s grief and shame about his
decision to sacrifice Iphigeneia keep him from talking, although he, of course,
understands Iphigeneia’s illocution.20 But there are also instances of illocution-
ary ineffectiveness in which the character simply refuses to answer, and their
personal aversion becomes clear—they arewilfully reacting by not talking. The
fathers Oedipus in Sophocles’ OC and Theseus in Euripides’ Hippolytus when
refusing to speak with their sons exemplify this use.21 Silence has therefore
been shown to represent two different kinds of non-responses that are caused
either by locutionary and illocutionary or merely by illocutionary ineffective-
ness.
17 ‘Commonly, dispreferred responses are preceded by some delay component in their turn
[…]’ Schegloff (1988: 445).
18 See Stivers and Robinson (2006: 373); Levinson (1983: 300–301) calls this type of silence
in general an ‘attributable silence’ as speakers have been selected to speak by their inter-
locutor but stay silent.
19 In Sophocles’Philoctetes (731–745), themain character falls silent and breaks contact with
Neoptolemus because he is in pain and sick. In Euripides’Hippolytus (179–283), Phaedra’s
breaks in communicationwhen talking toher nurse in the beginning of the play are said to
be causedby sickness,which again is causedby a state of mental confusion—Phaedra her-
self calls this μανία, and the chorus call it νόσος. Given that both her emotion and sickness
are portrayed as severe, this failure to establish contact should be explained as locutionary
ineffectiveness.
20 Cf. Creon’s pain about the prophecy that his son Menelaus needs to be sacrificed in Eur-
ipides’Phoenissae (Eur. Phoen. 967–970).
21 Soph. OC 1271–1348: Oedipus does not want to talk to Polyneices and ignores him for a long
time—there is a gap of nearly 80 lines between Polyneices’ enquiring about the silence
and his eliciting an indirect response by Oedipus. Likewise, in Euripides’Hippolytus (Eur.
Hipp. 902–1101), Theseus does not want to acknowledge Hippolytus’ arguments out of
hatred. For the ἦθος of OC’s Oedipus being represented by his silence, see Perceau (2014:
68).
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When considering the examples above,22 however, the paradoxical nature
of silence in tragic dialogue becomes manifest: as it marks a pause in tragedy’s
metrical language, it must follow that silent speakers do still take up their turn
despite not speaking, and, what’smore, precisely by staying silent. For the types
of silence discussed can also be said to have an illocutionary force and a per-
locutionary effect:23 by choosing not to speak, hence by giving a non-response
and still taking up a turn, interlocutors convey a deeper meaning to their reac-
tion and a disturbing effect is achieved on the speaker.24 Silences in persuasive
discourse are consequently either caused by external factors—i.e. sickness or
insanity—or internal factors—such as intense emotional involvement or per-
sonal aversion. The terminology provided by speech act theory and Conversa-
tionAnalysis can help classify silences and their explanationsmore adequately
and clearly: as a result, we are able to distinguish between voluntary and invol-
untary silence, external or internal reasons, as well as the degree of influence
of the speaker-interlocutor relationship. Observing that silent speakers take up
their turn by filling it with silence points to an important dramatic meaning.25
These categories do not become eminently clear from performance or text.
3 Strategies of Reconnecting
We have seen what silences in persuasive discourse mean and how they are
interpreted by the speakers. It will illuminate our understanding of the relev-
22 The Cassandra passage in A. Ag. offers a very clear turn-sequence, in which the chorus
selects Cassandra as the next speaker, and Clytaemestra answers instead: 1049–1050 Χο.
πείθοι’ ἂν, εἰ πείθοι’· ἀπειθοίης δ’ ἴσως.Κλ. ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἐστὶ μὴ χελίδονος δίκην […], s.a. 1053–1055;
the same is true for Soph. Phil. 730–731, but Neoptolemos keeps talking after a diaeresis
after the second length: Νε. ἕρπ’ εἰ θέλεις. τί δή ποθ’ ὧδ’ ἐξ οὐδενὸς λόγου σιωπᾶις κἀπόπλη-
κτος ὧδ’ ἔχηι; S.a. Soph. OC 1268–1272: Polyneices implies a response by his father (πρὸς σοί,
πάτερ παρασταθήτω 1268–1269); we can infer a caesura after 1270 before τί σιγᾶις in 1271,
which again offers a pause as 1271 is an incomplete verse. In Eur.Hipp. 910–911, Hippolytus
selects his father as the next speaker and then comments on his silence, which also sug-
gests a break (πάτερ, πυθέσθαι βούλομαι σέθεν πάρα). All these instances are attributable
silences and effect breaks in conversational flow, which marks the absence of vocalised
uptake. Therefore, attributable silences should be seen as a turn which speakers choose
to or are forced (by emotional or physical impediment) to fill with a non-response.
23 I wish to thank Luis Unceta Gómez for this observation.
24 Cf. comments such as τί σιγᾶις, which express a state of confusion and prompt the audi-
ence to wonder about the reasons.
25 Along the idea of Watzlawick et al. (1967: 48–51) that one cannot not communicate, I sug-
gest that silence is all the same a form of communication and therefore has the value of a
turn.
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ant passages to examine the speakers’ approach to an occurrence of silence
in discourse and their attempts at reconnecting. Firstly, we should examine
the distinctive feature of the scenes under discussion: what do τί σιγᾶις etc.
imply?26 The τί-questions here considered seem to have a two-fold function: 1)
they are the first verbal instance in discourse to mark this silence on stage (i.e.
Wortregie) and 2) they already show some kind of reaction to the preceding
silence—literally, by asking for the reason for the interlocutor’s silence.27 But if
we look at the texts, there are puzzling aspects about questions like τί σιγᾶις:
on their own, they are almost never answered in a straightforward way28—
they tend not to entice a character to explain the reason for their silence,
which would be the preferred response.29 Even when they are combined with
τί φής—which generally suggests the rather unmarked meaning of τί σιγᾶις on
its own—they do not make the interlocutor speak instantly.30
Instances in which these questions do convince the previously silent inter-
locutor to reply are few and have one feature in common: they are always
combinedwith other questions showing further personal interest for the silent
interlocutor and the reason for their silence.31 So in fact, these short expres-
sions are often only the prelude to a more engaged and interested approach
by the speaker,32 and not so much a valid question of their own. Since we
26 Here, I also include the questions (τί) σιγᾶις and σιωπᾶις aswell as their combinationswith
τί φής; τί σιγᾶις; τί φής; σιωπᾶις (see note 4 and 5 for a list of passages). Lexically, there is
little difference between σιγᾶν and σιωπᾶν when used intransitively: cf. Eur. IA 1245 ἰδού,
σιωπῶν λίσσεταί σ’ ὅδ’,ὦπάτερ (LSJ s.v. σιωπάω I. ‘keep silence’) andTelephusTrGF fr. 706.3–
4 μέλλοι τις εἰς τράχηλον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐμόν, σιγήσομαι δίκαιά γ’ ἀντειπεῖν ἔχων (LSJ s.v. σιγάω I.
‘keep silence’). For transitive use, cf. Eur. TrGF fr. 1037 ἀτὰρ σιωπᾶν τά γε δίκαι’ οὐ χρή ποτε;
Eur. Alc. 93 οὔ τἂν φθιμένας γ’ ἐσιώπων (LSJ s.v. σιωπάω II. ‘keep secret, speak not of ’) vs. Eur.
Med. 81 ἡσύχαζε καὶ σίγα λόγον (LSJ s.v. σιγάω ‘hold silent, keep secret’).
27 Montiglio (2000: 192) hints at this function when she observes: ‘This phrase, by putting
forward speech, betrays the agitation aroused by silence in those who try to understand
this behavior and to bring it to an end.’
28 Exceptions are Soph. Phil. 806 und Eur. Andromeda TrGF fr. 126/127/128.
29 Cf. Soph. OC 1271–1274, where the inefficacy of τί σιγᾶις is particularly clear; cf. also
Soph. Phil. 730–735; Soph. Ichneutai, fr. 314.203–205; Eur. fr. 1008; Eur. Andromeda TrGF
fr. 126/127/128; Eur. Hypsipyle TrGF fr. 757.839.
30 Aesch. Edonoi TrGF fr. 61 (context uncertain, but at least ten more lines of rhesis); Soph.
Phil. 951–952 (longer rhesis and choral song before interlocutor replies).
31 Such a case is e.g. Soph. Phil. 804–805, where we find the additional question ποῦ ποτ’
ὤν, τέκνον, κυρεῖς; and the desired answer in the next line; however, see also Soph. Phil.
730–731 with the further question τί ἔστιν after σιωπᾶις; cf. finally Eur. Andromeda TrGF
fr. 126/127/128: Ανδρ. σιγᾶις· σιωπὴ δ’ ἄπορος ἑρμηνεὺς λόγων. Περσ. ὦ παρθέν’, οἰκτίρω σε
κρεμαμένην ὁρῶν where there is also a straightforward answer in the following turn, but
only after an additional comment on silence being hard to understand.
32 Soph. OC 1271–1274 (featuring additional questions about interlocutor’s state of mind after
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have to assume a short pause after each of these questions, the interlocutor’s
silence is obviously marked by several missed turns. These missed turns make
the speaker who is asking τί σιγᾶις engage further and ask more specific ques-
tions.
Therefore, asking e.g. τί σιγᾶις is one of the basic ways to approach a silent
interlocutor. Moreover, τί σιγᾶις on its own seems to have little lexical value but
rather to be a formulaic or conventionalised expression, in the sense of a pre-
ferred response to a non-response turn within an established pattern33—this
might also be a marker for the audience, underlining the interlocutor’s non-
response turn as well as the speaker’s resulting confusion. In essence, τί σιγᾶις
functions as a metadirective.34
Furthermore, we should examine cases in which several non-response turns
are taken up by the silent interlocutor. Can we observe more involvement
and interest in an interlocutor’s silence than speakers using merely formulaic
expressions like τί σιγᾶις? Two scenes featuring onstage reflection on how to
deal with someone’s silence may help, as both of them refer to wilful silence
due to illocutionary ineffectiveness:
Revisiting the scene in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, we find a situation without
someone asking τί σιγᾶις: the poet is drawing attention to Cassandra’s silence
by making both Clytaemestra and the chorus each ask her three questions
that do not receive an answer. As we have already seen, when pointing out a
newwelcoming home to Cassandra and a sacrificewithin, Clytaemestra fails to
make hermove or talk. She hypothesises three possible reasons for Cassandra’s
silence: her barbaric language, her lack of understanding, or, if Cassandra does
indeed rationally understand Clytaemestra, a lack of persuasive strategy on
Clytaemestra’s part: 1052 ἔσω φρενῶν λέγουσα πείθω νιν λόγωι.
Scholars’ explanations of the difficult expression ἔσω φρενῶν differ:35Whilst
Fraenkel doubts the authenticity of ἔσω φρενῶν λέγουσα,36 Denniston and Page
accept it hesitantly (‘I persuade her within her mind.’) on account of a paral-
τί σιγᾶις); Soph. Ichneutai TrGF fr. 314.203–205 (more questions needed until Silenus
answers); Eur. TrGF fr. 1008 (context unclear but combined with another question); Eur.
Hypsipyle TrGF fr. 757.839 (no response for 30 lines).
33 For the brief notion of τί σιγᾶις as part of a pattern and amention of Aristophanes’ parody
of it in Ar. Ran. 832, see Montiglio (2000: 192, 217). The need for more questions can also
be explained bymetrical reasons: asking only τί σιγᾶιςmeans that an entire line would be
lost and therefore, another marked silence would occur.
34 Onmetadirectives in Latin persuasive contexts andother contexts, see e.g. Risselada (1993:
44–45).
35 In Eur. Med. 316 it means ‘in someone’s mind’.
36 Fraenkel (1950: 477–478).
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lel from the Iliad.37 However, much earlier than Fraenkel as well as Denniston
and Page, namely in Scholefield’s 1828 edition,38 and conversely, also in more
recent works,39 ἔσω φρενῶν λέγουσα is seen as Clytaemestra’s adjustment to
Cassandra’s φρένες in a persuasive context. This reflection shows that here, as
Budelmann and Easterling40 have pointed out for the following scene, we can
see an example of Theory of Mind in action: Clytaemestra thinks about how to
adjust to Cassandra’s φρένες and therefore has a concept of Cassandra’s mind
as differing from her own.41 Hence, without having commented on Cassandra’s
silence explicitly, there is an idea that an adjustment to someone’s φρένες is
required to make them talk—42 it is an acknowledgement of one’s own failure
to persuade.
Furthermore, there is another striking scene in which a break in contact
marked by silence is reflected upon: when Polyneices tries to convince his
father to support his cause in Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus (Soph. OC 1271–
1348),43 he begins his speech with a very negative description of Oedipus, self-
deprecation, and an appeal for pity. Then, Polyneices comments on his father’s
silence with τί σιγᾶις,44 but in the end resorts to appealing to his sister for
help in order to establish contact again.45 Antigone however refuses to do so
and says the following lines—crucially, this is after Polyneices has asked τί
σιγᾶις:46
37 Cf. Il. 9.587 ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὧς τοῦ θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἔπειθον; see Denniston and Page (1957: 162).
The same passage is already cited, but rejected as an insignificant parallel, by Fraenkel
(1950: 477).
38 ‘ita loquens ut intellegat Cassandra.’ Scholefield (1828: 246).
39 Raeburn and Thomas (2011: 183): ‘transmitting words which Cassandra at least under-
stands.’
40 Budelmann and Easterling (2010).
41 For a general approach to Theory of Mind in tragedy, but only with a short comment on
line 1052, see Budelmann and Easterling (2010); see also Battezzato in this volume.
42 However, that adjustment of her argumentation does not, in fact, take place: she once
again emphasises the upcoming sacrifice in the Argive palace and therefore implies ambi-
guity and imminent death for the prophetess, which the audience will have noticed as
well. As a result, Cassandra stays silent—Clytaemestra did not fully grasp her φρένες in
the end but assumed perlocutionary failure. But realising her φρένες would have been a
prerequisite for 1) establishing contact and 2) succeeding in her persuasion.
43 On the entire scene with an emphasis on Oedipus’ response, see Saravia de Grossi (2002).
44 Soph. OC 1271–1272 τί σιγᾶις; φώνησον, ὦ πάτερ, τι· μή μ’ ἀποστραφῆις.
45 Soph. OC 1275–1276 ὦ σπέρματ’ ἀνδρὸς τοῦδ’, ἐμαὶ δ’ ὁμαίμονες, πειράσατ’ ἀλλ’ ὑμεῖς γε κινῆσαι
πατρὸς…
46 My translation is based on Lloyd-Jones (1994) and has been adjusted in doubtful cases
such as l. 1282.
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[2] Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 1280–1283
λέγ’, ὦ ταλαίπωρ’, αὐτὸς ὧν χρείαι πάρει·
τὰ πολλὰ γάρ τοι ῥήματ’ ἢ τέρψαντά τι
ἢ δυσχεράναντ’ ἢ κατοικτίσαντά πως
παρέσχε φωνὴν τοῖς ἀφωνήτοις τινά.
Tell him yourself, poor brother, what it is you need! For abundance of
words, bringing delight or being full of annoyance or pity, can sometimes
lend a voice to those who are speechless.
She tells him to speak for himself (αὐτός) and reflects on how tomake someone
re-enter the conversation (παρέσχε φωνὴν τοῖς ἀφωνήτοις τινά). Antigone argues
that words (ῥήματα) may help and specifies these as pleasing (τέρψαντα), angry
(δυσχεράναντα), or pitiful (κατοικτίσαντα).47 Whilst the correct translation and
meaning of this advice has been correctly explained by Jebb,48 scholars have
so far—to my knowledge—failed to see these words as a reflection on rhet-
orical strategy: pleasing, rebuking, or pitying someone using words in order to
make them speak involves awareness of who they are andwhat arguments they
might want to hear; and we are more likely to make them re-enter discourse if
we adjust to them. In short, Antigone also implies a Theory of Mind.
By taking Clytaemestra’s expression of persuading someone with regard to
their φρένες into account, we might be able to explain Antigone’s advice more
precisely: communicative contact, which is in the end a prerequisite for Poly-
neices’ overall aim in this speech, i.e. persuasion, can, according toAntigone, be
re-established by reacting to someone’s mindset in one’s speech. And as Anti-
gone gives this advice after Polyneices has uttered τί σιγᾶις—in this instance
probably functioning as a cue—she seems to demand that he do more than
simply ask for reasons. Since this is an example of illocutionary ineffectiveness
because of personal aversion, Antigone’s advice makes perfect sense: interest
in and engagement with the interlocutor’s state of mind is crucial. Whilst at
this specific point Polyneices and Antigone seem only concerned with Oed-
ipus entering discourse again,49 Antigone’s remark refers to Polyneices’ general
speech: it is clear that Polyneices means to achieve not just any reply from
47 Cf. Arist. Rh. 1358b13–14 ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπαινος τὸ δὲ ψόγος.
48 ‘[…] by giving some pleasure,—or by some utterance of indignation, or of pity’ (Jebb
31900: ad 1281–1282); similarly, Saravia de Grossi (2002: 58).
49 1272 Πο. φώνησον, ὦ πάτερ, τι; 1282 Αν. φωνὴν τοῖς ἀφωνήτοις τινά.
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Oedipus; of course, he prefers a compassionate response from him, and so a
persuasive strategy is required.
Polyneices does not entirely follow Antigone’s advice: he may be using a
proper captatio beneuolentiae by portraying Oedipus as the sole saviour of his
Argive operation as well as arguing with his own unfortunate position as a
refugee and suppliant, but then he begins his speech by addressing not Oed-
ipus but Zeus ἱκεταῖος andTheseus; later on, he dwells on his brother’s injustice
and the strength of his own army.50 Polyneices therefore does not adjust to the
mind of his addressee, but focuses on himself and his own situation in order to
portray himself as pitiful.
The effect thismust have had on the audience ismirrored by the choruswho
positively refuse Polyneices’ proposition (Soph. OC 1346–1347), and later on by
Oedipus, who, as we have already seen (cf. Soph. OC 1348–1396), ignores his son
in his address and then rejects him. He only takes one step in a two-step pro-
cess: he does, dutifully, at times, followAntigone’s advice of τέρψαντα ῥήματα by
stressing Oedipus’ vital role in saving Thebes; but overall, he fails to do all the
things necessary for effective and persuasive communication, such as address-
ing one’s interlocutor or arguing from their point of view instead of one’s own.
So, it almost seems as if Polyneices makes Oedipus establish contact again by
not doing what would be persuasive; instead he offers a speech that is outraged
and therefore outrageous: δυσχεράναντα ῥήματα.
It has become clear that one needs more involvement than simply asking τί
σιγᾶις tomake someone enter discourse again, and there seems to be an aware-
ness for the need of Theory of Mind, to speak in modern terms, within the
characters’ minds in order to establish contact and persuade their interlocutor.
Showing interest in the interlocutor’s mind was a feature in cases of both vol-
untary and involuntary silence (i.e. personal aversion vs. intense emotions) and
underlined the speaker’s confusion over this break in contact as well. τί σιγᾶις
therefore acts as merely a marker of silence within a pattern of non-response
turns, i.e. as an embedded stage direction.
50 For the clash of narratives between Oedipus and Polyneices in this passage, see Markan-
tonatos (2007: 104–105). For a more detailed narratological interpretation, see Markan-
tonatos (2002: 69–75).
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4 Breaks in Contact as a Marker for Failure of Persuasion?
By acknowledging that silence in tragedy usually represents breaks in contact
due to a specific dispositionof the interlocutor, questions inevitably arise about
its relation topersuasion, i.e. perlocutionary force,within thedialogue inwhich
it is embedded: does silence after one single persuasive utterance within a lar-
ger persuasive framework51 always signal the failure of all persuasive speech
acts employed by the speaker? How likely is a character to give a preferred
response after having already reacted with the most unwelcome non-response
of all, namely silence?
Apart from Clytaemestra’s failure to establish contact, it is more common
for characters, such as Polyneices, to re-establish contact, but then fail in their
persuasion. Two additional scenes feature a failure of persuasion prefigured by
the interlocutor’s silence:
In Euripides’ Hippolytus (900–945), Theseus refuses to establish commu-
nicative contact with his son after having read Phaedra’s compromising letter.
Hippolytus first has to establish contact but then fails to persuade him of his
innocence because Theseus disrespects him. Despite Hippolytus’ serious con-
cern about his father’s feelings (909–912), there is barely any straightforward
communicationbetween the interlocutors, andwhenTheseus finally addresses
him he does so hatefully (948).
Similarly, in Euripides’ Iphigeneia at Aulis (1238–1257), Agamemnon, told by
the prophecy that sacrificing Iphigeneia is demanded by the gods, falls silent
when his wife and daughter urge him to save Iphigeneia’s life;52 Iphigeneia her-
self plays with her own rhetorical deficits and uses her silent young brother
as a persuasive device. Although contact can be re-established, his emotional
silence prefigures his emotional refusal, denying Iphigeneia her escape from
the sacrifice because of his religious and moral convictions.
51 In this section, I exclude stichomythic passages in which contact is re-established within
the next turn. See n. 27–29.
52 Agamemnon’s reluctance to give a preferred response is alreadymarked by the comments
on his silence in 1141–1142, and in 1209 the chorus selects Agamemnon as the next speaker
(πιθοῦ. τὸ γάρ τοι τέκνα συνσώιζειν καλόν), but Iphigeneia answers. During Iphigeneia’s
speech, this silent reluctance is made more obvious by his gestures: he looks away and
refuses the physical contact with the suppliant (1239–1240). What is more, the obvi-
ous response expected by all three characters approaching Agamemnon (Clytaemestra,
chorus, Iphigeneia) is a preferred response to their speech acts: Agamemnon should
pledge not to kill Iphigeneia. Instead, Agamemnon wilfully refuses any contact, he gives a
non-response by staying silent.
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In all these scenes (including Soph. OC), characters—after having exper-
ienced a break in contact due to illocutionary ineffectiveness—successfully
re-establish contact bypartially adjusting to their interlocutor, doingmore than
simply asking e.g. τί σιγᾶις.53 But even though charactersmight be successful in
re-establishing contact, they then fail to persuade their counterparts anyway. τί
σιγᾶις or similar comments therefore can act as a conventionalised marker for
breaks in contact that typically lead to failure of persuasion, as simply uttering
τί σιγᾶις has been shown not to be sufficient in order to re-establish contact. In
the scenes discussed in this section, silences due to illocutionary ineffective-
ness and failure of persuasion are closely linked.
5 Successful Persuasion Despite Previous Loss of Contact: Sophocles’
Philoctetes54
Whilst the appalling aesthetic effect of Philoctetes’ pain and his screaming has
been noted since antiquity,55 the silences used in the very same scene also
deserve attention. Earlier, we saw Neoptolemus struggling to have a proper
conversation with Philoctetes (cf. Soph. Phil. 731–745 in Section 2). Philoctetes’
silence due to locutionary ineffectiveness is only momentary as his pain flares
up in waves. At this point, the intrigue is still in full effect with Neoptolemus
pretending to save Philoctetes from the Atreidai, both have entered and exited
Philoctetes’ cave in order to pack up his things. But even though contact is re-
established instantly after Philoctetes’ cry of pain, Neoptolemus goes on:
[3] Sophocles Philoctetes 755–76156
Νε. δεινόν γε τοὐπίσαγμα τοῦ νοσήματος
Φι. δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ῥητόν· ἀλλ’ οἴκτιρέ με.
Νε. τί δῆτα δράσω; Φι. μή με ταρβήσας προδῶις·
ἥκει γὰρ αὕτη διὰ χρόνου, πλάνοις ἴσως
ὡς ἐξεπλήσθη. Νε. ἰὼ ἰὼ δύστηνε σύ,
53 In Sophocles’ OC, Polyneices uses a captatio; in Euripides’Hippolytus, Hippolytus asks his
father questions about his pain and shows his general concern; in Euripides’IA, Iphigeneia
asks her father to face her again and uses Orestes’ presence as an emotional leverage on
her father.
54 For this scene in general, see Perceau (2014).
55 See Männlein-Robert (2014).
56 My translation is based on Lloyd-Jones (1994) and has been adjusted in doubtful cases.
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δύστηνε δῆτα διὰ πόνων πάντων φανείς.
βούλει λάβωμαι δῆτα καὶ θίγω τί σου;
Ne. The burden of the sickness is grievous.
Phil. Grievous indeed, and indescribable!
Ne. What shall I do?
Phil. Donot take fright andbetrayme! It has come inperson after a time,
perhaps because it is weary of wandering, the sickness.
Ne. Ah, unlucky one! Unlucky you are found to be in every kind of
trouble!
Do you wish me to take hold of you and hold you?
Neoptolemus acknowledges Philoctetes’ wound as the source of his pain and
asks what he may do about it—not only does this mean an adjustment to
the interlocutor, but openly shows his intent to know the reason for his pain.
Philoctetes, as a result, complies by repeating δεινόν in the same position, asks
Neoptolemus to pity him, and even hands him his bow (762–773). This mean-
ingful moment in the play when Philoctetes and Neoptolemus are portrayed
as slowly developing a real emotional bond is visibly marked by contact that is
lost and re-established.
Then, another bout of pain seizes Philoctetes and he cannot communicate
coherently anymore. He once again screams and wishes for his death:
[4] Sophocles Philoctetes 799–806
Φι. … ὦ τέκνον, ὦ γενναῖον, ἀλλὰ συλλαβών,
τῶι Λημνίωι τῶιδ’ ἀνακαλουμένωι πυρὶ
ἔμπρησον, ὦ γενναῖε· κἀγώ τοί ποτε
τὸν τοῦ Διὸς παῖδ’ ἀντὶ τῶνδε τῶν ὅπλων,
ἃ νῦν σὺ σώιζεις, τοῦτ’ ἐπηξίωσα δρᾶν.
τί φήις, παῖ;
τί φήις; τί σιγᾶις; ποῦ ποτ’ ὤν, τέκνον, κυρεῖς;
Νε. ἀλγῶ πάλαι δὴ τἀπὶ σοὶ στένων κακά.
Phil. … O my son, O my noble son, take me, and burn me with this fire
that is invoked as Lemnian, noble one. I also once consented to do
this to the son of Zeus in return for those weapons which you now
are guarding!What do you say, boy? what do you say?Why are you
silent?Where are you, my son?
Ne. I have been in pain long since, lamenting for your woes.
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Remarkably, Neoptolemus has now fallen silent. Philoctetes, in turn, has to
ask him τί σιγᾶις; (805). This is a different silence, one caused by illocutionary
ineffectiveness, as Neoptolemus has understood Philoctetes’ speech acts per-
fectly, but is prevented from speaking for different reasons. How does Philoct-
etes now, in return, re-establish contact?
He asks Neoptolemus about his current thoughts and mental state:57 805
ποῦ ποτ’ ὤν, τέκνον, κυρεῖς. Again, this shows an interest for someone else’s
mind, which is slightly more involved than commenting on their silence.58
Neoptolemus’ answer offers the reason for his silence: ἀλγῶ πάλαι δὴ τἀπὶ σοὶ
στένων κακά (806). Admittedly, this silence is an emotional one,59 having an
ambiguous effect on the audience: 1) Neoptolemus is obviously affected by
Philoctetes’ excruciating pain—this has already been observed; 2) he is still
pondering whether or not to follow Odysseus’ plan to take Philoctetes by
force.60 Again, this is a decisive moment in the play.
The re-establishment of contact after a break (τί σιγᾶις;) also results in some
middle ground established between the interlocutors, which is unusual when
comparing it to the exampleswehave seen: Neoptolemus evenpromises him to
stay61 and, later on, admits that he andOdysseus had a plan (915). After hearing
the revelation, Philoctetes shares his hateful monologue demanding his bow
back. Neoptolemus, again, falls silent, as is marked by σιωπᾶις:
[5] Sophocles Philoctetes 950–951, 961–962, 965–966
Φι. … ⟨ἀλλ’⟩ ἀπόδος. ἀλλὰ νῦν ἔτ’ ἐν σαυτοῦ γενοῦ.
τί φής; σιωπᾶις. οὐδέν εἰμ’ ὁ δύσμορος.
[…]
ὄλοιο—μή πω, πρὶν μάθοιμ’, εἰ καὶ πάλιν
γνώμην μετοίσεις· εἰ δὲ μή, θάνοις κακῶς.
[…]
Νε. ἐμοὶ μὲν οἶκτος δεινὸς ἐμπέπτωκέ τις
τοῦδ’ ἀνδρὸς οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι.
57 Schein (2013: 244).
58 Cf. Neoptolemus’ engagement with the mind of his interlocutor in 729–755.
59 Cf. ‘silence comme cri’ Perceau (2014: 77).
60 Seth Schein rightly notices the choice of the word πάλαι as instructive, since it refers to
the speaker’s perspective and therefore implies relativity, see Schein (2013: 244).
61 813 ἐμβάλλω μένειν.
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Phil. … Give it back! Even now it is not too late, come to yourself! What
do you say? You are silent! I am nothing, miserable one!
[…]
May you perish—but not yet, before I learn whether you will once
more change your decision. If you do not, may you die miserably!
[…]
Ne. As for me, a strange pity for this man has fallen upon me, not
now for the first time, but since long ago.
Again, Philoctetes makes a comment on his interlocutor’s thoughts and shows
awareness that is beyond simply asking why someone is silent: he debates
whether he could change his mind or not. Once again, this is a sign for illoc-
utionary ineffectiveness, as his addressee has very well understood him: πρὶν
μάθοιμ’, εἰ καὶ πάλιν γνώμην μετοίσεις (961–962). After the chorus point out
Neoptolemus’ responsibility for the mission at hand, Neoptolemus finally
answers with a positive response (965 οἶκτος δεινὸς).
So why does this silence caused by illocutionary ineffectiveness—in con-
trast to the other sceneswehave presented—raise the expectation of a positive
outcome for Philoctetes? Two aspects can be employed to explain this specific
outcome:
1) The interlocutor that fell silent—who was influenced by his emotions—
has a reputation for his honest and friendly φύσις.62
2) Philoctetes’ silence was the symptom of his severe pain; this caused Neo-
ptolemus’ silence, which was in turn a symptom of his pity and his φύσις
(the two characters thus exemplify the difference between silence due to
locutionary ineffectiveness and illocutionary ineffectiveness).
Characters’ non-responses in the form of silence have to be interpreted by the
audience and by other characters as a representation of the characters’ minds:
therefore, these non-responses convey the underlying dispositions of charac-
ters. Re-establishing contact that has been caused by illocutionary ineffect-
iveness made it possible that persuasion and synchronisation of interlocutors
could be accomplished in this case. In fact, they are even furthered by silences,
as Philoctetes’ effectual silences only elicit the feeling of pity and concern in
Neoptolemus—the embodiment of this feeling are his own silences.
Our question was whether τί σιγᾶις always predicts a failure of persuasion:
in this particular instance, we have seen that silence caused by positive emo-
62 Neoptolemus’ distinctive character trait had already been established as early as the very
first scene with Odysseus (Soph. Phil. 79–80, 87–88).
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tions (such as pity)may predict a positive outcome. Breaks in contact therefore
always ask for an engagement of Theory of Mind by the audience. Tomy know-
ledge, however, silence as a non-response seems to be more often an embod-
iment of negative emotions in tragedy, prefiguring a dispreferred response to
the entire speech act of persuasion, and therefore predicting the failure of such.
6 Conclusions
We have considered the linguistic functions that can be attributed to silence
and breaks in contact in tragedy. In the course of this study we have explored
how characters tend to reconnect after a silence. Having investigated the
impact of breaks in contact on the persuasive discourse they are featured in,
we can draw three general conclusions:
1) Whilst silence in persuasive discourse is always a non-response, it can
express either locutionary ineffectiveness, when the interlocutors did not
grasp the meaning of the utterance made to them (in this case, silence
in tragedy usually symbolises insanity or severe sickness); or it embodies
illocutionary ineffectiveness,whichmirrors positive ornegative emotions
on the interlocutor’s part—which does not prevent them from under-
standing, but from answering. A special case of illocutionary ineffective-
ness would be interlocutors refusing to communicate due to these emo-
tions. Silence, marked by short pauses on stage, has also been shown
to function as a turn featuring a non-response. Finally, silence can be a
symptom as well as a persuasive device: it may force characters to adjust
their speech, as a result of communicative contact lost.63
2) Tragic characters tend to have a concept of their interlocutor’s mind—
which may be true or false—and understand that they have to use this
knowledge in order to overcome silences caused by illocutionary ineffect-
iveness and to persuade. As we have seen, this calls for a deeper level of
involvement than merely asking τί σιγᾶις, which appears to be more of a
formulaic and conventionalised expression rather than conveying mean-
ing or impact.
3) In most cases, persuasion in scenes marked by τί σιγᾶις fails entirely
because there silences express negative emotions or aversions—Philoc-
tetes succeeds becauseNeoptolemus’ silences are the symptomof his pity
andhonestφύσις. Thenotion of silence as a cue that is to be interpreted by
63 Cf. e.g. Antigone’s advice and Polyneices’ reaction in Soph. OC 1280–1283.
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the audience both on and off stage is therefore noteworthy, not because
it draws attention to the character (as in the case of Cassandra or in Aes-
chylus’Myrmidones), but rather because they shift the focus towards the
caesura in communication and the discrepancy in disposition. τί σιγᾶις
and the like therefore function as relational markers prompting the audi-
ence to pay attention to characters’ φρένες and their ῥήματα when they
are trying to overcome silence in the only way in which tragic characters
know how to do so: by talking.
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Doing Things withWords … and Gestures on Stage
Matteo Capponi
This paper aims to demonstrate the importance of gesture in the analysis of
dramatic texts. Expanding on the central theme of this book, I will focus spe-
cifically on the relationship between speech acts and gestures on stage. For
some years I have been adapting and directing ancient texts for the stage and
this frequently exposes me to this problematic. I always try to bring the benefit
of my stage experience to my academic work, combining theory and practice,
and my approach thus incorporates the effects in theatrical performance of
what can be done with both words and gestures.
This principle is far from an obvious one. The problematic of speech acts,
after all, was born in the world of words, in the works of Oxford philosophers
of language1 in the 1960s and 1970s who ‘[ont ouvert] véritablement la voie à
la pragmatique, en observant que le rôle du langage n’est pas exclusivement
de décrire le réel, mais aussi d’exercer une action (c’est la théorie des actes
de langage)’.2 The debate in these circles focused on the function of speech,
eclipsing questions about its physical delivery. This imbalance led the linguist
Alain Berrendonner to emphasise the fundamental distinction between saying
and doing. The chapter dedicated to this in his 1982 work Éléments de prag-
matique linguistique is eloquently entitled ‘Quand dire c’est ne rien faire’. In it
he reintroduces the idea that ‘un acte est un geste ou ensemble de gestes’.3 Like
speech act theory, the philological tradition is also rooted in texts (as the name
implies). The rise of performance studies aside, we might say that this tradi-
tion shows reluctance to think three-dimensionally.4 It seems that caution is
the watchword: if a text constitutes objective data, gesture always depends on
conjecture.
Nevertheless we cannot deny that gesture plays an essential role in the per-
formance of texts, particularly in the case of melic poetry, rhetorical speech,
1 Principally, John Austin (1911–1960), Paul Grice (1913–1988) and John Searle (*1932).
2 Bracops (22010: 28).
3 Berrendonner is responding to Austin’s 1955 lecture ‘How to do Things with Words’, which
he refutes thus: ‘Aussi bien la représentation ‘naïve’ du langage que la théorie béhavioriste
mettent le faire du côté du geste. Selon elles, il n’y a d’actes que s’ il y a pratique gestuelle. […]
Souscrivons, et posons: “Un acte est un geste ou ensemble de gestes”.’ (Berrendonner 1982: 81).
4 Alan Boegehold’s 1999 bookWhenaGestureWas Expected is a significant exception. It focuses
on the rare occurrences in which a gesture replaces a phrase, for instance in the case of the
aposiopesis.
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and drama. The problem is that when gesture in drama is the focus of research,
it is only rarely linked to spoken lines and thus to speech acts. For instance,
you will not find ‘pragmatics’ or ‘speech acts’ in the general index of Greek and
Roman Actors,5 which focuses instead on the ‘art of the actor’, ‘body use’, and
‘type of performance’. Likewise, questions about pragmatics and interaction do
not generally feature in canonical studies on gesture and acting.6 The reason
is simple: the concepts had not yet been invented. This means that it is now
necessary to review and complete these studies by adding new perspectives.
Of course, contemporary pragmatics does not completely ignore the ges-
ture. It features prominently under the label of kinesics as an essential part of
communication that is considered interaction.7 As we shall see, scholarly clas-
sifications aim to distinguish different types of gesture. These classifications,
however, have not taken root in the study of ancient drama. A certain amount
of work remains to be done to report the whole complexity of gestural ana-
lysis. This chapter represents amodest attempt to contribute to that end. It will
highlight the significance of the gestural dimension to the pragmatic analysis
of texts created for the stage. Through a comparison of the distinct dramatisa-
tions by Sophocles and Euripides of the same (or very similar) tragic scene, it
will illustrate the benefits of a unifying approach that incorporates both words
and gestures. Before that, however, we must define our terms.
1 Gesture and/or Speech
Everyday acts of language are usually accompanied and sometimes replaced
by gestures. According to the interactionist approach,8 communication rarely
occurs through one medium at the exclusion of the other. Catherine Kerbrat-
5 Easterling and Hall (2002).
6 By canonical studies, I mean works such as Sittl (1890), Capone (1935), Spitzbarth (1945) and
Neumann (1965). Alsoworthmentioning is Kaimio (1988) on physical contact in tragic scenes
and Telò (2002a, 2002b) on the performance of gesture. We will refer to them later.
7 For the cultural and definitional issues of gesture, seeThomas’ introduction to ACulturalHis-
tory of Gesture: ‘Kinesics is a highly developed subject with a variety of subdivisions, ranging
from proxemics (the study of the distance which people keep from each other when talking),
to haptics (the study of the way in which they touch each other during the conversation).’
(Thomas 1991: 3); see also Scolari in this volume.
8 ‘La perspective interactionniste confirme et même renforce l’ idée selon laquelle parler c’est
agir—ou plutôt interagir, en ce sens que tout au long du déroulement d’un échange commu-
nicatif quelconque, les différents participants exercent les uns sur les autres des influences
de nature diverse.’ (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 22005: 53). See also Ricottilli and Raccanelli in this
volume.
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Orecchioni defines it as both multi-channel (voice, look, touch) and multi-
semiotic (language, body signs).9 David McNeill refers to the ‘inviolability of
the speech-gesture unit’.10 There is no reason to believe it would have been
different for the Greeks. In fact, in the Laws, Plato refers to the same prin-
ciple:
[1] Plato Laws 7, 816a3–6
ὅλως δὲ φθεγγόμενος, εἴτ’ ἐν ὠιδαῖς εἴτ’ ἐν λόγοις, ἡσυχίαν οὐ πάνυ δυνατὸς
τῶι σώματι παρέχεσθαι πᾶς. διὸ μίμησις τῶν λεγομένων σχήμασι γενομένη τὴν
ὀρχηστικὴν ἐξειργάσατο τέχνην ξύμπασαν.
And in general, no one who is using his voice, whether in song or in
speech, is able to keep his bodywholly at rest. Hence, when the represent-
ation of things spoken by means of gestures arose, it produced the whole
art of dancing.11
This complementarity of gesture and speech is echoed in ancient iconography.
For example, the simple act of saying something, the locutionary act,12 is sig-
nified by an outstretched arm.13 The gesture is used to symbolise the voice
dynamic. The same principle is applied in the comic representations depicted
in Apulian vase painting.14 Thus the difference between drama and real life is
unmarked.We can even draw a parallel between iconography, where the image
remains silent forever, and the ancient theatre play, where masked actors per-
form to large audiences: in both, gesture is essential to understanding who is
speaking.
It is legitimate therefore to attempt to systematically rebuild the presence
of gesture in dramatic representation and understand the varied interactions
it maintains with words. After all, the art of the actor is based on the controlled
9 Kerbrat-Orecchioni (22005: 150).
10 McNeill (22009: 301).
11 Tr. Bury (1926).
12 Austin distinguishes three types of speech act: locutionary (the act of saying something),
illocutionary (theway of using language; the performance of the act in saying something),
andperlocutionary (the effects on the feelings, thoughts or actions of participants brought
about by performing an illocutionary act).
13 ‘Woaber derMantel dieArmenicht einengt, dürfte als Regel gelten, dass jeder Sprechende
durch die Bewegung seiner Hand gekennzeichnet ist.’ (Sittl 1890: 284).
14 See, for example, Taplin (1993: 30–31, 59) andGreen (2002: 111–112) on the ‘NewYorkGoose
Play’ and ‘Choregoi’ vases.
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combination of gesture and speech. A lack of coordination can damage a scene
and even result in the actor’s dismissal!
[2] Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 1.78.8
ἀγωνιστοῦ δὲ τραγωιδίας ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Σμύρναν Ὀλυμπίοις τὸ ‘ὦ Ζεῦ’ ἐς
τὴν γῆν δείξαντος, τὸ δὲ ‘καὶ γᾶ’ ἐς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνασχόντος, προκαθήμενος τῶν
Ὀλυμπίων ὁ Πολέμων ἐξέωσεν αὐτὸν τῶν ἄθλων εἰπὼν ‘οὗτος τῆι χειρὶ ἐσολοί-
κισεν.’
Again, when a tragic actor at theOlympic games in Smyrna pointed to the
ground as he uttered the words, ‘O Zeus!’ then raised his hands to heaven
at the words, ‘and Earth!’ Polemo, who was presiding at the Olympic
games, expelled him from the contest, saying: ‘The fellow has committed
a solecism with his hand.’15
Space does not permit us here to explore all forms of gesture performed on
stage. Echoing the volume’s central concern, we will focus on those gestures
that accompany speech acts. Speech act theory questions precisely the line
between saying and doing but attributes to speech the capacity to do as well
as say. In doing so, it privileges speech over gesture and casts the illusion, per-
haps unwittingly, of the independence of speech. Thus it runs against the grain
of McNeill’s principle of the inviolability of the speech-gesture unit, and brings
us to questions about howweunderstand and classify both gestures and speech
acts.
2 Terminology and Classifications
The concept of the speech-gesture unit, hinted at by Plato and theorised over
twomillennia later byMcNeill, compels us to consider independently and sim-
ultaneously the roles of gesture and speech. If this distinction is maintained, it
allows us to focus on the multiple variations that may exist in the relationship
between the two as they form a unit. But how do we make such a distinction?
Let us first review the typology outlined by Kerbrat-Orechioni in Les actes de
langage dans le discours (see Table 1).16 In any interaction, she argues, there are
15 Tr. Wright (1922: 131).
16 Kerbrat-Orecchioni (22005: 153–154).
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table 1 Kerbrat-Orecchioni’s typology of acts




Brushing a horse, run-
ning, picking olives, etc.
Knocking at the door, rais-
ing a hand, shrugging the
shoulders, etc.
Questioning, promising, sup-
plying, etc. (all the things
you can ‘do’ by speaking)
communicative speech acts and communicative non-speech acts. The latter
consist of gestures performed as a complement or an alternative to speech.
They may take the place of a speech act in an interaction. Such communicat-
ive non-speech acts coincide with codified gestures of various types, including
deictic and symbolic (termswewill discuss later).We find them in art and icon-
ography, for example in the depiction of prayer, supplication, and order. The
third category in Kerbrat-Orecchioni’s typology is non-communicative non-
speech acts (or praxical gestures). Here again, the iconographic examples are
numerous: brushing a horse, killing the minotaur, picking olives, etc. Any dra-
matic text includes gestures of this third kind: entering and leaving the stage,
running, crawling, and so on. It will also likely include non-gestures such as
characters who stand immobile for some reason. However, in an art form as
highly symbolic as drama, even praxical gestures may carry communicative
value, whereas in real life they do not. Gestures such as veiling, sitting on the
ground, or lookingupordownmay takeona specific significanceon stage.They
may become communicative, whether to other characters or indeed to audience
members.
Let us first consider the category of communicative non-speech acts, for it is
the most closely linked to the theme of this volume.We may again distinguish
different types, depending on the roles these acts play in relation to words.
Kerbrat-Orecchioni distinguishes three: the subordinate gesture, which com-
pletely serves the speech act, the complementary gesture, which reinforces or
fine-tunes (makes precise) the speech act, and the plain gesture, which per-
forms an intervention.17 However, we may ourselves wish to fine-tune this
classification as it might apply to drama, particularly concerning the distinc-
17 Kerbrat-Orecchioni (22005: 153–154).
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table 2 Kendon’s continuuma
Gesticulations → Language-like gestures → Pantomimes → Emblems → Sign lan-
guage




‘the spontaneous movements of the arms and
hands that accompany speech’
Language-like gestures
(= complementary gesture)
‘similar to gesticulations but […] “integrated”
into a linguistic string in the sense that they
must occur at a certain point and contrib-
ute to the interpretation of the string as a
whole’
Pantomimes
(= complementary or plain gesture)
‘movements that depict objects or actions;
accompanying speech is no longer obligatory’
Emblems
(= plain gesture)
‘cultural-dependent symbolic gestures used
to convey a wide range of both positive and
negative meanings’
Sign language ‘languages proper, with their own syntactic,
semantic and phonological rules’
a Presented, with these definitions, in Allan and Jaszczolt (2012: 583).
tion between subordinate and complementary roles. Arranging five kinds of
gesture distinguished by Adam Kendon on a continuum running from invol-
untary movements to sign language, McNeill18 offers us an alternative, which
he calls Kendon’s Continuum (see Table 2): ‘As we move from left to right on
the continuum, the gestures become less natural, take onmore “language-like”
properties and depend less on the co-presence of language itself.’19 This typo-
logy better reflects the use of gesture in the theatre.
18 For a concise explanation, see McNeill (22009).
19 Allan and Jaszczolt (2012: 583).
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Rarely do the distinctions made by scholars account for how gestures are
used in drama. For instance, in his study on the use of the body in acting, Kostas
Valakas identifies three types of gesture without elaborating further. Neverthe-
less, note the attention he pays to bodily posture, significant in itself:
The meanings of body language can be expressed through postures as
much as gestures and movements, and the dynamic aspect of a charac-
ter could depend on the particular symbolic shape taken by the axis of
the performer body.20
Oliver Taplin rules out the category of gesticulations but then draws no dis-
tinction between what we could describe as praxical gestures (such as sitting
or lying down, running, kneeling, or striking) and communicative gestures,
including language-like gestures (supplicating, embracing, etc.) and emblems
(bowing the head, looking away, etc.):
But these run-of-the-mill bodily movements, while they are a concern for
the actor and producer andwhile their economy and appropriateness are
essential for a good performance, are notmy chief concern here. I ampre-
occupied with the unique action which is brought about by, and which
often epitomizes, the dramatic impact of a particular moment. […] There
is still a large residue: sitting and lying down, running, kneeling, supplic-
ating, embracing, striking, bowing the head, looking away and so on.21
Finally, Mario Telò offers similar examples in his ‘grammar of gesture’ in Greek
tragic drama, referring to praxical gestures such as falling down and bouncing
back and gestures with emblematic value such as veiling and unveiling the
face.22 In his second paper, however, he considers one kind of communicative
gesture (which can be language-like or symbolic/emblematic) which doubles
most often as a speech act: the plea.23
By focalising on specific gestures, neither Telò nor Taplin addresses the
fundamental question of the formal interaction between gesture and speech.
Doing so might enable us to shed light on the type of gesture favoured by
ancient drama. After all, as any actor will testify, a line delivered before a ges-
ture, during a gesture, and after a gesture are not the same. This raises aesthetic
20 Valakas (2002: 79).
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and practical questions. Each time he speaks andmoves, the (masked) ancient
actor must at the same time signify that his turn to speak has come, rein-
force the content of his speech, and create an effect, a picture in the minds
of his audience. This conjunction of two semiotic media, speech and gesture,
is closely related to the codes and aims of ancient drama.We may apply to the
dramatic gesture the same functionDavidWiles gives to the choreographic ges-
ture: ‘Rather than competing for the audience’s attention, the physical action
made it possible to grasp the complex words, and the words in turn made it
possible to read the action.’24 Thus we must go deeper into the analysis and
look into the text for the precise traces of interactions between gesture and
speech.
3 Gestures in Ancient Drama
As mentioned above, we will study an emblematic scene from ancient drama
that appears as adialogue and forwhichwehavedifferent versions: the recogni-
tion between Orestes and Electra. It appears in three plays: Aeschylus’ Choeph-
oroe (The Libation Bearers), Sophocles’Electra, and Euripides’Electra. However,
the same event is dramatised very differently by each author through their use
of language and gestures.25 Here we will limit our focus to Sophocles and Eur-
ipides.We will follow step by step, gesture after gesture, the reunion of brother
and sister in both plays. That way we can identify the precise moments where,
depending on the text and its pragmatic data, some gesture is necessary.
However, before turning our attention to the texts, wemust first make some
observations about how, why and which gestures were used in ancient theatre.
Fundamental technical principles of ancient theatre production, many the
consequence of the construction and layout of the building, help to explain
why gestures were necessary.
1) First of all, we must never forget that drama was played remotely before
a huge audience by masked and dressed actors.
2) Acoustics were a crucial factor. When an actor spoke or sung, he would
have to stand in front of the audience and face it directlymost of the time,
although there is some debate over whether he would do this from the
‘stage’ in front of the skênê or from the orchêstra (between the auditor-
24 Wiles (2000: 139).
25 For a comparison of how each play represents the proofs used in the recognition scene,
see Solmsen (1967).
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figure 1 Sketch of the Athenian theatre in the second half of the fifth century BC
Note: FromMoretti (2001: 124). As we observe, the actor cannot talk while having
his head turned on the left or the right, risking that half of the audience would
not have heard him. It goes the same for gesture: they must be performed front-
ally, so as to be seen by everyone.
ium and the skênê). Audience members in the centre of the auditorium
would be able to perceive the performance head on, visually and aur-
ally. Those at the sides could still take advantage of an approximately 60°
angle. However, an actor speaking side-on, in dialoguewith another char-
acter for example, would not have been heard clearly.26 Figure 1 illustrates
these constraints by sketching the layout of the Athenian theatre in the
fifth century BC.
An image on a fragment of a calyx-crater excavated in Sicily illustrates
this rule. It depicts whatmost believe to be a tragic scene from Sophocles’
26 ‘Because of the size of the audience, the first requirement of the Greek actor was audibil-
ity.’ (Wiles 2000: 151).
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canonical playOedipus theKing.27 Two characters (Oedipus and Jocasta?)
are looking to one side at a third character, a messenger, who is facing
the observer. J.R. Green, considering the ‘performance style’, describes the
messenger thus:
He makes the conventional gesture of address with his left hand, two
fingers and the thumb raised. […] The gesture makes it clear that the
person he is addressing is the king, Oedipus, but he is turned to face
the spectator: he is performing for the audience.28
Thus this Sicilian artefact seems to hint at the intertwined relationship
of speech and gesture in dramatic performance. Even while gesturing to
one side, the actor still faces the audience head on.29 His performance
requires both.
3) With each speech act, each delivery and response from the masked
ancient actor, gesture is necessary to stress who is speaking. But it is also
necessary to reveal intention and emotion. Thus the movements we are
interested in are not of the gesticulation type. In fact, gesticulations are
probably quite rare in ancient theatre since they risk interfering with the
speech intent. Language-like gestures, too, have little or no effect in so
large a setting as the theatre stage. Where such gestures do occur, they
are generally used to strengthen aposiopesis (the rhetorical device of sud-
denly breaking off in speech), as Boegehold shows.30 We are then left
with pantomimes and emblems,31 and it is the latter that we are most
interested in since theymay replace, reinforce or fine-tune the performed
speech act on stage. Antipathy, surprise, laughing gestures: Sittl refers to
these as symbolische Gebärden, ‘symbolic gestures’.32 These emblems are
codified gestures inspired by everyday life and reproducedwith a spectac-
ular dimension on stage. They imply the full body of the actor, including
his mask and stage costume.
27 IGD (= Trendall and Webster 1971) III.2.8. Reproduced in Green (2002: 108) and Wiles
(2000: 157).
28 Green (2002: 108).
29 Another point we find in Wiles (2000: 149): ‘It is a fact that spectators listen more effect-
ively when they focus on the face of the speaker.’ And a few sentences later: ‘In a large
open-air theatre the effect of classical masks was to bring the face closer to the spectator
and thus create intimacy.’
30 See Boegehold (1999: 53–66) on aposiopesis in tragedy.
31 For obvious reasons, the fifth category of gesture, sign language, is not relevant to our pur-
poses here.
32 Sittl (1890: 81–116): ‘Gebärden […] welche Begriffe für das Auge des anderen illustrieren
und dadurch das gesprocheneWort verdeutlichen oder sogar ersetzen sollen’ (81–82). On
gestures in drama, Sittl postulates ‘eine Art von Symbolik der Bewegungen’ (201).
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table 3 Key to gesture icons
Symbolic gestures (emblems)
Address The character points their hand toward someone or
something.
Order The character makes an imperative gesture at another
character.
Interrogation The character rises their hands for a request (question
or plea).
Denial The character makes a gesture of denial.
Exclamation The character spreads their hands to signify joy or sur-
prise.
Lament The character hits themselves or takes their own hands
to show their suffering.
Deictic gestures
Gazing The character casts their gaze towards a specific object.
Pointing The character points to a specific object.
Symbolic gestures implying contact
Interlocking
hands
The character takes the hand of another character
(holds hands, grips, shakes hands, etc.).
Embracing Two characters embrace one another.
4) Gestures on stage thus refer less to the content than the form of speech.
By expressing the speaker’s stance or attitude, they embody the modalit-
ies of the speech act and make visible the illocutionary value of what is
being said.33 In our comparative analysis of the texts by Sophocles and
Euripides, we may identify six symbolic gestures or emblems associated
with the following six modalities of speech: address, order, interrogation,
denial, exclamation (joy, surprise), and lament.
33 On the matches between gestures and types of speech (both captured in Greek by the
term σχήματα), see Capponi (2020: 207–232).
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5) To this list we should add two deictic gestures (indicative motions that
can be manual or non-manual): pointing and gazing at a specific object.
These are fundamental to drama and on stage they do not play the subor-
dinate role Kerbrat-Orecchioni ascribes to them in everyday life. Rather,
they accompany speech acts and serve to situate the speaker within the
fictional setting created on stage or within the specific interaction tak-
ing place at that moment. Finally, wemay add two emblems which imply
physical contact: interlocking hands (holding, grabbing, shaking, etc.)
and embracing. All these gestures are indexed by Sittl and find numerous
equivalents in ancient iconography.34 Our typology could well include
other examples (e.g. swearing, cursing, veiling, falling on the knees, etc.),
but this list of ten gestures is sufficient to analyse the two scenes in ques-
tion. Table 3 presents the icons used in our analysis.35
In our analysis, the role of the participants in the interaction is presented by
naming the characters and describing the scene. Rows that are coloured grey
describe gestures; plain rows give the accompanying lines of dialogue, as for
example:
El. Or. Electra makes a gesture of denial at Orestes.
Ἠλ. μὴ δῆτα πρὸς θεῶν τοῦτό
μ’ ἐργάσηι, ξένε. (Soph. El. 1206)
El. Do not do that to me, I beg you,
stranger!
Or. El. // El. Or. Orestes looks at Electra. Electra makes a
gesture of denial at Orestes.
Ἠλ. μή, πρὸς γενείου, μὴ ’ξέληι τὰ φίλτατα.
(Soph. El. 1208)
El. No! By your beard, do not take fromme
what I love most!
The definition of the setting and nature of the performed gesturemay be based
on textual elements. Here the pragmatic data and enunciation markers are
34 See the index in Sittl (1890): Begrüssung, Befehl, Bitte, Verneinen, Gemütsbewegungen,
Schmerz, Zeigen. The classification presented in Spitzbarth (1945) overlaps with our own:
1. Zeigegebärde, 2. Enthüllen undVerhüllen, 3. Anrufung, 4. Lauschen und Spähen, 5. Begrüs-
sung und Abschied, 6. Trauergebärden, 7. Gewalt, 8. Auf- und Abtreten.
35 These icons are strictly utilitarian to this paper. They do not coincide in a realistic way
with the performed gestures.
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the most revealing. Indeed, spoken lines in drama tend to point out the mod-
alities in accordance with which the words are to be pronounced: speaking
verbs abound, and the markers of order, interrogation, denial or exclamation
hold strategic positions. They are regularly found heading or ending a line of
speech. Because speech acts have corresponding gestures and because gestures
must appear between replies to be efficient, we see here the opportunity to
detect the continuity between gesture and speech, determining a rhythm spe-
cific to the dramatic aesthetic. The gestures ‘set the tone’ for the next reply.
Furthermore, they also address certain decorum and conventions prescribed
by the form. For example, ‘[i]n tragedy as in everyday life, the wearing of the
himation imposed a bodily discipline involving stillness, balance and restric-
ted gesture.’36
In the same vein, we must pay attention to the position held by deictic
markers in speech. Often they occupy a strategic place in the sentence which
links them to the gesture action.37 For example, space deictics and third-person
markers are used to point to someone or something in the margins of an inter-
action; first- and second-person markers allow the speaker to draw attention
to themselves or their interlocutor. In order to bring to light the importance
of all these modalising and deictic elements, as well as their affinity with the
characters’ gestures, we will highlight them in bold in the text.
3.1 The Recognition Scene in Sophocles
Keeping these principles in mind, we may now observe the conditions of the
recognition between Orestes and Electra in Sophocles’ play (Table 4). It takes
place in the fourth episode (1098–1231), quite late in comparison to Aeschylus
(212–246) and Euripides (487–595). The recognition is deliberately delayed by
Sophocles to maximise suspense and bring the scene to a climax. Orestes asks
his maids to take to Electra the urn that is supposed to contain his ashes.While
Orestes watches on, Electra laments the remains of her brother. The text spe-
cifies that she is holding theurn inher hands: ‘Allowme, by the gods, to take it in
my hands’ (1119–1120 δός νυν, πρὸς θεῶν, […] εἰς χεῖρας λαβεῖν).38Wemay deduce
36 Wiles (2000: 159).
37 ‘There are many references to stage business in the dramatic texts. […] Like the deictic
expressions typical of dramatic texts, such as the use of first and second person, present
tense etc., such references form a bridge between speech and gesture, the gestural signs
being inscribed in the text. Frequent use of this form of deixis is typical of Greek tragedy.’
(Kaimio 1988: 7).
38 The text is from Jebb (31894); all quotations and translations of Sophocles are from Lloyd-
Jones (1994).
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that Electra is on her knees at this point, even if the text does not mention
it, because standing and holding the urn in her hands would prevent any
other kind of manual gesture. For instance, Electra’s gesture of supplication
at verse 1208 would be impossible: ‘No, I beg you, do not rip from me what
I hold most dear!’ (μή, πρὸς γενείου, μὴ ’ξέληι τὰ φίλτατα, 1208). Furthermore,
kneeling is universally regarded as a position fitting to grief.39 This inference
of Electra’s position also chimes with what we know about the destiny of the
urn: as soon as she abandons it, it is picked up by Orestes’ followers, who bring
it to Clytaemestra. The recognition scene begins when Orestes tries to disab-
use his sister by threatening to take the urn off her hands. For the reasons we
have discussed concerning the constraints of the form and the stylisation of
gestures, we can exclude the idea that Orestes did actually physically get his
hands on theurn. Bodily contact betweenbrother and sister only occurs at their
reunion.
table 4 Sophocles Electra 1205–1236
Or. urn Orestes points to the urn. He speaks facing the audience (this
principle has been given as a condition for the play, so we will
not repeat it, but it must be considered systematically).
Ὀρ. μέθες τόδ’ ἄγγος νῦν, ὅπως τὸ πᾶν μάθηις. Or. Then let go that vessel, so that you can learn all!
El. Or. Electra makes a gesture of denial at Orestes.
Ἠλ. μὴ δῆτα πρὸς θεῶν τοῦτό μ’ ἐργάσηι, ξένε. El. Do not do that to me, I beg you, stranger!
El. Or. // Or. El. Electra turns to Orestes. Orestes makes an imperative gesture,
then a gesture of denial.
Ὀρ. πείθου λέγοντι κοὐχ ἁμαρτήσει ποτέ. Or. Do as I say, and you will never go wrong!
Or. El. // El. Or. Orestes looks at Electra. Electra makes a gesture of denial at
Orestes.
Ἠλ. μή, πρὸς γενείου, μὴ ’ξέληι τὰ φίλτατα. El. No! By your beard, do not take fromme what I love
most!
39 Green (2002: 109) draws a similar conclusion in his analysis of another tragic scene: ‘The
woman in the centre of the group has thrown herself to her knees in a way all too famil-
iar to us from images of recent events in the Balkans, and here too it must imply extreme
distress, perhaps at the news of the death of a loved one.’
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Table 4 Sophocles Electra 1205–1236 (cont.)
Or. El. Orestes makes a gesture of denial.
Ὀρ. οὔ φημ’ ἐάσειν. Or. No, I say I will not let you keep it!
Or. urn // El. urn Orestes stretches his hand to the urn. Electra puts her hands
on the urn.
Ἠλ. ὦ τάλαιν’ ἐγὼ σέθεν, El. I am unhappy,
Ὀρέστα, τῆς σῆς εἰ στερήσομαι ταφῆς. (1210) Orestes, if I am cheated of the power to give you burial.
Or. El. Orestes makes an imperative gesture at Electra.
Ὀρ. εὔφημα φώνει· Or. Say nothing that is ill-omened!
Or. El. Orestes makes a gesture of denial at Electra.
πρὸς δίκης γὰρ οὐ στένεις. You have no reason to lament!
El. Or. Electra makes an interrogative gesture, of aporia.
Ἠλ. πῶς τὸν θανόντ’ ἀδελφὸν οὐ δίκηι στένω; El.How can I have no reason to lament my dead brother?
Or. El. Orestes makes a gesture of denial.
Ὀρ. οὔ σοι προσήκει τήνδε προσφωνεῖν φάτιν. Or. It is not right for you to call him that!
El. Or. Electra makes an interrogative gesture.
Ἠλ. οὕτως ἄτιμός εἰμι τοῦ τεθνηκότος; El. Am I so refused honour with regard to the dead man?
Or. El. Orestes makes a gesture of denial.
Ὀρ. ἄτιμος οὐδενὸς σύ· Or. You are refused no honour;
Or. urn // Or. Orestes points to the urn, then makes a gesture of denial.
τοῦτο δ’ οὐχὶ σόν. (1215) but this does not belong to you!
El. urn Electra points to the urn.
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Table 4 Sophocles Electra 1205–1236 (cont.)
Ἠλ. εἴπερ γ’Ὀρέστου σῶμα βαστάζω τόδε. El. It does, if it is the body of Orestes that I hold here.
Or. El. Orestes makes a gesture of denial.
Ὀρ. ἀλλ’ οὐκὈρέστου, πλὴν λόγωι γ’ ἠσκημέ-
νον.
Or. It is not Orestes, except in pretence!
El. Or. Electra makes an interrogative gesture.
Ἠλ. ποῦ δ’ ἔστ’ ἐκείνου τοῦ ταλαιπώρου τάφος; El. Butwhere is the tomb of that unhappy one?
Or. El. Orestes makes a gesture of denial.
Ὀρ. οὐκ ἔστι· τοῦ γὰρ ζῶντος οὐκ ἔστιν τάφος. Or. There is none; a living man does not have a tomb!
El. Or. Electra makes an interrogative gesture.
Ἠλ. πῶς εἶπας, ὦ παῖ; El.What did you say, youngman?
El. Or. // Or. El. // Or. Electra looks at Orestes. Orestes looks at Electra. Orestes
makes a gesture of denial.
Ὀρ. ψεῦδος οὐδὲν ὧν λέγω. (1220) Or. There is no lie in what I say!
El. Electra makes an interrogative gesture.
Ἠλ. ἦ ζῆι γὰρ ἁνήρ; El. Then is the man alive?
Or. Or. Orestes makes a gesture directed to himself.
Ὀρ. εἴπερ ἔμψυχός γ’ ἐγώ. Or. If I am living!
El. Or. // El. urn Electra looks at Orestes, then points to the urn.
Ἠλ. ἦ γὰρ σὺ κεῖνος; El. Then are you… he?
Or. ring Orestes displays the ring and shows it to Electra (praxical ges-
ture).
Ὀρ. τήνδε προσβλέψασά μου Or. Look at this seal
σφραγῖδα πατρὸς ἔκμαθ’ εἰ σαφῆ λέγω. that was my father’s, and learn whether I speak the truth!
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Table 4 Sophocles Electra 1205–1236 (cont.)
El. sky Electra stands up and stretches her arms to the sky.
Ἠλ. ὦ φίλτατον φῶς. El.O dearest light!
Or. sky Orestes stretches his arms to the sky.
Ὀρ. φίλτατον, συμμαρτυρῶ. Or. Dearest, I too can witness.
El. Or. Electra points to Orestes.
Ἠλ. ὦ φθέγμ’, ἀφίκου; El. Voice, have you come?
Or. El. Orestes makes a gesture of denial.
Ὀρ. μηκέτ’ ἄλλοθεν πύθηι. (1225) Or. Ask it of no other!
El. Or. Electra takes Orestes’s hand.
Ἠλ. ἔχω σε χερσίν; El. Do I hold you in my arms?
Or. El. Orestes holds Electra’s hand.
Ὀρ. ὡς τὰ λοίπ’ ἔχοις ἀεί. Or. So may you always hold me!
Or. chorus Electra stands aside. She stretches an arm to the chorus and
talks to it.
Ἠλ. ὦ φίλταται γυναῖκες, ὦ πολίτιδες, El. Dearestwomen, fellow townswomen,
El. Or. Electra stretches an arm to Orestes.
ὁρᾶτ’Ὀρέστην τόνδε, μηχαναῖσι μὲν you see here Orestes, dead by a stratagem,
θανόντα, νῦν δὲ μηχαναῖς σεσωσμένον. and now by a stratagem preserved!
Ch. Or. // Ch. The chorus looks at Orestes, then speaks facing the audience
mimicking joy and cries.
Χο. ὁρῶμεν, ὦ παῖ, κἀπὶ συμφοραῖσί μοι Cho.We see him, daughter, and a tear of
γεγηθὸς ἕρπει δάκρυον ὀμμάτων ἄπο. (1230) rejoicing at your fortune comes from our eyes!
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Table 4 Sophocles Electra 1205–1236 (cont.)
El. Electra starts singing and dancing, mimicking joy.
Ἠλ. ἰὼ γοναί,
γοναὶ σωμάτων ἐμοὶ φιλτάτων,
ἐμόλετ’ ἀρτίως,
ἐφηύρετ’, ἤλθετ’, εἴδεθ’ οὓς ἐχρήιζετε. (1235)
El. Io bodies!
dearest of bodies ever engendered,
now you have come;
you have found, you have arrived, you have seen those
whom you desired!
Or. Or. Orestes makes a gesture to himself.
Ὀρ. πάρεσμεν· Or. I am here;
Or. El. Orestes makes an imperative gesture at Electra. He speaks
facing the audience.
ἀλλὰ σῖγ’ ἔχουσα πρόσμενε. but keep silent, andwait.
What may we conclude from this staging sketch? Foremost, we must under-
line that it is based on the text. Of course, we should be aware of the fragility
of some suggestions, many of which cannot be guaranteed with absolute cer-
tainty.Nevertheless, themainpoint is that, if we agreewith the assumption that
the gesture of a speaker is necessary with or before each speech act, we may
find an equivalent in the pragmatic and deictic markers (those we put in bold).
Through these, in a regular and consistent manner, the text calls for action, of
which praxical gestures (grabbing the urn, for example) are but one category.
The technical principles we have highlighted, linked as much to the aural as
to the visual perception of the play, explain the large number of deictic, self-
referencing, and modalising words that appear in the lines of dialogue. They
also give sense to the syntactical construction of those lines.
This analysis of gesture also lays bare the specificity of the Sophoclean ver-
sion. Sophocles dramatises the reunionof Orestes andElectraby foregrounding
a tension in their relationship. This tension does, to a degree, emit from the
story itself, since Orestes is trying to save Electra from her long period of grief
and, more consistently, grab the urn from her hands, the symbol of this grief.
Yet this tension is to be found in the speech acts and in the gestures. It is far
from being an informational dialogue! The main parts of each spoken line are
marked; as orders or denials for Orestes, as questions or laments for Electra.
Thus the construction of dramatic dialogue here is based on illocutionary
acts and their corresponding gestures. The moments of contact are very short.
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However, the scene leads to a reversal, as can be seen from the end of this
excerpt. It begins with Orestes trying to save Electra from her grief and it ends
with him trying to contain her joy. Electra’s emotional overflow is marked by
the eruption of lyric verses, which the actor sings and dances to. At the cli-
max of Electra’s emotion, another form of speech and gesture takes place. The
gesture becomes choreographic; prosody becomes melody. These modalities
of representation only have reality for the audience.40 Through them Electra’s
character is as if thrown to another aesthetic level, detached from the story
itself. Because for Orestes, of course, Electra is not singing nor dancing. He
quantifies her behaviour instead as loud and inappropriate and commands
her to keep silent with an order accompanied by an imperative gesture: ‘I
am here; but keep silent, and wait.’ (1236). Orestes is overwhelmed by Elec-
tra’s emotions, translated in a code other than his own. He struggles to bring
the melodious Electra back into the (iambic) storyline. Thus, Sophocles builds
his reunion scene by creating a mode of tension and playing with pragmatic
values and aesthetic codes. The bodily contact between the two characters
is minimal, and the gestures focus our attention first on the urn, the object
of the debate between Orestes and Electra, then on Electra’s expression of
joy.
3.2 The Recognition Scene in Euripides
In contrast, Euripides chooses a completely different way to present the recog-
nition scene. He differs from Sophocles in all aspects: pragmatic, aesthetic,
gestural. The recognition staged by Euripides occurs in lines 576 to 599, much
earlier in the play than in Sophocles’ Electra. It does not create a climax. Fur-
thermore, it is mediated with the presence of an old servant, who is the first
to recognise Orestes because of the scar on his eyebrow. Probably standing
between Orestes and Electra, he invites them to fall into one another’s arms.
As before, we shall add the gestures as didascalies. They determinemovements
at precise moments, pauses and contacts (Table 5).
40 The singing and dancing of both the protagonists and the chorus are justified only at the
level of the performance.With rare exceptions (such as the arrival of the chorus of Maen-
ads in Bacchae or that of the chorus of girls celebrating the Feast of Hera in Euripides’
Electra), they are not motivated by the story.
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table 5 Euripides Electra 576–59941
Old El. // Old Or. The old man looks at Electra. He stretches his right arm to
Orestes. He is speaking facing the audience.
Πρ. ἔπειτα μέλλεις προσπίτνειν τοῖς φιλτάτοις; Old. Then do you hesitate to embrace your dearest one?
El. Old Electra does a denial gesture towards the old man.
Ἠλ. ἀλλ’ οὐκέτ’, ὦ γεραιέ· συμβόλοισι γὰρ El. Not any longer, old man; for my heart
τοῖς σοῖς πέπεισμαι θυμόν. is persuaded by your tokens.
El. Or. // Or. El. Electra goes to Orestes and grabs his right hand. Orestes is
looking at Electra.
—ὦ χρόνωι φανείς, —O youwho have appeared at last,
ἔχω σ’ ἀέλπτως— I hold you, beyond all hope.—
Or. El. Orestes speaks facing the audience and holds Electra’s hand.
Ὀρ. κἀξ ἐμοῦ γ’ ἔχηι χρόνῳ Or. And you are held by me at last.
El. Or. Electra lets go of Orestes and does a denial gesture.
Ἠλ. οὐδέποτε δόξασ’. El. I never expected it.
Or. El. Orestes does a denial gesture.
Ὀρ. οὐδ’ ἐγὼ γὰρ ἤλπισα. (580) Or. Nor did I hope.
Or. El. // El. Or. // El. Or. Electra looks at Orestes. Orestes looks at Electra. Electra lets
go of Orestes and makes an interrogative gesture.
Ἠλ. ἐκεῖνος εἶ σύ; El. Are you that one?
Or. Or. Orestes makes a gesture to himself.
Ὀρ. σύμμαχός γέ σοι μόνος. Or. Yes, your one ally.
ἢν δ’ ἀνσπάσωμαί γ’ ὃν μετέρχομαι βόλον— If I draw back the cast of the net I am aiming for—
41 The text is from Diggle (1981), the translation from Coleridge in Oates and O’Neill (1938).
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Table 5 Euripides Electra 576–599 (cont.)
Orestes makes a gesture illustrating this metaphor (express-
ing a pantomime gesture in order to fulfil the aposiopesis)
πέποιθα δ᾿· I have confidence;
Or. Orestes does a denial gesture.
ἢ χρὴ μηκέθ’ ἡγεῖσθαι θεούς, or else we must no longer believe in gods,
εἰ τἄδικ’ ἔσται τῆς δίκης ὑπέρτερα. if wrong is to be victorious over right.
Or. El. Orestes and Electra turn to face one another. They embrace
(praxical gesture). The chorus sings and dances with this
image as a background.
Χο. ἔμολες ἔμολες, ὤ, χρόνιος
ἁμέρα, (585)
κατέλαμψας, ἔδειξας ἐμφανῆ
πόλει πυρσόν, ὃς παλαιᾶι φυγᾶι
πατρίων ἀπὸ δωμάτων τάλας
ἀλαίνων ἔβα.
θεὸς αὖ θεὸς ἁμετέραν τις ἄγει (590)
νίκαν, ὦ φίλα.
ἄνεχε χέρας, ἄνεχε λόγον, ἵει λιτὰς
ἐς θεούς, τύχαι σοι τύχαι
κασίγνητον ἐμβατεῦσαι πόλιν. (595)
Ch. You have come, you have come,
oh, long-delayed day,
you have lighted up, you have made visible
a beacon to the city, who in long ago exile went forth from his
father’s house,
unhappily wandering.
A god, now, a god brings
our victory, my dear.
Lift up your hands, lift up your words, send prayers to the gods
for your brother with fortune, with fortune, to enter the city.
Or. El. Orestes pulls himself out of Electra’s embrace with a gesture of
denial.
Ορ. εἶἑν· φίλας μὲν ἡδονὰς ἀσπασμάτων Or.Well; I have the loving pleasures of your greeting
ἔχω, χρόνωι δὲ καὖθις αὐτὰ δώσομεν. and later I will give them back in turn.
Or. Old. Orestes points to the old man.
σὺ δ’, ὦ γεραιέ, καίριος γὰρ ἤλυθες, You, old man—for you have come at the right time,
λέξον, tell me,
Or. Orestes makes an interrogative gesture.
τί δρῶν ἂν φονέα τεισαίμην
πατρός;
what should I do to avenge myself on my father’s murderer?
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How does Euripides proceed? The first thing to recall, not contained in our
analysis, is that themodalities of the recognition imply a clear reference toAes-
chylus’ Choephoroe. In Aeschylus’ version, Electra is puzzled by the signs she
finds on the grave, Orestes’ hairlock and footprint, but accepts Orestes when
he proves his identity by revealing a woven piece of clothing that she herself
had made. Euripides’ Electra rejects one by one all of these proofs. She only
admits the scar on Orestes’ eyebrow that identifies him (in Sophocles, it is the
signet ring of Agamemnon that serves the same purpose). This intertextual
game gives way in Euripides’ play to a reunion essentially marked by bodily
contact—unlike in Sophocles.
We may point to the first contact of hands at verse 578. It corresponds to
the verb ἔχω, ‘to have’, a traditional expression for the recognition in tragedies,
used here by both brother and sister.While marking the siblings’ intimacy and
the recovery of trust between them, this holding of hands means the actors
can speak facing the audience. It is only at line 584 that Electra and Orestes
truly embrace, evident from the use of ἀσπασμάτων (‘embrace’) at 596. Yet to
give way to this embrace, the emotion felt by the characters—as well as by
the audience—has to be delegated to the chorus. Contrasting with Sophocles’
dancing and joyful Electra, it is the chorus who assumes the lyric role and sing
and dance while brother and sister continue to hug. The dramatic effect is a
powerful one since it superimposes onan immobile image, the emblemof long-
awaited reunion, intense bustle.This ismarkedby the abundance of dochmiacs
in the chorus’ song.
As Sophocles does, Euripides exploits gesture in order to create a specific
emotive and aesthetic effect, but he instead uses the chorus to do so. Further-
more, the gestures reveal the stakes in the interaction between brother and sis-
ter. In Sophocles’ play, Orestes struggles to comprehend Electra’s emotions, of
grief asmuchasof joy. InEuripides’ play, there is no tension in the gesturenor in
the illocutionary value of the speech acts. Rather, the speech acts answer one
another (assertion–assertion, denial–denial, question–answer). Orestes finds
in Electra an equal, an ally who, at the right time, will work side by side with
him. She would later remind us of that after helping her brother to murder
Clytaemestra: ‘And I urged you on and put my hand to the sword together with
you.’ (1224–1225 ἐγὼ δ’ ἐπεγκέλευσά σοι ξίφους τ’ ἐφηψάμαν ἅμα).
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This albeit brief comparison demonstrates the rich interpretative potential
that can result from a unifying analysis that takes account of both gesture and
speech. Inspired by practical experience in the theatre, this approach invites
us to picture very concretely the physical context of the speech act in textual
studies. After all, how is one to grasp a text made for the stage if not by repres-
enting the scene in a manner that gives it sense and life? Describing the poet’s
task, Aristotle supports the same principle in the Poetics:
[3] Aristotle, Poetics 1455a22–23
δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῆι λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ
ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον.
In constructing plots and completing the effect by the help of dialogue
the poet should, as far as possible, keep the scene before his eyes.42
We have followed this injunction. It might be possible to apply it at a bigger
scale, for example to comic and satyric drama where gestures, especially prax-
ical gestures, have the biggest part to play! We should also try to understand
how gesture structures and sequences long replies (ῥήσεις). In this paper, our
pragmatic method has been simple: it aimed to highlight the contribution of
gesture in the performance of speech acts. To that end, it challenges the very
notion itself that speech acts can be independent acts. No response by one
character to another on stage can avoid the gestural support that initiates it.
Thus a new aesthetic is emerging that sees the whole body as serving both ges-
ture and speech. This perspective moves beyond the simple notion of ‘making
a gesture’ to understanding the schêma of the body in its entirety; that is, its
posture, its shape, its mode—indeed all the etymological senses of that word.
Such a perspective already sees theatrical gesturality and dance as operating in
the same way.43 Wiles’ consideration of the use of the tragic mask ends with a
similar conclusion: ‘To perform successfully in a Greek-style helmet mask, the
actor needs to find the point where language and body converge in the voice
42 Tr. Fyfe (1932).
43 On the polysemy of the term schêma, see Catoni 2005, and more precisely 133–143 for the
use of the term in the field of dance.
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and the breath that produce sound.’44 The evaluation of his talent depends on
the success of this complex exercise.
It might be possible to affirm that there is also a kind of alternation between
gesture and speech in the practice of ancient drama. As we have seen, gestures,
translated into postures, are used pragmatically to prepare, strengthen and
even speak for speech. As such we could reverse the notion in Kendon’s Con-
tinuum of gesture being ‘integrated into a linguistic string’45 to that of speech
being integrated into a gestural string!—or perhaps modify the image to one
of two intertwined strings. Such an approach can help to develop a new prag-
matics of the theatrical text, one that invites us to study not only the discursive
strategies that preside over the interactions between characters, but also the
gestures inscribed in the text’s material that determine spectacular images and
power relations.
Without taking gesture into account, it is hard to see how a dramatic text
can be perceived accurately in the particular space of the ancient theatre. In
pragmatic terms, the question to ask is therefore: What strategies, stylistic and
gestural, does a theatrical speech put in place to be grasped by the audience?
Because ultimately, the audience is the only recipient that matters.
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Reflections on Gestures andWords in Terence’s
Comedies
Licinia Ricottilli
The methodology that has been adopted in the present study is based on an
adaptation of communication pragmatics (that has been identified in the field
of cybernetics and psychiatry by G. Bateson and more broadly recalled by
P. Watzlawick, J. Helmick Beavin, and D.D. Jackson)1 to classical texts.2 Stud-
ies based on such a method have also enabled the in-depth study of gestural
representation, where gestures are often endowed with the most explicit and
intense expression of the quality of the relation at hand, while words more
clearly express the content of the interaction itself. This re-elaboration revealed
its particular relevance in the field of theatre studies, as its analysis is focused
on the systemic dimension of interaction.
This method, starting from certain specific gestural indications that may be
found in the written text, allows scholars to retrace the Roman audience’s high
level of competence in relation to gestural categories as well as their appropri-
ateness and value around Terence’s time. Without such competence, comedy
playwrights would not have been able to use gestures to create comic effects
through precise strategies that will be identified in the course of the present
study in the paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2.
1 Watzlawick et al. (1967). Since 1982, such adaption has been carried out by our research group
(Licinia Ricottilli, Renata Raccanelli, and Evita Calabrese), which has published a series of
studies that re-elaborated themethodological tools of pragmatics of human communication
and provided new ones in order to make them more functional in relation to the analysis of
literary texts and, in particular, those of ancient Greek and Latin cultures. This re-elaboration
has been successfully tested in analysing Greek and Latin authors (e.g. Menander, Plautus,
Terence, Virgil, and the philosopher Seneca). This method was easily integrated into the
present study, given its shared pragmatic frameworkwith the speech act theory of J.L. Austin.
2 For more on this, see Ricottilli (2009) and a preliminary review of contributions relating to
theatre in Ricottilli (2010). The results of the research group until 2009, composed by Licinia
Ricottilli, Renata Raccanelli, and Evita Calabrese, have been analysed in the two previously
mentioned contributions; as far as the group’s publications since 2009 are concerned, provid-
ing further confirmation of the validity of such a methodology, along with in-depth analyses
that assist in improving and extending its possible applications, see the following selected
bibliography: Ricottilli 2018c (including contributions by R. Raccanelli and E. Calabrese);
Calabrese (2017a, 2017b, 2018); Raccanelli (2010, 2012, 2016); Ricottilli (2013, 2018a, 2018b).
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In paragraph 2.1, the analysis demonstrates how gestures significantly con-
tribute to outlining the profound and noble qualities of the amicitia that
Chremes offers to Menedemus and that the latter decides to reciprocate. In
other words, the study of humanitas in Terence’s works is enriched and perfec-
ted if one considers the characters’ gestures as well as their linguistic expres-
sions within a systemic dimension of interaction.
As today, in ancient Rome, face-to-face communication included the use
of gestures—both in terms of body language and facial expressions—as well
as words. Such gesturing accompanied verbal language in order to prepare,
enhance, and emphasise certain specific aspects or to correct and adjust it.
Sometimes gestures even substituted verbalmessages in order to express some-
thing that could not be explicitly voiced, that words were incapable of express-
ing, or that simply could not be expressed with the same force. In this last case,
we may speak of ‘doing things with gestures’ in the same way things can be
done with words.
Unfortunately, recent definitions of gestures do not concur: in the present
study, I shall adopt a definition that I elaborated in my book on gestures and
words in the Aeneid: a definition which is well suited to aid the study of inter-
actions with verbal language. With the word ‘gesture’, I refer to bodily or facial
behaviour that takes on a communicative, informative, or interactive value in
relation to a direct addressee or possible observer and that may be controlled
by a sender.3
In Terence’s comedies, interactions among characters present both cases:
doing things with gestures and doing things with words and gestures.
3 Ricottilli (2000: 16). Since the present study provides examples of gestures that are more
effective and suitable for the context than words, it carries forth the approach adopted by
Corbeill (2004) and Aldrete (2017), who studied the importance and power of gestures in the
ancient Roman cultural system and interactions, respectively. Nevertheless, the pragmatic
framework that recalls the theories of speechact of J.L.Austin and that of agencyof A.Duranti
(whichhave alreadybeenused for “powerfulwords” inBettini [2004]) and applies them to the
gestures that may be found in Latin literature decisively differentiates the present contribu-
tion from those byA. Corbeill andG.S. Aldrete, which quote neither J.L. Austin (or J.R. Searle),
nor A. Duranti. Another distinguishing element lies in the author’s definition of gesture, in
that it is narrower than that proposed by Aldrete (2017: 151) but has the advantage of facilit-
ating the comparison between gestural communication and linguistic communication, and
therefore that of consolidating the application of “agency” (and more specifically Duranti
[2007: 87–122]), which is typical of words, to gestures. Moreover, all of the studies on gestures
in ancient Romeare indebited to thepioneering researchof Sittl (1890); further useful inform-
ation has also been provided by numerousmore recent studies, among which Brilliant (1963)
regarding the fine arts, Maier Eichhorn (1989) and Graf (1991) on orators and actors, Aldrete
(1999) on gestural acclamations and Corbeill (2005) on Roman law.
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1 Doing Things with Gestures
1.1 Comical Limitations Regarding the Comprehension of Gestures
[1] Terence Eunuchus 735–737
Pyth. nil dixit tu ut sequere sese? Chr. nil, nisi abiens mi innuit.
Pyth. eho nonne id sat erat? Chr. at nescibam id dicere illam, nisi quia
correxit miles, quod intellexi minus; namme extrusit foras.
Pyth. Didn’t she suggest you should follow her?
Chr. No, except that she nodded to me as she left.
Pyth. Hey, wasn’t that enough?
Chr. Well, I didn’t knowwhat shemeant, but the soldier setme straight
by throwing me out.4
The situation is the following: the courtesan Thais, who had brought the young
Chremes to the soldierThraso’s home for dinner after a fightwithThraso, leaves
while signalling to Chremes to follow her. The young man, who is rather naive,
does not understand what Thais is trying to tell him with such a gesture but is
given a hint by Thais’ maid Pythias.
Innuere has the meaning of ‘signalling’ that is well known among Terence’s
contemporaries, precisely as other gestures pertaining to the same family:
adnueremeans ‘to say yes, to consent’ and abnuere ‘to say no, to refuse’. Accord-
ing to the classification of Ekman and Friesen, they are emblems that cor-
respond to immediate verbal translation (‘Emblems are those nonverbal acts
which have a direct verbal translation, or dictionary definition, usually consist-
ing of awordor two, or perhaps aphrase’5) and are therefore gestures that could
easily attain the value of a speech act.6
4 Texts and translations from Terence are taken from Barsby (2001).
5 Ekman and Friesen (1969: 63). From a different perspective, Poggi (1983) classifies these as
lexical gestures that correspond to a single word of a language, like pointing to the ground
near oneself instead of saying ‘here’ or rotating one’s wrist loosely to say ‘very’ in modern
Italy. On the contrary, holophrastic gestures are the equivalent of a sentence carrying out a
performative: for instance, brushing the back of one’s hand under one’s chin with an out-
wards movement, in modern Italy, corresponds to the sentence ‘I don’t care at all’. It contains
an informative performative (i.e. an ‘expositive act’ according to Austin [21975: 161–163]), con-
sisting inmy informing someone that I do not care about something or someone at all. Facial
expressions are usually holophrastic: for example, a happy face expression conveys the mes-
sage ‘I am happy’, while a sideways glance (see Homeric ὑπόδρα ἰδών or Latin acerba tuens,
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In Aelius Donatus’ comment to Terence’s comedies, Chremes’ comical naiv-
ety is underlined, and, above all, the perfect comprehensibility of Thais’ gesture
is confirmed:7
[2] Donatus ad Eunuchum 736.1
EHO NONNE ID SAT ERAT adeo simplex hic inducitur adulescens, ut a
Pythia reprehendi possit. Nam quid opus fuit dicere, si innuit?
‘Hey, wasn’t that enough?’] Here the young man [scil. Chremes] is por-
trayed as being so naive that he is scolded by Pythias. In fact, what need
was there for Thais to speak if she had sent him a signal?8
Such a scholium provides explicit recognition of the fact that gestures, com-
pared to verbal language, sometimes have the ability to express messages that
aredirectedat the addresseemore efficiently or in accordancewith theneedsof
the context at hand. At that time, like nowadays, communicative competence
required the ability to decode gestures that, among other things, were prefer-
able to verbal messages in delicate situations such as the conflict between
Thais and the soldier. Such gestures are often signs of understanding that the
addresseemust notmiss: Chremes is a foreigner to theways of life in the city so
that he does not understand them, just as he does not understand the situation
he finds himself in. Naturally, all of this has the effect of making the audience
laugh.9
Once inserted in the context, a gesture like innuere acquires a specific value
as a speech act (according to Poggi [1983], lexical gestures or emblems do not
contain a particular performative value like holophrastic gestures, so they draw
lumine toruo) corresponds to the sentence ‘I am angry with you’ or ‘I despise you’. In these
cases, we have an informative performative as well.
6 Other emblems, along with the ones that have previously been seen, consist in gestures used
to greet when meeting or leaving someone. See, for example, Capponi in this volume.
7 As is known, this is a comment inwhich the reflections of earlier scholars, e.g. Valerius Probus
andAemilius Asper, converged. For a comment byDonatus onTerence, see in particular Ferri
(2016: 256): ‘Donatus comments on another use of deictic pronouns and adverbs, inwhich the
speakers use deixis to form elliptical, highly idiomatic sentences which need an accompany-
ing gesture to acquire meaning for an interlocutor’; see also Basore (1908); Madyda (1953);
Thomadaki (1989).
8 The translations of the CommentumTerenti are mine.
9 Some commentators explain that Chremes’ inability to comprehend the nod was due to his
drunkenness, but such a theory does not conform to his ownwords (736 at nescibam id dicere
illam) or to the scholium quoted as text [2].
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it from the context in which they appear). In this case, the performative value
of the gesture appears to be the requestive ‘follow me’ gesture, which cor-
responds to sequere me in Latin. Austin (21975: 155–157) speaks of ‘exercitive
acts’.10
From a relational point of view, the agreement on the action to be carried
out, which is necessarily conveyed by Thais as not to be immediately grasped
by the miles, does not take place right away, due to Chremes’ comical inabil-
ity to understand the language of gestures. Nevertheless, in the course of the
comedy, such an agreement between the courtesan and the young man will
be gradually instated and attain the relationship of amicitia that Thais desired:
naturally, in this case, it consists of a clientele form of amicitia between patro-
nus and cliens, with themeretrix taking on the role of cliens and youngChremes
that of patronus.
Overall, the verb innuere, which recurs in Plautus and Terence, does not
appear often in prose and even less frequently in poetry.11
In Terence’s plays, the verb innuere occurs three times—one of which has
already been examined—and in all three cases, there is a requestive perform-
ative (i.e. an exercitive act in the terminology of Austin [21975: 155–157]). Thus,
in Ter. Ad. 170, young Aeschinus commands a slave to beat the leno Sannio by
means of a gesture.
[3] Terence Adelphoe 170–171
caue nunciam oculos a meis oculis quoquam demoueas tuos,
ne mora sit, si innuerim, quin pugnus continuo in mala haereat.
Nowmake sure youdon’t take your eyes off mine. If I nod, don’twait. Plant
your fist in his jaw instantly.
This passage represents, quite well, the need for the slave to be attentive to his
owner’s slightest gesture and ready to obey. The nod (nutus), which is generally
executed with the head or sometimes with the eyes or eyebrows, conveys the
order in precisely the samemanner as verbal language and, not by coincidence
the term nutusmay also mean ‘command’.
The confirmation of this other meaning is offered by
10 For more on this, see also Sbisà (1989: 113–130).
11 The use of the verb innuere in Plin Ep. 7.27.9 is also noteworthy.
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[4] Cicero Tusculan Disputations 5.61
tum ad mensam eximia forma pueros delectos iussit consistere eosque
nutum illius intuentes diligenter ministrare.
Then he told chosen slave-boys of exceptional beauty to stand by the
table, watch for his nods, and wait on him attentively.12
In its third appearance in Terence’s plays, the value of innuere is the same as in
the second, which may be found a few verses earlier:
[5] Terence Adelphoe 173–174
Aes. geminabit nisi caues. San. ei miseriam!
Aes. non innueram, uerum in istam partem potius peccato tamen.
Aes. He’ll do it again if you don’t look out.
San. (as Parmeno strikes him again) Ow! That hurts! (he loosens his grip
on the girl)
Aes. (to Parmeno) I didn’t nod. But it’s a fault in the right direction.
1.2 A Singular Language of Courtship
[6] Terence Heautontimorumenos 369–373
sed heus tu, uide sis ne quid imprudens ruas.
patrem nouisti ad has res quam sit perspicax.
ego te autem noui quam esse soleas impotens.
inuersa uerba, euersas ceruices tuas,
gemitus, screatus, tussis, risus abstine.
But listen, please make sure you don’t spoil everything by being careless.
You know how keen-scented your father is for this sort of thing; and I
know how headstrong you can be. None of your double meanings, side
glances, sighs, throat clearing, coughs, laughs.
12 Text and translation are taken from Douglas (1990); this is the famous episode of Damo-
cles’ sword.
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Here the slave Syrus, while leading Bacchis, the courtesan beloved by Cliti-
pho, to his owner’s home while pretending that her lover is the young Clinia,
reminds his young owner to not betray himself before his father, Chremes, with
communicative behaviour that could reveal that he is themeretrix’s lover.
Gestures of courtship and seduction appear, for instance, in the famous
verses of Naevius’ Tarentilla:
[7] Naevius Tarentilla 74–7613
quasi pila
in choro ludens datatim dat se et communem facit.
alii adnutat, alii adnictat, alium amat, alium tenet.
As though shewere playing at ball, give-and-take in a ring, shemakes her-
self common property to all men. To one she nods, at another she winks;
one she caresses, another embraces.14
It seems to pay homage to such verses by emphasising the furtive nature of the
gestures:
[8] Plautus Asinaria 784
neque illa ulli homini nutet, nictet, annuat.
She shall not nod, wink, or make any signs to any man.15
This is one of the clauses of the comical contract that the parasite drew up
for young Diabolus; in exchange for twenty silver minae, this contract granted
exclusive possession of the courtesan Filenia for one year.
If we compare the two preceding examples with Terence’s verses, we may
notice that in Syrus’ list of prohibited behaviours there are certain comical
modifications having the intent of highlightingClitipho’s excesses, like euertere
ceruices, which indicates an unnatural position of the neck that is so unexpec-
ted and exaggerated that it made the audience laugh.
13 Formore on this, see the excellent analysis in Traina (52000: 34–35); for more on the com-
plexity of the problems related to these verses, Barchiesi (1978: 67–150) is of fundamental
importance.
14 Text and translation are taken fromWarmington (21961).
15 Texts and translations of Plautus are taken from de Melo (2011–2013).
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While the context specifies that this gesture has the intent of making his
beloved notice him, the ancient commentator’s various explanations do not
clarify whether this entails tilting one’s neck backwardswhich, by analogywith
the term abnuo, could indicate a proud refusal, or pride in general, as Eugra-
phius asserted in his comment to Heautontimorumenos:
[9] Eugraphius ad Heautontimorumenum 372
EVERSAS CERVICES TUAS quod iactantia et superbia est.
YOUR SIDE GLANCES (gesture) that indicates exhibitionism and pride16
and is partially confirmed in
[10] Scholia Terentiana ad Heautontimorumenum 372 Schlee
EVERSAS dissolutas et supinas, huc illucque reuertentes.
SIDE the (neck) is relaxed, tilted backwards, and turns here and there.17
In this scholium, exhibitionism is associated with a sideways turn of the neck,
which also has the aim of drawing attention.
Another possible interpretation refers to the opposite movement of the
neck, i.e. downwards, as confirmed by
[11] Scholia Bembina ad Heautontimorumenum 372 Mountford
EVERSAS infractas, inflexas, amatorieque deiectas.
SIDE the (neck) is loose, bent, and directed downwards as is typical of a
person in love.18
16 The translations of Eugraphius’Commentary aremine. An analogous use is present in Sen.
Ben. 2.13.2 libet itaque interrogare, quid se tanto opere resupinet, quid uultum habitumque
orisperuertat, utmalit personamhaberequamfaciem? ‘And so I feel like askingwhyadonor
is so stuck up,whyhe contorts his facial expression somuch that he seems to prefer amask
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More recent studies translate it with ‘storcere il collo’ (‘to twist the neck’)
Ronconi (1960) and similarly: e.g. ‘tes contorsions du cou’ (‘your contortions of
the neck’) Marouzeau (1942–1949 II); Lietzmann (1974) translates euerterewith
‘umdrehen, verdrehen’; Barsby (2001) recurs to the expression ‘side glances’,
and Bianco (1993) ‘storcere la testa’ (‘to twist the head’).19
It is very difficult to recreate with certainty a gesture that is executed in a
singular and comical manner, even when it is located within a verbal context
(althoughwedonot have clear indications about the context,which could have
been a banquet imagined by Syrus) and in the presence of a clear intent, i.e.
drawing the attention of the woman one loves. The fact that the term euersas
is chosen, among other things, in order to achieve a paronomasiawith inuersa
uerba, must be taken into consideration. After all, one must keep in mind that
a gesture is never a perfect equivalent of words.
In this case, the performative is requestive along the same lines as saying
‘look at me’ or ‘pay attention’ to his beloved.
Moreover, if risus indicates laughter and not smiles, then this facial gesture
would also be too obvious to be part of a sort of knowing and refined courtship
that must only be understood by its addressee.
The series of paralinguistic behaviours that Syrus imagines could be attrib-
uted to Clitipho include gemitus, screatus, and tussis; however, while gemitus
could be considered appropriate should it be executedwith scarcely any sound,
the other two (screatus—a hapax legomenon— and tussis) have a comical
effect because they are more readily associated with an old phlegmyman than
an amans ephebus.
Eugraphius (ad Heautontimorumenum 373) proposes a different explana-
tion: GEMITUS SCREATUS TUSSIS haec omnia adulescentuli faciunt, quotiens-
cumque uidere aut uideri uolunt ab his, quos desiderant, ita sub quodam metu,
ut, quasi dum aliud necessitate conficiunt, sic impleant uoluntatem: ‘young men
do all this whenever they want to see or be seen by the people they care about,
if they are under the influence of a certain fear, so they may satisfy their desire
while, so to say, executing “something else” out of duty’. Themention of a secret
sort of communication between the adulescentuli, despite their fear while they
are compelled to accomplish something else, seems to be a scholastic situation,
rather than a courtship that must remain a secret.
19 Different translations:Wagner (1872) compares it to Ov. Her. 16.233 uersa ceruice recumbo
‘I stretch by turning my head in the opposite direction’ and observes that ‘dem gegenüber
euersae komisch klingt beinahe “aus dem Gelenke gedreht” ’. Brothers (1988) interprets it
as ‘those over-the-shoulder glances of yours’, while Gray (1902) chooses ‘to crane his neck
in the hope of catching sight of her’.
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The scholia Bembina ad loc. refer to the furtive convening between the lov-
ers GEMITUS—RISUS quae faciunt amantes ad conuertendos in se oculos eorum
quos amant ut significare furtim aliquid mutuo nutu possint: ‘things that lovers
do to make their beloved’s eyes turn towards them, so that they may commu-
nicate in secret by means of a mutual nod’. Interestingly enough, three para-
linguistic notations (gemitus, screatus, and tussis) and one gesture (risus) are
summarised and explained with amutual nod (mutuus nutus). The situation is
thus enrichedwith elements that arenot present anddefer to common formsof
communication between lovers. The scholiaTerentiana ad loc. have: SCREATUS
screare est spuere et phlegmapurgare ‘coughingupphlegm involves spitting and
eliminating moist humour’, which is more faithful to the comical tone of the
context.
We cannot exclude the possibility that the actorwhopersonified Syrus could
have emphasised these bodily and paralinguistic singularities in his reciting,
thus increasing the audience’s entertainment.20
The enjoyment of the spectators at seeing how Clitipho betrays himself
before his father must have been even greater, surpassing the comical expecta-
tions that had been triggered by the slave. In fact, instead of the inappropriate
and ridiculous use of gestures and paralinguistic behaviour, the young man,
who is even more incapable of controlling himself than Syrus had foreseen,
directly takes action and is discovered by his father, Chremes, while slipping
his hand over the courtesan’s breast. This obviously is an action rather than a
gesture:
[12] Terence Heautontimorumenos 562–564
Chr. quid istuc, quaeso? qui istic mos est, Clitipho? itane fieri oportet?
Clit. quid ego feci? Chr. uidin ego te modo manum in sinum huic
meretrici inserere?
Chr. Tellme,what are youup to?What sort of behaviour’s this, Clitipho?
Is this the proper way to act?
Clit. What have I done?
Chr. Didn’t I see you just now putting your hand inside that woman’s
bosom?
20 Formore on themargin of freedom that actors enjoyedwhen performing, see Panayotakis
(2005).
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Clitipho is impotens, as Syrus claims (371), and incapable of controlling
his amorous desires, but there is probably an anthropological factor in this
sequence of behaviours that is relevant for that time, i.e. the possibility that
simulating could be disreputable for an adulescens. In comedies, simulation
is often naturally part of comical games based on successful or unsuccessful
deceptions, and as such may also involve free characters (see, for example, Ter.
Phorm. 210). Nevertheless, there may be reflections of the negative value that
it had at the time—especially in political, judicial, and commercial contexts—
and that was destined to be expressed efficiently by Cicero.21 In the same
comedy, Clitipho’s father, Chremes, refuses to actively participate in the scam
weaved by the slave Syrus:
[13] Terence Heautontimorumenos 781–784
Syr. … non ego dicebam in perpetuom ut illam illi dares,
uerum ut simulares. Chr. non meast simulatio.
ita tu istaec tua misceto ne me admisceas.
egon, quoi daturus non sum, ut ei despondeam?
Syr. … I wasn’t suggesting that you should give her to him permanently,
but just pretend.
Chr. Pretence is notmyway. You do your stirring but keepme out of the
pot. Engage her to a man I don’t intend to marry her to?
The fact that gestures of seduction are typical of courtesans in Naevius’ Tar-
entilla does not seem to be a coincidence; likewise, the simulated seduction
is only in Syrus’, the slave’s, mind, while his young free owner, Clitipho, is not
pretending and reveals himself bluntly and directly.
The mentality of Ovid’s time seems to have greatly changed and, in his
Amores, the poet personally playswith the furtive gestures of hidden courtship:
[14] Ovid Amores 1.4.17–19
me specta nutusque meos uultumque loquacem;
excipe furtiuas et refer ipsa notas.
uerba superciliis sine uoce loquentia dicam.
21 In Cicero, the act of simulating damaged the credibility of a person and the accusation of
simulating was used as a weapon to strike an adversary: see Cic. Pis. 1; Clu. 72; Rab. Post.
35; Red. Sen. 15; for more on this in general, see also Off. 2.43, 3.61; see also Sall. Cat. 31.7.
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Keep your eyes on me, to get my nods and the language of my eyes; and
catch my stealthy signs, and yourself return them.22
2 Doing Things withWords and Gestures
2.1 Gestures That Intensify the Expression of a Feeling
In the opening scene of the Heautontimorumenos, Menedemus bursts into
tears during his exchange with Chremes, who invites him to stop crying and
confide in him and promises to help him.
[15] Terence Heautontimorumenos 83–86
Men. eheu!
Chr. ne lacruma atque istuc quidquid est fac me ut sciam.
ne retice, ne uerere; crede, inquam, mihi.
aut consolando aut consilio aut re iuuero.
Men. (sobbing) Oh dear, oh dear!
Chr. Don’tweep.Whatever your trouble is, tellmeall about it; don’t keep
it to yourself. Don’t be afraid; trust me, I say. I’ll help you whether
you need consolation or counsel or money.
A senexwho sheds tears on the stage amounts to a situation that is very differ-
ent from those in Plautus’ works due to the role of the character who is crying
and Terence’s respect for him.23 The different portrayal of the senex in Plautus
is particularly evident in the case of the senex amator who becomes his son’s
rival over desire for a woman and, on the basis of the anthropological context,
is destined to be defeated and evenpunished or at leastmocked.24 At the end of
this first scene, the two elderly men, who have become friends, take their leave
andChremes, now alone, speaks in a brief monologue of his profound compas-
sion for his neighbour, one so intense that it made him cry. At this point, the
audience learns that Chremes has also shed tears:
22 The translation is taken from Showerman (1963); analogous examplesmay be found inOv.
Am. 2.5.15–20; Her. 17.79–92.
23 SeeDutsch (2008: 96–97)who, in referring only to flere andplorare, observes howTerence,
as opposed to Plautus, avoids presenting characters who cry loudly on stage.
24 See Bettini (1982: 72–77).
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[16] Terence Heautontimorumenos 167–168
lacrumas excussit mihi
miseretque me eius.
He made me shed a tear, and I’m sorry for him.
The gesture of crying is holophrastic and generally presents an informative per-
formative (a ‘behabitive act’ in the terminology of Austin [21975: 160–161]).
In this case, as opposed to the previous one, the mention of tears does not
occur simultaneously, but in retrospect. The old man’s emotional involvement
before his neighbour’s suffering was already perceivable from the conversation
between the two. Then why does Terence have the senex say something that
could have been understood by what preceded the monologue? In truth, there
are various reasons for this.
One of these consists in a peculiar feature of Terence’s monologues, which
appear, from a communicative point of view, like a dialogue between one part
of the ‘Ego’ that expresses its feelings, reflects on what has happened, informs
on the facts, and another part of the ‘Ego’ that may be a silent speaker that
only listens or an active conversant who asks, comments, and contests (e.g. in
Phorm. 185–190).25 For this reason, what a character says in the absence of oth-
ers in a dialogue with one’s self is conventionally considered a sincere expres-
sion of their feelings. In other words, the compassion that Chremes feels for
Menedemus is not a ruse to gain something from the conversation but rather
a true sentiment that Chremes perceives in himself and is therefore presented
by the poet as sincere compassion.
In particular, the effect that is obtained by Chremes’ tears, i.e. the intensific-
ation of mercy, is a valid reason for this retrospective mention. The gesture, in
this case, is therefore a display of affection, or proof of emotions.
The third reasonmay be found in the author’s desire to add an element that
integrates and confirms the portrayal of the two senes as well as their relation-
ship. In this case, in fact, we have contagious tears (or a contagion of tears): the
fact that the friendship between the two senes had already been instituted is
attested precisely by their mirroring one another’s gesture of crying and is con-
firmed in the course of the comedyby theway inwhich the events unfold.26The
25 For more on Terence’s monologues, see Haffter (21969: 55, with the comment of D. Nardo,
129); Denzler (1968); Minarini (1995).
26 See Lefèvre (1994). An important anthropological investigation on friendship in Plautus’
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contagion of tears reveals not only Chremes’ emotional involvement before
his friend’s suffering but especially the intensity and nobility of such involve-
ment.27
The presence of painful situations that are indicated by tears must not be
excluded in comedies: the expectation, however, is that situations of suffer-
ing are concentrated at the beginning of the comedy and gradually decrease as
problems are solved by fate or the characters’ intervention and reach a peaceful
ending. In De comoedia, Evanthius underlines such a feature:
[17] Evanthius De comoedia 4.2
illic [scil. in comoedia] prima turbulenta, tranquilla ultima, in tragoedia
contrario ordine res aguntur.
[In comedies] the opening scenes are turbulent, the final serene; in tra-
gedies, the order of the scenes is the contrary.28
Such an expectation is confirmed by positioning tears in the initial scenes of
the comedy and rigorously eliminating them in the final scene.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the most relevant findings of the present analysis, consisting of
specific cases from Terence’s works, include the following:
1. The significant knowledge of the second century BC Roman audience in
relation to the use of gestures during face-to-face exchanges is confirmed.
On the basis of such competence, comic playwrights may entertain the
audience by emphasising, e.g., young Chremes’ comical limitations in his
ability to understand the meaning of gestures (1.1).
comedies may be found in Raccanelli (1998). For further details on contagious tears in
Terence, see Ricottilli (2018a: 154–166).
27 Some critics do not seem to have paid much attention to the elements that reiterate the
character’s positive portrayal: as a result, an unjustified tradition of antipathy in relation
to it has emerged. For example, Perelli (1973: 51) sustains that Chremes ‘viene sempre
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2. Specific types of relations, e.g. courtship, featured distinctive and appro-
priate gestures: the comical plot twists created by such gestures were an
excellent opportunity to entertain the audience and were employed by
the slave Syrus to underline young Clitipho’s inability to control his pas-
sion for the meretrix Bacchis. The enjoyment of the spectators at seeing
how Clitipho betrays himself before his father must have been all the
greater, surpassing the comical expectations that had been triggered by
the slave (1.2).
3. Small clues emerge from the written text by means of which it is possible
to reconstruct some of the comical plays on gestures that were, for the
most part, improvised by the actor during performances and otherwise
would have been irretrievable (1.2).
4. Theway in which interacting characters influence each other’s behaviour
may be studied in light of the methodology of communication prag-
matics. Such a close connection between different characters’ behaviour
clearly surfaces in the course of the exchanges between Chremes and
Menedemus (2.1).29
5. Gestural notations represent necessary keys to understanding the quality
of the relationships that are established among characters in Terence’s
theatrical works, as well as Chremes’ profound nobility, which is revealed
by his contagion of tears (2.1).
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The Kiss in Plautus’ Stichus: Notes on Gestures and
Words in View of a Pragmatics of Comic
Communication
Renata Raccanelli
In this paper, I aim to show how the pragmatics of communication can spe-
cifically contribute to the study of gestures in Plautus’ comedies. Since gestural
expressiveness is far frombeing a new and scarcely explored topic in studies on
palliata in general and Plautus in particular,1 my observations are not intended
to provide an exhaustive or systematic overview of the subject. Rather, I wish to
reflect on somemethodological insights through a case study in order to focus
on how a pragmatic approach may lead to a better understanding of Plautus’
texts.
It may be useful to begin by briefly mentioning some fundamental premises
underlying the pragmatic approach to gesture.2 From the perspective of prag-
matics, gesture is mostly a form of analogic communication (i.e. complement-
ary to verbal communication) in which the specific function of transmitting
referential data predominates in its logical and syntactical architecture, while
the ability to express relational information remains limited. On the contrary,
analogic communicationentails theprevalenceof the specific ability to express
1 Indeed, the topic lends itself to different—albeit closely connected—approaches. From our
perspective, however, the stream of research into non-verbal behaviour, i.e. body language
and mimicry, in Roman comedies—first introduced by Warnecke (1910) and taken up again
by Taladoire (1951)—is particularly interesting. Some useful reflections on palliata may be
found in Handley’s essay on New Comedy (2002); Panayotakis (2005) provides a clear meth-
odological framework, while Monda (2010, 2014) offers thought-provoking examples of spe-
cific case studies. A connected field of inquiry deals with the relationships between gestures,
improvisation techniques, and mime, with particular reference to Plautus: see Arnott (1995),
Hofmann (1995), Petrone (1995), and Zimmermann (1995); on the role of dance, see Moore
(2012: 105–134). Other works present a comparative study (already familiar to ancient rhet-
oric) of the actor’s and the orator’s actio: among the many studies on this, see Graf (1991),
Fantham (2002), Dutsch (2002, 2007, 2013) and Nocchi (2013). For a general overview of
ancient gesture, see Sittl (1890) with his valuable and numerous observations on Plautine
texts; as for the Roman world, see Aldrete (1999, 2017) and Corbeill (2004).
2 Watzlawick et al. (1967: esp. 29–52). On the application of methodological instruments bor-
rowed from the pragmatics of communication to the study of Latin literary texts, see the
comprehensive overview inRicottilli (2009);more specifically, for an in-depth analysis of ges-
ture, see Ricottilli (2000: esp. 81–116 for methodological observations on the contribution of
the pragmatic approach to the analysis of Virgil’s text).
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the relational aspects of communication, while the syntax employed to define
the nature of relationships remains elusive. As a result, human communica-
tion is based on the interaction of these two languages (verbal and gestural),
which convey different levels of information in different ways. They therefore
aremutually ‘untranslatable’ in general, if not at the cost of a significant loss of
information.
Some implications of these general assumptions are particularly interesting
for our study. Firstly, gestural language is ambiguous: tears can express either
joy or pain, a smirk can signify either complicity or contempt, a raised fist can
symbolise a threat or an expression of unity, etc. Secondly, gestural language
may be used either as an alternative to verbal language or in combination with
it. In any case, a gesture is seldomeither an exact substitute for or aperfect equi-
valent of words; moreover, in virtue of its ability to express relationships, ges-
tural language is particularly suited to assumingmetacommunicativemeaning.
In other words, if a gesture accompanies words, it often shows how the referen-
tial contents that are conveyed by the words should be understood; ultimately,
it expresses the nature of the relationship between the interactors.
Through the case studywhichwill follow, I aim todemonstratehow these (inev-
itably generalised) pragmatic assumptions may foster the understanding of
culturally specific texts, like Plautus’ comedies. In particular, I wish to analyse
anextremecase inwhichamisalignmentbetweenverbal andgestural language
emerges.
The passage I will discuss is set within the second scene of Plautus’ Stichus,
where two sisters welcome their father with an osculum (Stich. 89–92) upon his
arrival: in this greeting scene, the interaction between the verbal and gestural
levels of communication is interesting in general, but I will mainly focus on the
kiss between the elderly father and his daughters.
If we rely on Ekman and Friesen’s classification of gestures, this kiss must be
placed in the category of ‘emblems’, along with gestures of greeting, farewell,
assent, denial, etc.3 Emblems generally express a meaning shared by a spe-
cific group of individuals who use them. Therefore, they feature a high level of
awareness, in that their use is (much)more conscious and intentional than that
of other non-verbal behaviour. Moreover, they often have an immediate verbal
translation, ‘usually consisting of a word or two, or perhaps a phrase’,4 e.g. clap-
ping one’s hands finds his linguistic equivalent in ‘Bravo!’. From this point of
3 Ekman and Friesen (1969: 63–68, 94–95).
4 Ekman and Friesen (1969: 63).
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view, they are, in a certain sense, one of the closest gestural categories to verbal
language. Emblems are also characterised by strong social codification or, in
other words, high cultural value: different cultures use different emblems and,
conversely, the same emblematic behaviour may convey different meanings in
different cultures.
This is why it is particularly important to examine this type of gesturewithin
the framework of the Roman cultural context. Licinia Ricottilli’s study Gesto e
parola nell’Eneide, which contextualises Ekman and Friesen’s results with ref-
erence to the language of Roman gesture, is particularly useful here.5 In her
reading of Virgil’s Aeneid, Ricottilli observes how Roman emblems are gen-
erally enacted not only with great awareness and deliberate communicative
intentions, but also, in many cases, with a specific ‘componente rituale, che,
implicando un forte controllo sociale, tende ad intensificare il grado di con-
trollo personale nell’esecuzione del gesto stesso.’6
1 A Case Analysis: The Kiss in Plautus’ Stichus 89–92
At the beginning of the comedy, the two sisters Panegyris and Pamphila7 com-
plain about their absent husbands, who have been abroad for three years to
improve their fortunes. The two matronae know that their father intends to
make them divorce from their destitute absent husbands, in view of more
illustrious marriages. The women are aware of their father’s unchallengeable
authority (see 69 cuius potestas plus potest) and, seeing that any open opposi-
tion would be both impious and shameful, plan to use the weapon of entreaty
(exoratio), in order to dissuade him from his heinous plan.8
5 Ricottilli (2000) examines the relationship between gestures andwords inVirgil’s Aeneidwith
particular reference to the rhetorical treatment of gesture in antiquity (quasi sermo corporis,
according to the famous definition inCic.Deor. 3.222) and to contemporary fields of research,
such as the pragmatics of communication and Ekman and Friesen’s classification (1969). A
useful working definition of gesture is provided by Ricottilli (2000: 16): ‘per gesto intendiamo
un comportamento corporeo o facciale che assuma un valore comunicativo, informativo o
interattivo nei confronti di un destinatario diretto o di un eventuale osservatore, e per il quale
esista una possibilità di controllo da parte dell’emittente’.
6 Ricottilli (2000: 23): ‘a ritual component which, by implying a strong degree of social control,
tends to intensify the degree of personal control in the performance of the gesture itself.’
7 Regarding the names of the two matronae, which the manuscripts have transmitted rather
uncertainly (the younger sister was quite likely a nameless character; indeed, many editors
prefer the generic designation of Soror in place of Pamphila), see Petersmann (1973: 85).
8 Stich. 70–74.
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As soon as the senex Antipho arrives, both daughters rush to welcome him
and lavish him with attention:
[1] Plautus Stichus 89–96
Pan. is est ecastor. ferre aduorsum homini occupemus osculum.
Pamph. salue, mi pater. Ant. et uos ambae. ilico agite assidite.
Pamph. osculum— Ant. sat est osculi mi uostri. Pan. qui, amabo,
pater?
Ant. quia itameae animae salsura euenit. Pamph. assidehic, pater.
Ant. non sedeo istic, uos sedete; ego sedero in subsellio.
Pan. mane, puluinum— Ant. bene procuras. mi satis sic fultum
est. sede.
Pamph. sine, pater. Ant. quid opust? Pan. opust. Ant. morem tibi
geram. atque hoc est satis.
Pamph. numquam enim nimis curare possunt suom parentem filiae.
My proposal for the translation of this sequence is as follows:9
Pan. Oh, it’s him, let’s make the first move and kiss him.
Pamph. Greetings, father dear!
Ant. Same to you both. Come on, just sit down where you are.
Pamph. A kiss—
Ant. Enough with your kissing!
Pan. But why, father dearest?
Ant. Because that’s howmy breath has turned salty.
Pamph. Sit here near us, father.
Ant. I won’t sit there. You both sit down; I will sit on a stool.
Pan. Wait, a cushion—
Ant. No need to fuss. I’m perfectly comfortable like this. Sit down.
Pamph. Allow me, father—
Ant. Is this really necessary?
Pan. Yes, it is.
Ant. All right, whatever makes you happy. Now that’s enough!
Pamph. Daughters can never take enough care of their fathers.
9 For Plautus, I draw on deMelo (2011–2013) for both the Latin text and the English translation,
unless otherwise stated (as in the present case).
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As we can see, the dynamics of interaction in this scene highlight the con-
trast between the exuberant acts of the daughters as they rush towelcome their
father with deference on one hand and, on the other hand, the static and dry
reactions of their father, who shields himself with brusque and imperiousman-
ners, and interrupts thematronae’s words and gestures.
Let us now focus on the kiss sequence. The two sisters anticipate their father
(occupemus)10 and hurry to kiss him. From a pragmatic perspective, we might
say that the women are trying to force the normal punctuation of the inter-
active sequence by forestalling a move they expect—and dread—from their
interactor. Although they attempt to set up a harmonious interactive frame-
work, their proposal is immediately rejected with a command that is aimed at
keeping them lower than and at a distance from him (ilico agite assidite).
The proxemic framework of this sequence is particularly explicit in the text:
we can observe the quick movement of the daughters towards their father and
the rigid attitude of the senex, who stands stiffly before them and keeps his
distance while maintaining his dominant position.
On the level of verbal communication, Antipho amasses various directive
utterances within six lines (90 ilico agite assidite; 93 uos sedete; 94 sede, to
which one may add the sharp invitation at 95 atque hoc est satis) and expres-
sions indicating refusal (93 non sedeo; 94 bene procuras);11 most importantly,
he interrupts his daughters’ lines three times, i.e. when Pamphila asks for a
kiss (91 osculum), as well as when each of the two sisters offers him a cushion
(Panegyris at 94 mane, puluinum; Pamphila at 95 sine, pater). This represents
a way for Antipho to get the upper hand by hijacking his daughters’ turns to
talk.
10 For occuparewith the infinitive, see Petersmann (1973: 109) and Ussing (21972: II 435). See
also Krauss (2008: 33) ‘Panegyris announces her plan to kill their father with kindness: she
says they will make the first move by kissing him […]. This line has a military ring, despite
the affectionate context, and echoes their father’s own warlike plan’.
11 While it is true that simple imperatives do not necessarily convey harshness in direct-
ives in Latin (Risselada 1993: 111–122, 163; Unceta Gómez 2009: 65), in this context they
are summed with various signals indicating urgency and irritation, especially with the
threefold command to sit down as well as the presence of agite at 90. This illocutionary
device is opposed to amabo (91), a typical ‘polite modifier’ of female language in palliata:
as Adams (1984: 67) observes, ‘whereas obsecro, quaeso and amabo usually tone down a
remark, sis and age can be described as “intensifiers” ’ and age / agite + imperative is often
to be understood as ‘urgent in tone […] or hortatory’. The adverb ilico (90)may convey loc-
ative value if one considers the system of spatial references at 92 asside hic, pater and 93
non sedeo istic […] sedero in subsellio, but itmay also feature a sharp temporal connotation
related to urgency (see Don. ad Ter. Andr. 514; v. ilico in TLL, 7.1, 330.77; Lodge 1924–1933:
II 743). Formore on bene procuras as a formula of polite refusal, see Petersmann (1973: 110).
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The words of the senex express an abrupt and impositional attitude that
is correlated with the proxemic requirement to mark a hierarchical distance
between himself and his daughters. On the basis of this observation, I agree
with the scholars who believe that Antipho avoids the kiss, rather than shield-
ing himself after being assaulted by his daughters with kisses.12 In particular,
line 91 (sat est osculi mi uostri) most likely expresses an absolute refusal of his
daughters’ osculum (singular, with an abstract connotation); i.e. he rejects the
gesture of kissing in general, rather than the kisses that are being offered in the
specific situation. In this light, we could contest the hypothesis of those who
imagine such interaction at line 91:
Pamph. A kiss—(they embrace him and kiss his cheeks)
Ant. (interrupting) I’ve had enough of your kissing.13
Themain reason for rejecting similar translations, however, lies in the nature of
the gestures involved. Many commentators interpret the scene of the kiss as a
simple clash between the women’s expansiveness and the old man’s gruffness,
as he is afraid of becoming overwhelmed and being seen asweak and tender by
his daughters, with whom he is about to argue:14 the dynamics of the situation
certainly are an important component of the interaction between the charac-
ters on stage, but not all the implications of this gesture seem to have been fully
investigated so far. As previouslymentioned, the kiss belongs to the category of
12 ‘Osculum prohibet, quod offerebatur’, noted Havekenthal, who also underlined the local
value of ilico in line 90 (1607: 463). Ernout (1932–1938: VI 218) and Scandola in Questa
(2005: 105) also interpret his gesture thus: ‘Panfila (gettandogli le braccia al collo): un bacio
…/ Antifonte (allontanandola bruscamente): Ne ho abbastanza dei vostri baci’.
13 De Melo (2013). This interpretation finds an influential precedent in Lambin (1577: 990):
‘Satis vos osculatus sum.’ Petersmann (1973: 109) acknowledges the difficulty of interpret-
ing the passage but tends to believe that Antipho does not shield his face from his daugh-
ters’ kisses immediately: ‘dieserwehrtweitereKüsse ab,weil seinGesicht davon schonnaß
und salzig ist’. Nixon (1916–1938: V 17) also leans in the same direction: ‘Pan. Let’s surprise
him with a kiss as he comes in (they do so with high success)’, as does Poster (1995: 324):
‘Sister: Just one more hug! / Antipho: I’ve had enough of your hugs and kisses’. See also
Petrone (1989: 94, 2015: 42–43): ‘il particolare insistito del bacio con cui le figlie vanno ad
accogliere il genitore, mentre questi tenta invano di sottrarsi. […] non è il caso di dargli
altri oscula’.
14 Stich. 79: scio litis fore—ego meas noui optume (‘I know there will be arguments—I know
mygirls perfectly’). See, for example, Petrone (1989: 210): ‘È unagara tra furbi, come sempre
nelle commedie plautine,ma anche tra persone chemescolano affetto e interesse: le figlie
eccedono in carezze perché il padre, preso nei lacci dell’affetto, acconsenta alla loro scelta,
questi cerca di stare sulla difensiva e di respingerne le tenerezze, per non cedere subito’.
See also Petrone’s previous work (1977: 40).
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emblems: therefore, it entails a focus on the specific cultural meaning that the
social context gives to the gesture itself. In fact, not only is the osculum included
in this ritualised situation of greeting familymembers but it is, in itself, subjec-
ted to a strongly symbolic ritualisation in Roman culture, where the so-called
ius osculi is a well-known institution, recommended by themos maiorum.15
Petrone rightly points out that ‘si tratta evidentemente del bacio di controllo
che a Roma i parenti maschi danno alle donne di casa.’16 Nevertheless, to the
best of our knowledge, this insight stands alone among modern Plautine stud-
ies, which, moreover, seem to have failed to grasp the explicit reference to the
ritual nature of this kiss in a fragmentary passage of Festus, which quotes the
very line in question:17
[2] Festus 214 Lindsay
significatur etiam osculo sauium, ut Plautus in Neruolaria (Stich. 91):
‘Osculum sat est osculi mihi ⟨uostri⟩. Qui, amabo, mi pater?’; quod inter
cognatos, propinquosque institutumab antiquis est,maximeque feminas
…
The kiss (sauium) is also referred to with the term osculum, as Plautus
attests in Neruolaria (Stich. 91): ‘Osculum—Enoughwith your osculum!—
But why, father dearest?’; a use which was introduced in antiquity among
kinsmen and in-laws and especially women …18
The passage—lacuna notwithstanding—clearly shows how Festus, in explain-
ing the osculum as an ancestral Roman institutum, is perfectly aware of the
ceremonial background underlying the interaction. Nevertheless, excepting
15 As far as the classification of kisses in Latin (ritual, erotic, or as a show of affection)—in
other words, the differences between osculum, sauium, and basium—is concerned, it is
well known that traces of an ancient debate remain: see, e.g., Moreau (1978), Flury (1988),
Cipriani (1992). On the vocabulary concerning kisses in Plautus, see Plepelits (1972).
16 Petrone (2015: 42): ‘it is clearly the “kiss of control” that male relatives give to the women
of their household’; see also Petrone’s previous work (1989: 94).
17 The passage is mentioned by Giovanni Pietro Valla in his commentary on Plautus (1499)
concerning the use of the word osculum in Stich. 91. Later on, however, the discussion of
this important evidenceof Plautus’ indirect traditionwasnot as concentratedon the inter-
pretative aspects as it was on the attribution of this verse, which Festus does not ascribe
to Stichus, but rather to Neruolaria, one of the so-called non-Varronian comedies. For a
recent and well-balanced discussion of this issue, see Monda (2015).
18 My translation.
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Petrone’s mention, this rituality is neither perceived by Plautus’ modern read-
ers, nor—perhaps more importantly—does it seem that the anthropological,
pragmatic, and dramaturgical implications of this ritual gesture have ever been
explored in Stichus.19
2 The Anthropological Context
Before returning to our comic situation, let us now briefly focus on the ius
osculi: as is well known, many ancient records explain this ritual, in which cog-
nati and propinqui (i.e. kin and in-laws) kissed the women of their family. Dif-
ferent interpretations of this gesture have been suggested in antiquity aswell as
in modern scholarship, but, in most cases, the classical authors sustained that
the ius osculi is justified by the need to control and guarantee the reputation of
women in the family.20 In particular, the following features (amongst others)
may help us better understand the text we are examining:
19 Petrone (1989: 94) grasps the anthropological allusion to osculum but does not construct
a specific analysis around it, believing that in this scene affection prevails over ritual: ‘qui
il fatto consuetudinario si fa pretesto di un sottile movimento sentimentale e psicologico,
ricco di complicazioni e persino delicato, pur nella dimensione comica. […] Il bacio ‘di
controllo’ si trova invischiato in una rete di rapporti che lasciano indovinare uno spaccato
domestico diverso da quello che ci si potrebbe immaginare alla luce della tradizionale
severità paterna e delle norme del diritto. […] l’auctoritas paterna vacilla, per affetto,
nei confronti delle figlie.’ See also Petrone (2015: 42). In our view, while the matronae
are certainly reconfiguring the kiss as a show of affection, we should not overlook the
implications of the osculum inAntipho’s communicative intention: therefore, a pragmatic
analysis of this gesture aids not only the investigation of its function in the interaction
between the characters and in its interplay with the words, but also that of its cultural
value and of the role it plays in Plautus’ comedies.
20 See e.g. Polyb. 6.11a.4 (in Athen. 10.440e–f): λαθεῖν δ’ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον τὴν γυναῖκα πιοῦσαν
οἶνον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδ’ ἔχει οἴνου κυρείαν ἡ γυνή· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φιλεῖν δεῖ τοὺς συγγενεῖς
τοὺς ἑαυτῆς καὶ τοὺς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἕως ἐξανεψιῶν καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν καθ’ ἡμέραν, ὁπόταν ἴδηι πρῶ-
τον. λοιπὸν ἀδήλου τῆς ἐντυχίας οὔσης τίσιν ἀπαντήσει φυλάσσεται· τὸ γὰρπρᾶγμα κἂν γεύσηται
μόνον οὐ προσδεῖ διαβολῆς (‘It is impossible for a woman to drink wine in secret. Firstly, in
fact, a woman cannot dispose of wine; secondly, she must kiss her relatives, as well as her
husbands’, up to her second cousins, and must do so every day as soon as she encounters
them.Therefore, because she does not knowwhom shewillmeet, shewill be cautious. For
even if she only has a taste of wine, this custom makes any gossip superfluous’; my trans-
lation). On Cato’s perspective, see Plin. nat. 14.90: Cato ideo propinquos feminis osculum
dare, ut scirent an temetum olerent (‘Cato writes that male relations kiss their women in
order to knowwhether they smell of wine’:my translation fromPliny’s text); aswell asGell.
10.23. See also the extensive analysis in Plut. Rom. Quaest. 6, whichMoreau (1978) believes
to be most likely influenced by Varro’s linguistic and antiquity studies: see esp. ‘διὰ τί τοὺς
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– an osculum is a kiss on the mouth (Plut. Quaest. Rom. 6 τῶι στόματι φιλοῦ-
σιν) that is explicitly intended to check the woman’s abstinence from wine
(respectable women were prohibited from drinking wine, as it was, accord-
ing to themos maiorum, notoriously linked to adultery);
– furthermore, it is a sign of honour and power for women, who can thus dis-
play their bond with men of recognised standing in public (Plut. Quaest.
Rom. 6: ὡς τιμὴν ἅμα καὶ δύναμιν αὐταῖς φέρον);
– inasmuch as it guarantees and displays a woman’s connection to a certain
household, it is a sign of recognition and acceptance; conversely, the act of
rejecting the osculum sanctioned a woman’s infamia and openly expressed
her kinsmen’s rejection of her, as Cicero clearly states in Rep. 4.6: si qua erat
famosa, ei cognati osculum non ferebant.21
In short, the matter of recognition is a central node in the semantic system of
the Roman osculum.
Confirmation of this may be found e.g. in a renowned exemplum narrated
by Valerius Maximus that focuses on how exactly an osculum could be used
as proof of belonging to a kinship group. Sempronia, the sister of Tiberius and
Gaius Gracchus and wife of Scipio Aemilianus, when summoned by a tribune
of the plebs to appear before the assembly of the people, does not surrender to
the pressures of the crowd and refuses to kiss a certain Equitius, thereby refus-
ing to acknowledge him as the son of her brother Tiberius:
[3] Valerius Maximus 3.8.6
coacta es eo loci consistere ubi principum ciuitatis perturbari frons sole-
bat, instabat tibi toruo uultu minas profundens amplissima potestas,
clamor imperitaemultitudinis obstrepebat, totum forumacerrimo studio
συγγενεῖς τῶι στόματι φιλοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες;’ πότερον, ὡς οἱ πλεῖστοι νομίζουσιν, ἀπειρημένον ἦν
πίνειν οἶνον ταῖς γυναιξίν· ὅπως οὖν αἱ πιοῦσαι μὴ λανθάνωσιν ἀλλ’ ἐλέγχωνται περιτυγχάνου-
σαι τοῖς οἰκείοις, ἐνομίσθη καταφιλεῖν; […] ἢ μᾶλλον ἐδόθη τοῦτο ταῖς γυναιξὶν ὡς τιμὴν ἅμα καὶ
δύναμιν αὐταῖς φέρον, εἰ φαίνοιντο πολλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἔχουσαι συγγενεῖς καὶ οἰκείους; (‘Why
do the women kiss their kinsmen on the lips? Is it, as most authorities believe, that the
drinking of wine was forbidden to women, and therefore, so that womenwho drunkwine
should not escape detection, but should be detected when they chanced to meet men of
their household, the custom was established? […] Or was this rather bestowed upon the
women as a privilege that should bring them both honour and power if they should be
seen to have many good men among their kinsmen and in their household?’: translation
from Babbitt 1962). For a modern-day discussion of this issue, see Contini (1984); Bettini
(1988, 1995); Timpanaro (1987); Cipriani (1992).
21 ‘If a woman had a bad reputation, her relatives would not have kissed her.’ (my transla-
tion).
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nitebatur ut Equitio, cui Semproniae gentis falsum ius quaerebatur, tam-
quam filio Tiberi fratris tui osculum dares. tu tamen illum […] execrabili
audacia ad usurpandam alienam propinquitatem tendentem reppulisti.
You were forced to stand there, where leading citizens usually fail to
hide their agitation, where the highest authority of the State pressed you
and threatened you with an intimidating look, where the clamour of the
ignorant mass resounded, where the entire forum pressured you to kiss
Equitius, whose right to belong to the gens Sempronia as the son of your
brother, Tiberius, was falsely claimed. But you […] pushed away he who
so boldly attempted to claim a bond of kinship towhich he had no right.22
This moralising tale offers us a peculiar twist of the traditional custom of the
osculum, as it recounts the deeds of a representative of a high-profile gens (in
this case an irreprehensible matrona) by using the ritual of the kiss to ensure
the purity of her kinship group: her public refusal to kiss him reveals the unwor-
thiness of this impostor, who is trying to shamefully infiltrate an aliena propin-
quitas, thereby contaminating a noble lineage.
3 The Role of the osculum in Plautus’ Comedies
Moving from the level of the cultural implications of the osculum to its role in
Plautus’ plays, we notice some similarities with the tale of Sempronia—albeit
in a strictly comical way—in Epidicus. The senex Periphanes, tricked by his
slave Epidicus, believes that the citharist Acropolistis is the illegitimate daugh-
ter he had with Philippa many years earlier in Epidaurus. Later, when Philippa
arrives in Athens to ask for his help to find their real daughter, who has been
taken as a prisoner of war, Periphanes leads to her Acropolistis and urges her
to kiss the girl, but Philippa refuses to grant her an osculum and the acknow-
ledgement this would entail:
[4] Plautus Epidicus 570–576
Acr. quid est, pater, quod me exciuisti ante aedis? Per. ut matrem
tuam
uideas, adeas, aduenienti des salutem atque osculum.
22 My translation.
- 978-90-04-44026-5
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com10/12/2020 08:49:24PM
via free access
392 raccanelli
Acr. quammeammatrem? Per. quae exanimata exsequitur aspectum
tuom.
Phil. quis istaec est quam tu osculummi ferre iubes? Per. tua filia.
Phil. haecine? Per. haec. Phil. egone osculumhuic dem? Per. quor
non, quae ex te nata sit?
Phil. tu homo insanis. Per. egone? Phil. tune. Per. quor? Phil.
quia ego hanc quae siet
nec scio nec noui neque ego hanc oculis uidi ante hunc diem.
Acr. Why is it, father, that you called me out in front of the house?
Per. So that you can see your mother, go to her, and greet and kiss her
on her arrival.
Acr. What mother of mine?
Per. The one who is almost dead while seeking to behold you.
Phil. Who is that woman you’re asking to give me a kiss?
Per. Your daughter.
Phil. This woman?
Per. Yes, this woman.
Phil. I should give her a kiss?





Phil. Because I don’t know or recognize who she is and I haven’t set eyes
on her before this day.
As Raffaelli rightly points out, the situation in Plautus’ Epidicus is ‘l’opposto
del canonico meccanismo dell’agnizione.’23 While Periphanes anticipates an
ἀναγνώρισις betweenmother and daughter, soliciting an osculum as a seal, Phil-
ippa affirms that she does not recognise Acropolistis precisely by denying her
the kiss. We can also note how, in this interaction, the emblem is performed
together with a verbal expression: Philippa’s refusal to give the osculum (574
23 Raffaelli (2014: 94). This mechanism of inverting the agnitio, moreover, is pivotal in Epi-
dicus, in which it is duplicated in a sequence with two interlinked non-recognitions, then
followed by the traditional ἀναγνώρισιςwhich resolves the whole situation in the end. For
more regarding the centrality of agnitio in the construction of the plot of Epidicus, see
also Philippides (2016).
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egone osculum huic dem?) is roughly ‘translated’ by her verbal explanation
(575–576 quia ego hanc quae siet nec scio nec noui neque ego hanc oculis uidi
ante hunc diem).24
While the verb osculari is very common in Plautus, as it encompasses ritual
kisses as well as erotic ones, the noun osculum occurs in only three situations
in Plautus:25 besides the two dialogues examined in [1] and [3], it is also fea-
tured in the famous scene from Amphitruo (676–860) in which Alcmena reacts
coldly to Amphitruo’s salutatio upon his return from war: she believes she has
just said good-bye to him after the longa nox (which, however, we know she
really spent with Jupiter disguised as her husband). In the following dispute,
Alcmena, indignant because she believes that Amphitruo is testing her (688
an periclitamini …? and 692 temptas), claims that she has already greeted him
and given him an osculum (716 and 800–801).26
In short, the failure to obtain the requested salutatio, a ritual in which the
osculum plays an important part, is interpreted by the husband as a symptom
of a problem regarding his wife’s pudicitia:
[5] Plautus Amphitruo 711–713
… salutare aduenientemme solebas antidhac,
appellare itidem ut pudicae suos uiros quae sunt solent.
eo more expertem te factam adueniens offendi domi.
You used to greetme onmy arrival before and to addressme thewaymod-
est wives normally greet their husbands. On my arrival I’ve found you at
home without that habit.
24 See also Epid. 581–582 (Periphanes to Acropolistis): quid tu, quae patrem tuom uocas me
atque osculare, quid stas stupida? quid taces? (What about you, who call me your father
and kiss me?What are you standing here like an idiot?What are you silent for?).
25 See Lodge (1924–1933: II 272). For an examination of the use of osculum, sauium, and oscu-
lari in Plautus, see Plepelits (1972).
26 Amph. 714–716 Alc. ecastor equidem te certo heri aduenientem ilico et salutaui et ualuis-
sesne usque exquisiui simul, mi uir, etmanumprehendi et osculum tetuli tibi (‘I certainly did
greet you here on your arrival yesterday and asked you at the same time if you’d been well
throughout,myhusband, and I took yourhandandgave youakiss’); 799–801adueniensque
ilico me salutauisti, et ego te, et osculum tetuli tibi. Amph. iam illud non placet principium
de osculo. (‘on your arrival you immediately greeted me and I you, and I gave you a kiss.
Amph. I already dislike that first point about the kiss.’). For more on greeting scenes in
Plautus’ comedies, see Berger (2016).
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From their omniscient viewpoint, the spectators are perfectly aware that
Alcmena’s failure to greet her real husband in her salutatio as expected from
her is due to the fact that she had already welcomed a false Amhpitruo in his
place. In facts, Alcmena’smistake regarding the osculum emblematises themis-
understanding around which the whole plot revolves. Once again, recognition
is the central node of this ritual gesture on Plautus’ stage.
4 The osculum in the Interactional Context in Stichus
Let us now return to the dramatic context of [1]. Having examined the two
scenes from Plautus above, [4] and [5], the ritualistic meaning of the osculum
should now be more evident. The two matronae demand the ritual osculum
from their father as a sign of harmony in the family at a time of crisis and
conflict. In light of the previous analysis, we now see that, in the eyes of the
spectators, the father’s avoidanceof the osculummust have appeared as amuch
stronger gesture than an old man’s gruffness in the face of his daughters’ over-
whelming affection.
Indeed, if we examine the immediate context, we can observe how, before
meeting his daughters, Antipho thinks aloud and imagines two possible strate-
gies for interacting with them:
[6] Plautus Stichus 75–87
principium ego quo pacto cum illis occipiam, id ratiocinor:
utrum ego perplexim lacessam oratione ad hunc modum,
quasi numquam quicquam in eas simulem, an quasi quid indaudiuerim
eas in se meruisse culpam; an potius temptem leniter
an minaciter? scio litis fore—ego meas noui optume—
si manere hic sese malint potius quam alio nubere.
non faciam. quid mi opust decurso aetatis spatio cum ⟨m⟩eis
gerere bellum, quom nil quam ob rem id faciammeruisse arbitror?
minime, nolo turbas, sed hoc mihi optumum factu arbitror:
perplexabiliter earum hodie perpauefaciam pectora.
sic faciam: assimulabo quasi quam culpam in sese ammiserint.
postid [agam] igitur deinde, ut animus meus erit, faciam palam.
multa scio faciunda uerba.
I’m considering the beginning, how I should start with them: should I vex
themwithmy speech obscurely like this, as if I were never accusing them
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at all, or as if I’d heard something, that they’d become guilty; in other
words, had I better handle themgently or threateningly? I know therewill
be arguments—I know my girls perfectly—if they prefer staying here to
getting married to different men. I won’t do it. What’s the use of waging
war with my girls now that I’ve reached the end of the course of my life,
when I don’t think they’ve done anything forwhich theydeservemydoing
this? No, I don’t want commotions; rather, I think this is the best thing for
me to do: I’ll frighten their hearts in a confusingmanner today. I’ll act like
this: I’ll pretend that they’ve committed some offense. Then, after that, I’ll
reveal what my feelings are. I know that I’ll have to use a lot of words.
What should Antipho do? Should he provoke them with ambiguous words
(perplexabiliter), act as if nothing has happened, or pretend that he has heard
rumours about somemisdemeanourof theirs (quasi quid indaudiuerimeas in se
meruisse culpam)? Endearments or threats? The oldman considers his options
but eventually decides that he will not go to the extremes. Therefore, he will
make an attempt at intimidation (perplexabiliter earum hodie perpauefaciam
pectora), but he will be ready to withdraw before the conflict escalates: he will
frighten his daughters, behaving at first as if they were guilty, and only later
dropping his pretence, and exposing his true feelings for them.
In the end, Antiphomeets his daughters after revealing to the audience that
he will adopt an accusatory attitude. As a result, the rejection of the kiss is a
very strong gesture, when related to his resolve to accuse the matronae. It is
tantamount to a refusal to recognise them as his daughters, almost an act of
repudiation, and above all constitutes a serious threat to the daughters’ repu-
tation, as seen in Cicero’s attestation (Rep. 4.6): si qua erat famosa, ei cognati
osculum non ferebant.
However, the fact that not a single accusation is expressed on a verbal level
in the entire scene is significant: in the text, there is not a single word of doubt
about the women’s behaviour.
When his daughter Pamphila asks why he refuses her an osculum (qui,
amabo, pater?), Antipho answers (Stich. 92): quia ita meae animae salsura
euenit (the literal translation of which is ‘because that’s how the saltiness has
come to my breath’). This is not the place to enter a drawn-out debate sur-
rounding this line,which is generally consideredobscure inmeaning: a detailed
analysis of the bibliographical references and a new perspective on the line
may be found in a recent article of mine.27 Here, it is sufficient to note that it
27 See Raccanelli (2019), which reviews the numerous exegetical hypotheses on Stich. 92 that
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is often a misunderstanding of the gesture that hinders the interpretation of
the line, especially if one reads the scene while thinking of reciprocal kisses
on the cheek.28 It becomes much clearer if we think about the ritual osculum
on the mouth and its cultural implication in ensuring a woman’s sobriety and
pudicitia. By refusing his daughters’ kisses, Antipho creates the expectation of
saying something censorial on their breath, and therefore on the propriety of
their behaviour, but indeed, at the very climax of the exchange, he releases the
tension by drawing attention to his own breath. In other words, he is commu-
nicating perplexabiliter, just as he had promised before, in that he is combining
his gesture of refusal with an elusive verbal message; he threatens an accusa-
tionwith the gesture but does not confirm it withwords. Instead, hewithdraws
with a vague allusion to his ownbreath, as if activating a kind of self-censorship
mechanism to avoid explaining the real reasons for his irritation. In any case,
he does not voice the terrible accusation that would sully his daughters’ good
name.Moreover, he removes the accusationhintedbyhis gestures immediately
afterwards by pointedly saying:
[7] Plautus Stichus 99–101
Ant. bonas ut aequom est facere facitis, quom tamen apsentis uiros
perinde habetis quasi praesentes sint. Pamph. Pudicitia est,
pater,
eos nos magnuficare qui nos socias sumpserunt sibi.
have been proposed in Plautine scholarship and suggests a new approach to read Anti-
pho’s words through a systematic comparison with the most appropriate loci paralleli. In
particular, in Plautus the word salsura seems to refer to methods of conserving food that
evoke olfactory and taste reactions of disgust. Antipho therefore seemingly motivates his
refusal to kiss his daughters with the excuse that he has bad breath. In my view, Antipho’s
line is based on an ambiguous strategy (perplexabilis) which in terms of communicative
pragmatics could be construed as amisalignment between the level of content (on which
the character utters a trivial, self-denigrating witticism, in line with the Plautine topos
of jokes about fetid breath; see e.g. As. 893–985; 929; Merc. 574–576) and the metacom-
municative level of the interaction (in which a veiled threat is conveyed). Therefore, the
off-handed remark is not an expedient that is adopted as an impromptu joke, but rather
has the deliberate function of providing comic relief in a tense situation.
28 De Melo (2013: 27) supplements the translation with the comment: ‘the girls’ cheeks are
still wet with tears, hence the reference to salting’, drawing on the work of Ernout (1932–
1938: VI 218) and Petersmann (1973: 109): ‘d.h. die Schwestern weinen noch (vgl. zu V. 20)
oder sie sind vom Weinen noch tränenbenetzt und küssen den Vater (osculum). Dieser
wehrt weitere Küsse ab, weil sein Gesicht davon schon naß und salzig ist.’
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Ant. You’re acting the way good women ought to act, since you treat
your husbands as if they were present, absent though they are.
Pamph. It’s a matter of womanly virtue, father, to honor the men who
have taken us as their partners.29
On this foundation of restored harmony, the verbal skirmish between the
pudicaematronae and the father continues, for he subjects them to witty ques-
tioning about feminine virtues. The sisters answer alternatingly in a kind of
antiphonal competition, yet somehow the father still exercises the function of
control evoked by the ritual osculum in the following agon:
[8] Plautus Stichus 126
edepol uos lepide temptaui uostrumque ingenium ingeni.
I’ve tested you two and the nature of your nature delightfully.
Indeed, his testing is nothing but a game (lepide temptaui30) and the contest
between the sisters provides a new opportunity for them to highlight their vir-
tues and their perfect conformity to the code of behaviour formatronae.
5 The Relationship betweenWord and Gesture
To summarise what has been observed so far: when enacting his intention to
frighten his daughters, Antipho does not express his accusation in words. In
fact, as far as verbal language is concerned,weonly find sharp commands, deni-
als, and—conversely—explicit recognition of the daughters’pudicitia. Only on
the level of gestural language is there a feigned accusation (assimulabo quasi
quam culpam in sese admiserint), expressed through the refusal of the oscu-
lum, a denial of the ritual recognition which is reserved, as previously seen, for
women of dubious reputation ( famosae).
Even if the emblematic gesture finds a correspondence on the verbal plane
(‘I acknowledge/do not acknowledge you as aworthy daughter/wife, etc.’), here
29 My adaptation of deMelo’s translation is in italics. Preemptive reassurance about the two
women’s innocencewas also granted by Antipho as early as line 82 (quomnil […]meruisse
arbitror?).
30 As previously seen, the issue of testing (periclitor, tempto) is also important in Amph. 688
and 692.
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we can clearly confirm that gestures are not an exact equivalent of words. An
explicit accusation of impudicitia, and therefore a verbal codification of such
repudiation, would be quite incompatible with the comic context of Stichus;
indeed, Antipho immediately rules out any blame through explicit words of
confirmation of their good behaviour (99 bonas ut aequom est facere facitis).
If the refusal to grant recognition through the osculum can be performed on
the stage elsewhere in Plautus, it is because:
– in Epidicus, the unacknowledged woman is a citharist with no reputation;
she is part of a deceitful plan that must be thwarted;
– in Amphitruo, we are faced with the extreme case of an unwitting adul-
teress, a victim of mistaken identity; more importantly, we are dealing with
a tragicomedy, in which the intermingling and substitution of men and gods
subvert the rules of the genre and allow the tragic theme of adultery to be
restructured and integrated into a comic context.
In Stichus, the denial of the ritual osculum is a gesture expressing what words
do not (and cannot) say, not even as a pretence (assimulabo). In fact, casting a
shadow on the reputation of a matrona would evoke a tragic scenario incom-
patible with the boundaries of palliata (if not at the cost of a metamorphosis
in theatrical genre, which is precisely what happens in Amphitruo).31
It is not surprising, therefore, that the playwright chooses to represent a
feigned threat by resorting to gestures while using words to reassure the audi-
ence that the infamous culpa (hinted at only in the gestural threat) will never
materialise or even be evoked in verbal language. Indeed, the underlying com-
municativemechanism in the scene, where the wives, long left behind by their
husbands, are tested by their father, seems to be based on the dispelling of
an audience’s anxiety. This becomes more plausible upon remembering that
Stichuswas first performed in 200BC. in front of an audience thatmust have felt
strongly about the Odyssean theme of veterans returning after years abroad at
war. The ‘proven fidelity’ of the two wives—which had been anticipated at the
beginning throughPanegyris’ line in the opening scene about their (self)identi-
fication with Penelope—has been extensively studied from this perspective.32
In conclusion, our case of the osculum in Plautus’ Stichus demonstrates how
important it is to more thoroughly comprehend ancient drama by focusing to
an equal degree on verbal and gestural language: in fact, we tend to be less
31 Amph. 59–63.
32 Stich. 1–6. Along with Fraenkel (2007: 71), see also Wagenvoort (1931); Arnott (1971–1974:
552, 1972: 57–64); Petrone (1977: 35–36); Owens (2000); Rossi in Questa (2005: 61–82);
Papaioannou (2016).
- 978-90-04-44026-5
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com10/12/2020 08:49:24PM
via free access
the kiss in plautus’ stichus 399
vigilant and less trained in the critical perception of cultural difference when
dealing with the gestures presented in ancient texts.
Translators who fall into the trap of imagining these to be affectionate kisses
on the cheeks do not grasp the meaning of the scene: they focus on translating
words but do not address the issue of also ‘culturally translating’ gestures. As a
result, theymodernise them by associating themwith our social convention of
kissing on the cheeks (perhaps due to the fact that from our cultural perspect-
ive we would consider it strange and quite morbid for fathers and daughters
to kiss each other on the mouth). By doing so however, the ritual depth of the
situation is lost, along with the ambiguity of Antipho’s threats to his daughters
with gestures rather than words.
In contemporary theatre studies, which are so attentive towards perform-
ative aspects as well as textual philology, the field of pragmatics of commu-
nication may offer a twofold contribution. On the one hand, it helps us better
understand the dynamics of intersection andmisalignment between the com-
municative levels of word and gesture and provides reliable tools in order to do
so. On the other hand, it urges us to read both levels while paying critical atten-
tion to the anthropological contexts underlying the interaction, thus reminding
us to culturally interpret not only words but also gestures in works of ancient
theatre.
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Lacrimae and uultus: Pragmatic Considerations on
Gestures in Seneca’s Tragedies
Evita Calabrese
1 Introduction
The following analysis presents a pragmatic perspective on gesture.1 My point
of departure will be the operational definition that has been developed by
Licinia Ricottilli:
… per gesto intendiamo un comportamento corporeo o facciale che
assumaun valore comunicativo, informativo o interattivo nei confronti di
un destinatario diretto o di un eventuale osservatore, e per il quale esista
una possibilità di controllo da parte dell’emittente.2
The present study focuses on Seneca’s dramatic œuvre and investigates,
without expecting to be exhaustive, two specific aspects of its gestures: tears
and uultus.
1 In thewake of Sittl’s seminal work dating back to 1890, research on gestures in ancient Greece
and Rome has been resumed in recent years and led to numerous studies that would be diffi-
cult to cite in their entirety. Thus, it shall suffice tomention some of themost significant ones
here, such as Bremmer and Roodenburg (1991); Lateiner (1995); Aldrete (1999, 2017); Corbeill
(2004); Cairns (2005).More recently, Clark et al. (2015) inquired into the relationbetween ges-
tures and emotions. Other studies have focused on specific aspects of gestures and include
Fögen (2009) on tears in the Graeco-Roman world; Hagen (2016) on tears as a means of per-
suasion in Roman historiography; Rey (2017) on the power of tears in ancient Rome; Beard
(2014), which faces the topic of laughter in ancient Rome; Naiden (2006) on supplication. I
also permitmyself to refer toCalabrese (2018, 2019), inwhich I dealwith gestures in Petronius’
Satyricon.
2 ‘By gesture we denote a behaviour of the body or the face that assumes communicative,
informative or interactive significance towards a direct, intended recipient or a possible
observer and over which the sender can exert control.’ Ricottilli (2000: 16). Other studies
by the same author, in particular Ricottilli (1992, 2016), constitute the starting point for the
present study on gestures.
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2 The Pragmatics of Tears
2.1 Not Shedding Tears: Andromache at the Beginning of Act III of
Troades
Among Seneca’s tragic works, tears are extensively found in Troades with its
dominant feminine presence. Here, tears appear at the very beginning, in the
context of a funeral dirge. At the end of her first line, Hecuba encourages the
chorus consisting of female Trojan prisoners to resume their cries, reminding
them of the gestures that had to be associated with their tears:3
[1] Seneca Troades 63–65
lamenta cessant? turba captiuae mea,
ferite palmis pectora et planctus date
et iusta Troiae facite …4
Do yourwailings falter?O throng of mine, captives as ye are, smite breasts
with palms, make loud laments, due rites for Troy perform …
The prisoners must let their hair down and cover it with ashes while beating
their bare chests (Sen. Tro. 83–85, 87–89, 92–95): Hecuba thus invites them to
perform a collective lament according to the typical Roman funeral ritual.5
In Troades, the collective feminine ritual of mourning is evoked and soli-
cited in the beginning but also questioned in a sense by Andromache, who
demonstrates that her own behaviour contrasts with the gestural aspects of
mourning and funeral lamentations that are exhibited by the Trojan women.
In fact, Andromache enters the scene at the beginning of Act III and distances
herself from the very gestures that the queen had previously solicited:
[2] Seneca Troades 409–413
quid, maesta Phrygiae turba, laceratis comas
miserumque tunsae pectus effuso genas
3 Šterbenc Erker (2009: 142) observes that the subject of lamenting or performing solemn ges-
tures of mourning is rather common in Latin poetry.
4 The excerpts from Seneca’s tragedies are reproduced from Zwierlein’s critical edition (21987).
The translations are taken fromMiller (1917).
5 For more on the various aspects of gestures that are associated with weeping and mourning
lamentations, see Corbeill (2004: 67–106).
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fletu rigatis? leuia perpessae sumus,
si flenda patimur. Ilium uobis modo,
mihi cecidit olim …6
Ye Phrygian women, mournful band, why do you tear your hair, beat
on your wretched breasts, and water your cheeks with weeping unres-
trained? Trivial woes have we endured if our sufferings can be told by
tears. Ilium has fallen but now for you; for me she fell long since …
Andromache claims that the Trojan women may give vent to recent losses
through their tears, but her long acquaintancewith pain hasmade her insensit-
ive andnumb (Tro. 417). Hector’swife is a stranger to the otherwomen’smourn-
ing because her experience was different from theirs and she is in a different
psychological condition.7 Her rigidity and listlessness affects her gestures and
renders her unable to take part in the external manifestations of grief that, on
the contrary, characterise the behaviour of the other prisoners.
The tears that Andromache is unable to share with the Trojan women are
those that she sees Hector’s ghost shed during a vision that occurs while in a
strange state of psychic suspension between wakefulness and sleep:
[3] Seneca Troades 448–451
non ille uultus flammeum intendens iubar,
sed fessus ac deiectus et fletu grauis
similisque nostro, squalida obtectus coma.
[…] tum quassans caput …
Not such his face, blazing with battle light, but weary, downcast, heavy
with weeping, likemy own, coveredwithmatted locks. […] Then, shaking
his head [he said …]
In these lines, gestural elements that are related to uultus8 describe Hector’s
attitude andmark the clear distancebetween the exhausted shade and thehero
6 Cassandra has a similar reaction to Andromache in Sen. Ag. 659–663. See Tarrant (1976: 295–
296); Aricò (1996: 142).
7 See Caviglia (1981: 254) on Tro. 412–413: ‘la contemporaneità ideale tra la caduta di Ettore e
la caduta di Troia, che è “luogo comune” della tragedia, è qui sottolineata come esperienza
personale, che riguarda soltanto Andromaca, non la comunità (uobis …mihi).’
8 For more on the meaning of the term uultus, see n. 21.
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of the past: in addition to tears, these include defeated downwards glances and
the despondent shaking of the head.9 Aswe know, themodel for Andromache’s
dream is Verg. Aen. 2.269–297, Hector’s apparition in Aeneas’ dream. Virgil’s
Hector also sheds tears (271 largosque effundere fletus). A significant differ-
ence between the two passages consists in the fact that, while Aeneas cries in
response (279 ultro flens ipse uidebar), Andromache is not even able to share
Hector’s tears. We shall return to this point later on when attempting to clarify
the evolution that Andromache’s gestures undergo in Troades.
2.2 A RecurringMotif Made Estranged: False Feminine Tears
In the course of Act III of Troades, we see Andromache weep. She does so
before Ulysses after giving him false news on the death of Astyanax: her tears
are produced within a fraus (see Tro. 482 and Scolari in this volume), i.e. an
attempt to deceive. False feminine tears are frequent in Graeco-Roman liter-
ature,10 but Seneca managed to make particular use of this recurring motif to
the point of making it seem estranged and paradoxical. Ulysses describes the
weeping Andromache in the same line in which, addressing himself, he won-
ders whether or not to believe the vow of a mother:
[4] Seneca Troades 615–618
scrutare matrem: maeret, illacrimat, gemit;
sed huc et illuc anxios gressus refert
missasque uoces aure sollicita excipit:
magis haec timet, quammaeret …
Watch the mother. She grieves, she weeps, she groans; now here, now
there shewanders restlessly, straining her ears to catch eachutteredword;
this woman’s fear is greater than her grief …
In this passage, we observe how Andromache exhibits, on the one hand, the
typical gestures ofmaeror, above all tears, andhow, on theother hand, such ges-
9 A gesture ‘of distress or angry frustration’, according to Fantham (1982: 281). It is the same
gesture found inVerg. Aen. 7.292 tumquassans caputhaec effundit pectoredicta, performed
by Juno immediately before venting her sharp pain, in direct discourse, (see 291 stetit acri
fixa dolore) upon seeing Aeneas and his followers happily disarm the ships after their
peace with king Latino. The same gesture also appears, as a sign of sufferance (see Traina
1997: 182), beforedirect discourse in Aen. 12.894 ille caputquassans […]. In Seneca’s theatre,
the expression is also found at Oed. 913 regius quassat caput.
10 See Fögen (2004: 228–229, 2009: 187); Ricottilli (2016: 76–77).
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tures clashwith the typicalmanifestations and attitudes of timor, e.g. nervously
pacing back and forth and receiving every word with concern. It is precisely
this inconsistency that causes the failure of the deception and leads the inter-
locutor to understand that the woman is lying. In particular, her tears, which
are a gestural sign of sufferance, and her stride (referred to in Latin as incessus
or gressus) do not harmonise. The heroine violates a behavioural principle of
the utmost importance in Roman culture that is codified in oratory and philo-
sophy, i.e. consistency between ideas, states of mind, and external behaviours
(the latter made up of the union of various elements, including gestures, pos-
ture, and gait).11 Andromache attempts to deceive Ulysses by expressing pain
caused by the death of her child, but her tears are mixed with concern, which
is clearly revealed by her anxious way of pacing. For an attentive observer like
Ulysses, all of these elements are clues that reveal the woman’s true state of
mind.12
From a preliminary reading (of course, a more in-depth study would be
needed on thematter), we can notice that three elements (uultus, incessus, and
habitus) substantially reveal a person’s animus in Seneca’s philosophical reflec-
tions13 asmuch as in his dramas. For instance, these are the elements onwhich
the identification between Hector and Astyanax is based:
[5] Seneca Troades 464–466
… hos uultus meus
habebat Hector, talis incessu fuit
habituque talis …14
… such features my Hector had, such was he in gait, such in bearing …
11 This principle is clearly codified in passages such as Cic. De or. 3.216; Cic. Brut. 141; Sen. Ep.
114.22; Quint. Inst. 11.3.66, 67; Sen. Ep. 52.12. See Ricottilli (2000: 84); Corbeill (2004: 114–
118). The common principle at the base of these texts is that a person’s appearance reveals
his or her character: see Graf (1991: 40).
12 In deciphering the state of mind of the interlocutor, attentive and precise observation
assumes a fundamental role: see, for instance, the use of the verb scrutari in Tro. 615 (see
[4]) and the importance that is attributed to the act of observation in Sen. Ep. 52.12. For
more on the matter, see Bettini (2000: 326).
13 See Sen. Ep. 114.22. For an explanation on the meaning of the terms uultus and incessus,
see n. 21.
14 uultus, habitus, and gait are also revealing signs of the grave ill that afflicts Phaedra in
Phaedr. 363 proditur uultu furor, 372–373 semper impatiens sui mutatur habitus, 374 uadit
incerto pede.
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Facial expression and gait are also the pivots of Ulysses’ description upon
entering the scene:
[6] Seneca Troades 522–523
adest Ulixes, et quidem dubio gradu
uultuque: nectit pectore astus callidos.
Ulysses is here, with step and look of one in hesitation; in his heart he
weaves some crafty stratagem.
In this case, they are completely coherent with one another, to the point of
allowing Andromache to puzzle out the hero’s intentions.15 On the contrary,
when facial expression and gait are incoherent like in Andromache’s case, they
deprive words of their reliability and, for an attentive observer, signal the need
to further investigate (Tro. 618, 625). By juxtaposing different and unreconcil-
able gestures, Seneca thus subjects the recurringmotif of fake feminine tears to
a paradoxical treatment that is such that this traditional means of deceit loses
its efficiency and even becomes a revealing sign of the deceit itself.
False tears are the gestural element that dominates Act III of Phaedra, which
opens with Theseus’ return from the Underworld. The tired and weary sover-
eign is greeted with cries coming from within the palace, and he immediately
requests an explanation:
[7] Seneca Phaedra 850–852
quis fremitus aures flebilis pepulit meas?
expromat aliquis. luctus et lacrimae et dolor,
in limine ipso maesta lamentatio?
But what is this tearful outcry that strikes my ears? Let someone tell me.
Grieving and tears and woe, and on my very threshold sad lamentation?
The nurse tells him that Phaedra is resolved to die, and he hastens to her to ask
why she longs for death. Phaedra pretends that her honour had been attacked
15 In other cases, e.g. that of Hippolytus (Phaedr. 431–434), the speaker drawsmistaken con-
clusions from his interlocutor’s facial expression and gait.
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by Hippolytus. Phaedra’s false words are preceded by an interesting series of
gestures, including weeping, as we may extract from the interlocutor’s line:
[8] Seneca Phaedra 886–887
quidnam ora maesta auertis et lacrimas genis
subito coortas ueste praetenta optegis?
Why dost thou turn away thy sorrowing face and hide with veiling robe
the tears that suddenly o’erflow thy cheeks?
The rapidity with which tears appear may certainly be a sign of their fals-
ity. However, Phaedra turns her afflicted face away and covers her tears with
garments. They are gestures with a twofold communicative value:16 as well as
enforcing the lie bymeans of a typically femininemalicious attitude, theymay
indicate the difficulty in which the protagonist finds herself upon perpetrat-
ing the deception in the presence of her husband. The act of turning her head
away is significant in this context, for it may also be interpreted as a gestural
manifestation of refusal of the communicative situation in progress. It appears,
in this sense, at the end of a long series of gestural and verbal messages that
have an analogous meaning: starting from Theseus’ use of the verb abnuo a
few lines earlier (883) in a comment on his wife’s silence and continuing to the
frequent resort to abstract sententiae, with which she withdraws from the rela-
tional appeal in her husband’s words.17
As far as Theseus’ appeals to the relationship between the interlocutors are
concerned, by which he tries to convince his wife to speak (see 873 and 875),
it is interesting to notice how they culminate with an explicit reference to the
tears that he sheds and expects his wife to reciprocate:
[9] Seneca Phaedra 880
lacrimae nonne te nostrae mouent?
Do not my tears move thee?
16 Casamento (2011: 218).
17 Formore on sententiae as ameans to avoid recalling relations, seeCalabrese (2009: 93). For
more on the stylistic value of sententiae in Seneca, see Traina (1974), as well as Casamento
(1999a, 1999b), with their specific reference to tragic works.
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The tears that Phaedra refuses to shed in response to her husband’s will be
shed immediately afterwards in order to deceive him.
Also in Phaedra, Seneca resorts to the topos of fake feminine tears, and again
he makes a complex and uncommon use of it: the fact that tears are located
within a rather complicated communicative and relational context and that
they are associated with other gestures of an ambiguous value indicates the
need for an interpretation that is not unequivocal, but rather blurred and prob-
lematic.
2.3 A Structural Use of the Gesture of Crying
In Phaedra, Senecamakes thoughtful use of tears in relation toTheseus: in fact,
this gesture accompanies and signals the fundamental moments of the char-
acter’s on-scene story from his first entrance on the scene to the end of the
tragedy. Just after returning from the Underworld, as he approaches the palace,
a grieving sound of wailing reaches him (see [7]). In the course of the same
act, he himself will cry (see [9]) in the attempt to convince his wife to speak by
means of gestures that are not only characterised by strong relational value but
are also supposed to be reciprocated by his wife. The gesture of crying frames
Theseus’ on-scene story within a ring composition, leading to the final ampli-
fication of the initial image:
[10] Seneca Phaedra 1275–1276
patefacite acerbam caede funesta domum;
Mopsopia claris tota lamentis sonet.
Open wide my palace, gloomy and foul with slaughter, and let all Athens
with loud laments resound.
Theseus’ entrance on the scene was accompanied by a grieving sound of wail-
ing reaching him from inside the palace; now, in an amplifiedmirror image, he
orders the doors of the palace to be opened, so the grief of the royal housemay
spread and all of Attica may resound with its laments.
2.4 Tears, Kisses, andTorn Locks: Andromache at the End of Act III of
Troades
Act III of Troades concludeswith a use of gestures (including tears) that I found
remarkably innovative: on the one hand, this use determines, like in the case
we have just seen, the ring-like closure of the entire act;18 on the other hand,
18 On the concentric structure of act III of Troades see Boyle (1997: 76–77).
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it solves some essential dramatic knots. When she sends Astyanax to death,
Andromache entrusts him with a gestural token to be given to his father, i.e.
her kisses, tears, and torn locks of hair:
[11] Seneca Troades 799–801, 806–809
oscula et fletus, puer,
lacerosque crines excipe et plenus mei
occurre patri
[…]
sume nunc iterum comas
et sume lacrimas
[…] sume quae reddas tuo
oscula parenti.
Now, son, take my kisses and tears, take my torn locks and, full of me,
hasten to thy sire […] Take now once again these locks, and take these
tears […] take kisses to deliver to thy sire.
Notice how the gestural elements of this ending are endowed with particu-
lar significance by means of the chiastic structure of the lists in which they
appear (oscula, fletus, and crines at 799–801; comas, lacrimas, and oscula at
806–809). Such elements are furthermore tied to those present in the initial
verses (see [2]) and enclose the act within a ring composition whose end rep-
resents the evolution and resolution of the first. While, at the beginning of the
act, Andromache strikes a pose that starkly distinguishes her from the Tro-
jan women with their gestures of grief (tearing their hair, beating their chests,
weeping), at the end, these gestural aspects (with the addition of kisses) are
precisely the ones that round off Andromache’s suffering and mark its final
stage.19 At the end of her complex interaction with Ulysses, Andromache not
only manages to express her grief, but through her gestures, she is also able
to rebuild her lost relationship with Hector. All of this paradoxically occurs
through the son who is sent to die. Astyanax even becomes the means of an
exchange of kisses between husband and wife: in fact, not only will he bring
19 In Calabrese (2017: 73–148), I reflect extensively on Andromache’s story in Seneca, which
I interpret as relational and, at the same time, one concerning identity. Frommy point of
view, a social ritual of utmost importance in Roman culture such as that of the collective
(feminine)mourning is used by Seneca in order to conveymeanings about the character’s
identity.
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Hector Andromache’s oscula, but he will also allow the latter to enter into con-
tact with her husband’s ashes by rummaging through the clothing that had
touched his tomb with her face:
[12] Seneca Troades 809–812
matris hanc solacio
relinque uestem: tumulus hanc tetigit meus
manesque cari. si quid hic cineris latet,
scrutabor ore …20
This cloak leave as comfort for thy mother: my tomb has touched it, and
my beloved shades. If any of his dust is hidden here, I’ll hunt it with my
lips …
She finally makes good for the embrace with Hector’s shade which she desired
but was unable to perform at the end of the tormented nocturnal vision (Tro.
460) with a kiss that seems as inevitably virtual as powerfully concrete. In
Troades, Andromache’s gestures therefore undergo a remarkable evolution that
may be especially noticeable and pronounced in connection with tears: while
her initial rigid numbness preventedher not only fromsharing in the other cap-
tives’ grief but also from crying in response to her husband’s tears, at the end of
the act, she is capable of transforming her tears into a gestural instrument that
is necessary to reunite herself with her spouse.
3 The Pragmatics of uultus
3.1 uultus attollere
Gait and uultus21 are the elements on which one’s attention is focused the
moment a character makes their entrance on the stage and encounters other
20 Stok (1999: 130) notices similarities between this passage and Eur. Andr. 416–417, which
presents gestural elements such as kisses, tears, and embraces within a situation devoid
of the paradoxical features that are created by Seneca.
21 Formore onnot only the lexical but especially the culturalmeaning of the term uultus, see
Bettini (2000: 322–336), who defines it first and foremost as ‘l’espressione dell’interiorità’
(emphasis in original). Being connected to interiority, uultus is an ever-changing expres-
sion, i.e. a set of attitudes. For more on locating uultus in the upper part of the face, see in
particular pp. 327–329. Another fundamental theoretical distinction for the present study
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characters. This, for instance, is a pertinent feature of the brief description that
Andromachemakes of Ulysses when she sees the deceitful hero approach (see
[6]).22
Gait and uultus also have great relevance in the nurse’s description when
Phaedra re-enters the scene after failing to convinceHippolytus to indulgehim-
self in passion:
[13] Seneca Phaedra 583
sed Phaedra praeceps graditur, impatiens morae.
But Phaedra is hurrying towards us, impatient of delay.
[14] Seneca Phaedra 587–588
attolle uultus, dimoue uocis moras:
tuus en, alumna, temet Hippolytus tenet.
Lift thy face, break silence. See, my daughter, thine own Hippolytus
embraces thee.
A particular function is entrusted to the term uultus in combination with the
verb attollo at 587: the invitation to raise one’s eyes is closely associated to the
is that between uultus, indicating facial gestures, and gestus, mainly used instead to indic-
ate corporeal gestures (although this distinction is not always clear in concrete linguistic
use); for more on this, see Ricottilli (2000: 17–18). For more on the meaning of the word
incessus, see Köstermann (1933) and Horsfall (1971). Corbeill (2004: 118–120) describes the
particular use that Ciceromakes of the term incessuswhen describing his political oppon-
ents. The terms that define physical appearance have a relevant cultural function, i.e. that
of fixing personal identity: see Bettini (2000: 319–322), who singles out the traits that are
capable of determining the identity of a person, including gait (incessus or gressus) and
facial expression (uultus).
22 The extreme complexity of Seneca’s theatre and the unsolved matter of the real scenic
destination of these tragedies do not, in my opinion, allow us to speak of real impli-
cit stage directions. Nor may any general conclusions be drawn from the present study’s
brief observations on the matter about the way in which entrances and encounters are
characterised by Seneca. However, one may notice a certain recurrence that should be
the object of a more extensive study. For more on the matter of gait interpretation by
characters at entrances and exits in particular, as a type of stage direction, see O’Sul-
livan (2011). On the presence of implicit stage directions in Seneca’s works, see also
n. 27.
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request that a person disperse whatever creates an obstacle for words:23 it is,
therefore, an invitation to enact the interaction with Hippolytus, one that is
made iconic through gestures.The gesture of raising one’s eyes (attollereuultus)
therefore has an eminently communicative and interactive function:24 it sig-
nals the need to start a communicative exchange.
Finally, we must notice the use of the gesture of raising one’s eyes (uultus
attollere) at theopeningof the scene inwhichPhaedra confessesher love.There
she reveals the truth about herself in the most painful and difficult way since
she does so directly to the object of her incestuous love. The gesture balances
the line immediately preceding the false accusation against Hippolytus (ora
auertere).25 In both cases, the movement of the head assumes a communicat-
ive function, though with opposite meanings: while the gesture of raising one’s
eyes reveals the necessity to prompt direct interaction with the interlocutor,
that of turning one’s head, on the contrary, is a sign of refusal of the ongoing
communicative act as well as of any relationwith the present interlocutor. It is,
moreover, possible to notice how the act of raising one’s eyes signals a form of
communication that, complex as it may be, is honest, while turning them away
corresponds to deceptive messages.
3.2 uultus auertere, uultus referre
Gestures connected to uultus may therefore be characterised by an eminently
relational aspect. If at Phaedr. 587 attollere uultus is the iconic signal of the
beginning of an interaction, the gaze fulfils an opposite function elsewhere.
We are referring to the final act of Oedipus, in which the title character enters
the scene after having blinded himself and declares the profound relief that the
darkness that envelops his head has finally brought him (Sen. Oed. 998–1003).
With blindness, Oedipus feels to have finally attained a uultus, a face, an
outside appearance that is suited for him (1003 uultus Oedipodam hic decet).26
At this point, Jocasta enters: the chorus describes the woman’s attitude and
23 For more on the meaning of dimoue, see De Meo (1995: 178); for that of uocis moras, see
Coffey and Mayer (1990: 144).
24 The expression attollere uultus seems to essentially have communicative value, even in a
passage that is in many respects similar to that just commented on in Phaedra: Ov. Met.
4.142–144 ‘Pyrame’ clamauit, ‘quis temihi casus ademit? Pyrame, responde! tua te, carissime,
Thisbe nominat: exaudi uultusque attolle iacentes’.
25 See [8].
26 For more on the expression uultus Oedipodam hic decet, see Boyle (2011: 343): ‘a strong
metatheatrical conclusion to Oedipus’ opening speech in the final act […] The metathe-
atrical effect would have been enhanced here if the actor playing Oedipus had pointed to
his bloody mask’.
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appearance27 and implicitly indicates the nature of the ongoing tragedy before
her line makes it clear. Jocasta desires and fears, at the same time, to speak to
the man who is already on the stage and then finally decides to do so, but her
words remain stuck in her mouth (see Oed. 1004–1009).
As I have attempted to explain elsewhere, the last scene of Oedipus rep-
resents a powerful attempt on Seneca’s part to tackle problems related to the
impossibility to name that which cannot be named.28 For Jocasta, the main
problem in initiating interaction with the man who has revealed himself to
be her husband and son at the same time is disturbing in its simplicity: what
should she call him (Oed. 1009–1011)? In a scene centred onwords, a significant
gesture takes place at this point. The initial communicative blockade is over-
comeby Jocasta in virtue of herwill to reactivate a dialogue (1011), and therefore
a relationship, with Oedipus. He responds to the relational appeal contained in
his mother’s words by turning his head to the other side:
[15] Seneca Oedipus 1011–1012
quo auertis caput
uacuosque uultus?
Why dost thou turn away thy head, thy sightless face?
This type of gesture reveals his desire not to communicate and therefore trans-
mits, on a relational level, a message that opposes the verbal one conveyed by
his mother.29 Oedipus’ gesture follows Jocasta’s agitated questions and imme-
diately precedes his utterance. The analysis of these words enforces the rela-
tional interpretation of the gesture that precedes them but also provides fur-
ther important elements in order to deepen the analysis of the interaction:
27 In relation to the way in which the Chorus announces Jocasta’s entrance on the scene,
Boyle (2011: 344) observes that their description contains implicit stagedirections. Accord-
ing to Boyle, such instructions were erroneously interpreted as a supporting element of
the thesis that Seneca’s tragedies are ‘Rezitationsdramen’, and that Seneca couldhavebeen
influenced by the pantomime genre, in which a narrative description (which is often per-
formed by a Chorus) accompanies a dancer’s gestures and movements.
28 See Calabrese (2008).
29 A similar gesture to Oedipus’ is executed by Dido in Verg. Aen. 6.469 illa solo fixos ocu-
los auersa tenebat, where the participle auersa represents the gesture of turning to the
other side as having already been performed and also presents the element of the fixed
gaze.With this series of gestures, Didomanifests her refusal to communicatewithAeneas,
with whom there will, in fact, be no exchange (see Ricottilli 1992: 215).
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[16] Seneca Oedipus 1012–1014
quis frui tenebris uetat?
quis reddit oculos? matris, en matris sonus!
perdidimus operam …
Who wills not that I enjoy my darkness? Who restores my eyes? My
mother’s, lo, my mother’s voice! I have worked in vain …
The compresenceof these two types of communication, i.e. gestural andverbal,
makes this part of the interaction particularly interesting. The gesture of turn-
ing one’s head to the other side, as previously mentioned, indicates that the
character does not wish to speak with his interlocutor. However, Oedipus’
words contain more information than the gesture, whose relational function
they indicate, along with its uselessness. As we have seen, the character enters
the scene with a feeling of realisation, and more precisely that of now having
a face that is suited to Oedipus: the black cloud that envelops his head finally
makes him feel at peace with the gods. The darkness that he wants to be sur-
rounded by is pierced and somewhat dissolved by his mother’s voice, which
attains the paradoxical effect of restoring his sight. This powerful synaesthesia
contains the core of the tragedy of Seneca’s Oedipus: his empty eye sockets,
when diverted from his interlocutor as a gestural signal of desperate refusal
(see [15]) are somewhat filled by the voice of his mother, who in fact gives him
back his eyes (see [16]). Hismother’s voice has the power to bringOedipus back
into a relationship with her30 (one that has already been irreversibly contam-
inated by incest), thus thwarting the effects of his self-blinding, an act which,
also in light of the part of the interaction that has just been analysed, may be
interpreted as being finalised towards the interruption of every sort of relation
and contact with the outside world.31
uultus is, therefore, a vehicle of relations. This very aspect of uultus, namely the
relational aspect, comes to the fore in a scene that has similar features to the
30 The fact that the voice is a vehicle of relations also seems to be proven by passages such as
Sen. Tro. 962–963 hac sola uocor iam uoce mater (see Calabrese 2017: 33), Phoen. 224–225
ego ullos aure concipio sonos, per quos parentis nomen aut nati audiam?
31 In recent years, Fornés andPuig have dealtwith eye gestures in Latin literature. Fornés and
Puig (2010) (which owesmuch to Ricottilli 2000) in particular is dedicated to the gestures
that implicatemovements of the iris, like diverting one’s eyes and rolling them repeatedly.
Fornés and Puig (2011) recalls other aspects of eye gestures.
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one from Oedipus analysed above. In Phoenissae, Jocasta, upon arriving on the
battlefield, has a long discussion with her rival sons Eteocles and Polynices by
first addressing both and then each one alternately. The first addressee of her
words is the exiled Polynices:32
[17] Seneca Phoenissae 471–474
uinculo frontem exue
tegumenque capitis triste belligeri leua
et ora matri redde—quo uultus refers
acieque pauida fratris obseruas manum?
Unbind thy brow, take the grim helmet from thy warlike head, and let thy
mother see thy face. Why dost thou look away, and with fearful glance
watch thy brother’s hand?
The invitations to disarm culminate in that of turning the son’s face back
towards hismother (oramatri redde). The process, however, is interruptedmid-
way and Polynices, instead of facing Jocasta, turns away from her and looks
fearfully towards his brother’s armedhand. In this context,uultus referremeans
turning one’s gaze to observe something other than the direct interlocutor, thus
depriving the latter of the gaze and fixing it on other and different sources of
interest (and concern).33 This type of uultus gesture is made all the more signi-
ficant by the fact that (based on the configuration of the interaction thatwe can
retrace through Jocasta’s words) it seems to be how Polynices responds to the
invitation to turn his face towards his mother—obviously a negative reponse,
i.e. one of refusal. As the subsequent lines, which are centred on the matter
of fides (Phoen. 475–480), demonstrate, the relationship itself is at stake in the
midst of this movement of glances. It is a relationship that Jocasta tries to visu-
ally restore by means of Polynices’ gradual disarmament but one that he, on
the contrary, by means of gestures rather than words, shows to be incapable of
re-establishing.
32 For more on Jocasta’s complex change of interlocutors in the first sequence of the scene
where she interacts with her sons, see Mazzoli (2002).
33 In the expression uultus referre, refero seems to be a synonym of conuerto. According to
Frank (1995: 205), refero is used by Seneca here instead of auerto. Nevertheless, the use of
refero in place of auerto seems to be suitable for the context since Polynices not only looks
away but even focuses on another interlocutor, i.e. his brother Eteocles.
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The pragmatic analysis of gestures in Seneca’s tragedies led to some new obser-
vations. In the case of Andromache, the focus on gestures allowed us to notice
the evolution that they undergo in the course of Act III of Troades. The gestural
evolution, as I maintain in a more in-depth study,34 is the visual, iconic sign
of the profound dynamics that the character undergoes on a level of identity
and relationship. The study of gestures also allowed us to show the particular
(alienated and paradoxical) use that Seneca makes of a traditional and recur-
rent motif. Moreover, gestures appeared to have a structural function. With
specific regard to the gestures connected to uultus, their eminently interact-
ive and relational aspect led to a better comprehension of the dynamics which
take place in the passages analysed. Through these pragmatic considerations,
Seneca’s theatre should begin to appear not only as a theatre of words but also
as a theatre of gestures.
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Pragmatics of fraus: Encoding and Decoding of
Deceit in Seneca’s Troades and Thyestes
Lavinia Scolari
1 Introduction
The Latin language has a broad range of words covering the semantic area of
‘deception’ and ‘trick’.1 Among them, fraus occupies a central position in the
dramaturgical contexts as a recurring pattern of tragic plots.2 Scholars have
pointedout that it expresses the general notionof deceit but also the concept of
‘harm throughdeception’.3 In fact, the basicmeaningof fraus is ‘injury’ or ‘dam-
age’ (malum, quod quis facit uel patitur, damnum, iniuria), as the connection to
the roots of Greek θραύειν (‘to break’) and τιτρώσκειν (‘towound’) corroborates;4
therefore, fraus is a ‘detriment’ that implies a certain measure of ‘fraudulent
responsibility’. In other words, it denotes a ‘deceit’ or a ‘stratagem’,5 in which
the notio nocendi (‘the notion of doing harm’) prevails and it comprises con-
ducts involving guilt which are therefore liable to punishment: accedit quod
iniuria fallendo fit (‘it occurs that one commits an outrage by deceiving’).6
Frequently, fraus is combined with dolus, especially in non-legal texts,
where they are, to some extent, interchangeable (one need only think that
fraus corresponds to dolus malus in ThLL’s definition).7 Nevertheless, they
represent independent concepts: the former conveys the notion of ‘damage’
or ‘harm’ (like in the expression sine fraude), confirming its strictly negative
(moral) sense; by contrast, the latter, which communicates the idea of ‘mali-
cious intent’ (like in the expression dolo malo, ‘evil device’ or ‘artifice’, hence
‘fraud’, ‘deceit’),8 may also have a positive connotation, even if the negative
sense is predominant. According to Isidorus (Etym. 5.26.7), dolus is said to be
1 Abbot (1997: 42n. 1) gives a list of themost commonwords associatedwith trickery anddeceit.
See also Brotherton (1926); Carcaterra (1970: 32); Wheeler (1988: 50–92).
2 See Michelon (2015: 17–71).
3 Brotherton (1926: 9); Ernout and Meillet (41985: s.v. fraus).
4 Rubenbauer (1926: c. 1267); Wheeler (1988: 63), who refers to Krüger and Kaser (1943).
5 Wheeler (1988: 50–52, 63–65).
6 Rubenbauer (1926: c. 1267, 1269). See also OLD, s.v. fraus, 1–4, p. 732.
7 Rubenbauer (1926: c. 1267). On dolus in juridical context, see Ter Beek (1999).
8 Wheeler (1988: 58). On the difference between dolus bonus and dolus malus, see Carcaterra
(1970).
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from deludere (ab eo quod deludat), i.e. ‘to play false’, ‘to mock’, ‘to deceive’, and
it consists in ‘a cunning of the mind’ (est mentis calliditas), or—as we should
say—in its effects.9 Therefore, we can argue that the agent of dolus is able ‘to
play false’ or ‘deceive’ in so far as he ‘does one thing and fakes another’ (aliud
enim agit et aliud simulat) as stated by Isidorus (ibid.).10 Hence, as is stressed
by Cicero (Off. 3.64) as well, dolus—especially dolus malus—intertwines itself
with the concepts of simulatio and dissimulatio, which fall within a similar
semantic field. In fact, simulatio is ‘a falsely assumed appearance’ or ‘insincer-
ity, deceit’:11 a kind of pretence regarding physical or mental states, although
the first meaning of this word more generally refers to an act of copying or
imitation.12 While the semantic bonds between dolus and simulatio/simulare
as well as between fraus and dolus are mostly explicit, the link between fraus
and simulatio is not. But in the tragic context of fraudulent imitation (of an
attitude, a feeling, etc.), their bond becomes more evident, as it is the case in
Seneca’s tragedies, on which we will focus in this survey.
More specifically, we will explore the most relevant strategies of encoding
and decoding of deceits in Seneca’s Troades and Thyestes (which both show
significant correlations, as we will try to illustrate further below) from a prag-
matic, dramaturgical, and anthropological point of view, in the belief that
such an interdisciplinary approach may provide a more comprehensive and
detailed framework of the practice and the meaning of deception in Seneca’s
theatre and, more generally, in Roman culture. In this regard, we will follow
the research methodology developed by Licinia Ricottilli and her school, who
have successfully appliedpragmatics toClassical Studies, combining themwith
the anthropological survey tools.13 Using this approach, we shall take the tra-
ditionally assumed—not incorrect, but only partly adequate—meaning of the
term fraus (discussed below) as a starting-point; ultimately, we shall attempt to
provide amore accurate definition of fraus, that takes Roman cultural categor-
ies into account that are involved in the communication dynamics portrayed
by Seneca.
9 For this translation, we follow Barney et al. (42008).
10 See Hey (1910: c. 1857) and OLD, s.v. dolus. See also Ulp. Dig. 2.14.7.9 dolus malus fit callidi-
tate et fallacia.
11 Lewis and Short (1879: s.v. simulatio).
12 OLD, s.v. simulatio 1–2. See also OLD, s.v. simulo.
13 See Ricottilli (2000, 2009, 2011, 2018b: 7–19), who relies on Austin (21975);Watzlawick et al.
(1967); Searle (1969); Bateson (1972). For a combination of anthropological and pragmatic
approaches, see also Bettini and Ricottilli (1987); Duranti (1997); Beta (2004); Raccanelli
(1998, 2010, 2011). On Seneca’s tragedies (specifically on Phaedra), see Calabrese (2007,
2009, 2011).
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2 Pragmatics of fraus in Troades
2.1 First Phase: The Concealment
Seneca’s Troades provides us with a very relevant case of (unsuccessful) deceit
performed by Andromache. The plot of the play, mainly based on Euripides’
TrojanWomen and Hecuba, is well known: Troy has already fallen and the Tro-
jan women are waiting to be assigned to the Achaean leaders. But, according
to the herald Talthybius, the ghost of Achilles has returned from the Under-
world to demand that the Trojan princess Polyxena be sacrificed at his tomb.
The prophet Calchas, once consulted by Agamemnon, adds that Hector’s son,
Astyanax, must be slain too. Only then will the Greeks be able to return home.
Butmeanwhile, the ghost of Hector appears inAndromache’s dreamandwarns
her of the danger. So, she orchestrates a fraud consisting in hiding her son in
Hector’s grave and pretending that he is dead in order to deceive Ulysses, who
has been sent to hand over the child to the Achaeans.
Euripides’ tragedy on the same subject lacks the entire scene of fraus as
well as the agon between Andromache and Ulysses, which we shall discuss
below. Actually, in Greek TrojanWomen, Talthybius informs Hector’s widow of
the Achaeans’ decision when Ulysses has already ordered to lead her son away
(709–779). Hence, we can argue that Seneca’s representation of this fraus con-
veys some aspects of the deceit dynamic closely interrelated with the Roman
cultural categories of that time, which makes it particularly significant for our
survey.
In Seneca’s Troades, when Andromache first comes onto the stage, the only
reason for keeping the Greeks from leaving is Astyanax, because of the danger
he poses, since he is Troici defensor et uindex soli, ‘Troy’s defender and avenger’
(471): being not only a future enemy to the Achaeans but also the potential uin-
dex of his land, magni certa progenies patris, ‘the true child of his great father’
(461), and hence una spes Phrygibus, ‘sole hope of the Phrygians’ (462).
Therefore, Andromache needs to find a place where she can hide him:
[1] Seneca Troades 476–477
heu me, quis locus fidus meo
erit timori quaue te sede occulam?
O what place will not betray my fear, in what shelter shall I hide you?14
14 For the text and the translation of Seneca’s Troades, we follow Boyle (1994), except where
otherwise noted.
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[2] Seneca Troades 481–482
superestque uasta ex urbe ne tantum quidem,
quo lateat infans. quem locum fraudi legam?
From that wasted city enough survives not even to hide a child. What
place can I choose for my fraud?15
As the above-mentionedpassages clearly show, the first phase of Andromache’s
deceit consists in the practice of concealment, strongly recommended by Hec-
tor’s ghost (452–453): see occulam (477) and lateat (482).16 For it to succeed,
Seneca stresses the importance of fides for the fraudatrix, i.e. her necessity to
rely on someone or something in order to ensure that the fraus is successful.
In fact, Andromache is looking for a locus fraudis (482), which is fidus as well
(476), andultimately, shewill choose the cinusof her deadhusband, literally his
‘ashes’,metonymically his ‘tomb’, inasmuch as it can be considered fidelis (502),
a ‘safe’ place, not exposed to danger or risk and, what is more, ‘trustworthy’ as
Hector was.17
In this regard, if Andromache names her deceit fraus (loci) at 482, the old
servant defines it as dolus at 492 (amoue testes doli, ‘remove the witnesses to
the deceit’). But at this stage, both of them refer only to the concealment of
Astyanax in his father’s tomb. However, Andromache’s deception does not res-
ult merely in concealing.
In the development of the deceit, the old servant plays a significant role by
pointing out the major element of the fraus:
[3] Seneca Troades 489–490
haec causa multos una ab interitu arcuit:
credi perisse.
One cause has savedmany fromdestruction: the belief that they have per-
ished.18
15 For the translation of this passage, we follow Boyle (1994), except for the translation of
quem locum fraudi legam? (Boyle ‘Where can I choose?’).
16 Fabre-Serris (2015: 109).
17 Note that Hector’s ghost himself calls Andromache fida coniunx, ‘trustworthy wife’ (453).
18 The translation of this passage is taken fromMiller (1917).
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So the only chance of Astyanax to survive is to be supposed dead. This state-
ment reveals that the main purpose of fraus is to affect and redirect the inter-
pretative act of the receiver (i.e. his fides), to lead him to believe in the altern-
ative reality the fraudator has shaped. In fact, the Latin credere (‘to believe’) is
frequently considered tobe the corresponding verb to fides, or at least as aword
linked to its semantic field, given that fides is the actio uel facultas credendi siue
confidendi (‘the action or the property of believing and trusting’).19 Hence, the
tragic representationof the first phase of Andromache’s fraud leads us to recon-
sider the traditional meanings of fraus and dolus that we have provided above,
by supplementing them with the notion of fides. More suitably, we can claim
that fides is strictly involved in the dramaturgical frames of deceit, inasmuch
as it acts on the victims’ property or capacity of believing and trusting. In this
view, deceits can be intended as damaging and cunning practices of simulation
consisting of re-addressing, obtaining, or manipulating fides.
From the beginning, however, Andromache is presented as a fraudatrix
doomed to fail because of her inability to hide her true state of mind. Even
the servant (senex) does not seem to trust his mistress. That becomes evident
when he suggests she move away: for otherwise, she might reveal the location
of Astyanax’s hideout by means of her non-verbal language and compromise
the deceit by clearly showing her timor:
[4] Seneca Troades 513–518
Sen. quem ne tuus producat in medium timor,
procul hinc recede teque diuersam amoue.
An. leuius solet timere, qui propius timet;
sed, si placet, referamus hinc alio pedem.
Sen. cohibe parumper ora questusque opprime:
gressus nefandos dux Cephallanum admouet.
Old Man To stop your own fear from exposing him, step back from here
and hold yourself apart.
An. Proximity of danger reduces fear. But, if you advise it, let us
withdraw.
19 On this definition of fides, see Fraenkel (1926: c. 663, c. 686–687). On the meaning of
fides as ‘confidence’, i.e. the fact of trusting someone or something, see also Scolari (2016:
112–114, 2018b: 91–96); Fraenkel (1916: 187–188); Hellegouarc’h (21972: 33); Benveniste (1969:
I 115–121); Freyburger (1986: esp. 37–39, 319–320).
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Old Man Silence for a moment; stop your laments. Cephallenia’s cursed
chief approaches.
The senex begs Andromache to ‘manage the impact’ of her use of space (see
514), to be quiet (cohibe parumper ora), and to muffle her cries (517 ques-
tusque opprime), i.e. to reset or, at least, to control her verbal and non-verbal
communication. In other words, he is concerned that Ulysses may decode
Andromache’s kinesic and paralinguistic signals (her lament, her weeping,
etc.)20 as well as her proxemic behaviour (her use and perception of space)
because—as Andromache herself states, attempting a sort of kinesic exam on
him (see [5])—Ulysses is a man who is accustomed to weaving cunning wiles:
[5] Seneca Troades 522–523
An. adest Vlixes, et quidem dubio gradu
uultuque: nectit pectore astus callidos.
An. Ulysses is here—with hesitant step and expression. His mind
weaves some cunning trick.
Seneca here uses two otherwords of the semantic area of fraus: astus ‘the craft’,
which implies the idea of ‘sharpness’,21 and callidus. As far as the latter is con-
cerned, according to Cicero (Nat. D. 3.25), callidos (‘hardy’) are ‘those whose
minds have become shrewd with use as the hand is hardened and has become
callous by work’ (quorum, tamquammanus opera, sic animus usu concalluit).22
calliditas, astus, and the ‘weaving’ motive (nectere) thus co-operate to define
the portrait of a consummate, gifted deceiver, who is not easily fooled.23
20 The kinesic system is one of the semiotic systems of non-verbal communication and it
entails the interpretationof thebody’smovements such as facial expressions andgestures,
including tears, as demonstrated by Ricottilli (2018a: esp. 145–147), who also highlights the
relational connotation of the tears in Latin theatre, specifically in Terentius. See also Cap-
poni in this volume.
21 Lewis and Short (1879: s.v. astus).
22 The translation is mine. On callidus, which it is said from callum (‘callus’), see Ernout and
Meillet (41985: s.v. callum).
23 See Michelon (2015: 24–27), who highlights in n. 23 that astus and the verb calleo (‘to be
callous’) are already related to Ulysses by Accius, if Neopt. 184 D (satin astu et fallendo cal-
let?) refers to him, which seems very likely.
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2.2 Scrutare matrem: Encoding and Decoding fraus
If—in Attic tragedy—Ulysses is the one who convinces the Greeks that Astya-
nax must be killed (Eur. Tro. 721), in Seneca’s drama, his step is hesitating (522
dubio gradu) and he introduces himself as a mere ‘minister of harsh fate’ (524
durae minister sortis). In fact, when the king of the Cephallenians comes onto
the stage, he performs a very sophisticated suasoria, through which he tries
1) to remove all sense of responsibility from himself: ore quamuis uerba
dicanturmeo, non esse credas nostra: Graiorum omnium procerumque uox
est, ‘though thesewords are spokenbymymouth, youdonot believe them
mine. It is the voice of all theGreeks and chiefs’ (525–527); hanc fata expe-
tunt, ‘him fate demands’ (528);augurhaecCalchas canit, ‘so teachesAugur
Calchas’ (533).
2) to bridge the relational gap betweenAndromache and himself. Therefore,
he does not hesitate to call her by name (531 Andromacha) and to use the
possessive adjective to refer to Astyanax (natus […] uester, 532–533) in
order to pursue the goal of bringing her closer.
3) to induce a feeling of empathy by showing the convergence between
the Phrygians’ doom and what the Greeks have already suffered: neue
crudelem putes, quod sorte iussus Hectoris natum petam: petissemOresten.
patere quoduictor tulit, ‘don’t thinkme cruel for seekingHector’s son com-
manded by the lot. I’d have sought Orestes. Accept what the victor bore’
(553–555).
Therefore, from Ulysses’ first speech, the conjunction emerges between emo-
tive and conative function (the latter in a less emphatic form). The emotive
function relates to the speaker and it focuses on his internal, emotive state
or condition, while the conative function entails a communication or a lin-
guistic act aiming at persuading the addressee, acquiring his adhesion to the
message provided or influencing his behaviour. In the considered texts, the
emotive function is used in order to activate the conative one, which ismarked
by the use of the imperative forms (e.g. non credas, ne putes), the vocative case
Andromacha, and the possessive adjective uester.24 In other words, in order
to persuade Andromache to hand over her son, Ulysses tries to connect the
illocutionary act (which has a certain ‘force’ in saying something) with the per-
locutionary act (which consists in the achieving of certain effects by saying
something).25 But her reaction is not what he had hoped for.
24 On the functions of language, see Jakobson (31981: esp. 191 = 1960: 357).
25 On the theory of linguistic acts, and notably on the definitions of the illocutionary and
perlocutionary act, see Austin (21975: esp. 126).
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[6] Seneca Troades 556–558, 562–566
An. utinam quidem esses, nate, materna in manu,
nossemque quis te casus ereptummihi
teneret
[…]
nate, quis te nunc locus,
fortuna quae possedit? errore auio
uagus arua lustras? uastus an patriae uapor
corripuit artus? saeuus an uictor tuo
lusit cruore?
An. O that you were in your mother’s arms, my son, or that I knewwhat
chance stole and keeps you from me […]. My son, what place now,
what fortune holds you? Do you wander the fields lost? Or has our
country’s vast conflagration consumed you? Did the savage victor
sport with your blood?
Hector’s widow responds with a sort of ‘closing attitude’, conveyed in prag-
matic terms by the anaphora of the personal pronoun of the second person
(tu) and the possessive tuo, which always refers to Astyanax and never, in this
passage, to Ulysses, her interlocutor. The use of this marker reveals that she is
not inclined to activate a positive mutual communication with him. After the
death of Hector, the only relationship she cares about is with her son, as the use
of the personal pronounmihi in the clause quis te ereptummihi teneret stresses,
combined with the vocative nate, very close to materna at 556, both placed
twice in emphatic positions. In this way, Seneca marks the emotive function
of Andromache’s locutionary act. However, Ulysses does not fall for her trick-
ery:
[7] Seneca Troades 568–571
simulata remoue uerba; non facile est tibi
decipere Vlixem: uicimus matrum dolos
etiam dearum. cassa consilia amoue;
ubi natus est?
Drop this pretence.Youwon’t find it easy to foolUlysses. I’ve beatenmoth-
ers’ tricks, goddesses’ too. Forget your futile ploy. Where’s your son?
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Simulata remoue uerba, ‘stop it with these false speeches’. Here, Ulysses has
openly switched to the conative function of language because of the failure
of the emotive one.26 In other terms, his locutionary act by which he tries to
convince Andromache to hand over Astyanax has not achieved its perlocu-
tionary intent since it has no effects. Nevertheless, Ulysses highlights a flaw in
Andromache’s deceptive system: the fact that she encodes her fraus—or rather
her simulatio, i.e. her ‘falsely assumed appearance’ as we have said above27—
only on a verbal level, merely by means of a locutionary act (simulata uerba).
He reminds her whom she is dealing with, namely the master of tricks and
manipulation, and thereby evokes the literary memory of this character: that
of the hero who has already unmasked a mother’s fraud, not just anyone’s
but a goddess’.28 Here, Ulysses is referring to the doli of Thetis, who dressed
and disguised her son Achilles as a girl, determined to keep him out of the
war that would have caused his death.29 Thus, Ulysses’ statement allows a
key component of the fraud to emerge: the importance of becoming aware
of the identity role of the interlocutor, if one wishes to perform a successful
fraus.
Andromache, however, does not seem to care about the identity role of
Ulysses or about his story. Even if she knowshis reputation, she seeks to deceive
him by using a strategy similar to his:
[8] Seneca Troades 594–597
inuita, Vlixe, gaudium Danais dabo.
dandum est. fatere quos premis luctus, dolor.
gaudete, Atridae, tuque laetifica, ut soles,
refer Pelasgis: Hectoris proles obit.
I hate, Ulysses, to give the Danai joy. Yet I must. Confess the sorrow you
hide, grief. Gloat, sons of Atreus. You, take the Pelasgi, as usual, joyous
news: Hector’s child is dead.
Firstly, Andromache does not avoid naming him (see the vocative Vlixe in 594)
to close the gap between them; secondly, she attempts to provide an alternate
26 See above n. 24.
27 See Section 1.
28 On the traditional representation of Ulysses as master of deceits underlined by Seneca in
[7], see Michelon (2015: 27–28).
29 See Sen. Tro. 213 and Boyle (1994: ad loc.).
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reality, which canmeet the Greek’s expectations, as can be seen from the use of
the semantic field of delight and joy: gaudium, gaudete, laetifica, etc. (in oppos-
ition to the field of dolor). Once again, Ulysses demands a concrete guarantee,
which is able to ensure that what Andromache said is true:
[9] Seneca Troades 598
et esse uerum hoc qua probas Danais fide?
What proof do you give Danaans that this is true?
The question asked byUlysses in this line brings the paretymology of fraus into
play that is provided by Cicero (Off. 1.23), according to whom fides comes from
fiat and dico, because it implies that what you do matches what you said you
would do, namely that there is no discrepancy between words and deeds: quia
fiat, quod dictum est appellatam fidem, ‘fides (‘trust’) is called this because one
does what he has said’.30
But Andromache has no such proof, so instead of a tangible guarantee, she
swears, to some extent, an assertory oath (599–604) to prove that Astyanax ‘lies
with deadmen’, inter extinctos iacet (603). Andwe know that assertory oaths in
the ancient world were serious business since an oath was considered a self-
curse, inasmuch as oath-takers placed themselves directly under the threat of
divine punishment, which everyone believed would surely be imposed on the
perjurer.31 Ulysses stresses that the oath represents a guarantee of mutual fides
( fidem alligauit iure iurando suam, si peierat, timere quid grauius potest?, ‘she
had pledged her faith by swearing an oath. If she swears falsely, what worse
can she fear?’, 611–612). He is convinced that the Greeks will trust him, but the
point is whom Ulysses trusts.
[10] Seneca Troades 607–609
Vl. quid agis, Vlixe? Danaidae credent tibi:
tu cui? parenti? fingit an quisquam hoc parens,
nec abominandae mortis auspicium pauet?
30 On this passage, see Dyck (1996: ad loc.). See also Cic. Rep. 4.7 (fr. 2.5–6) fides enim nomen
ipsummihi uidetur habere, cum fit, quod dicitur, ‘for it seems to me that fides is called this
because one does what he says’.
31 See Lecointre (1991: 9–10); Pageard (1991: 35); and Benveniste (1969: II 163–164).
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Ul. (Aside) What’s this, Ulysses? The Danai will trust you. But you
trust—amother?Wouldanymother lie andnot fear omensof fright-
ful death?
Unlike Andromache, Ulysses asks himself about the prominent identity role of
his interlocutor in the very context and in the very moment of their dynamic
of communication: above all, she is a mother, as the polyptoton parenti / pa-
rens points out (608). This is her predominant role. The persona of Ulysses
derives this information from Andromache, who implicitly introduces herself
as amater animosa, ‘a dauntless mother’, who ‘admits no fears’: animosa nullos
mater admittit metus (588). Therefore, the only type of fides she can express
is materna fides: maternam fidem umquam exuissem, ‘I would never put off a
mother’s loyalty’ (561–562).
[11] Seneca Troades 613–618
nunc aduoca astus, anime, nunc fraudes, dolos,
nunc totum Vlixem; ueritas numquam perit.
scrutare matrem: maeret, illacrimat, gemit;
sed huc et illuc anxios gressus refert
missasque uoces aure sollicita excipit:
magis haec timet, quammaeret. ingenio est opus.
Now summon your guile, my soul, now tricks, deceits, now all Ulysses;
truth is never lost. Examine the mother. She mourns, weeps, groans, but
paces her anxious steps up and down and strains her troubled ears to pick
up sounds. She’s more afraid than grieving. We need our wits.
Thus, Ulysses sets out to examine Andromache’s non-verbal communication,
paying particular attention to her parental role (615 scrutare matrem).32 In
other words, he intends to make a pragmatic analysis of the non-verbal forms
of her behaviour in order to assess their compliance with Andromache’s locu-
tionary act. In order to achieve this, he needs ‘all of Ulysses’, the entire master
of manipulation and deceits: not surprisingly, he calls astus, fraudes and dolos
(613) into question since he is convinced that they are especially apt not only
for ‘encoding’ deceits and fraudsbut also for decoding them.On theother hand,
32 On the investing gaze of Ulysses, see Benton (2002: 34–35). On the meaning of scrutari,
see OLD, s.v.: ‘to look searchingly at’, ‘scan’, ‘scrutinize’.
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there is no part of him which completely exemplifies the characteristics of
his persona—this is summed up in a single word at the end of the passage:
ingenium (618), his ‘innate quality’. It is evident that this is once again an impli-
cit mention of the literary memory of this mythical character, of his identity
features, and dramaturgical function. In fact, Ulysses is able to identify:
– paralinguistic features (withinwhich all themeta-communication compon-
ents are included, such as gasps and sighs) and kinesic signals (if we accept
tears as gestures):33maeret, illacrimat, gemit.
– proxemic communication and kinesic signals: sed huc et illuc anxios gressus
refert.
– prosodic features, like the empty pause (the silence) of Andromache, which
conveys her suspense, worry and anxiety (cf. sollecita), and the consequent
chronemic signals, which reveal an irregular, non-fluent communication
flow:34missasque uoces aure sollicita excipit.
The decoding of Andromache’s non-verbal communication, on all levels, con-
veys a discrepancy between words and paralinguistic, kinesic and proxemic
language. In other words, the outcome of the decoding act is that Andromache
magis […] timet, quammaeret (618). Therefore, by his pragmatic investigation,
Ulyssesmanages to detect that the prominent feeling of his interlocutor is fear.
2.3 The Counter-Fraud
After decoding fraus and individuating the weakness of Andromache (her
timor), which emerges very clearly from her mimic, gestures, and non-verbal
behaviour, Ulysses decides to reply with a sort of ‘counter-fraud’ to test his
own interpretation. We will use this term on the basis of ‘counter-gift’, in so
far as fraus is a perlocutionary act35 that belongs to the mechanism of negat-
ive reciprocity, consisting precisely in a dramaturgical pattern of iniuria (the
‘offence’) and ultio (the ‘revenge’).36 Furthermore, we have already noted that
iniuria is linked to the semantic field of fraus.37 Ernout and Meillet explain it
as ‘tort fait à quelqu’un’, ‘dommage’, i.e. the same meaning as that of iniuria,38
‘et par suite “fraude, tromperie” ’:
33 On the kinesic system and tears classified as gestures, see above n. 20 and Calabrese in
this volume.
34 For an analysis of the relationship between prosody and gesture, seeWharton (2009: 139–
149).
35 See Austin (21975: 101–108).
36 See Courtois (1984: 109–124).
37 See Section 1.
38 See Scolari (2018a: 136–139). See also Manfredini (1977: esp. 135) and Krause (2006: 83 =
2004: 90).
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Comme le dommage s’accompagne généralement de manœuvres dolo-
sives, fraus est arrivé à signifier ‘ruse, tromperie, fourberie’ et même
‘piège’ dans la langue familière.39
Therefore, the mechanism of fraus works along the same principles as
exchange, and notably gift-giving practices, but antithetically. In fact, iniuria
is the first stage of the revenge system in that it upsets the beneficium process
(and, more generally, the process of gift-giving);40 revenge, in a second step,
constitutes the antithesis to gratitude and the ‘counter-gift’.41 In this respect,
Cicero reports a definition of iniuria, which confirms that even fraus forms
part of the negative reciprocity systems as one of the two patterns of ‘injustice’
(iniuria), which is the most contemptible:
[12] Cicero De officiis 1.41
cum autem duobusmodis, id est aut ui aut fraude, fiat iniuria, fraus quasi
uulpeculae, uis leonis videtur; utrumque homine alienissimum, sed fraus
odio digna maiore.
There are two ways in which injustice may be done, either through force
or through deceit; and deceit seems to belong to a little fox, force to a
lion. Both of them seemmost alien to a human being; but deceit deserves
a greater hatred.42
The counter-fraud of Ulysses consists in revealing the harsh truth (a strategy
that complies with his sentence ueritas numquam perit [614]), by underlin-
ing the nature of the Astyanax’s death decreed by the Achaeans, in order to
intensify mother’s emotions:43 quemmors manebat saeua praecipitem datum e
turre, lapsis sola quae muris manet, ‘a savage death awaited him, hurled head-
long from the only tower those ruined walls still have’ (621–622). In the aside,
which has a didascalic function, Andromache allows her non-verbal signals of
fear to emerge:
39 Ernout and Meillet (41985: 252 s.v. fraus).
40 Discussed more fully in Scolari (2018a: 136–142, 195–207).
41 In this regard, see Gouldner (1960: 169); Verdier (1980a: 30, 1980b: 11); Seaford (1998: 1); van
Wees (1998: 24).
42 For the translation, see Griffin and Atkins (1991).
43 See Fabre-Serris (2015: 110–111).
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[13] Seneca Troades 623–631
An. reliquit animus membra, quatiuntur, labant!
torpetque uinctus frigido sanguis gelu.
Vl. intremuit. hac, hac parte quaerenda est mihi.
matrem timor detexit. iterabo metum.
ite, ite celeres, fraude materna abditum
hostem, Pelasgi nominis pestem ultimam.
ubicumque latitat, erutam in medium date.
bene est: tenetur. perge, festina, attrahe—
quid respicis trepidasque? iam certe perit.
An. (Aside) Life seeps from my limbs. They quiver, give way. My blood
congeals, bound fast by freezing ice.
Ul. (Aside) She trembled. This, this is where I must probe. Fear
unmasked the mother. I’ll double that fear. (Aloud) Go, go, men!
Quickly! A mother’s trick hides our enemy, the Pelasgians’ last
blight. Wherever he hides, root him out, bring him here! Good, we
have him!Hurry, quick, drag himhere—(ToAndromache)Why look
back and tremble? Surely he’s now dead.
By decoding her uncontrolled trembling (625 intremuit), Ulysses can deduce
that ‘fear has unmasked themother’ (626matrem timor detexit). Bymanipulat-
ing Andromache’s emotions, Seneca’s character proves that he has mastered
the rhetorical art of persuasion, which lies in provoking the feelings useful
to achieve the desired effect (Cic. De or. 2.115).44 In order to decode materna
fraus (627), he clearly knows that he has to consider the parental role of
Andromachemore than any other aspect of her identity. Furthermore, he does
not overlook to observe her eye movement attentively: quid respicis trepidas-
que? [12]. respicere signifies ‘to look back’ and it is properly applied to express
the action of turning the head back to look at something or someone.45 As
stated by Bettini, this verb also communicates the willingness to have con-
tact or rather to take someone into account.46 Hence, Andromache’s action
44 See also Arist. Rhet. 1356a4, 14–15, 20–25; Cic. De or. 1.17, 178; Quint. Inst. 1.2.30, 1.6.2. On
the link between persuasive strategies and the manipulation of emotions in classical
antiquity, see Sanders and Johncock (2016).
45 See Marchese (2016: 14–22).
46 Bettini (21988: 135).
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of respicere is a kinesic signal that allows Ulysses to find Astyanax and to
thwart his mother’s plans.
When it is too late, all of a sudden, Andromache remembers whom she is
dealingwith, amachinator fraudis et scelerumartifex, ‘genecist of deceit, crafts-
man of evil’ (750), and she recognises the specific identity of Ulysses and the
natural inclinations of his malefica mens (752), demonstrated by dolus and
astus.
We can claim that from the very beginning of the tragedy Seneca’s Andro-
mache shows her incompatibility with the fraudator profile. In the hiding
scene, she is portrayed as incapable of decoding non-verbal signals of her own
son, when she interprets his fear as shame:
[14] Seneca Troades 503–505
An. quid retro fugis
turpesne latebras spernis? agnosco indolem:
pudet timere.
An. Do you shrink back, spurn base refuge? I recognise your breeding:
You’re ashamed of fear.
She seems to be convinced of her ability to recognise Astyanax’s proxemic
and kinesic signals as hereditary traits (agnosco indolem), but, as stressed by
Ulysses, ‘grief is no impartial judge of things’, est quidem iniustus dolor rerum
aestimator (545).
But the failure of her tricks notably depends on the disregarding of the
receiver’s identity and his dramaturgical role, although the real value of Ulysses
is well known: uirtus Vlixis […] nota est satis (757). We could say that Andro-
mache does not follow the advice that Thyestes, in the homonymous tragedy,
gives to himself: cum quod datur spectabis, et dantem aspice, ‘when you view a
gift, look at the giver, too’ (Thy. 416).47
47 For the translation of Seneca’s Thyestes, we follow Boyle (2017), except where otherwise
noted. Tarrant (1985: 151 ad 416) stresses that this sententia is grounded in symmetrically
balanced nouns and verbs—quod datur-dantem, spectabis-aspice. But, at least, it will be
Atreus who looks carefully at Thyestes: see 505 aspice.
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3 Pragmatics of fraus in Thyestes
3.1 Post fratris dolos: Outrage and Revenge
In Thyestes as well, the fraus practice seems to be related to a dynamic of
negative reciprocity.48 We can note that much when we take into account
the dialogue between Atreus and his attendant (satelles), in which Atreus
states that his revenge will be performed post fratris dolos (178) and the ana-
phora of fraus at 224 ( fraude est adeptus, fraude turbauit domum, ‘by fraud he
filched our ancient mark of power, by fraud confounded our house’), which
refers to the dramaturgical and pragmatic pattern of iniuria committed by
Thyestes against his brother. Moreover, at the end of the drama, Atreus rep-
resents the ultio carried out by the fraus as a way to repay his brother for
his crimes: sceleri modus debetur ubi facias scelus, non ubi reponas, ‘evil has
due measure when evil’s done, not when it’s avenged’ (1052).49 Therefore,
with his fraus, Thyestes has betrayed Atreus’ fides first: in fact, the latter calls
him perfidus (235), which indicates ‘someone who breaks his promise’, who
has overturned the bond ensured by fides.50 Indeed, at 239, Atreus deplores
that the imperi fides, i.e. his ‘guarantee about the power’, is disrupted (quassa
est).51
Unlike Andromache, Atreus claims knowledge of the innate quality of Thy-
estes (noui ego ingenium uiri, indocile, 199–200), his untameable nature, and,
consequently, his weakness. Therefore, in the light of this boon, grounded on
‘relational knowledge’, he will be able to lead Thyestes himself to cause his own
ruin: quod est in isto scelere praecipuumnefas, hoc ipse faciet, ‘the principal hor-
ror in this crime—he will perform himself ’ (285–286).52 The perlocutionary
effect that Atreus intends to achieve with his fraus resides in this very aim, for
which the knowledge of the interlocutor’s disposition is essential:
[15] Seneca Thyestes 286–295
Sat. sed quibus captus dolis
nostros dabit perductus in laqueos pedem?
48 See Paduano (1988–1989: 296).
49 On the topic of measure (modus) and on themaius-motif of revenge in Seneca’s tragedies,
see Schiesaro (2003: 130).
50 See Ernout and Meillet (41985: s.v. fides): ‘ “perfide”, que l’on explique par qui per fidem
decipit (Plt., Mo. 500, per fidem deceptus sum), mais où per- peut marquer la déviation’.
51 Picone (1984: 12, 61–66).
52 On Atreus as amachinator doli, see Picone (1984: 65).
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inimica credit cuncta. At. non poterat capi,
nisi capere uellet. regna nunc sperat mea:
hac spe minanti fulmen occurret Ioui,
hac spe subibit gurgitis tumidi minas
dubiumque Libycae Syrtis intrabit fretum,
hac spe, quod esse maximum retur malum,
fratrem uidebit. Sat. quis fidem pacis dabit?
cui tanta credet? At. credula est spes improba.
Att. What tricks will drawhis feet into our snares?He thinks theworlds
his foe.
Atr. He couldn’t be taken unless he aimed to take us. He hopes for my
kingdom still. In this hope he’ll meet Jove’s menacing bolt, in this
hope he’ll face threats of swelling seas and enter Lybian Syrtes’
dubious shoals. In this hope—to him the greatest trial—he’ll see
his brother.
Att. Who’ll assure the peace?Whom will he trust on such things?
Atr. Vile hope trusts all.
Atreus underlines his intent of encoding a deceptive message able to meet
the ‘unfair expectation’ (295 spes improba) of Thyestes (emphasised by the
anaphora of hac spe at 290, 291, and 29353), who hopes to obtain Atreus’ king-
dom (289 regna nunc sperat mea). Though the courtier stresses the necessity
to provide a tangible guarantee of peace ( fides pacis), Atreus has no reason to
worry, because, focusing on the specific weakness of the victim of the fraus,
he knows that it consists in his credulitas (namely an excess of fides): credula
est spes improba (295). However, during the entire play, Thyestes has a presen-
timent regarding the oncoming deceit54 and urges himself not to trust his
brother, who is described as a res incertissima alongside power (424–425 rebus
incertissimis, fratri atque regno, credis…?, ‘do you trust themost faithless things,
brother and throne?’). Moreover, he labels his heart as ‘credulous’ or—more
suitably—‘deluded’ in the apostrophe at 963: credula praesta pectora fratri,
‘offer your deluded heart to the brother’.55 In this sentence, the adjective credu-
53 I follow Boyle (2017) and Fitch (2004: ad loc.); Tarrant (1985: ad loc.) and Zwierlein (32009:
ad loc.) move 290 to after 292. On the motive of spes regni as a trap against Thyestes, see
Picone (1984: 61).
54 See Thy. 472–473, 482–484.
55 For the sense of credulus as ‘deluded’, ‘too trusting’, I follow Traina (1981: 131–132), who
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lus underscores the danger of excessive trust placed in Atreus. As Traina has
noted, the opposition between the syntagm praesta and the semanteme credu-
lum encapsulates the conflict between the two main themes in the monody:
the will, voice of consciousness, and the premonition, voice of subconscious.56
Nevertheless, Thyestes proves unable to escape Atreus’ fraus that is perform-
ing as a trap (see [15] for the use of captus and laqueos), for which the sig-
nifier of ‘piège’, provided by Ernout and Meillet,57 is more than appropri-
ate.
3.2 Praestetur fides: The Performance of fraus between Encoding and
Decoding Acts
[16] Seneca Thyestes 504–511
cum sperat ira sanguinem, nescit tegi—
tamen tegatur. aspice, ut multo grauis
squalore uultus obruat maestos coma,
quam foeda iaceat barba. praestetur fides.
fratrem iuuat uidere. complexus mihi
redde expetitos. quidquid irarum fuit
transierit. ex hoc sanguis ac pietas die
colantur, animis odia damnata excidant.
Whenanger smells blood, itwon’t behidden—yethidden itmust be. Look
how matted, filthy hair overwhelms his gloomy face, how foul his droop-
ing beard. Now for a show of faith. (To Thyestes) Brother—it’s a joy to see
you. Give me the hug I’ve longed for. (They embrace) What anger existed
let it be gone. From this day let’s cherish blood and family piety, rid out
hearts of damned hate.
The ‘encoding of the fraus’ scene is divided into two brief dramaturgical
moments, an aside and the proper dialogue between the brothers. In the first
frame of the scene, Atreus notes the squalor of his brother, caused by his exile,
the principal reason of his weakness, and suggests to himself to conceal his
wrath and to be believable (507 praestetur fides), i.e. to provide evidence of
examines the occurrences of this term in Seneca’s corpus from a semantic point of view
to provide a more accurate translation.
56 Traina (1981: 132).
57 See supra, n. 39.
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his credibility to perform a non-verbal behaviour, which works as a ‘display of
loyalty’.58 The second part of the fraus act reveals not only a didascalic but a
pragmatic function as well: the opening utterance fratrem iuuat uidere is not
only an illocutionary act, but it also conveys some information about the kin-
esic and mimic signals that Atreus manipulates to affect the interpretation act
of Thyestes.59 He pretends to be glad to see his brother, and he asks him for a
hug, involving even the haptic level of communication in the encoding of the
fraus. The physical contact impliedmakes this an interaction entailing touch.60
He also provides to Thyestes a proof of loyalty, showing his intention of restor-
ing (reddere) the paternumdecus (528) to his brother, i.e. the crown and sharing
the power with him.
This dynamic takes the form of a gift: Seneca represents the simulatio of for-
giveness performedbyAtreus as amechanismof positive reciprocity61 aimed to
overturn the nature of their relationships: from hostility and hatred into a pos-
itive reciprocity exchange. Even if Seneca does not use the verb simulare, the
strategy of Atreus’ fraus complies to itsmeaning: ‘a falsely assumedappearance’
and ‘a kind of pretence regarding […] mental states’, or rather, ‘regarding rela-
tional dynamic’ as gift-giving.62 By the expedient of the simulated gift, Atreus
is able to close the gap between his brother and himself (in this case, both
relational and physical), taking advantage of the fascinating power of the gift,
which is already described byRenata Raccanelli as ‘ilmetalinguaggio analogico
della relazione’, or (more suitably) ‘la comunicazione della proposta di comu-
nicare’.63
Thyestes does not waste any time: accipio, he says, ‘I accept’ (542). The same
concept will be repeated in a different form at 983–984 with reference to the
cannibalistic banquet provided by Atreus, which is ultrix daps (894) as well:
58 Even if this frame is generally regarded as an aside, it may imply an audience, i.e. a role
that the satelles could play, even if his entry is not explicitly marked. On the presence
on stage of minor characters, see de Jong (2007: 7–9) and Taplin (1977: 8). On aspice as a
metatheatrical invitation to the real audience, see Boyle (2017: ad loc.).
59 Di Raimo (2019: 317–318) argues that Atreus simulates the reasons of his glee but not the
feeling itself (conveyed by the verb iuvat): the awareness of approaching revenge makes
the character delighted. See also the use of iuuat at 1101.
60 Atreus asks the same to his nephews in 521–524 a genibus manum aufer meosque potius
amplexus pete. uos quoque, senum praesidia, tot iuuenes, meo pendete collo.
61 See the above-mentioned 416 cum quod datur spectabis, et dantem aspice, 536 dona fortu-
nae, and 984 donum dapis.
62 See Section 1. See also Ernout and Meillet (41985: s.v. similis: ‘simulo: […] “faire semblant
de” ’).
63 Raccanelli (2011: 307–309).
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capio fraternae dapis donum.64 Hence, Seneca uses a performative and com-
plementary couple of verbs (reddere/accipere).65 The latter allows Thyestes ‘to
do things with words’, namely to obtain the crown that Atreus puts on his head
but, at the same time, to get caught.
Thus, in Thyestes, the decoding act is carried out by the fraudator himself
since it belongs to the deceptive practice. Furthermore, Atreus has already cla-
rified that he does not want to see him broken, ‘but to see him being broken’
(907 miserum uidere nolo, sed dum fit miser).66 In this purpose, the acknow-
ledgement scene in which the ultor can reveal his fraud is an essential part of
the revenge:
[17] Seneca Thyestes 1004–1005
Atr. … natos ecquid agnoscis tuos?
Thy. agnosco fratrem.
Atr. … I suppose you recognise your sons?
Thy. I recognise my brother.
4 Conclusions
As we sought to illustrate in this survey, in the plays considered, Seneca makes
extensive use of the semantic field of deceit, especially of fraus and dolus.
The latter is mostly used in the plural (see Tro. 213, 569, 613; Thy. 178, 286, 318)
and, apparently, not only formetrical reasons. fraudematerna [13, line 627], for
instance, corresponds tomatrum dolos [7, line 569] (not to the singular dolus);
and fratris dolos (178) and fraude at 224 relate to the same deceit.67 Hence, we
can argue that, even if Seneca employs fraus and dolus almost interchangeably,
he prefers to use fraus to convey a more complex and sophisticated strategy of
deception, in so far as dolus is apparently considered as a ‘softer’, less structured
deceit.
64 See Mazzoli (2016: 341–350).
65 Onperformative utterances, seeAustin (21975: esp. 6–8, 25–36). On performativity applied
to Latin literature, see Anscombre and Pierrot (1985).
66 Here I follow Fitch (2004).
67 See also fraudem (Thy. 316) and dolos (Thy. 318) that refer to the same deception. The only
occurrence of the singular dolus in Thyestes is in 773: errat hic aliquis dolus, which can be
more suitably translated as ‘here there is some kind of deceit’.
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However, the success of fraus (and dolus) within the communication event
represented in Seneca’s two tragedies which we have examined (but we might
as well widen the scope of our investigation), depends mainly on:
– knowledge of the interlocutor: the fact of having regard to his/her identity
role, desires and weaknesses;
– credulitas of the receiver, or simply their willingness to trust (credere) the
fraudator; conversely, the fraudator’s ability tomanipulate his interlocutor’s
fides;
– compliance between verbal and non-verbal communication;
– ability to manipulate relational contexts.
Therefore, in order to furnish adefinitionof fraus fromapragmatic and anthro-
pological point of view, we can define fraus as amimetic and performative act,
which underlies ‘a falsely assumed appearance’ and ‘a kind of pretence regard-
ing […] mental states’ or ‘relational dynamic’ (the proper sense of simulatio
provided in Section 1) with perlocutionary intent, i.e. the purpose of achieving
certain effects, specifically of influencing someone’s actions or forms of beha-
viour by saying something. This performative act forms part of the negative
reciprocity system of iniuria and aims at driving the interlocutor’s belief (his
fides, taking advantage of his credulitas) and redirecting his interpretative acts,
by means of the compliance between verbal and non-verbal communication,
as well as the ability of the fraudator to manipulate the relational contexts, in
order toprovide tangible evidence to enforce the trustworthiness of thedecept-
ive message.
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Euripides: Von der Rhetorik zur Pragmatik
Carlo Scardino
1 Einleitung: Rhetorik und Pragmatik
Bezüglich des Verhältnisses zwischen der Rhetorik und der Pragmatik haben
von linguistischer Seite die Pragmatisten Sperber undWilson die traditionelle
Rhetorik auf der theoretischen Ebene kritisiert und behauptet, dass ihr ein
eigener Forschungsgegenstand fehle und sie vielmehr ein „disparate set of
items rather than an autonomous category“ sei.1 Sie beschränken die Rhetorik
auf die elocutio und betrachten sie als eine heterogene Sammlung von Regeln,
durch die man die Kommunikation beeinflussen kann, die aber einer theoreti-
schen Verankerung entbehrt. Alle rhetorischen Verfahren seien einem Redner
eigentlich von selbst bewusst; die Rhetorik biete nur die Selbstvergewisserung
eines natürlichenWissens.2Daher könneman ganz auf die Rhetorik verzichten
und durch einen kognitiven Ansatz – die von Sperber undWilson entwickelte
Relevanztheorie – ersetzen.
Die Kritik an der Rhetorik ist fast so alt wie sie selbst. Schon Platon hat
ihr im Gorgias 453a den Rang einer Wissenschaft – das von ihm verwendete
τέχνη kommt diesem Begriff mutatis mutandis am nächsten – abgesprochen
und sie als „Erzeugerin der Überredung“ (πειθοῦς δημιουργός) den praktischen
Beschäftigungen gleichgesetzt. Hingegen bezeichnet Aristoteles die Rhetorik
(Rhet. 1355b25–34) analog zur Dialektik als τέχνη, deren spezielles Objekt, das
sie zu einer τέχνηmacht, τὸ πιθανόν („das, was Überzeugung erweckt“) ist. Aris-
toteles’ kommunikatives Modell bleibt in der Folge die wichtigste Grundlage,
auch wenn sich die Rhetorik von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart weiterent-
wickelt hat. Von den im 20. Jh. entwickelten Ansätzen soll wenigstens der
nach dem ZweitenWeltkrieg von Chaim Perelman und Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca
(1958) unternommene Versuch, eine ‚Neue Rhetorik‘ zu begründen, erwähnt
werden. Ebenso wie Aristoteles betten die beiden Gelehrten die Rhetorik in
ein auf der Logik fußendes kommunikatives System ein. Dabei erfüllen etwa
die rhetorischen Figuren neben der schmückenden auch eine ‚pragmatische‘
Funktion und werden demgemäß funktional eingeteilt.3
1 Sperber undWilson (1980: 96): „Rhetoric has no proprietary subject matter to study because
the phenomena and issues it claims as its own amount to a disparate set of items rather than
an autonomous category.“
2 Sperber undWilson (1980: 96).
3 Ähnlich haben die Linguisten der Lütticher Groupe μ die rhetorischen Figuren als Abwei-
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Standen Sperber und Wilson der Rhetorik ablehnend gegenüber, haben
andere Linguisten versucht, die beiden Systeme miteinander in Einklang zu
bringen. So betrachtet etwa Venier die Rhetorik als Teil der Pragmatik, die
sich mit dem persuasiven Aspekt der Sprache auseinandersetzt. Als Disziplin
beschäftigt sie sich vor allem mit der Perlokution, also mit der unmittelbaren
Wirkung eines Sprechakts auf den Rezipienten, während die Pragmatik auch
die Illokution, die Kraft eines Sprechakts, untersucht.4
Daneben darf nicht vergessen werden, dass die Aristotelische Rhetorik und
Logik für viele Pragmatiker wichtige Inspirationsquellen waren. So sind das
bekannte Kooperationsprinzip, auf dem gemäß Paul Grice die Konversation
beruht, und die vier Konversationsmaximen, in denen es sich entfaltet,5 das
Resultat seiner Anwendung der Logik auf die Kommunikation. Durch die
Benutzung bzw. Verletzung der von ihm identifiziertenMaximen verfolgt nach
Grice ein Sprecher eine kommunikative Absicht. Mit dem System der Konver-
sationsmaximen können die traditionellen rhetorischen Figuren hinsichtlich
ihrer kommunikativen Funktion als spezielle Fälle in einem viel weiter gefass-
ten System erklärt werden: Die Tautologie ist etwa eine klare Verletzung der
Maxime derQuantität, gemäßdermannur soviel Informationwie nötig liefern
soll, währendmit Hilfe von Ironie,Metapher, Litotes undHyperbel dieMaxime
der Qualität, gemäß der man nur das sagen soll, was man nicht für falsch hält,
manipuliert werden kann.
Auch das von John Austin, selbst ein Kenner des Aristoteles, entwickelte
Modell der Sprechakte, das eine Äußerung gemäß ihrer illokutionären Kraft
anstelle ihrer syntaktischen Form einteilt (Austin 21975), geht auf Protagoras
zurück, der die Äußerungen funktional in Befehle, Bitten, Fragen, Antworten,
Erzählungen, Appelle etc. eingeteilt hat.6
chungen von einer sprachlichen Nullstufe (degré zéro) verstanden. Vgl. zur Geschichte der
Rhetorik von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart den ausgezeichneten Überblick von Mortara
Garavelli (152014). Vgl. auch Cohen (1994), der antike und moderne Rhetoriktheorien mitein-
ander vergleicht.
4 Venier (2008: 11): „La retorica è la disciplina che si occupa del discorso persuasivo, del discorso
la cui azione è finalizzata alla persuasione, la pragmatica linguistica è invece più in generale
la disciplina che si occupa del potere azionale del linguaggio, che illustra perché ogni dire
possa essere concepito come un fare, e in che termini debba essere concepito come un fare.“
Ähnlich Piazza (2011), die von einemVerwandtschaftsverhältnis zwischenbeidenDisziplinen
ausgeht.
5 Vgl. dazu Grice (1989: 26), der das Kooperationsprinzip folgendermaßen formuliert: „Make
your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose
or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.“
6 Protagoras DK 80 A 13–17. Vgl. auch Arist. Poet. 19, 1456b9–19.
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Nicht nur die Sprechakttheorie, sondern auch einige Theorien der Höflich-
keit (‚politeness‘) lassen sich auf rhetorische Kategorien zurückführen. So wird
die Idee der Abmilderung (mitigatio bzw. deminutio bzw. μείωσις) bereits beim
Auct. ad Her. 4.38.50 formuliert.7 Auch das Gegenteil, die Steigerung (amplifi-
catio bzw. αὔξησις), ist ein Begriff der antiken Rhetoriktheorie. Diese beiden
Figuren bilden mutatis mutandis die Grundlage eines Modells, mit dem die
Strategien zur Abmilderung (bzw. zur Verstärkung) illokutionärer Akte in der
Interaktion beschrieben werden. Gleichermaßen lassen sich etwa rhetorische
TropenundFigurenwie Litotes, Euphemismus, Periphrase oderAposiopese als
Erscheinungsformen der deminutio erklären.8
2 Rhetorik und Pragmatik im antiken Drama
Bei der Analyse des Dramas und speziell der Tragödien des Euripides sind
bisher gelegentlich rhetorische und sporadisch pragmatische Ansätze ange-
wendet worden, wobei das Potential dieser beiden Disziplinen bei der Ana-
lyse der Tragödie noch lange nicht ausgeschöpft ist. Allerdings ist bei der
Anwendung besonders der Pragmatik, die zur Untersuchung realer verbaler
Interaktionen entwickelt worden ist, zu berücksichtigen, dass sich der dra-
matische Dialog, die häufigste Form der Kommunikation unter den dramatis
figurae, durch seinen fiktionalen und stets motivierten Charakter auszeich-
net und sich sowohl an die Zuhörer innerhalb der dramatischen Fiktion als
auch an ein Publikum außerhalb derselben richtet. Damit der Dichter die
von ihm intendierte Wirkung in verständlicher Weise erzeugen kann, muss
er einen sprachlichen code benutzen, den seine Rezipienten kennen, und der,
obgleich es sichumeineKunstsprachemit einemspeziellen stilistischenRegis-
ter handelt, mit der vom Publikum verwendeten Alltagssprache kommensura-
bel ist. Der dramatische Dialog ist daher meist dichter, kohärenter und rei-
cher an Informationen als die alltägliche Konversation; seine Sätze sind in
der Regel syntaktisch wohlgeformt und vollständiger, wobei die Missachtung
der Regeln der verbalen Interaktion (wie Schweigen, Unterbrechen etc.) meis-
tens bedeutungsvoll ist. Da also der dramatische Dialog denselben Regeln
wie die übrigen Arten von verbalen Interaktionen gehorcht, ist er dazu geeig-
net, sowohl mit Hilfe von Methoden, die wie die Rhetorik zur Analyse der
literarischen Kunstsprache verwendet werden, als auch mit solchen, welche
7 Vgl. Lausberg (31990: 145–146).
8 Dazu vor allem Caffi (2001: 29–30, 141–150).
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wie die Pragmatik die Funktionsmechanismen der Alltagssprache untersu-
chen, analysiert zu werden, um seine Besonderheiten zum Vorschein zu brin-
gen.9
Es gibt viele nützliche Arbeiten zur Sprache des antiken Dramas, die neben
Fragen zur Grammatik und zur Stilistik10 vor allem die rhetorische Gestaltung
einzelner ῥήσεις11 und der darin verwendeten rhetorischen Mittel untersucht
haben.12 Mit Hilfe der Rhetorik läßt sich neben der Gliederung der Reden und
der darin verwendeten Stilmittel vor allem die Argumentationstechnik der im
Drama involvierten Figuren beschreiben. Ältere Arbeiten haben sich mit der
rhetorischen Technik und den Quellen, aus denen Euripides diese entnom-
men haben könnte, befasst.13 Wie Riedweg mit Recht bemerkt hat, begnüg-
ten sich diese „mit der Aufzählung einschlägiger Euripidesstellen […] bzw.
mit eher oberflächlichen Strukturanalysen.“14 Neuere Arbeiten, die einzelnen
Phänomenen wie dem Agon,15 der Stichomythie,16 dem Botenbericht17 und
dem ‚speech in speech‘18 gewidmet sind, befassen sich partiell mit der rheto-
rischen Gestaltung. Es fehlen, wie Riedweg mit Recht bemerkt, systematische
Untersuchungen zu den in denTragödien verwendeten rhetorischenVerfahren
und ihren Funktionsmechanismen innerhalb der einzelnen Passagen und Stü-
cke. Eine derartige Analyse sollte sich indessen nicht auf die ῥήσεις beschrän-
ken, sondern sollte auch die schnellen verbalen Schlagabtausche des Dialogs
miteinbeziehen. Der dramatische Dialog kann trotz der relativen Starre und
9 Ungeheuer (1980: 46): „Solche Dialoge sind auch keinesfalls ‚künstlich‘ in dem Sinne,
dass sie gegen Regeln kommunikativen Gebarens verstoßen. Sie sind freilich (oder kön-
nen es sein) unrealistisch in ihrer Konzentration, aber gerade dieses Merkmal macht sie
für eine Analyse zum Zwecke kommunikationswissenschaftlicher Begriffsbildung inter-
essant.“
10 Zur Bedeutung der Rhetorik und Stilistik bei der Analyse antiker literarischer Texte vgl.
allgemein Landfester (1997).
11 Mannsperger (1971: 143) definiert jede mehr als 5–6 Verse lange, nicht unterbrochene und
gut gegliederte Äußerung, die nicht zu den lyrischen Partien gehört, als Rede (ῥῆσις).
12 Vgl. zur Bedeutung der Rhetorik in der Tragödie Pelling (2005); bei Euripides Goldhill
(1997), Dubischar (2001: 23–43) und Zimmermann (2011: 515). Die Bedenken gegen die
Anwendung einer auf Aristoteles fußenden Rhetorik, wie sie Bers (1994: 182) äußert, der
in Anlehnung an Gorgias die Überredung (πειθώ) untersuchen will, weisen in der Praxis
gegenüber traditionellen Definitionen keine Vorteile auf.
13 Vgl. z.B. Lechner (1874); Miller (1887); Tietze (1933).
14 Riedweg (2000: 6 Anm. 26).
15 Lloyd (1992); Dubischar (2001).
16 Vgl. Schwinge (1968); Seidensticker (1971).
17 De Jong (1991).
18 Bers (1997).
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Regelmäßigkeit seiner Struktur nicht auf eine Reihe von aufeinander folgen-
den ῥήσεις und Repliken (in der pragmatischen Terminologie ‚Redebeiträge‘19)
reduziert werden,20 sondern ist wie die reale Konversation das Produkt der
Interaktion seiner Teilnehmer, deren verbale Handlungen nicht nur auf die
kommunikativen Ziele der Sprecher, sondern auch auf die kontingenten Cha-
rakteristiken der Gesprächssituation und auf die Zuhörer ausgerichtet sind.21
Die rhetorischen Figuren und Techniken im Dialog müssen ebenso wie die
linguistischen und stilistischen Merkmale der Euripideischen Kunstsprache,
zu denen auch die metrische Form gehört, in einen weiter gefassten kommu-
nikativen Rahmen eingefügt und unter dem funktionalen Aspekt untersucht
werden.
Eine adäquate und tiefgreifende Studie des dramatischenDialogs unter dem
kommunikativen Aspekt benötigt eine weiter und allgemeiner gefasste Per-
spektive als die zwar nützlichen, aber beschränkten Betrachtungsweisen, die
in den bisherigen Studien zur Anwendung gekommen sind und die jeweils
nur einzelne Aspekte des Dialogs erfasst und analysiert haben. Die Pragma-
tik, die die Sprache als Form der Handlung und die Sprecher als Subjekte der
énonciation, die sich in einem Kontext befinden, betrachtet, bietet einen ganz-
heitlichen und umfassenden Ansatz, da sie eine Untersuchung der verbalen
Interaktionen in ihrer ganzen Komplexität ermöglicht. Infolgedessen kann sie
die rhetorische Analyse der Reden ergänzen und erweitern22 DieWirkung rhe-
torischer Mittel wird innerhalb der dramatischen Fiktion durch die Pragmatik
funktional erklärt und durch die Berücksichtigung anderer, für dasVerständnis
der verbalen Interaktionen signifikanter sprachlicher Phänomene, welche die
traditionelle Rhetorik und Stilistik nicht in ausreichendemMaße zu klassifizie-
ren imstande sind, ergänzt. Mithilfe der Pragmatik können die Mechanismen,
die den rhetorischen Figuren und Strategien zugrunde liegen, erklärt und hin-
sichtlich ihrer kommunikativen Funktionen erfasst werden. Die zahlreichen
analytischen und interpretativen Möglichkeiten, die von der Pragmatik zur
Untersuchung der dramatischen und theatralischen Kommunikation geliefert
19 Der Begriff ‚Redebeitrag‘ ist die Übersetzung des englischen ‚turn‘, so Meibauer (22001:
131); dagegen verwendet Pfister (112001) dafür durchgehend ‚Replik‘.
20 Pfister bemerkt (112001: 212–213), dass „sich rhetorische Analysen bisher im wesentlichen
auf die Analyse großer Reden im Drama beschränkt haben, ist daher zwar verständlich,
heißt aber, das heuristische Potential der Rhetorik nicht voll auszuschöpfen.“
21 Vgl. dazu Pfister (112001: 179), der die Bedeutung des sprachlichen Verhaltens für die Cha-
rakterisierung der Figuren betont.
22 Vgl. dazu Caffi (2001: 141–165); Larrazabal und Korta (2002); Venier (2008); Piazza
(2011).
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werden,23 sind erst seit kurzem auf die Erforschung der griechischen Tragödie
angewendet worden.
Für die Untersuchung der Tragödie haben erst wenige Forscher die Prag-
matik eingesetzt. Als erster hat Lloyd die Verwendung von Höflichkeitsstra-
tegien bei Sophokles und Euripides untersucht.24 Schuren hat die Stichomy-
thien in Euripides mit Hilfe der Gesprächsanalyse und der Soziolinguistik
analysiert.25 Eine Pilotstudie zur Anwendung der Pragmatik und Soziolingu-
istik hat van Emde Boas anhand von Euripides’ Elektra vorgelegt, wobei er,
wenn auch unsystematisch, bisweilen die rhetorische Technik berücksichtigt
hat.26
Eine Studie, welche beide Ansätze konsequent miteinander verbindet, eine
methodologisch fundierte Grundlage zur rhetorisch-pragmatischen Analyse
antiker Texte bietet und konkrete Anwendungsmöglichkeiten dieser Methode
im antiken Drama auslotet, bleibt aber weiterhin ein Desiderat.
3 Rhetorik und Pragmatik imOrestes
Im folgenden soll anhand eines bisher bei der Interpretation desOresteswenig
untersuchten Abschnittes exemplarisch aufgezeigt werden, wieman die rheto-
rische Analyse mit der Pragmatik (Gesprächsanalyse, Sprechakt-Theorie und
Höflichkeits-Modelle) verbinden und auch kurze, aus wenigen Versen beste-
hende Repliken analysieren kann, um die sprachliche Charakterisierung der
handelnden Figuren, die Technik des Dialogs bei Euripides und die Konventio-
nen der dramatischen Kunstsprache besser zu erfassen.
Der vierte Akt desOrestes (1013–1245)27 umfasst die Ereignisse nach der Ver-
urteilung des Orestes und seiner Schwester Elektra wegen Muttermords zum
Tode und leitet zum zweiten Teil des Stücks, der Intrige, über.
Orest, dessen Herannahen der Chor gemeldet hat, wird von seiner Schwes-
ter Elektra, die durch den Botenbericht umdasTodesurteil weiß,mit folgenden
Worten empfangen.
23 Eine Übersicht über moderne Ansätze gibt Hess-Lüttich (1980: 5–22, 2001a, 2001b).
24 Lloyd (2006, 2009).
25 Schuren (2015).
26 Van Emde Boas (2017a). Ebenso hat van Emde Boas (2017b) die Gesprächsanalyse mit
besonderer Berücksichtigung der Partikeln zur Untersuchung von zwei Dialogen aus Ais-
chylos Agamemnon und Sophokles Aias verwendet.
27 Vgl. zum Kontext der HandlungWillink (1986: 258) undWright (2008: 42–44).
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[1] Euripides Orestes 1018–102128
οἲ ’γώ· πρὸ τύμβου γάρ σ’ ὁρῶσ’ ἀναστένω,
ἀδελφέ, καὶ πάροιθε νερτέρων πυρᾶς.29
οἲ ’γὼ μάλ’ αὖθις· ὥς σ’ ἰδοῦσ’ ἐν ὄμμασιν
πανυστάτην πρόσοψιν ἐξέστην φρενῶν.
Wehmir! Ich seufze, da ich hier anGrabes Rand, so nah dem Scheiterhau-
fen, Bruder, dich erblicken muss. Und aber wehmir: heute sie mein Auge
dich zum letzten Male – ganz vergehn die Sinne mir.30
Elektra beginnt, nachdem sie ihren Bruder Orestes gesehen hat, eine laute
Klage. Die beiden leichten Enjambements (1018–1019 mit Hiat und 1020–1021)
sprengen die enge Sinneinheit desTrimeters, passen ihreÄußerung demnatür-
lichen Fluss der Rede an und erweitern den Raum für den emphatische Aus-
druck ihrerGefühle.31Mit einemHysteronproteron32 äußert Elektra die furcht-
bareVision ihres Bruders Orestes vor demGrab (1018) und dem Scheiterhaufen
(1019) und schließlich in zwei Versen ihr letztes Wiedersehen mit ihrem Bru-
der (1020–1021). Die beiden Perioden sind durch ein Verhältnis der Steigerung
geprägt, welche die imaginierte (1018 ὁρῶσ’) neben die reale, pleonastisch mit
der homerischenWendung ἰδοῦσ’ ἐν ὄμμασιν33 ausgedrückte Sicht des Bruders
(1020) – Ausdrücke des Sehens bilden die Klammer ihrer Aussage – stellen:
zunächstmit demPräsens ἀναστένω (1018), dannmit dem tragischenAorist ἐξέ-
στην (1021), dermit Hilfe vonKlangfiguren verstärkt wird und die Aufgeregtheit
ihrer Stimmung anzeigt.34 Sie drückt ihre starken Emotionen in einem expres-
28 Der Text stammt, wo nicht anders angegeben, aus Diggle (1994).
29 DieKorrektur von Jacobs νερτέρων πύλης anstelle des überlieferten νερτέρου πυρᾶς ist nicht
nötig, vgl. Eur. Alc. 608 φέρουσιν ἄρδην πρὸς τάφον τε καὶ πυράν. Biehl (1965: 113): „Die
metaphorische Bezeichnung ‚Grab‘ bzw. ‚Totenscheiterhaufen‘ (Suppl. 1058) enthalten die
gleiche Vorstellung (‚Tod‘) mit unterschiedlichem Gefühlsgehalt (als ‚climax‘).“ Dagegen
hält West (1987: 256) νερτέρου πύλης für eine „poetic duplication“ von τύμβου.
30 Die Übersetzung stammt, wo nicht anders angeben, von Donner u.a. (2016).
31 Zum Enjambement in der tragischen Dichtung Battezzato (2001).
32 Battezzato (22018: 36) betont, dass „l’hysteronproteron aggiunge un elemento specifico alle
circostanze e utile a precisare i dettagli della narrazione o della conversazione.“
33 Vgl. etwa Hom. Il. 1.587 und 18.190.
34 Kühner und Gerth (1898: II 163–164). Biehl (1965: 113) nennen ihn „Aorist zur Bezeichnung
der imAugenblick vor sich gehendenAffektäußerung.“ Lloyd (1999: 43), der den tragischen
Aorist auf performative Verben beschränkt, betrachtet Fälle wie diesen als „descriptive“
Aorist, bei dem „the reference is to a particular emotional impulse rather than to a settled
attitude.“
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siven Sprechakt35 aus, der auch die Funktion der Kontaktaufnahme erfüllt. Die
Wiederholung der Formel οἲ ’γώ36 an derselben Stelle zu Beginn des Verses und
der Periode (1018 und 1020) verleiht der Aussage ebenso wie die Alliteration
auf p-Laute (1019 und 1021) und das Homoioteleuton (1021) Emphase. Mit dem
Vokativ ἀδελφέ (1019) wendet sie sich direkt an Orest, um seine Aufmerksam-
keit auf sich zu ziehen, und versucht ihn dadurch an sich zu binden, dass sie
das Verhältnis der Verwandtschaft betont.
[2] Euripides Orestes 1022–1023
οὐ σῖγ’ ἀφεῖσα τοὺς γυναικείους γόους
στέρξεις τὰ κρανθέντ’; οἰκτρὰ μὲν τάδ’, ἀλλ’ ὅμως.37
Dem, was verhängt ist, füge dich und lasse von derWeiberklage: zwar ist’s
schmerzlich – dennoch trag’s.
Orestes äußert in seiner ersten Replik ebenso sehr emphatisch in eineinhalb
Versen einen direktiven Sprechakt,38 mit dem er auch die Klage seiner Schwes-
ter indirekt rügt. Der negative Befehl wird durch die Sperrstellung mit Enjam-
bement (οὐ … στέρξεις;),39 Assonanz und Homoioteleuton γυναικείους γόους –
so deutet er tadelnd Elektras Klage im vorangehenden Redebeitrag – verstärkt.
In Antinomie zur Klage gibt er imBefehl das seinerMeinung angemesseneVer-
halten, das im Schweigen σῖγ’ (1022) besteht, an. Ist sein direktiver Sprechakt
zunächst schroff und ohne Höflichkeitsstrategien, enthält die elliptisch ange-
deutete Erklärungmit der Antithese οἰκτρὰ μὲν τάδ’ eine concessio und zugleich
eine leichte Abmilderung des Befehls durch eine Strategie positiver Höflich-
keit,40 da er für Elektras Verhalten Verständnis zeigt, auch wenn er mit der in
35 Mit einemexpressiven Sprechakt drückt ein Sprecher einen psychischen Zustand aus, vgl.
Meibauer (22001: 95).
36 Ebenso Hec. 1035–1037; Med. 1008–1009; Tro. 628–629; Aesch. Ag. 1343–1345; Cho. 876.
37 Der vonKirchhoff getilgteVers 1024φέρειν σ’ ἀνάγκη τὰς παρεστῶσας τύχας, der denDuktus
der Distichomythie zerstört und beim Scholiasten fehlt, ist wahrscheinlich eine spätere
Interpolation.
38 Mit einem direktiven Sprechakt will ein Sprecher seinen Gesprächspartner zur Aus-
führung bzw. Unterlassung einer künftigen Handlung verpflichten. Direktive sind Verben
wie ‚befehlen‘, ‚auffordern‘, ‚bitten‘, ‚einladen‘ etc., vgl. Meibauer (22001: 195).
39 Zum verneinten Befehl mit οὐ und Futur vgl. Kühner und Gerth (1898: I 176), die betonen,
dass in dieser Frage „das Begehrte in strengem und drohendem Tone, zuweilen mit einer
gewissen ironischen Bitterkeit ausgesagt wird.“
40 Positive Höflichkeitsstrategien sind diejenigen, mit denen man den Gesprächspartner
lobt oder ihm Solidarität bekundet, vgl. Meibauer (22001: 114–116).
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Antithese stehendenelliptischenAussageἀλλ’ ὅμως41 an seiner Position festhält
und der Gesprächspartnerin zu verstehen gibt, dass er nicht weiter sprechen
will. Die Tatsache, dass die Abmilderung nur einen halben Vers umfasst und
am Ende steht, sowie das Fehlen eines Vokativs zeigen, dass er der Gesprächs-
partnerin kaum Beachtung schenkt.42
[3] Euripides Orestes 1025–1026
καὶ πῶς σιωπῶ; φέγγος εἰσορᾶν θεοῦ
τόδ’ οὐκέθ’ ἡμῖν τοῖς ταλαιπώροις μέτα.
Wie kann ich still sein? Dieses Licht des Himmels hier zu schauen, ist uns
Armen nicht vergönnt hinfort.
Elektra ihrerseits lehnt geschickt Orestes‘ Befehl zu schweigen mit der kur-
zen (bis zur Penthemimeres reichenden) rhetorischen Frage καὶ πῶς σιωπῶ
ab, die durch die dunklen o-Laute Wucht erhält.43 Formal eine Frage, die
dem Gesprächspartner die Möglichkeit zur Antwort gibt, mildert sie als ‚off-
record‘-Strategie44 die Ablehnung von Orestes’ Befehl ab, die im Gegensatz
zur Annahme desselben das nicht-präferierte Komplement der Paarsequenz
Befehl-Annahme/Ablehnung ist, d.h. dasjenige Komplement, dessen Verwirk-
lichung dem Sprecher schwerer fällt.45 Sie mildert diese zusätzlich mit einer
Erklärung, also mit positiver Höflichkeit ab, die eineinhalb Verse umfasst,
durch die Alliteration auf t-Laute emotional verstärkt wird und durch das
gehobene poetische Vokabular feierlich erscheint: φέγγος εἰσορᾶν θεοῦ (met-
41 Ebenso Eur. Hec. 843; El. 753; IA 904; Ar. Ach. 956, 1024.
42 Nach Dickey (1996: 193) zeigt das Fehlen des Vokativs am Anfang an, dass der Sprecher „is
angry, or is being insulting.“
43 Zu Fragen der Lautmalerei haben sich bereits in der Antike Grammatiker und Rhetoriker
wieDionysios vonHalikarnass geäußert, der etwa inComp. 14 die eu- undkakophonischen
Qualitäten der Laute anhandmehrerer Beispiele beschreibt. Vgl. dazu auchHofmann und
Szantyr (1972: 712–714) und Ercolani (2003).
44 In der Terminologie der Höflichkeitstheorie von Brown und Levinson (21987) wird eine
Aussage, die zur Gesichtswahrung des Adressaten nur indirekt gemacht wird, ‚off record‘
genannt, vgl. dazu Meibauer (22001: 114–116).
45 Zu den Paarsequenzen, englisch ‚adjacency pairs‘, vgl. Meibauer (22001: 133–135). Die
Gesprächsanalyse hat gezeigt, dass bei der durch einen Befehl eröffneten Paarsequenz
die Annahme leichter ist und daher schnell undmühelos ausgesprochenwird, also ‚präfe-
riert‘ ist, während die Ablehnung möglichst vermieden oder mit größerer Schwierigkeit
und wortreicher ausgedrückt wird, weshalb sie ‚nicht-präferiert‘ ist. Vgl. zum System der
Präferenzen Schegloff (2007).
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onymisch statt ἡλίου) ist die Periphrase des Begriffs „Leben“. Durch das beide
Geschwister umfassende Personalpronomen ἡμῖν (1026) markiert sie sodann
Gemeinsamkeit mit ihrem Gesprächspartner.
[4] Euripides Orestes 1027–1028
σὺ μή μ’ ἀπόκτειν’· ἅλις ἀπ’ Ἀργείας χερὸς
τέθνηχ’ ὁ τλήμων· τὰ δὲ παρόντ’ ἔα κακά.
Nicht töte dumich! Schon genug vonVolkeshandbin ich gemordet: denke
nicht an dieses Leid!
Orest wendet sich wieder mit dem verneinten Imperativ Präsens ἀπόκτειν’
(ἀποκτείνω wird hier metaphorisch gebraucht),46 in einem erneuten Befehls-
akt bzw. einerWarnung sarkastisch an seine Schwester, die er ohneVokativ nur
mit dem Personalpronomen σύ – emphatisch an der Spitze des Satzes und kei-
neswegs höflich – anspricht. Er fordert sarkastisch in einer Übertreibung, sie
solle ihn nicht töten, wobei diesmal Orest neben emphatischen Mitteln wie
Alliterationen und auf m- und t-Laute (1028) seine Aussage analog zum vor-
herigen Redebeitrag seiner Schwester durch das Enjambement erweitert und
neben seinem implizitenTadel vor allem seinenUnmut über ihr Verhalten und
seine Ungeduld äußert. Mit dem Adverb ἅλις und dem Adjektiv τλήμων (1028)
drückt Orest ein gewisses Selbstmitleid als Begründung für sein Verhalten aus,
was als positive Höflichkeitsstrategie seine Aussage abmildert. Mit dem zwei-
ten Befehl ἔα κακά am Ende, der durch die vielen a-Laute seine Unduldsamkeit
unterstreicht,47 widerspricht er der Aussage seiner Schwester und fordert sie
erneut auf, sich nicht um das gegenwärtige Leiden zu kümmern. Da dieser
Befehl in einem gewissen Sinn Elektra trösten soll, also in ihrem Interesse ist,
wird er nicht abgemildert.
[5] Euripides Orestes 1029–1030
ὦ μέλεος ἥβης σῆς,Ὀρέστα, καὶ πότμου
θανάτου τ’ ἀώρου· ζῆν ἐχρῆν σ’, ὅτ’ οὐκέτ’ εἶ.
46 In gleicher Bedeutung wird das Verb ἀποκτείνειν in Eur. Hipp. 1064 verwendet. Der Impe-
rativ Präsens drückt gemäß seinem Aspekt die Dauer bzw. den Verlauf der Handlung aus,
ohne dass auf deren Abschluss Rücksicht genommen wird, vgl. Kühner und Gerth (1898:
II 189).
47 Mit der Häufung von a-Lauten werden in der Tragödie oft Leiden und Schmerzen ausge-
drückt, vgl. dazu Ercolani (2003: 187, 192) mit Beispielen aus den Persern des Aischylos.
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Mich jammert deine Jugend und dein früher Tod, o Bruder: leben sollst
du, und bist dahin.
Elektra fährt unbeeindruckt von Orestes’ Redebeiträgen in ihrer Klage fort
und wendet sich mit dem Vokativ Ὀρέστα direkt an Orestes, wobei die vie-
len Homoioteleuta dem mit der Partikel ὦ verstärkten Ausruf des Kummers48
(1029) Nachdruck verleihen. Der antithetischeNachsatz ζῆν […] εἶ verstärkt das
Adjektiv ἀώρου. Ebenso verleihen die polysyndetisch verbundenen Synonyme
πότμου und θανάτου dem Gedanken, dass das Leben (ζῆν), das als summum
bonum aufgefasst wird, als dessen Negation ihrem Gedanken Tiefe. Dadurch,
dass sie ihren Bruder ins Zentrum der Klage stellt, also sozusagen ihren expres-
siven Sprechakt in seinem Interesse verwirklicht, begründet sie indirekt ihre
Missachtungder vonOrest in der vorangehendenReplik ausgesprochenenAuf-
forderung.
[6] Euripides Orestes 1031–1032
μὴ πρὸς θεῶν μοι περιβάληις ἀνανδρίαν,
ἐς δάκρυα πορθμεύουσ’ ὑπομνήσει κακῶν.
Nicht, bei denGöttern, treibemich zu feigerTat, dieTräneweckenddurch
des Leids Erinnerung.
Emphatisch mit der Schwurformel μὴ πρὸς θεῶν, also mit einer Strategie nega-
tiver Höflichkeit,49 bittet Orest in einem direktiven Sprechakt, der schwächer
als ein Befehl ist, und mit dem prohibitiven Konjunktiv Aorist, der ebenfalls
schwächer als die in den vorangehenden Repliken gebrauchten Imperative
ist,50 seine Schwester, ihn mit ihrer Klage nicht zu einem unschicklichen Ver-
halten zu verleiten. Ihr Handeln beschreibt er metaphorisch mit zwei Bildern
περιβάλῃς und πορθμεύουσ’.51 Der Wechsel von positiver zu negativer Höflich-
keit ist ein Anzeichen für Orestes’ Hilflosigkeit gegenüber seiner Schwester; er
48 Vgl. 160 und Hec. 425; IT 868; Med. 358 und Biehl (1965: 114).
49 NegativeHöflichkeitsstrategien sind diejenigen,mit denenman sich beimGesprächspart-
ner für die mit dem Sprechakt verbundene (mögliche) Einschränkung seiner Handlungs-
freiheit entschuldigt, vgl. Meibauer (22001: 114–116).
50 Kühner undGerth (1898: I 238) ziehen die abmilderndeWirkung des Konjunktivs gegenü-
ber dem Imperativ in Betracht.
51 Vgl. Eur. Or. 786, wo Orest das ἀκλεῶς κατθανεῖν als ἄνανδρον zurückweist, und Herakles
Soph. Trach. 1071–1074, der dasWeinen als unmännlich ablehnt.
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hat keine guten Argumente, um sie von ihrem Verhalten abzubringen, nach-
dem in seinemRedebeitrag davor (1027–1028) die Selbstbemitleidung nicht die
gewünschteWirkung erzielt hatte. Er begründet seinVerhaltenmit demEhren-
kodex, alsomit dem τελικὸν κεφάλαιον des καλόν, was auch als positive Höflich-
keitsstrategie dient, da das Begründen des eigenen Verhaltens höflich ist.
[7] Euripides Orestes 1033–1034
θανούμεθ’· οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ στένειν κακά·
πᾶσιν γὰρ οἰκτρὸν ἡ φίλη ψυχὴ βροτοῖς.
Wir gehn zum Tode: Seufzer weckt das Leiden stets, und jammernd lässt
sein Leben nur der Sterbliche.
Elektra dagegen wiederholt die Feststellung, dass sie beide im Sterben liegen,
indem sie asyndetisch die 1. Person Plural θανούμεθ’ (1033) verwendet, und die
Folge, dass es unmöglich ist, nicht zu klagen, durch die doppelte Negation (οὐχ
οἷόν τε μὴ …) verstärkt, wobei die unpersönliche und gnomische Ausdrucks-
weise als negative Höflichkeitsstrategie ihre Aussage, mit der sie indirekt Ores-
tes’ Bitte zurückweist, abmildert. Ebenso wie Orest begründet sie ihr eigenes
Verhalten mit einer Gnome (1034), welche mit οἰκτρόν Orestes’ οἰκτρά (1023)
wiederaufnimmt und die allgemein anerkannte Maxime (πᾶσιν […] βροτοῖς als
versumschließendesHyperbaton) durchdieAlliteration auf Labiale untermalt.
Inder FolgewechseltOrestes, demesnicht gelungen ist, die Schwester vomKla-
gen abzubringen, das Thema (1035) und sprichtmit ihr über die verschiedenen
Todesarten. Elektra akzeptiert, sich selbst zu töten. Orest ändert dabei allmäh-
lich seinen Ton und spricht seine Schwester nun liebevoll an. Dies geschieht
nicht unmittelbar, sondern in mehreren Schritten, die wohl durch den körper-
lichen Kontakt und die nichtverbale Kommunikation verstärkt werden.
Zunächst reagiert Orestes sarkastisch auf Elektras Bitte (1042), ihn zu umar-
men:
[8] Euripides Orestes 1043–1044
τέρπου κενὴν ὄνησιν, εἰ τερπνὸν τόδε
θανάτου πέλας βεβῶσι περιβαλεῖν χέρας.
Sei froh der eitlen Freude, wenn dir’s Freude macht, den Arm um die zu
schlingen, die zum Tode gehn.
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Als Konzession52 gewährt er ihr diese als κενή – was eine klare Kritik ist –
bezeichnete Freude (1043), die durch Assonanz, Paronomasie (τέρπου / τερ-
πνὸν) und die Alliterationen auf Dentale und Labiale im Enjambement ver-
stärkt wird. Sein indirekt geäußerter Tadel wird dadurch, dass er in einemKon-
ditionalsatz ausgedrückt wird, etwas abgemildert, da er die Möglichkeit, dass
die Umarmung τερπνόν ist, offenlässt.
[9] Euripides Orestes 1045–1046
ὦ φίλτατ’, ὦ ποθεινὸν ἥδιστόν τ’ ἔχων
†τῆς σῆς ἀδελφῆς ὄνομα† καὶ ψυχὴν μίαν.53
Du Liebster, der die Züge seiner Schwester trägt, die süßen, heißgeliebten,
ganz ein Sinn mit ihr.
Trotz Orestes’ Sarkasmus setzt Elektra ihre Rede unbeirrt fort und antwor-
tet nicht mehr auf den Redebeitrag ihres Bruders, sondern drückt wieder in
einem expressiven Sprechakt sehr erregt mit zweimaligem durch ὦ eingeleite-
tem Ausruf, Superlativ, Enjambement und Hyperbaton ihre Emotionen aus.54
Sie betont ihre Verwandtschaft (1046) und sagt hyperbolisch, dass sie beide ein
einziges Leben (ψυχὴν μίαν) sind.
[10] Euripides Orestes 1047–1051
ἔκ τοί με τήξεις· καί σ’ ἀμείψασθαι θέλω
φιλότητι χειρῶν. τί γὰρ ἔτ’ αἰδοῦμαι τάλας;
ὦ στέρν’ ἀδελφῆς, ὦ φίλον πρόσπτυγμ’ ἐμόν,
τάδ’ ἀντὶ παίδων καὶ γαμηλίου λέχους
προσφθέγματ’ ἀμφοῖν τοῖς ταλαιπώροις πάρα.55
52 Biehl (1965: 115) weist auf den konzessiven Imperativ hin, vgl. Kühner und Gerth (1898:
I 236–237).
53 West (1987: 131) hat dagegen τῆι σῆι γ’ ἀδελφῆι σῶμα und übersetzt: „O my dearest, whose
body is lovable and most delightful to your sister“. Biehl (1965: 115) hält mit Recht an τῆς
σῆς ἀδελφῆς ὄνομα fest: „Elektra kann die Bezeichnung ‚Bruder‘ nur so lange anwenden
bzw. die Bezeichnung ‚Schwester‘ hören, wie Orest lebt.“
54 Den Vokativ ὦ φίλτατ’ verwendet Elektra auch Eur. El. gegenüber Orestes. Mit dem Super-
lativφίλτατεwird inderTragödie einnahes Familienmitglied angesprochen, vgl. vanEmde
Boas (2017a: 99).
55 West (1987: 257) betrachtet diese Verse, die die Distichomythie unterbrechen, analog zu
255–257 als echt.Willink (1986: 263) bezeichnet alle dreiVerse als unpassend undhält eine
Interpolation aus einem anderen Stück für möglich.
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Du wirst mein Herz erweichen, lass denn meinen Arm auch dich umfan-
gen, denn was soll mich noch scheun? O Schwesterbrust! O Traute, die
mein Arm umschlingt! Statt lieber Kinder, statt des Glücks der Ehe blieb
uns Armen dieserWorte Trost allein vergönnt.
Elektras Strategie, die aus verbaler und nichtverbaler Kommunikation besteht,
ist dabei, Orestes’ Herz zu erweichen, wie er selbst feststellt.56 In hoher poeti-
scher Sprache, wie die pathossteigernde Tmesis ἐκ … τήξεις mit der Metapher
des Schmelzens zeigt, widerruft er seine frühere Aussage über die Männlich-
keit (1031–1032) mit einer rhetorischen Frage (1048) off-record, wohl um sein
Gesicht zu wahren. Er erwidert sodann die Umarmung, bedient sich also auch
der nicht-verbalen Kommunikation, und drückt ähnlich wie seine Schwester
mit zweimaligem, durch ὦ eingeleitetem Ausruf – das erste Mal in diesem
Gespräch, dass er Elektra liebevoll anspricht – seine Geschwisterliebe aus.
Vom Selbstmitleid (1048 τάλας; vgl. 1028 τλήμων) geht er zum Mitleid mit dem
Schicksal beider (1051 ἀμφοῖν τοῖς ταλαιπώροις; vgl. Elektra 1026 ταλαιπώροις)
über und verrichtet ähnlich wie Elektra im Redebeitrag davor einen expressi-
ven Sprechakt der Klage, wobei der Gegensatz durch Antithese mit Paradoxon
(die geschwisterliche Umarmung anstelle von Kindern und Heirat, also ein
Hysteron proteron), Hyperbaton und Enjambement (1050–1051) den Sprech-
akt verstärkt.
In der Folge (1052–1064) äußert Elektra denWunsch nach einem gemeinsa-
men Grab und fragt erst jetzt (1056–1057), ob der als böse (1057) bezeichnete
Menelaos ihm geholfen hat. In einer längeren ῥῆσις antwortet Orestes kurz,
dassMenelaos nichts getan hat. Seine grimmige Entschlossenheit, seinenWert
und seine Abstammung (1060–1061) durch einen glorreichen Tod zu bewei-
sen, wird durch die Alliteration auf Labiale ἀποδείξω πόλει, παίσας πρὸς ἧπαρ
φασγάνῳ (1061–1062) verstärkt. Dannwendet er sich seinemFreund Pylades zu,
der das ganze Gespräch zwischen den Geschwistern stummmitverfolgt hat.
[11] Euripides Orestes 1065–1068
Πυλάδη, σὺ δ’ ἡμῖν τοῦ φόνου γενοῦ βραβεύς,
καὶ κατθανόντοιν εὖ περίστειλον δέμας
56 Das Futur hier und 1048 zeigt, dass „siamo quindi in presenza di un processo che viene
descritto nel suo stesso sorgere“ (Di Benedetto 1965: 209), vgl. auch Kühner und Gerth
(1898: I 173, Nr. 5). Im Gegensatz dazu erwidert Iphigenie in der IA 1433–1466 die Tränen
und die Umarmungen derMutter nicht, weil sie derenWahrnehmung der Situation nicht
teilt (siehe auch Sorrentino in diesem Band).
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θάψον τε κοινῆι πρὸς πατρὸς τύμβον φέρων.
καὶ χαῖρ’· ἐπ’ ἔργον δ’, ὡς ὁρᾶις, πορεύομαι.
Du, Pylades, sollst unsers Todes Zeuge sein. Für unsere Leichen sorge
wohl, sind wir dahin, vereint bestatte bei dem Grab des Vaters uns und
lebe wohl. Ich schreite, wie du siehst, zur Tat.
Er spricht ihnmit demNamenΠυλάδη an, wobei der Vokativ hier lediglich den
Wechsel des Adressaten anzeigt. Orest sieht sich und Elektra als Einheit (ἡμῖν
und 1067 κοινῆι), von der er Pylades unterscheidet (σὺ δ’). Der Befehl, durch drei
Imperative und Homoioteleuton verstärkt, findet erst durch den Abschieds-
gruß am Ende καὶ χαῖρ’ (1068)57 eine leichte Abmilderung; dass Orest seitens
seines Freundes keine Replik, sondern die stille Ausführung seines Befehls
erwartet, zeigt die letzte Aussage, dass er jetzt zur Tat schreitet; mit dem star-
ken affektivenEinschubὡς ὁρᾶιςwill er dieAufmerksamkeit unddie (implizite)
Zustimmung seines Freundes erreichen, mildert aber zugleich mit dieser Stra-
tegie positiver Höflichkeit den Befehl ab, indem er eine Begründung für sein
Verhalten angibt.
[12] Euripides Orestes 1069–1070
ἐπίσχες· ἓν μὲν πρῶτά σοι μομφὴν ἔχω,
εἰ ζῆν με χρήιζειν σοῦ θανόντος ἤλπισας.
Halt ein! Vor allem muss ich eins dir tadeln, wenn du wähntest, dass ich
leben will, wenn du mir stirbst.
Pylades erwidert auf Orestes’ Befehl mit einer nicht-präferierten Ablehnung,
die mit dem Imperativ ἐπίσχες sehr stark und aufgrund der Dringlichkeit der
Situation hier nicht abgemildert wird, also in der Terminologie der Höflich-
keit ‚bald on record‘58 ist. Der explizit geäußerte Tadel ἓν μὲν πρῶτά σοι μομ-
φὴν ἔχω (1069) wird aber durch den εἰ- statt ὅτι-Satz als hypothetisch abgemil-
57 καὶ verbindet χαῖρ’ nicht mit dem vorausgehenden Imperativ, sondern steigert χαῖρ’, so
richtig Biehl (1965: 118), vgl. KühnerundGerth (1898: II 248Nr. 5).Die Junkturκαὶ χαῖρεbzw.
χαίρετε wird in der Tragödie immer bei Trennungen verwendet und dient als Abschieds-
gruß, vgl. dazu Ercolani (2000: 187).
58 In der Terminologie der Höflichkeitsmodelle wird eine Aussage, die direkt und für den
Adressaten ‚gesichtsbedrohend‘ ist, ‚bald on record‘ genannt, vgl. dazu Meibauer (22001:
114–116).
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dert,59 wobei der zentrale Gedanke – Pylades mag nicht leben, wenn Orest
stirbt – durch die kunstvolle rhetorische Ausarbeitung mit der Antinomie von
Leben undTod im äußeren sowie von Pylades undOrestes in inneren Ring (ζῆν
με χρήιζειν ↔ σοῦ θανόντος) besonderes Gewicht erhält.60 Der Gegensatz zwi-
schen beidenwird also durch denGebrauch der Personalpronomina der ersten
und zweiten Person (σοι, με, σοῦ) markiert.
Nach diesem ersten Schlagabtauschwird das in Pylades’ Replik vorgegebene
Thema ζῆν με χρῄζειν σοῦ θανόντος in einer Stichomythie ausgetragen.
[13] Euripides Orestes 1071
τί γὰρ προσήκει κατθανεῖν σ’ ἐμοῦ μέτα;
Warum gebührte dir, mit mir zu sterben, Freund?
Orest beginnt sein Gegenargument ‚off record‘ mit der lebhaften rhetorischen
Frage (τί γάρ […] μέτα), die von Pylades als Aussage bzw. Aufforderung verstan-
den werden soll, dem unpersönlichen προσήκει und der Wiederaufnahme des
Gegensatzes der beiden hinsichtlich des Sterbens. Er betrachtet das Opfer des
Pylades als etwas, das außerhalb dessen ist, was sich gehört (προσήκει), und
daher nicht gerechtfertigt ist.
[14] Euripides Orestes 1072
ἤρου; τί δὲ ζῆν σῆς ἑταιρίας ἄτερ;
Du fragst? O Freund, wie kann ich leben ohne dich?
Durch ἤρου61 zeigt Pylades, dass er Orestes’ uneigentliche Frage nicht akzep-
tiert, sondern empört dessen Sprechakt zurückweist, wie die (rhetorische)
Gegenfrage beweist, die statt des Todes nun wieder das Leben fokussiert und
seine Aussage von Vers 1070 präzisiert. Als Prädikat des zweiten Fragesatzes ist
προσήκει aus demvorangehenden Satz zu ergänzen. SeineAussage ist somit die
59 Di Benedetto (1965: 213): „εἰ introduce quindi inaspettatamente una attenuazione del rim-
provero.“ Vgl. Kühner und Gerth (1898: II 369, Nr. 8).
60 Ähnlich äußert sich Pylades gegenüber Orest auch Eur. IT 674–686 in einer Rede, die
wie hier in einem Dialog zwischen den beiden Freunden steht und vielleicht als Vorlage
diente.
61 Vgl. ebenso Eur. El. 275 ἤρου τόδ’; αἰσχρόν γ’ εἶπας…mit ähnlicher Funktion.
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exakte Negation von Orestes’ Redebeitrag, aber als neues Element kommt die
Kameradschaft (ἑταιρία)62 als Wert hinzu, die sein Verhalten als passend (also
als προσῆκον) rechtfertigt.
[15] Euripides Orestes 1073
οὐκ ἔκτανες σὺ μητέρ’, ὡς ἐγὼ τάλας.
Du schlugest deine Mutter nicht, wie ich getan.
Da Pylades Orestes’ Ansinnen erfolgreich widerstanden hat, wechselt Orest
jetzt das Argument.Wiederumwird der Gegensatz zwischen den beiden durch
den Gebrauch der Personalpronomina σύ und ἐγώmarkiert. Wie schon in Vers
1048 nennt er sich τάλας und äußert damit Selbstmitleid.
[16] Euripides Orestes 1074
σὺν σοί γε κοινῆι · ταὐτὰ καὶ πάσχειν με δεῖ.
Ich tat es mit dir: teil ich denn dein Leiden auch!
Pylades übernimmt wieder die Satzaussage des Orestes, korrigiert sie aber
durch den elliptischen Zusatz σὺν σοί γε κοινῆι (zu ergänzen ist als Prädikat
aus Orestes Replik, allerdings in der 1. Person ἔκτανον), wobei σὺν und κοινῆι
zwar pleonastisch wirken, aber die Einheit der beiden betonten, und durch die
Alliteration und die Partikel γε verstärkt werden, was eine starke emotionale
Ergriffenheit anzeigt. Wie schon Elektra in Vers 1067 verwendet er das Adverb
κοινῇ, um ihre Einheit, die typisch für die Freundschaft ist, zu betonen.63
[17] Euripides Orestes 1075–1083
ἀπόδος τὸ σῶμα πατρί, μὴ σύνθνηισκέ μοι.
σοὶ μὲν γάρ ἐστι πόλις, ἐμοὶ δ’ οὐκ ἔστι δή,
καὶ δῶμα πατρὸς καὶ μέγας πλούτου λιμήν·
γάμων δὲ τῆς μὲν δυσπότμου τῆσδ’ ἐσφάλης,
62 Dieser Ausdruck bezeichnet besonders im politischen Bereich eine spezielle Art der
Freundschaft (etwa bei Konspirationen wie im vorliegenden Fall und bei Thuc. 3.82.4–
6), vgl. dazu Konstan (1997: 60–63).
63 Vgl. den bekannten Ausspruch z.B. in Pl. Phaedr. 279c κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων.
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ἥν σοι κατηγγύησ’ ἑταιρίαν σέβων·
σὺ δ’ ἄλλο λέκτρον παιδοποίησαι λαβών·
κῆδος δὲ τοὐμὸν καὶ σὸν οὐκέτ’ ἔστι δή.
ἀλλ’, ὦ ποθεινὸν ὄμμ’ ὁμιλίας ἐμῆς,
χαῖρ’· οὐ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστι τοῦτο, σοί γε μήν·
Gib Deinem Vater dich zurück, stirb nicht mit mir! Du hast noch eine
Vaterstadt, ich keine mehr, ein Vaterhaus noch und des Reichtums wei-
ten Port. Zwar dieser Unglückselgen Hand erhältst du nicht, die, deine
Freundschaft ehrend, ich dir angelobt: Zum Ehesegen suche dir ein and-
res Weib; nicht mein Verwandter wirst du mehr, noch deiner ich. So lebe
wohl, sei glücklich, du, mein lieber Freund: Ich kann es niemals wer-
den, doch du kannst es noch; denn uns, den Toten, lächelt keine Freude
mehr.
Orestes antwortet, nachdem es ihm vorher nicht gelungen war, Pylades zu
überreden, in einer längeren Rede. Seine stark mit positivem und negativem
Imperativ ausgedrückte Forderung wird nicht abgemildert, da sie im Inter-
esse des Adressaten ist. Er soll sein Leben seinem Vater geben (also leben)
und nicht mit ihm zusammen sterben, was als variatio der Figur κατ’ ἆρσιν καὶ
θέσιν betrachtet werden kann und dem Gedanken Gewicht verleiht. Er führt
die Antithese zwischen Pylades (σοὶ μὲν) und ihm selbst (ἐμοὶ δ’ mit δή am
Ende64 verstärkt) in einer polysyndetischen Aufzählungmit wachsenden Glie-
dern, die mit der Metapher des Reichtums als Hafen endet (1076–1077 πόλις,
δῶμα πατρός, μέγας πλούτου λιμήν), fort. Nach dem Argument des Nutzens im
ersten Teil der Rede folgt dasjenige des Rechts (1078–1081). Da die von ihm ver-
sprochene Ehe mit Elektra nicht zustande kommt, rät er Pylades, eine andere
Gattin zu suchen (1080), und endet mit der Erklärung, dass zwischen ihnen
keinVerwandtschaftsverhältnis (κῆδος)mehr besteht und Pylades ihm gegenü-
ber keineVerpflichtungmehr hat, wobei die Partikel δή amEnde (1081wie 1076)
seineAussage verstärkt. Zuletzt verabschiedet er sichwieder, ist aber imGegen-
satz zuVers 1068, ausführlicher, wie das Enjambement zeigt, und liebvoller, wie
der Vokativὦ ποθεινὸν ὄμμ’65 ὁμιλίας ἐμῆς beweist. Dennoch bleibt er auch nach
64 Di Benedetto (1965: 214) weist auf die merkwürdige Schlussstellung von δή hin: „Qui il
δή in posizione di rilievo serve a dar maggior forza di convinzione alla contrapposi-
zione σοί-ἐμοί. Oreste vuolemostrarsi assolutamente convinto del suo rifiuto del sacrificio
dell’amico.“ Zum emphatischen δή vgl. Denniston (21954: 214–215).
65 Zum liebevollen Gebrauch von ὄμμα vgl. auch IT 905; IA 354; im Vokativ Alc. 1133 und Ion
1261; Soph. Aj. 977.
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demAbschiedsgruß66 (1083) bei der Trennung zwischen ihm und Elektra (ἡμῖν
wie schon 1065) auf der einen, und Pylades auf der anderen Seite, was durch
den emphatischen Gebrauch adversativer Partikeln (σοί γε μήν) unterstrichen
wird.
[18] Euripides Orestes 1085–1099
ἦ πολὺ λέλειψαι τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων.
μήθ’ αἷμά μου δέξαιτο κάρπιμον πέδον,
μὴ λαμπρὸς αἰθήρ, εἴ σ’ ἐγὼ προδούς ποτε
ἐλευθερώσας τοὐμὸν ἀπολίποιμι σέ.
καὶ συγκατέκτανον γάρ, οὐκ ἀρνήσομαι,
καὶ πάντ’ ἐβούλευσ’ ὧν σὺ νῦν τίνεις δίκας·
καὶ ξυνθανεῖν οὖν δεῖ με σοὶ καὶ τῆιδ’ ὁμοῦ·
ἐμὴν γὰρ αὐτήν, ἦς ⟨γε⟩ λέχος ἐπήινεσα,
κρίνω δάμαρτα. τί γὰρ ἐρῶ καλόν ποτε
γῆν Δελφίδ’ ἐλθών, Φωκέων ἀκρόπτολιν,
ὃς πρὶν μὲν ὑμᾶς δυστυχεῖν φίλος παρῆ,
νῦν δ’ οὐκέτ’ εἰμὶ δυστυχοῦντί σοι φίλος;
οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν κἀμοὶ μέλει·
ἐπεὶ δὲ κατθανούμεθ’, ἐς κοινοὺς λόγους
ἔλθωμεν, ὡς ἂν Μενέλεως συνδυστυχῆι.
Was meine Worte wollten, hast du nicht erkannt. Fruchtbares Erdreich
möge nie noch helle Luft mein Blut empfangen, wenn ich dich lasse, dich
verrate, Freund, auf meine Rettung nur bedacht! Ich habe mitgemordet,
ja, ich leugn’ es nicht, und allesmitberaten, was du büßenmusst: Somuss
ich auchmitsterben, wenn du stirbst und sie. Denn diese Jungfrau, deren
Hand du mir gelobt, ist meine Gattin. Welchen Vorwand sänn’ ich aus,
nach Delphi kommend auf die Burg von Phokis, wenn ich euer Freund
war, eh die Not euch heimgesucht, und jetzt in deinem Leide dich ver-
leugnete? Niemals! – Doch eines liegt am Herzen mir wie euch: Da wir
nun sterben sollen, lasst uns noch vereint beraten, wie Menelaos mit ver-
derben mag.
Erneut drückt Pylades seine Ablehnung analog zu seiner Erwiderung in der
ersten Rede (1069) aus. Emphatisch und feierlich stellt er mit der verstärkten
66 Di Benedetto (1965: 215): „La duplicità del significato di χαῖρε si prestava bene a una con-
siderazione che intensificava l’effetto patetico della rhesis di Oreste.“
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Schwurpartikel ἦ πολύ und dem schweren Homoioteleuton tadelnd fest, dass
Orest seine Pläne nicht versteht (1086–1088). Mit der agonistischen Metapher
des Zurückbleibens suggeriert er, verbunden mit einem Tadel, Orestes’ Rück-
stand in der Freundschaft. Seine Entschlossenheit unterstreicht er mit einer
doppelten Selbstverfluchung,67 einem kommissiven Sprechakt,68 und mit der
Anapher μήθ’ und μή (1086–1087), wobei die beiden antithetischen Partizipien
προδούς und ἐλευθερώσας das ἀπολίποιμι σέmit den Pronomina der 2. Person im
äußeren Ring chiastisch beschreiben (1087–1088); vonOrest übernimmt er den
Gegensatz zwischen beiden durch die Gegenüberstellung der Personalprono-
minaundgibt durchEnjambement seinerAussagemehrRaum. InAnaphermit
dreimaligem καὶ führt er (1089–1091) polysyndetisch die Begründung mit Hys-
teron proteron (συγκατέκτανον, πάντ’ ἐβούλευσ’) und steigernd in einer Klimax
an, was als positive Höflichkeitsstrategie, mit der die feierliche Selbstverflu-
chung abgemildert wird, gedeutet werden kann: Sie haben gemeinsam getötet
und müssen daher auch gemeinsam sterben (ξυνθανεῖν), wie er 1091 betont.
Die nur mit dem Pronomen τῆιδ’ erwähnte Elektra betrachtet er, was in die-
ser Situation ein Paradox ist, als seine Ehefrau (1093) und antwortet somit auf
Orestes’ zweites Argument (1078–1081) nach dem iustum. In einer rhetorischen
Fragemit τί γάρ69 lehnt er Orestes’ Argument des utile (1075–1077) ab, indem er
das honestum (καλόν) der heroischen Schamkultur und eng damit verbunden
die Freundschaft – zweimal bezeichnet er sich alsφίλος–alsArgument anführt,
das, da es in den Bereich des Ethos fällt, ihn gleichzeitig als Sprecher posi-
tiv charakterisiert. Die Ablehnung der Vorstellung, in der Not seine Freunde
zu verlassen, drückt er formal off record in einer rhetorischen Frage aus, die
durch die Alliteration auf Labiale (1095), die Antithese von πρὶν μὲν und νῦν
δ’ und dieWiederholung der Leitbegriffe φίλος und δυστυχεῖν bzw. δυστυχοῦντι
verstärkt wird. Bei der Gegenüberstellung von Personalpronomina der 1. und
2. Person Singular tritt jetzt die 2. Plural (1095 ὑμᾶς) an die Stelle der 2. Sin-
gular; Pylades betrachtet Orest und Elektra als Einheit. Die logische Folgerung
οὐκ ἔστιν (1097) schließt brachylogisch, aber emphatisch amAnfang des Verses
die Erwiderung auf Orestes’ Rede ab; anstelle der peroratio folgert Pylades, der
in den beiden letzten Versen durch die 1. Person Plural der Prädikate alle drei
67 Selbstverwünschungen als rhetorisches Mittel kommen schon in der archaischen Litera-
tur (etwa Hom. Od. 24.433–436) und auch Eur. Hipp. 1028–1031 oder Soph. OT 1427–1428
vor.
68 Mit einemkommissiven Sprechakt verpflichtet sich ein Sprecher auf dieAusführung einer
zukünftigen Handlung; dazu gehören Akte wie ‚versprechen‘, ‚geloben‘, ‚drohen‘ etc., vgl.
Meibauer (22001: 95).
69 Vgl. dazu Denniston (21954: 62–63).
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als Einheit auffasst, dass sie in der Gewissheit des Todes gemeinsam planen
sollen (1098 κοινοὺς λόγους; vgl. 1067 κοινῆι), damit Menelaos, den er mit iro-
nischem Unterton zum Teilhaber des Leids macht, mitleide (das sehr seltene
συνδυστυχῆι [1099] nimmt δυστυχεῖνund δυστυχοῦντί als zentrales Konzeptwie-
der auf).70
[19] Euripides Orestes 1100
ὦ φίλτατ’, εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο κατθάνοιμ’ ἰδών.
Ach, säh ich das geschehen, wenn ich sterbe, Freund!
Orestes’ freudige Antwort zeigt an, dass er sich von Pylades’ Rede hat überzeu-
gen lassen.Den liebevollenVokativφίλτατ’ hatteElektra (1045) gegenüberOrest
gebraucht. DerWunsch ist, wie derOptativ zeigt, für ihn als erfüllbar angenom-
men und dient dazu, indirekt seine Zustimmung auszudrücken.71 In der Folge
wird der Racheplan entworfen.
In der analysierten Passage setzen alle drei Sprecher rhetorische und argumen-
tative Mittel ein: Elektra, die ihre Gefühle vor allem in expressiven Sprechak-
ten äußert, gelingt es, Orestes’ schroffe Ablehnung der Kommunikation durch
eine Mischung von Klage und Trost zu überwinden und ihn zu überreden,
seine Gefühle zu zeigen. Mehr als durch eine die condicio humana betreffende
Gnome (1034) überwindet sie Orestes’ auf dem adligen Ehrencodex beruhen-
den Einwand durch den Einsatz von emotionaler Sprache, also Pathos, wie
die Klangfiguren zeigen, sowie durch positive Höflichkeitsstrategien und for-
male off recordness, Vokative, nichtverbale, körperliche Mittel (Tränen, Umar-
mung). Dagegen ist Pylades ‚rationaler‘ und argumentiert klar, ohne auf emo-
tionale rhetorische Mittel, die seinen Argumenten Emphase verleihen, zu ver-
zichten (er verwendet zugleich Ethos und Pathos). Er setzt Abmilderungen
oder Höflichkeitsstrategien vor allem in der langen Rede ein, tadelt sonst aber
Orest explizit, indem er sich auf den Wert der Freundschaft beruft; auch in
diesen Fällen bedroht also die Direktheit das Selbstbild des Adressaten nicht,
70 Schwinge (1968: 76) meint, dass erst Pylades’ Vorschlag am Ende der ῥῆσιςOrestes überre-
det und den Umschwung erreicht; dies ist aber nur deshalb möglich, weil Pylades in der
vorangehenden Auseinandersetzung durch die Betonung der Freundschaft als wichtigs-
temmovens das Feld vorbereitet hatte.
71 Denniston (21954: 92) weist darauf hin, dass solcheWünsche im Drama vor allem in Ant-
worten vorkommen.
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weil die Akte zugunsten des Adressaten geäußert werden. Hat Orestes ver-
sucht, Pylades’ Opfer mit den Argumenten der Angemessenheit, des Nutzens
und des Rechts abzuwenden, rechtfertigt jener seine Opposition am stärks-
ten mit dem Argument der Freundschaft. Er geht dabei sehr genau auf Ores-
tes’ Punkte ein und benutzt bei der Widerlegung in der Stichomythie sogar
dessen Formulierungen, kommt aber zu entgegengesetzten Schlüssen. Sowohl
bei Elektra als auch Pylades erkennt Orestes, der sich vor allem in direktiven
Sprechakten an seine Gesprächspartner gewendet hat, ihre guten Absichten,
weshalb er sich jeweils am Ende der beiden untersuchten verbalen Interaktio-
nenmit sehr affektivenVokativen an beidewendet. Elektra und Pylades gelingt
es auf unterschiedlicheWeise, Orestes’ Wunsch nach Isolation und seine Resi-
gnation zu überwinden und alle drei zu einer Einheit zusammenzuschwei-
ßen.
4 Fazit
Die Untersuchung der rhetorischen Gestaltung und der argumentativen Mit-
tel, die im Dialog und in den ῥήσεις vorkommen und die keinesfalls nur dem
ornatus oder der Ergötzung der extrafiktionalen Rezipienten dienen, sondern
wichtige Instrumente sind, um die Bedeutung der geäußerten Gedanken und
die emotionale Betroffenheit der Sprecher, die dadurch auch charakterisiert
werden, zu verdeutlichen und zu verstärken, ist inVerbindungmit einem funk-
tionalen Ansatz wie der Pragmatik für das Verständnis der verbalen Interak-
tionen von großem Nutzen. Die Pragmatik allein reicht, wie die Analyse eini-
ger Passagen des Orestes gezeigt hat, angesichts der Konventionen der tragi-
schen Kunstsprache, die mit der Umgangssprache zwar kommensurabel ist,
aber ein eigenes stilistisches Register aufweist, dazu nicht aus, da durch die
rhetorische Ausgestaltung emotionale Färbungen und gedankliche Nuancen
ausgedrückt werden können, die in der alltäglichen Sprache mit anderen ver-
balen (und nicht-verbalen) Mitteln verwirklicht werden.72 Gerade die vielen
Klang-, Wort und Gedankenfiguren, die man in einer solchen Häufung in der
alltäglichen Konversation vermisst, spielen, wie gezeigt, in der Kommunika-
tion auf der Bühne eine wichtige Rolle und tragen als Indikatoren emotionaler
Betroffenheit der Figuren zusammen mit der Verwendung weiterer rhetori-
72 Schon Elam (1983: 66) hat anhand von Beispielen aus Dramen gezeigt, dass bei der Inter-
pretation eines Stücks, dessen Sprache nicht unmittelbar mit der alltäglichen Konver-
sation kommensurabel ist, die von der Pragmatik gelieferten Kategorien durch weitere
analytische Mittel wie die Rhetorik oder die Stilistik ergänzt werden müssen.
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scher Stilmittel in entscheidendemMaß zumVerständnis der Passage bei. Aus
diesemGrunddarf man, anders als Sperber undWilsonmeinten, geradebei der
Analyse einer literarischen Gattung wie der Tragödie nicht auf den wertvollen
Beitrag der Rhetorik verzichten.
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All terms listed in the index not only refer to the givenword, but also cover nouns, adjectives, and
verbs derived from the same root when relating to the same notion (e.g. ‘deceit’ also includes
‘deception’, ‘deceptive’, ‘deceitful’, ‘deceive’). In addition, a German translation is recorded of
those terms that occur in a paper composed in German (e.g. ‘adjacency pair’ / ‘Paarsequenz’).
address / Anrede 7, 70–75, 77–92, 168, 172,
175, 213, 218, 243, 247, 249–250, 329,
347–348
see also vocative
adjacency pair / Paarsequenz 7, 70n1, 78,
90, 107, 161, 163, 283, 289, 322n16, 455
expansion (of an adjacency pair) /
Sequenzerweiterung 107–112, 151,
201, 216–217, 219
see also insertion sequence, pre-sequence
advice / Rat(schlag) 3, 10, 77, 82, 164–165,
223, 240–241, 246–247, 250, 259, 264–
288, 328–329, 335n63, 435, 464
Agamemnon 36, 64, 160, 162–163, 165–170,
172–174, 176, 193, 323, 330, 359, 423
age 74–75, 80, 84, 92
Ajax 8, 25–30, 32, 39, 53n18, 55, 65–66, 104,
106, 122, 124, 126–136
alliteration see under figure of speech
ambiguity (in communication) / Zweideu-
tigkeit 38, 136, 155, 162n4, 188, 202,
279n22, 327n42, 333, 383, 395–396, 399,
410
anaphora processing 20–21
Andromache 404–408, 410–413, 418, 423–
436
aposiopesis see under figure of speech
assertive (speech act) see under speech act
Athena 8, 26, 29, 123, 125–136, 259
Atreus 435–440
audience involvement 123, 136
αὐτός 7, 19–20, 23–24, 27–29, 31–39, 61, 135,
328
body / Körper 11, 24, 29–36, 39, 175, 177,
339–340, 344, 347, 350–351, 356, 359–
360, 365, 373, 403n2, 426n20, 458,
467
body language 344, 365, 382n1
see also gesture, non-verbal (communica-
tion)
break (in contact) 320, 323–324, 327, 329–
331, 333, 335
Cassandra 36–37, 225, 320–324, 326–327,
336, 405n6
centre vs. periphery 24, 28, 33–34, 37
characterisation (of dramatic characters) /
Charakterisierung 7–9, 84, 91, 96–97,
100, 106, 111, 116, 141n5, 146, 160–161, 164,
168, 172, 192–193, 197n50, 208, 214, 220,
225, 237n3, 295–296, 451–452, 466, 468
chiasmus see under figure of speech
clarity (of communication) / Klarheit 145,
153–154, 157–158, 170, 209
Clytaemestra / Klytaimestra 8, 64, 161–169,
172–174, 176–181, 320–324, 326–328,
330, 351, 359
commissive (speech act) see under speech
act
common ground 4, 7, 43–63, 67, 121n3, 220,
260n48, 278–279, 282, 311
conversational maxim / Konversations-
maxime 98–99, 114, 280, 448
see also cooperative principle
conversation analysis (CA) / Gesprächsana-
lyse 5, 7–8, 70, 72–73, 77–79, 82, 85–
86, 88, 91–92, 107–109, 140, 160, 163,
187, 190, 201, 265n2, 283, 322, 324, 452,
455n45
cooperative principle / Kooperationsprinzip
188, 189, 448
see also conversational maxim
courtesan 10, 247, 250, 284n26, 291, 295,
303–311, 366, 368, 370, 373–374, 378
deceit / Trug 12, 54, 88, 96, 160, 162, 165, 167,
272n13, 374, 398, 406–410, 413–414, 421–
425, 429, 431, 435, 437, 440–441
see also fraus, simulatio
declarative (speech act) see under speech
act
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deixis / Deixis 7, 19–20, 22, 24, 29, 31–32,
36–37, 39, 52, 68, 99, 342, 348–350, 355,
367n7
δή 7, 43, 47–63, 67, 244n13, 464
see also particle
Dionysus / Dionysos 8, 58, 67, 140, 142–143,
148, 156–158, 215n8, 257, 259
directive (speech act) see under speech act
distance (D) see under politeness
(ἐ)κεῖνος 7, 19–20, 23–31, 38–39
Electra / Elektra 31n22, 37–38, 61, 96,
168n26, 345, 349–359, 452–461, 463–
468
enjambement see under figure of speech
expansion (of an adjacency pair) see under
adjacency pair
expressive (speech act) see under speech
act
face (in im/politeness theory) / Gesicht,
Selbstbild 9–10, 165, 188, 193, 196, 198–
200, 202–203, 205, 208–209, 214–215,
221–222, 224, 230, 272n14, 274, 276–279,
281, 284, 286–287, 294–295, 300n32,
302, 310, 312n59, 455n44, 460, 467
see also im/politeness
face threatening act (FTA) / gesichtsbedro-
hend 8–10, 70n1, 74, 83–84, 89, 165–167,
174n44, 200–201, 203, 205n68, 208–
209, 214–218, 220–221, 223, 264n1, 273–
275, 277, 281n25, 285, 287–288, 461n58
see also indirect (language, speech act),
mitigation, softener
failure (of persuasion, tricks) 11, 319, 326–
327, 329–331, 334–335, 407, 413, 425,
429, 435
fides 417, 424–425, 430–431, 436–438, 441
figure of speech / rhetorische Figur 447–
448, 451
see also irony, rhetoric
alliteration / Alliteration 454–456, 458–
460, 463, 466
aposiopesis / Aposiopese 6, 199, 319n4,
338n4, 347, 358, 449
chiasmus / Chiasmus 155, 175n45, 411,
466
enjambement / Enjambement 453–454,
456, 459–460, 464, 466
hysteron proteron / Hysteron proteron
453, 460, 466
litotes / Litotes 448–449
metaphor / Metapher 29, 30n18, 34–
35, 99, 205, 293n11, 358, 448, 453n29,
456–457, 460, 464, 466
synaesthesia 416
fraus 12, 406, 421–427, 429–430, 432–434,
436–441
see also deceit, simulatio
gesture / Geste, Gebärde 2–5, 11–12, 169, 175,
330n52, 338–361, 364–368, 370–378,
382–384, 386–389, 394–399, 403–418,
426n20, 432
see also body: body language, non-verbal
(communication)
cultural value of gestures 12, 339n7, 384,
388–389, 391, 396, 399, 412n21
gift 226, 228–229, 309, 311, 432–433, 435,
439
greeting / Gruß 12, 83, 107, 161n3, 167–169,
171–172, 178–180, 222–223, 226, 275, 300,
349n34, 367n6, 383, 388, 393–394, 408,
461, 465
Gricean maxim see conversational
maxim
Hippolytus 33–36, 323–324, 330–331, 408–
409, 413–414
hysteron proteron see under figure of
speech
illocution / Illokution 57n23, 176–178, 241,
266, 268, 270, 273, 280–281, 288, 322–
323, 326, 328, 331–335, 338, 359, 448
see also speech act
illocutionary act / illokutionärer Akt
321–322, 340n12, 355, 427, 439, 449
illocutionary force / illokutionäre Kraft
21, 23, 37, 39, 91, 163n8, 167, 175, 215, 242,
267n6, 272, 280, 324, 448
imperative / Imperativ 57, 77, 91, 143, 147,
157, 164, 167n19, 178–179, 224, 235,
237, 239–246, 250–252, 254–255, 257,
259–260, 277, 282, 285, 321–322, 348,
351–352, 355–356, 386n11, 427, 456–457,
459n52, 461, 464
see also speech act: directive
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im/politeness 5–6, 8–9, 87, 92, 187, 198, 252,
264, 277, 282, 292
see also face, mitigation, softener
impoliteness 4, 90, 73n10, 187–188, 190–
191, 199n57, 202, 213, 221, 223–226, 230,
256–257, 291–292, 294, 298n30, 301,
303n40
politeness see politeness
indirect (language, speech act) / indirekt
(Sprache, Sprechakt) 91, 135, 151–152,
165–166, 200, 203, 205, 218, 271, 323n21,
454, 455n44, 457–459, 467
see also face threatening act, politeness:
off-record (strategy), speech act
insertion sequence / Einschubsequenz
163
see also adjacency pair: expansion (of an
adjacency pair)
Iphigenia / Iphigenie 8, 160–162, 164–
165, 167, 169–181, 323, 330–331,
460n56
irony / Ironie 50, 90n32, 97n3, 148, 152n45,
188, 200, 209, 221n24, 226, 231, 256n35,
259n43, 448, 454n39, 467
Jocasta 103n28, 110n38, 191, 199, 347, 414–
415, 417
kinesics see under non-verbal (communic-
ation)
kiss see under non-verbal (communication)
language use see use of language
left periphery (LP) 70–74, 78–88, 91–92
litotes see under figure of speech
locution 213, 215, 322–323, 331, 334–335,
340, 428–429, 431
see also speech act
manipulation / Manipulation 5, 192–193,
196, 214, 217, 291–295, 300, 310, 312, 425,
429, 431, 434, 439, 441, 448
meretrix see courtesan
metadirective (expression) see under
speech act
metaphor see under figure of speech
metapragmatic (comment) 217, 220, 293–
294, 300, 305
mind style 7, 96–99, 101, 107, 114n45
misunderstanding / Missverständnis 8, 109,
142, 152, 218, 276n19, 394, 396
see also problem of communication
mitigation / Abmilderung 9, 163n8, 165, 167,
178–179, 200–201, 215, 221n23, 223–224,
239, 243–244, 272n14, 278–279, 281–
282, 285–287, 449, 454–459, 461, 464,
466–467
see also face: face threatening act,
im/politeness, softener
multiperspectivity 137n34
non-response 323–324, 326, 329–330, 334–
335
see also non-verbal (communication):
silence
non-verbal (communication) / nicht-verbal,
nonverbal (Kommunikation) 1, 6, 11,
165n16, 169, 174–175, 179, 366, 382–383,
425–426, 431–433, 435, 439, 441, 460,
468
see also body: body language, gesture
kinesics 339, 426, 432, 435, 439
kiss / Kuss 12, 175, 309, 382–384, 386–
399, 410–412
proxemics 339n7, 386–387, 426, 432, 435
silence / Schweigen 11, 144, 151, 178, 180,
190, 194n37, 319–327, 329–331, 333–336,
356, 409, 432, 449, 454–455
see also non-response
tears / Tränen 12, 173, 177–178, 180, 375–
378, 383, 396n28, 403–412, 426n20, 432,
460n56, 467
vultus 403, 405, 407, 412–414, 416–418
Odysseus, Ulysses 8, 23, 25–27, 31n22, 37,
84, 104, 106, 123, 125–137, 333, 334n62,
406–408, 411, 413, 423, 426–435
Oedipus 8, 9, 30, 96–97, 99–116, 137, 187–
188, 190–209, 323, 327–329, 347, 414–
416
off-record (strategy) see under politeness
on-record (strategy) see under politeness
Orestes / Orest 31, 36–38, 104, 106, 164, 176,
179, 248, 259n43, 331n53, 345, 349–359,
452–468
osculum see non-verbal (communication):
kiss
over-politeness see under politeness
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parasite 10, 267, 291, 295–296, 298–302,
310–312, 370
particle / Partikel 7, 23, 47–51, 56–58, 61–64,
66–67, 72, 122n4, 130–131, 142, 147, 149–
150, 154, 156, 244n13, 248, 452n26, 457,
463–466
see also δή, τοι
Pentheus 8, 58, 65, 67, 140–158
perlocution / Perlokution 76–77, 173, 175,
292, 312, 322, 324, 327n42, 330, 340n12,
427, 429, 432, 436, 441, 448
see also speech act
Phaedra 323n19, 330, 407–410, 413–414
Philoctetes 103–104, 106, 331–335
politeness / Höflichkeit 6, 9, 10, 71n3,
73n10, 75n16, 92, 160, 165–166, 174n44,
187–190, 193, 195, 197–199, 203–205,
209, 213–226, 230–231, 234–243, 247,
249–261, 264, 273–274, 278–279, 281–
289, 291–295, 299, 301–303, 311–313,
386n11, 449, 452, 454–456, 458, 461,
467
see also face, im/politeness, mitigation,
softener
distance (D) 10, 74, 90, 217n13, 218, 221,
247, 274, 288, 295, 307, 311
negative politeness / negative Höflich-
keit 180n54, 188n6, 200–201, 214,
219–221, 225, 246–249, 251–255, 260–
261, 271, 278–279, 282, 284, 294, 302,
457–458
off-record (strategy) 165–166, 188,
199–200, 202, 205, 249n23, 279–280,
282–283, 288, 455n44, 460, 462, 466,
467
see also indirect (language, speech act)
on-record (strategy) 74, 83, 85, 87–88,
188, 200, 202, 224, 277, 281–283, 285–
286, 288, 461
over-politeness 6, 10, 214n5, 217–218,
230, 291, 294, 303, 310, 312–313
positive politeness / positive Höflich-
keit 188n6, 200–202, 204, 214–216,
220–222, 225, 246–254, 260–261, 278–
279, 281–282, 284–285, 291n3, 294, 296,
302, 306, 310–311, 454–458, 461, 466–
467
power (P) 10, 197–198, 217–218, 221–224,
230, 243, 264, 274, 277, 288
pragmalinguistic vs. sociopragmatic
politeness 221
ranking of imposition (R) 217n13, 218,
274, 288
possible-world theory see theory of pos-
sible worlds
power (P) see under politeness
pragmatics of communication 1n1, 11, 364,
378, 382, 384n5, 396n27, 399
pre-sequence / Präsequenz 163n7
see also adjacency pair: expansion (of an
adjacency pair)
problem of communication / Kommunika-
tionsproblem, -schwierigkeit 140–141
see alsomisunderstanding




ranking of imposition (R) see under polite-
ness
relevance theory (RT) / Relevanztheorie 5,
99n13, 113–115, 447
repair 85, 89, 92, 108, 109
resonance (in the theory of dialogic syntax)
8, 121–123, 130n21
revenge / Rache 127, 135, 432–433, 436, 439–
440, 467
rhetoric / Rhetorik 3, 6, 12, 63, 96, 110n38,
129, 173, 177, 227n41, 280–282, 284, 319,
328, 330, 338, 347, 382n1, 384n5, 434,
447–452, 455, 460, 462, 466–469
see also figure of speech
right periphery (RP) 7, 70–74, 78–92
silence see under non-verbal (communica-
tion)
simulatio 374, 422, 425, 429, 439, 441
see also deceit, fraus
softener 10, 237, 239, 244, 246, 248, 250–255,
260–261, 302
see also face: face threatening act, imper-
ative, im/politeness, mitigation
speech act / Sprechakt 2, 7–8, 10–11, 43,
46, 48, 50, 57, 63, 73–77, 81–83, 85–86,
88, 91, 144, 160, 163–167, 169, 171–173,
175–179, 239, 241–242, 257–258, 264–
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269, 272–274, 277, 282, 288, 292, 300,
321–322, 324, 330, 333, 335, 338–342,
344, 347–350, 355, 359–360, 364–367,
448–449, 452, 454, 457, 459–460, 462,
466–468
see also illocution, indirect (language,
speech act), locution, perlocution
advisory act see advice
assertive / assertiv 76–77, 163, 172n35,
266–267, 282, 288
commissive / kommissiv 76–77, 165n13,
177, 466
declarative 75n16, 81
directive / direktiv 10, 57, 76–77, 81–
83, 86, 164–165, 173, 175, 177–179, 215,
224, 236–241, 244–246, 250, 256, 258,
264–268, 270, 273–274, 277, 279–280,
284–288, 386, 454, 457, 468
expressive / expressiv 76, 167, 171–172,
175, 177, 179n53, 453–454, 457, 459–460,
467
metadirective (expression) 77, 81, 326
statistics 101, 105, 237, 244, 245–246, 250–
253, 281, 308
supplication / Flehen 164–165, 167n21, 174–
176, 202, 217, 219, 243, 342, 344, 351,
403n1
synaesthesia see under figure of speech
tears see under non-verbal (communica-
tion)
term of address (TAd) see address
theory of mind (ToM) 4, 9, 11, 187, 189–190,
193, 196–198, 207, 209, 327–329, 335
theory of possible worlds 9, 187, 189–190,
193
Thyestes 435–440
Tiresias / Teiresias 9, 102–103, 105, 109–110,
114–115, 148, 157n59, 187–188, 190–209
τοι 7, 43, 47, 48, 62–67
see also particle
topicalisation 109
turn / Redebeitrag 5–8, 10, 66, 71–73, 77–79,
85–86, 88, 92, 103, 107, 109, 111, 121, 123,
125, 135, 142, 147–148, 162–167, 169–170,
178–180, 265, 267, 273, 279–281, 283–
287, 289, 322–326, 329–330, 335, 386,
451, 454, 456–460, 463
turn-taking / Sprecherwechsel 71n3, 78,
142, 144, 149
use of language / Sprachgebrauch 11, 19, 38,
46, 98–99, 116, 121n3, 140, 142, 145, 147,
149–151, 155, 157–158, 234, 251, 281n25,
345
verbal formula mismatch 223, 226
see also face: face threatening act,
im/politeness: impoliteness
vocative / Vokativ 30n19, 32n24, 70–72, 75,
79, 82n22, 85n23–24, 91, 168n26, 172,
180, 215n7, 225, 242–244, 247, 249–250,
253–255, 261, 292n10, 304, 311, 427–429,
454–457, 459n54, 461, 464, 467–468
see also address
vultus see under non-verbal (communica-
tion)
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Scholia (see also Donatus, Eugraphius)
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